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DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: THE NEED FOR CHANGE

STAFF REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

OCTOBER 16, 1985

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

OCTOBER 16, 1985.

Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR GOLDWATER AND SENATOR NUNN: During June 1983, Senator John Tower and the late Senator Scoop Jackson, then the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, directed the staff of the Committee on Armed Services to prepare a comprehensive study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. After an initial period of hearings, interviews, and research, a more vigorous study effort was initiated under your direction in January 1985. Additional guidance has been provided by the Task Force on Defense Organization which was formed in May 1985. The staff study, entitled *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, has now been completed and is respectfully submitted for the Committee's consideration.

In response to the broad tasking given the staff, the study addresses a wide range of issues affecting the performance of the Department of Defense. The Department's four major organizational elements are analyzed: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the Military Departments. Two key decision-making and management procedures of the Department of Defense—the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the acquisition process—are examined. By reason of its impact on the performance of the Department of Defense, congressional review and oversight of defense policies and programs are also addressed. Lastly, the study examines the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military.

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated:

> . . . in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the Nation.

The staff study concurs with Secretary Schlesinger's statement. The performance of the Department of Defense has been seriously hampered by major structural deficiencies.

While the staff study is critical of the current organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense (and of the Congress), it would be incorrect and unfair to place responsibility for these problems on present or past Administrations or on current or former civilian or military officials of the Department of Defense. Most of the deficiencies identified in this study have been evident for much of this Century. Moreover, these long-term problems have confounded some of the most thoughtful, decisive, and experienced officials who have sought to solve them during the last 85 years. As the Department of Defense is the largest and most complex organization in the Free World, it is understandable that effective solutions have been difficult to develop and implement. However, the greater demands on the Department of Defense that have evolved over the last 30 years have increased the seriousness of structural deficiencies.

As is the nature of organizational studies, the focus of this study is on deficiencies in the performance of the Department of Defense and the Congress. Obviously, these two organizations perform many tasks well. The absence of discussion of these areas does not mean that they have gone unnoticed. In some activities, the Department of Defense has achieved a level of efficiency unmatched elsewhere in the Federal Government. Moreover, the trends in the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense are moving in the right direction. Numerous improvements have been implemented, particularly in the last two years. However, much remains to be done, especially in light of the more severe fiscal constraints currently anticipated for the immediate future.

The purpose of this study is to strengthen the Department of Defense. The capabilities of U.S. military forces have been improved over the last five years. In many respects, American forces are better manned, equipped, and led than has been the case for a long time. The full potential of this revitalization cannot, however, be realized under current structural deficiencies. The study does not suggest that this revitalization of American military capabilities should be slowed or that defense spending reductions should be made. On the contrary, substantial force improvements will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future. The study does, however, see the need for a parallel revitalization of antiquated organizational arrangements.

While the staff study contains 91 specific recommendations, it is likely that only a small portion of these recommendations would be appropriately implemented through legislation. The vast majority of the proposed changes can and should be made under the existing authorities of the President and Secretary of Defense. The staff study examined a broad range of problems—including many for which legislative remedies are not feasible or appropriate—so that the Committee might have a comprehensive context in which to formulate legislation.

The conclusions and recommendations of this study represent a consensus of the participating Committee staff members. Not all staff members agree, however, with each conclusion and recommendation. In this regard, the study was the result of an extraordinary effort by a small group of Committee staff members, most of whom were concurrently responsible for their normal staff assignments. In fact, the study would not have been possible without the enormous contributions of two individuals: Rick Finn and Barbara Brown. The quality of this study is due, in large part, to Rick's thorough research and analysis and writing skills. Beyond his substantive contributions, Rick edited the entire study. Barbara typed nearly the entire manuscript through its many drafts—an enormous undertaking. Moreover, she handled much of the administration of this massive effort. Barbara simultaneously performed these two demanding tasks with great skill, patience, and dedication. The important contributions of Jeff Smith, Alan Yuspeh, Pat Tucker, John Hamre, and Colleen Getz also need to be recognized. Each of these individuals played a key part in preparing the study. Finally, another staff member—Carl Smith—and two former staff members—Bruce Porter and Jim Smith—also deserve recognition. While they were not involved in the final stages of the study, their early contributions were significant.

This staff study represents only a starting point for inquiry by the Committee on Armed Services. Many of the issues and proposals will need to be examined in more detail, especially by the most experienced and thoughtful experts available. The issues addressed in this study are critical to national security. Hopefully, the staff study will assist the Committee in its consideration of these important matters.

Respectfully,

James R. Locher III,
Professional Staff Member
and Study Director.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. INTRODUCTION

This study, as its title —*Defense Organization: The Need for Change*—indicates, is critical of the current organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense (DoD) and of the Congress. The underlying problems within DoD have been evident for much of this Century. The inability to solve these problems is not due to a lack of attention or a failure to have the issues examined by the most experienced and learned experts. At regular intervals during the last 85 years, these issues have been vigorously addressed by highly capable and well-intentioned individuals, both from the public and private sectors as well as from civilian and military life. It is the complexity of the Department of Defense — the largest organization in the Free World —that has served to frustrate previous efforts. Adding to the difficulty of these issues are the quickening pace of the technological revolution, the increasing and changing demands of protecting U.S. security interests in a dynamic international environment, and the resistance to needed changes by a substantial portion of the defense bureaucracy. While the problems in congressional review and oversight of the defense program have emerged more recently, their resolution has not been possible despite serious study and concern by Members of Congress.

Twenty-seven years have passed since major statutory changes were last made in DoD organizational arrangements. During that period, substantial experience has been gained with the basic structure provided by the National Security Act of 1947. There is a record —which is not always clear —of what has worked and what has failed. George Washington's statement at the time of the creation of the War Office in 1776 would be equally appropriate to the Department of Defense when it was created in 1949:

> The Benefits derived from it [the War Office], I flatter myself will be considerable tho' the plan upon which it is first formed may not be perfect. This like other great works in its first Edition, may not be entirely free from Error. Time will discover its Defects and experience suggest the Remedy, and such further Improvements as may be necessary; but it was right to give it a Beginning.

Moreover, the passage of time may permit more objective consideration of issues that flared into emotional controversies during the unification debates of the immediate post-World War II period. These two factors —actual organizational experience and a measured detachment from previous controversies —enhance prospects for the emergence of a consensus on solutions to the long-standing problems of the U.S. military establishment.

Hopefully, this is the case. The Department of Defense's task of protecting U.S. worldwide interests has become exceedingly more complex and demanding over the last 30 years. This trend has increased the seriousness of structural deficiencies within the U.S. military establishment. The gap between today's structural arrangements and the organizational needs of the Department of Defense is continuously widening.

B. PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONAL GOAL OF DOD

The principal organizational goal of DoD, both in 1949 and now, is the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions. In this study, this goal is termed "mission integration". Mission integration is necessary at both of the distinct organizational levels of DoD: the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations, and the operational level, consisting of the unified and specified commands. Effective mission integration is critical to U.S. national security because none of the major missions of DoD can be executed alone by forces of any single Service. Without effective mission integration, unification of the four Services —as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 —means little.

In fact, while previous debates on DoD organization have focused on unification or centralization, neither of these concepts is a useful starting point for identifying the organizational needs of DoD. Instead, mission integration describes the real goal of the search for a more effective and, perhaps, a more efficient U.S. military establishment. Focusing on mission integration offers greater prospects for understanding DoD's deficiencies.

At the present time, DoD has six major missions, three of which are worldwide in nature and three of which are regional. The major worldwide missions and their goals are:

nuclear deterrence—maintaining essential equivalence with the strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union;

maritime superiority —controlling the seas when and where needed; and

power projection superiority—deploying superior military forces in times of crisis to distant world areas which are primarily outside the traditional system of Western alliances.

The major regional missions are:

defense of NATO Europe, including both the northern and southern flanks;

defense of East Asia, particularly Northeast Asia; and

defense of Southwest Asia, especially the region's oil resources.

While DoD has other regional missions (e.g., Western Hemisphere and Africa), these relatively smaller, while important, missions are included in the mission of power projection superiority.

C. PROBLEMS AND BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Limited Mission Integration at DoD's Policymaking Level

The three principal organizations of the Washington Headquarters of DoD —the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Military Departments —are focused excessively on functional areas, such as manpower, research and development, and installations and logistics. This functional structure serves to inhibit integration of Service capabilities along mission lines, and, thereby, hinders achieving DoD's principal organizational goal of mission integration. The focus of organizational activity is on functional efficiency (or, in other terms, management control of functional activities) and not on major missions and their objectives and strategy. Without extensive mission integration efforts, numerous deficiencies occur:

In colloquial terms, material inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized.

A sharp focus on missions, where DoD must compete with potential adversaries, is lost in the functional diffusion.

Strategic planning is inhibited by the absence of an organizational focus on major missions and strategic goals.

Service interests rather than strategic needs play the dominant role in shaping program decisions.

Functions (e.g., airlift, sealift, close air support) which are not central to a Service's own definition of its missions tend to be neglected.

Tradeoffs between programs of different Services that can both contribute to a particular mission are seldom made.

Opportunities for non-traditional contributions to missions (e.g., Air Force contributions to sea control) are neither easily identified nor pursued.

Headquarters organizations are not fully attuned to the operational, especially readiness, requirements of the unified commanders.

Interoperability and coordination requirements of forces from the separate Services are not readily identified.

Beyond these major shortcomings, the functional structure encourages OSD micro-management of Service programs.

A more appropriate balance between functional and mission orientations is needed, especially within OSD. In the absence of an organizational focus on missions within the Washington Headquarters of DoD, effective mission integration will remain limited. For a major mission like defense of Southwest Asia —for which all four Services have important roles —insufficient mission integration at the policymaking level would lead to critical gaps in warfighting capabilities, wasted resources through unwarranted duplication, interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint training, and ineffective fighting forces.

2. Imbalance Between Service and Joint Interests

Under current arrangements, the Military Departments and Services exercise power and influence which are completely out of proportion to their statutorily assigned duties. The predominance of

Service perspectives in DoD decision-making results from three basic problems: (1) OSD is not organized to effectively integrate Service capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill the major missions of DoD; (2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system is dominated by the Services which retain an effective veto over nearly every JCS action; and (3) the unified commands are also dominated by the Services primarily through the strength and independence of the Service component commanders and constraints placed upon the power and influence of the unified commanders. In sum, the problem of undue Service influence arises principally from the weaknesses of organizations that are responsible for joint military preparation and planning.

This overwhelming influence of the Military Departments and Services works at cross-purposes to efforts to integrate the U.S. military establishment along mission lines. This is not the fault of the Military Departments. They have correctly pursued their interests vigorously through capable and tenacious headquarters staffs. What is missing is the organizational structure and supporting mechanisms that would provide an equally vigorous and capable integration effort along mission lines —to balance the influence of the Services on basic issues of strategy, policy, and resource allocation. Correcting the imbalance between Service and joint interests will require the strengthening of the authority, stature, and support of joint organizations, primarily the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or its succeeding organization) and the unified commands.

While these realignments are critically needed, they will not, by themselves, be sufficient to correct the imbalance between Service and joint interests. The problem is more deep-seated; it involves the basic attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps. As long as the vast majority of military officers at all levels gives highest priority to the interests of their Service or branch while losing sight of broader and more important national security needs —and believes that their behavior is correct —the predominance of Service influence will remain a problem. Whatever changes are made at the top of the DoD organization, powerful resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their Services. This dimension of the problem will require changes in the system of military education, training, and assignments to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements, a genuine multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of other Services.

3. Imbalance Between Modernization and Readiness

The imbalance between Service and joint interests is a major cause of the imbalance between modernization and readiness in the defense program. Overemphasis on future needs deprives operating forces of capabilities needed to respond to today's or tomorrow's crisis. Current warfighting capabilities are robbed to pay for hardware in the distant future. For the most part, the Washington Headquarters of the Services are focused on future requirements and the modernization of their equipment. The constituency for readiness is the operational commands which are among the joint organizations whose interests are under-represented in senior decision-making councils. Correcting this modernization-readiness imbalance will require a strengthening of the representation of the operational commanders, especially the unified commanders, in the resource allocation process.

4. Inter-Service Logrolling

While strong criticism of destructive and disruptive inter-Service rivalry is frequently voiced, DoD suffers more from inter-Service logrolling. The intensity of the postwar rivalry among the Services was so great that its continued existence has been assumed. It is true that inter-Service secretiveness, duplication, lack of understanding, and inconsistencies continue to exist. These are found at lower levels of organizational activity where they continue to undermine coordination and cooperation. However, over the last 20 years, the Services have logrolled on the central issues of concern to them in order to provide a united front to the Secretary of Defense and other senior civilian authorities. The natural consequence of this logrolling has been a heightening of civil-military disagreement, an isolation of OSD, a loss of information critical to effective decision-making, and, most importantly, a political weakening of the Secretary of Defense. The overall result of inter-Service logrolling has been a highly undesirable lessening of civilian control of the military. Actions to correct this problem will need to ensure that senior civilian authorities are informed of all legitimate alternatives.

The current system in many regards represents the worst of many possibilities. On critical issues, the Services logroll and deny the opportunity for effective decision-making. On lesser issues, the Services remain determined rivals and preclude the degree of cooperation and coordination necessary to provide efficient and integrated fighting teams.

5. Inadequate Joint Advice

The JCS system has not been capable of adequately fulfilling its responsibility to provide useful and timely unified military advice. The institutional views of the JCS often take too long to prepare; are not in the concise form required by extremely busy senior officials; and, most importantly, do not offer clear, meaningful recommendations on issues affecting more than one Service. As General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired), a former JCS Chairman, has stated:

> ...the corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful or very influential.

Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger concurs in his evaluation of formal JCS advice:

> ...The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded.

Symptoms of inadequate joint advice are found in many activities within DoD, including strategic planning, programming, operational planning, force employment, roles and missions of the Services, revision of the Unified Command Plan, organization of the unified commands, and development of joint doctrine. The JCS are viewed as the key military advisors on a substantial range of important strategy, resource, operational, and organizational issues.

Shortcomings in their ability to meaningfully address these issues have had a serious impact on the ability of DoD to prepare for and to conduct military operations in times of crisis. Moreover, the JCS have failed to provide adequate staff support to the Secretary of Defense in his mission integrator and chain of command roles. As a result, the Secretary has been forced to rely on civilians, whether they are qualified or not, for advice on issues for which independent military recommendations would have been preferred.

The dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs —often referred to as "dual-hatting" —to their individual Services and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary cause of the deficiencies of the JCS system. "Dual-hatting" poses an inherent conflict of interest for the Service Chiefs. They have one job that requires them to be effective advocates for their own Service. Their second job as JCS members requires them to subordinate Service interests to broader considerations. The Service Chiefs have been unable to balance these two conflicting demands; they have normally been unable to subordinate the interests of their parent Services to the larger interests of national defense. Therefore, "dual-hatting" yields weak JCS advice that simply reflects whatever level of compromise is necessary to achieve the four Services' unanimous agreement. "Dual-hatting" also overburdens the Service Chiefs by requiring them to shoulder more responsibilities than one person can handle. Simply performing all the duties entailed in leading a military Service is enough to fully consume the time and energy of a single individual.

6. Failure to Adequately Implement the Concept of Unified Command

The concept of unified command, as formulated in the immediate postwar period and articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been adequately implemented. At that time, President Eisenhower stated:

> Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command....Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency.

Despite President Eisenhower's efforts, the authority of the unified commanders remains extremely limited. They have weak authority over their Service component commands, limited influence over resources, and little ability to promote greater unification within their commands. As a result, the unified commands remain loose confederations of single-Service forces which are unable to provide effective unified action across the spectrum of military missions. In essence, there is limited mission integration at the operational level of DoD. As the 1970 *Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report* noted:

> The net result is an organizational structure in which "unification" of either command or of the forces is more cosmetic than substantive.

The operational deficiencies evident during the Vietnam War, the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and the incursion into Grenada were the result of the failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command.

7. Unnecessary Staff Layers and Duplication of Effort in the Top Management Headquarters of the Military Departments

Each Military Department has two separate headquarters staffs (three in the Navy): the Secretariat and the military headquarters staff. This arrangement results in an unnecessary layer of supervision and duplication of effort. Moreover, the existence of two separate staffs leads to delays and micro-management and is counterproductive and inefficient. There are two causes of this problem. First, the current arrangements are a holdover from an earlier era when the Service Secretaries headed separate, executive-level departments. The second cause is the failure of the Service Secretaries to effectively control the military headquarters staffs and their attempted use of the Secretariats to provide this control. The Service Secretaries would be able to exercise more effective management and control if these separate staffs were fully or partially integrated. Moreover, the dual levels of staff review would be eliminated; paperwork would be reduced; and substantial manpower savings would be possible.

8. Predominance of Programming and Budgeting

The overall performance of DoD suffers from the predominance in organizational activity of the programming and budgeting phases of the resource allocation process. Too much of the time and attention of DoD and its senior civilian and military officials is consumed by resource decisions. This has led to insufficient attention to strategic planning, operational matters, and execution of policy and resource decisions. For example, the Secretary of Defense —the critical civilian link in the chain of command —pays insufficient attention to his operational responsibilities. Moreover, insufficient attention is given to contingency plans, joint doctrine, joint training, and alliance issues.

The overemphasis on resource issues and the underemphasis of operational matters are also reflected in the professional development of military officers. The development of leadership skills needed in wartime has been given relatively low priority in the resource-oriented Services. Instead, technical, managerial, and bureaucratic skills have been emphasized. DoD's predominant focus on programming and budgeting must be diminished.

9. Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals

Inattention to strategic planning has led to numerous deficiencies, including a lack of clarity of DoD's strategic goals. The stated goals are vague and ambiguous. In an organization as large as DoD, the clear articulation of overall strategic goals can play an important role in achieving a coordinated effort toward these goals by the various components and individuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhance unity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of this unifying mechanism through its failure to clarify its strategic goals. To correct this problem and other strategic planning deficiencies, DoD needs to establish and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process.

10. Insufficient Mechanisms for Change

Throughout history, military organizations —like all large organizations —have been noted for their resistance to change. The U.S. military establishment shares the resistance to change inherent in the military profession. However, in DoD, this tendency is magnified by systemic problems. Key among these systemic problems are (1) the bureaucratic agreements among the Services —the Key West Agreement on Service roles and missions, the Unified Command Plan, and JCS Publication 2 (*Unified Action Armed Forces*) being key examples —which are "off-limits" even when serious deficiencies are identified; (2) the predominant influence of the Services, particularly when compared to that of joint organizations; (3) inter-Service logrolling on critical issues; and (4) absolute Service control over promotions and assignments of all military officers, including those in joint duty billets. The result of these systemic problems is that DoD does not have effective mechanisms for change.

As this study documents, the Department of Defense suffers from numerous organizational and procedural deficiencies. Of major concern is the frequent inability of DoD to correct these deficiencies on its own. Despite substantial evidence of poor performance, DoD expends its energies on defending the *status quo*. The absence of an effective process of self-correction and self-modification has resulted in an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures.

11. Inadequate Feedback

Related to insufficient mechanisms for change is the absence of useful feedback in many activities in DoD. Effective management control is not possible without useful and timely feedback on actual operations and implementation of plans. While the absence of useful feedback reduces management control of the resource allocation process, it also precludes learning important lessons from poor organizational performance. Past mistakes —whether in the procurement of a weapon system or in the employment of forces during a crisis —do not receive the critical review that would prevent them from recurring. DoD has not established a tradition of comprehensive, critical evaluations of its performance in many areas. The lessons go unlearned, and the mistakes are repeated. While there are other factors that contribute to this deficiency, inadequate feedback mechanisms play an important role.

12. Inadequate Quality of Political Appointees and Joint Duty Military Personnel

Problems with the quality of DoD personnel have been identified in political appointee positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretariats and in joint duty military positions, especially in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the staffs of the unified commanders. Political appointees are a problem because of their relative inexperience and high turnover rates as well as lengthy vacancies in appointed positions. These factors lead to extended periods of on-the-job training and poor continuity. DoD has given insufficient attention to the development of military officers capable of effectively performing joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in such assignments have been permitted to persist.

In this regard, some observers argue that the overriding solution to DoD organizational problems is to improve the caliber of senior officials. While improving the quality of DoD's senior leadership is an important initiative, it should not, however, be seen as a substitute for necessary organizational reform. Although good people can, to a certain extent, overcome a deficient organizational structure, a well-designed structure will support a higher level of sustained effectiveness than a poor structure will. Moreover, a choice between good people and sound structure need not be made. Efforts to improve DoD's performance should emphasize *both* structural change and enhancement of the management and leadership skills of senior officials.

13. Failure to Clarify the Desired Division of Work

One of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency is to rationally divide the work among the various structural components. Within DoD, the desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many instances; in others the assigned division of work is ignored in practice. Congressional micro-management of defense programs and OSD micro-management of Service programs are key examples of this problem. Equally relevant is DoD's inability to objectively examine the Unified Command Plan and the Services' roles and missions. This inability precludes a more rational division of work among the operational commands in the first instance and among the Services in the second. In the context of civilian control of the military, there is also a lack of clarity on the division of work between civilian and military officials and organizations. As a last point, many organizations have encroached on the duties of OJCS; both OSD and the Services are performing roles assigned to OJCS. The absence of a rational and enforced division of work leads to greater complexity, friction, delay, duplication, and inefficiency.

14. Excessive Spans of Control

At many levels of the Department of Defense, key managers have an excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. For example, the Secretary of Defense has 41 senior military and civilian officials (excluding the Deputy Secretary and his immediate staff) who report directly to him. Likewise, the Service Chiefs have unwieldy spans of control. The Army Chief of Staff has 42 officials reporting directly to him; the Chief of Naval Operations, 48 officials; the Air Force Chief of Staff, 35 officials; and the Marine Corps Commandant, 41 officials. Effective supervision and coordination of excessive numbers of officials are not possible. As a result, organizational inefficiency is substantial. In general, excessive spans of control in DoD result from the use of relatively flat organizational structures. Use of more orderly hierarchical structures may help to solve the problems of insufficient supervision and coordination.

15. Insufficient Power and Influence of the Secretary of Defense

The actual power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not sufficient to enable him to effectively manage the Department of Defense. The problem arises not from his formal statutory authority which provides him a full measure of power. Instead, the problem emanates from powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own agendas has substantially weakened the office of Secretary of Defense. As a result, the Secretary lacks the tools, levers, and organizational channels that he needs to effectively manage the defense bureaucracy. Moreover, his efforts are seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military advice; he is too dependent on the advice and counsel of the Service Chiefs who pre-negotiate key issues. The Secretary of Defense is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer him little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities. Organizational and procedural changes in DoD should be consistent with the need to enhance the management potential of the Secretary of Defense.

Strengthening the power and influence of the Secretary of Defense does not mean increased centralization. Only when bureaucratic constraints and obstacles that diffuse the Secretary's power are removed will he be able to decentralize without losing control. On the whole, the recommendations of this study offer the potential for the Secretary of Defense to realize the advantages of decentralized management of many activities.

16. Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional Oversight

The Congress has a central role in the overall planning and management of the Nation's security and must share responsibility for any fundamental problems. In fact, efforts to reorganize the Department of Defense will prove imperfect again unless accompanied by changes on Capitol Hill. The very structure of the Congress and its review procedures produce an inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pattern of oversight and guidance. This inconsistent pattern reinforces divisions within DoD, inhibiting the development of a coherent and integrated defense program. The absence of effective mission integration in DoD is a fundamental flaw, and the Congress has been a major contributor to that shortcoming.

There are five aspects to this congressional problem. First, the cognizant committees have developed different structures, styles, and traditions, resulting in an inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pattern of DoD oversight. These differences foster confusion and tempt factions within DoD to export conflicts to the Congress. Second, the Congress tends to review the defense program in terms of artificial accounting inputs rather than in terms of mission outputs. Adjustments tend to be made for financing reasons within accounts rather than for reasons of priorities among missions. Third, the Congress tends not to compare programs across Service lines and very rarely makes policy tradeoffs that cross Service lines. Fourth, the Congress tends to dwell on policy or program conflicts and tensions within DoD, reinforcing those conflicts. Fifth, the Congress has historically favored independent subordinate offices as opposed to centralized control in DoD, in order to maximize congressional leverage in directing the allocation of resources or determining the outcome of policy disputes.

Beyond this major deficiency, the current practice of congressional review and oversight has resulted in substantial instability in defense policies and programs. This has resulted from the hegemony of the congressional budget process which has overwhelmed the remainder of the legislative agenda and which has precluded meeting the established schedule for enactment of authorization and appropriations bills. As a result, the Congress has been forced to resort to continuing resolutions for spending measures. Instability in defense policies and programs has been further heightened by the tendency of the Congress to look at DoD activity in only single fiscal year increments with predictable short-sighted results. Lastly, the Congress extensively micro-manages DoD. Increasingly, the Congress is becoming involved in the details of the defense budget, not just the broad policies and directions that guide it.

D. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Many of the broad recommendations of the staff study are presented in the preceding text of the Executive Summary. The study also makes a total of 91 specific recommendations to solve the problems identified in Chapters 3 through 9. The twelve most important specific recommendations are:

1. Establish three mission-oriented under secretary positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) NATO defense, and (3) regional defense and force projection.
2. Disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, thereby, permit the Service Chiefs to dedicate all their time to Service duties.
3. Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a 4-star military officer from each Service on his last tour of duty to serve as the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
4. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own right.
5. Designate one of the members of the Joint Military Advisory Council, from a different Service pair (Army/Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps) than the Chairman, as Deputy Chairman.
6. Specify that one of the responsibilities of the Joint Military Advisory Council is to inform higher authority of all legitimate alternatives.
7. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty.
8. Establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty.
9. Make the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council (JMAC) the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JMAC system while ensuring absolute clarity that the JMAC Chairman is not part of the chain of command.
10. Remove the Service component commanders within the unified commands from the operational chain of command.

11. Fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy. (The Department of the Navy is treated differently because of its dual-Service structure.)

12. Create the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) who would be responsible for establishing and maintaining a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

In June 1983, Senator John Tower, then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the late Senator Henry M. Jackson, the Ranking Minority Member, initiated a comprehensive review of the organizational relationships and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense (DoD). As part of this project, the Committee held a series of 12 hearings in which it took testimony from 31 witnesses.

In addition, Senators Tower and Jackson directed the staff to prepare an objective evaluation of the structure and functions of the Department of Defense. In writing this study, the staff has relied on a variety of sources for information: a 40-year record of testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; interviews of current and former DoD civilian and military officials; reports done for and by the Executive Branch; and studies prepared by research institutions. Under the direction of the Committee's current Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, and the Committee's Task Force on Defense Organization, the staff has now completed its work on this evaluation.

The authority for congressional review of the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense derives from specific Constitutional powers. Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution provides that:

> The Congress shall have Power...
> To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; (clause 14)
> To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. (clause 18)

The specific responsibilities of the Committee on Armed Services are enumerated in Rule XXV (section 1(c)) of the Standing Rules of the Senate. The authority for the Committee's review is found in subsection (2):

> Such committee shall also study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defense policy of the United States, and report thereon from time to time.

B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS

In evaluating this study's accuracy and utility, two important considerations should be kept in mind. First, the task of providing for the national defense is enormously complicated and demanding, and the organizations that have been created to carry out this responsibility are extremely large and complex. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has noted in his book, *Thinking About National Security*:

> But the overall size and expenditures of the Department of Defense continue to dwarf most individual business enterprises. Even Exxon, number one in the *Fortune* 500, has annual sales that are only about half the annual expenditures of the DoD. In personnel, the differences with the private sector are more obvious: The DoD has more than 2 million uniformed personnel and about 1 million civilian employees and in fiscal year 1982 supported about 3 million workers in defense industries. By contrast, Exxon has about 139,000 employees, and AT&T, the single largest private employer, has just over 1 million. (pages 216-217)

The Department of Defense is clearly the largest and most complex organization in the Free World. For this reason, it is critically important that if changes are to be made to DoD organizational arrangements or decision-making procedures, the temptation to adopt simplistic, yet attractive, options must be avoided. Change just for the sake of change would be a critical mistake. Peter F. Drucker has observed that businesses sometimes suffer from this problem: "Companies are resorting to reorganization as a kind of miracle drug in lieu of diagnosing their ailments." (*Harvard Business Review on Management*, page 623) Reorganization of the Department of Defense is too important an issue to be determined without comprehensive and deliberate study and deserves the time and careful thought of the most experienced and learned people.

The second important consideration is that a partisan critique of the present organizational structure must be avoided. Problems reflected in this review have confounded some of the most thoughtful, decisive, and experienced Secretaries of Defense, Deputy Secretaries of Defense, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the like in both Republican and Democratic Administrations. The organizational structure which now exists, the good and the bad, is the genius and the failure of well-intentioned individuals in both Republican and Democratic Administrations. Any changes which the Administration and the Congress choose to make will have to work under both Republican and Democratic Administrations in the future. Because both Republicans and Democrats will have to live with changes that are made, it is imperative that proposed solutions have the fullest possible bipartisan support.

C. REASONS FOR THE STUDY

A growing number of responsible and knowledgeable observers of the U.S. military establishment, many of whom have served in senior positions in DoD, have voiced serious concerns over organizational and procedural deficiencies in the Department of Defense.

They firmly believe that the current organizational structure is an obstacle to performance of the national security mission. Though they do not agree on the steps that need to be taken to correct organizational weaknesses, they are quite clear about their dissatisfaction with current organizational arrangements. Their concern is too deeply felt to be ignored.

Adding to this weight of expert opinion is the recognition that the Congress has not undertaken a comprehensive review of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense since 1958 —more than 25 years ago. During this period of more than two decades, the international security environment has become much more complex and troubling. In response, the missions currently assigned to the Department of Defense are more varied and demanding. Given these changes and increased complexity, a comprehensive review of organizational structure and relationships appears warranted.

More specific indicators of organizational deficiencies have also been apparent. Key among these are the following:

- *operational failures and deficiencies* —poor inter-Service coordination during the Vietnam conflict, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and even the intervention in Grenada suggest deficiencies in the planning and preparation for employment of U.S. military forces in times of crisis;
- *acquisition process deficiencies* —cost overruns, stretched-out development and delivery schedules, and unsatisfactory weapons performance have been frequent criticisms of the acquisition process;
- *lack of strategic direction* —the strategies and long-range policies of the Department of Defense do not appear to be well formulated and are apparently only loosely connected to subsequent resource allocations; and
- *poor inter-Service coordination* —the programs of the individual military Services do not appear to be well integrated around a common purpose that clearly ties means to goals.

Individually, each of these problems is of great concern. In combination, they suggest the need for a comprehensive review of DoD organizational structure and procedures.

One question dominated consideration of this review of the organizational structure and decision-making procedures of the Defense Department: how would one know whether or not the Department of Defense should change its current organization and procedures? There is, after all, no financial bottom line for the Department linking benefits to costs that makes deteriorating performance clear in the sense that ineffective performance becomes unmistakable to a business enterprise. The output of the U.S. military establishment cannot be measured in the same financial terms used to calculate its input or costs.

In this regard, defense experts have strongly disagreed about the performance of the Department of Defense. While many prominent observers have argued for organizational reform in DoD, others have defended the *status quo*. In the end, a judgment on organizational performance has to be made between competing views.

In addition to criticism of the Department of Defense, there is increasing concern over the inability of the Congress to effectively discharge its responsibility to review DoD policies and programs. Many believe that congressional deficiencies have seriously hampered the performance of the Department of Defense.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The most fundamental and important principle governing the organization and operation of the U.S. military establishment is civilian control of the military. Chapter 2 of the study addresses this principle in detail in order to establish the foundation for formulating and evaluating necessary reforms in DoD.

To provide a comprehensive review of organizational and procedural problems in the Defense Department, this study addresses four principal DoD organizations: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Military Departments, and the unified and specified commands. Focusing on these four organizations also permits consideration of two distinct levels of DoD activity: the first three organizations combine to form the policymaking level of DoD; the unified and specified commands represent the operational level. To ensure consideration of the unique responsibilities of these organizations, a separate chapter (Chapters 3–6) is devoted to each.

To complement these organization-oriented analyses, reviews of the two major DoD decision-making processes—the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the Acquisition Process—were undertaken. These reviews are presented in Chapters 7 and 8. Although these internal processes are designed to support current organizational arrangements, problems within these processes might be a product of structural deficiencies. Furthermore, an understanding of these processes is important in comprehending the full range of DoD organizational relationships.

Although this report is focused primarily on the internal DoD organization and procedures, two important portions of the external environment were initially included in the effort: the national security interagency process and congressional review and oversight. After studying the interagency process, however, it was determined that organizational and procedural issues in that process had a minimal effect on internal DoD issues. Therefore, to narrow the scope of this effort, a decision was made to curtail further analysis of the interagency process. A brief description of this process, however, is presented in the following section of this chapter.

With regard to congressional review and oversight, an initial investigation revealed an extensive interrelationship with DoD problem areas. For this reason, a separate chapter (Chapter 9) is devoted to congressional review and oversight.

The seven chapters of the report (Chapters 3–9) that address specific organizations and procedures are organized in a consistent manner and include the following sections:

- historical evolution of the organization or decision-making procedure;
- analysis of key organizational or procedural trends;
- description of the current organization or procedure;

- identification of problem areas and causes;
- description of solutions to problem areas;
- evaluation of alternative solutions; and
- conclusions and recommendations

Chapter 10 analyzes in broad terms the effectiveness of the structure and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. It places into an overall defense perspective the more specific analyses presented in Chapters 3-9.

E. THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Before beginning this overview of the national security interagency process, it might be useful to define the term "national security policy." In the context of the National Security Council (NSC) interagency system, national security policy is a combination of foreign policy, defense policy, intelligence concerns, international economic policy, and information programs, with the internal mix changing over the years. This fluid combination of factors is important to keep in mind, because of the tendency of many observers to assume that national security policy and foreign policy have so much in common that they are almost the same thing.

This study is most interested in the national defense aspect of national security policy and the NSC system, the defense-related components, and the roles played by Department of Defense personnel, from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down. (This section on the national security interagency process is largely based on a paper prepared for this study by the Congressional Research Service.)

1. The National Security Council System

The National Security Council was established as a congressional initiative through passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 80-253). It was not created independently, but as part of a complete restructuring of the entire U.S. national security apparatus, civilian and military, including intelligence. One of the major issues related to the NSC was the assurance that it would be a civilian organization and would not be dominated by the new Secretary of Defense. Nonetheless, the creation of the NSC was one of the least controversial aspects of the National Security Act, compared with the concept of a unified defense department around which most of the congressional debate centered.

By statute, the NSC is chaired by the President, and its members are the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and the Director of Central Intelligence is the statutory intelligence advisor. The NSC's statutory function is:

> to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. (Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947)

Successive Presidents have taken advantage of the considerable leeway that they enjoy under the National Security Act to use and restructure the NSC as they saw fit. Thus, the use, membership, internal structure, and *modus operandi* of the NSC system have depended directly on the style and wishes of the President.

2. NSC System Under the Reagan Administration

A Presidential Directive detailing the Reagan Administration's National Security Council structure was issued on January 12, 1982. President Reagan's NSC is organized differently than it was in the Carter Administration.

a. Senior Interdepartmental Groups

Like most recent NSC's, however, there is a formal interagency committee structure, based on three Senior Interdepartmental Groups (SIG's) chaired, respectively, by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence. These SIG's establish policy objectives, develop policy options, make policy recommendations, and consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy or overall national security policy. All three SIG's include in their membership the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Secretaries or Under Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS. Senior officials of other agencies are invited to participate when their areas of responsibility are involved.

If the Senior Interdepartmental Groups agree on policy conclusions, their recommendations go directly to the President. If they disagree, their analysis and conclusions, including dissents, will be referred to the National Security Council. SIG's deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member of the SIG's or referred to them by subordinate interagency groups. They are also supposed to monitor the execution of policies and decisions approved by the NSC. If the matters require higher level consideration, the SIG's report them to the Secretary of the department involved or the NSC.

Each SIG is supported by a permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the lead department or agency. In response to the SIG chairman's request, the staff of these secretariats are augmented as necessary by personnel provided by the departments and agencies represented on each SIG.

b. Interagency Groups

The SIG's are supported, in turn, by assistant secretary-level Interagency Groups (IG's). Reporting to the IG's are interagency working groups dealing with specific subjects, mostly chaired by officials of the department or agency chairing the SIG in question.

c. Special Situation Group

In addition, there is a Special Situation Group for crisis management centered in the White House and chaired by the Vice President. Members include the Secretaries of State and Defense, the White House senior policy staff, the National Security Assistant, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the JCS. It thus has many of the same members as the National Security

Council itself, minus the President. The IG's were to establish full-time working groups to deal with specific contingencies in order to provide support to the NSC's crisis management operations.

3. Defense Department Participation in the NSC Interagency System

The Secretary of Defense is the senior statutory representative of DoD on the National Security Council. In the Presidential statement governing the organization and structure of the NSC in the Reagan Administration, he is referred to as the President's "principal defense policy advisor," and, in that role, is responsible for the formulation of "policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern" to DoD and "for execution of approved policy." He is also charged with the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities incident to defense policy formulation and for preparation of papers addressing U.S. defense policy matters for NSC consideration.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military —as opposed to broader defense policy —advisors to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. As noted above, the Chairman of the JCS or his representative sits in a military advisory capacity on all Senior Interdepartmental and Interagency Groups.

One of the three Senior Interdepartmental Groups established by the Reagan Administration was a Senior Interdepartmental Group-Defense Policy (SIG-DP) to assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibilities for defense policy and defense matters. The SIG-DP chairman is the Deputy Secretary of Defense and its permanent secretariat is comprised primarily of DoD personnel.

Under the SIG-DP, Interagency Groups were formed for each of the functional areas within DoD. Each IG was to be chaired by the appropriate Under or Assistant Secretary of Defense and composed of representatives of the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, the National Security Assistant, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provisions were also made for representation by additional departments at the invitation of the IG Chairman.

The chairmen of the DoD IG's (the Under and Assistant Secretaries of Defense) were charged with assuring the "adequacy" of United States policy in their areas of responsibility and the plans, programs, and resources necessary for implementing that policy. They were also charged with conducting interagency policy studies within their areas of responsibility for consideration by the Defense Policy SIG.

Because of recent developments in the Caribbean and the Middle East, the regional IG's under the State Department-chaired Foreign Policy SIG were assigned the preparation of contingency plans for potential crises within their areas of responsibility. Contingency planning was to be conducted in coordination with the chairman of the State Department's Political-Military IG, except for options for employment of military forces in potential crises, which were to remain within the purview of DoD and, in particular, the JCS.

CHART 1-1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY
ARMY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE
AF MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE
COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS
THE JOINT STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
COMMANDANT OF MARINE CORPS
NAVY MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
MARINE CORPS MAJOR COMMANDS AND AGENCIES
DEFENSE AGENCIES
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION
DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
DEFENSE AUDIOVISUAL AGENCY
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
SPECIFIED COMMANDS
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND
UNIFIED COMMANDS
EUROPEAN COMMAND
ATLANTIC COMMAND
CENTRAL COMMAND
READINESS COMMAND
PACIFIC COMMAND
SOUTHERN COMMAND

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JULY 84

As may be apparent from this discussion, present and past DoD officials and personnel are found throughout the various components of the NSC interagency system, especially under the Reagan Administration. They participate in three different ways —as representatives of the Defense Department, as NSC officials or staff (on detail from DoD), or as civilians retired (often recently) from military careers.

F. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The major organizational elements of the Department of Defense and their responsibilities are presented in this section. Chart 1-1 shows the relationships of these major organizations.

Under the President, who is also Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense exercises direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense. The Department includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three Military Departments, ten unified and specified commands, fifteen Defense Agencies, and eight DoD Field Activities.

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is the principal staff of the Secretary in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, and fiscal and program evaluation responsibilities. OSD includes the immediate offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, Assistants to the Secretary of Defense, and such other staff offices as the Secretary establishes to assist in carrying out his responsibilities.

2. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to the Secretary of Defense as well as to the President and the National Security Council. Members of the JCS, other than the Chairman, are the senior military officers of their respective Services and are responsible for keeping the Secretaries of the Military Departments fully informed on matters considered or acted upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Military Departments

The Military Departments are the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. (The Marine Corps is a part of the Department of the Navy.) Each Military Department is separately organized under its own Secretary but functions under the overall direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, supplying, and equipping forces for assignment to unified and specified commands.

4. Armed Forces Policy Council

The Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) advises the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and any other matters that the Secretary may direct. Its members report regularly on important matters under their cognizance which are of interest to the Department of Defense. In addition to members identified below, other officials of the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies in the Executive Branch may be invited by the Secretary of Defense to attend appropriate meetings of the AFPC. The Council's membership is as follows:

- Secretary of Defense (Chairman)
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Secretaries of the Military Departments
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Under Secretaries of Defense
- Chief of Staff, Army
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Chief of Staff, Air Force
- Commandant, Marine Corps

5. Unified and Specified Commands

The unified and specified commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them. Combatant units of the Military Departments are assigned to and under the operational command of Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's) of unified and specified commands.

Unified commands are composed of components of two or more Services. They include the European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, Southern Command, Readiness Command, and Central Command. In addition, the President has approved the establishment of a new unified command for space. Specified commands are usually composed of forces from one Service, but may include units and have representation from other Services. They include the Aerospace Defense Command, Strategic Air Command, and Military Airlift Command.

The military chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commanders of the unified and specified commands. Orders to these Commanders are issued by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

6. Defense Agencies

The Defense Agencies, authorized by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the provisions of title 10, United States Code, perform selected support and service functions on a Department-wide basis. There are 15 Defense Agencies that report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

7. DoD Field Activities

The DoD Field Activities are established by the Secretary of Defense, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, to perform selected support and service functions of a more limited scope than Defense Agencies.

CHAPTER 2

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

A. INTRODUCTION

An examination of the soundness of civil-military relations is essential to any study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. More than any other institutional issue, the relationships between civilian and military authorities in the U.S. military establishment are key to sustaining American democracy.

Since the founding of the Nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Virginia Declaration of Rights of June 12, 1776 stated this principle as follows:

> In all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by civil power.

The Constitution incorporates this principle. Both the President and the Congress were given power and responsibilities to ensure civilian supremacy.

Despite the importance of the concept of civilian control, it remains ill-defined and poorly understood. As Samuel P. Huntington stated in 1957 in *The Soldier and the State:*

> The role of the military in society has been frequently discussed in terms of "civilian control". Yet this concept has never been satisfactorily defined. (page 80)

Although troubling to some scholars and theorists, the lack of a consensus on a definition of civilian control has not proved a serious drawback to the success of the general principle, because the principle itself is so deeply ingrained. Thus this vague, but strongly-held, belief has seen American civilian government and its military through two centuries of evolution and events. Like other broadly defined, but fundamental, tenets set out in the Constitution, civilian control has benefited from the flexibility inherent in the Constitution. It has allowed civilian authorities to meet crises and to adapt to changes in the world and America's role in it. Civilian control by its very nature is subjective, dependent in large measure on personalities and circumstances.

The issues which have arisen in civilian-military relations fall into two general categories. First are those issues which relate to operational control of military forces. Second are those issues which relate to such non-operational matters as allocation of resources, the influence of the "military—industrial complex" and the expanding role of active and retired military officers in government.

This chapter focuses on the operational side of civilian control which, by virtue of the Constitutional separation of powers, is concentrated in the Executive Branch. This focus was selected for four reasons. First, operational military forces pose the greatest theoretical threat to civilian control. Second, although the military's ability to influence the allocation of defense resources may have some impact on the exercise of civilian control, it has never presented a threat to the constitutional structure or the functioning of the government. Third, the administrative dimension of civilian control is extensively discussed in other chapters of this study, especially Chapter 7 (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) and Chapter 9 (Congressional Review and Oversight). Fourth, one of the central and most emotional issues in debates on the organization of the U.S. military establishment has been whether civilian control of the military would be strengthened or weakened by various changes. This debate has almost always been cast in terms of civilian control over military operations, not allocation of resources or other administrative matters. But this is not to downplay the significance of the balance between civil and military authorities regarding non-operational matters. As noted, certain aspects of these issues are discussed in Chapters 7 and 9. In addition, four major trends affecting the administrative dimension of civilian control are presented in Appendix A of this chapter.

B. CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL

1. The Constitution

Civilian control of the military is reflected in several provisions of current law. The Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief, but gives the Congress the power to declare war and to "raise and support Armies,...provide and maintain a Navy [and] to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and Naval forces." In addition, the President can appoint military officers only with the advice and consent of the Senate.

2. Legislative Prescriptions

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council to "provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments,...relating to the national security to provide for unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense." (50 U.S.C. section 401) The members of the National Security Council are also specified, all of whom are civilian.

In addition, section 133 of title 10, United States Code, provides "there is a Secretary of Defense, who is the head of the Department of Defense, *appointed from civilian life*." (emphasis added). Section 133 also provides that a person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within 10 years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of the armed forces.

Under title 10 of the United States Code, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, two Under Secretaries, eleven Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation are appointed by the President from civilian life with the advice and consent of the Senate (sections 133, 134, 135, 136, and 136a). The top four officials may not be appointed within ten years of having served as a commissioned officer on active duty in the armed forces. The Secretary of the Air Force, by statute (section 8012), and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, by tradition, are appointed by the President from civilian life with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the under secretaries and assistant secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force must, by statute, be appointed from civilian life (sections 3013, 5033, 5034, and 8013 of title 10). No provision governs the length of separation from the armed forces for the Service Secretaries.

3. View of the Current DoD Leadership

The elements of civilian control are described thus by the current Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Howard Taft IV:

> Below the President and the Congress, central responsibility for civilian control within the Department of Defense is assigned to the Secretary of Defense by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The Secretary is the principal advisor to the President on all matters relating to the Department. He is a statutory member of the National Security Council (NSC) and the President's executive agent in the authority, direction, and control of the Department. He exercises operational authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of the unified and specified commands; he exercises direction of support activities through appointed officials in the Military Departments.
>
> The Secretary has at his disposal a number of means by which he exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense. These include: authority to realign the organizational structure of the Department; various management staffs throughout the Department; major management systems such as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC); and the DoD Directives System through which he communicates Departmental policies.
>
> Civilian control elements are distributed throughout the DoD by way of a system of appointive civilian officials, many with statutory charters, who are interspersed at levels below the Secretary of Defense. These positions include the Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, General Counsel, Inspector General, and Assistants to the Secretary within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Service Secretaries and their appointed civilian subordinates.

C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1. Traditional Threats to Civilian Control

Throughout history, including the contemporary period, military power and authority have diminished civil authority in a variety of ways. In some countries, the military has simply gained control of the national government through a coup or other takeover. In other cases, military officers have taken actions on their own initiative beyond the scope of their authority but which do not challenge the government. These traditional threats to civilian control are presented in order to examine their applicability to the course of civil-military relations in the United States.

a. Man-on-Horseback

One of the most basic theories of civil-military relations is the threat posed to democratic societies and civilian governments by "the Man on the White Horse." The Man-on-Horseback symbolizes the potential for a single military commander who possesses great personal authority and charisma to wrest control from civilian authorities, often, according to the theory, doing so to great popular acclaim. A Washington, McClellan, or MacArthur comes to mind as the closest example in the American experience of a military commander with such authority and popular support.

b. Benign, Objective Takeover

Another major theory of civil-military relations is the benign, objective military takeover when the civilian government's inability to govern has thrown the country into crisis. According to this theory, the military establishes stability and sound policies by which it governs until it determines that the country is secure enough to allow the civilians another chance at governing. At this point, it turns the reins of government over to the civilians and retreats watchfully into the background until it determines that it must again intervene. This has occurred repeatedly in Latin America.

c. Commander Taking Actions on His Own Initiative

A final theory is the threat posed by a military officer who acts —often for deeply patriotic reasons —beyond his authority and treads on areas reserved for civilian leaders. This was popularized in the classic 1960's film, *Dr. Strangelove*, the tale of a strategic bomber wing commander who takes it upon himself to start a nuclear war.

2. History of U.S. Civil-Military Relations

The instances in U.S. history when issues of civil-military relations rose to the fore are explored in the remainder of this section.

a. Revolutionary War Period

Americans' belief that standing armies pose a threat to liberty was clearly born of their colonial experience rather than philosophical or legal antecedents:

> On the military side the war of the American Revolution was in part a revolt against the British standing army....It was a protest against the re-enforcement of British government by military regulars and the quartering of regulars on the people of the colonies. In its inception at Lexington and Concord the Revolution was literally an attack by militiamen on British regulars—an uprising of embattled farmers who had homes to fight for against disciplined regulars who had no homes and fought for pay under fear. (Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession*, page 96)

Important though the Minutemen were, from the beginning it was clear that only by raising and supporting an army to fight the British could the American revolution succeed.

To the colonies' great good fortune, the cause of liberty was led by a military commander, General George Washington, who very firmly believed in military deference to civilian government. Washington's understanding of the appropriate role for the military was evident from the beginning of his service as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army. When he assumed command, the New York legislature sent a message which emphasized the moral contract implicit in his commission:

> On a general in America, fortune also should bestow her gifts, that he may rather communicate lustre to his dignities than receive it, and that his country in his property, his indred, and connexions, may have sure pledges that he will faithfully perform the duties of his high office, and readily lay down his power when the general weal requires it.

And Washington replied for himself and his colleagues:

> When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen; and we shall most sincerely rejoice with you in that happy hour when the establishment of American Liberty, upon the most firm and solid foundations, shall enable us to return to our Private Stations in the bosom of a free, peaceful and happy Country. (Gary Wills, *Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment*, pages 21–22)

Historians have rightly made much of Washington's role in defusing a potential military revolt at the end of the war. As James Thomas Flexner recounts, Washington was sympathetic to the army's grievances when the Continental Congress, in increasingly dire financial straits, sought to cut expenses in 1782:

> ...by reducing the number of regiments in a way that would demobilize many officers. However, no provision was made for giving them any pay, although some were owed (as Washington noted) for "four, five, or perhaps six years." A promise of pensions previously made at a dark moment in the war showed no likelihood of being honored. To officials in Philadelphia, Washington wrote bitterly that the demobilized officers would depart "goaded by a thousand stings of reflection on the past and of anticipation on the future...soured by penury and what they call the ingratitude of the public, involved in debts, without one farthing of money to carry them home, after having spent the flowers of their days, and many of them their patrimonies, in establishing the freedom and independence of their country, and suffered everything human nature is capable of enduring on this side of death....I cannot avoid apprehending that a train of evils will follow of a very serious and distressing nature." (*Washington: The Indispensable Man*, page 167)

However, despite attempts to persuade him to join the cause with warnings that if he did not his own authority would be in danger, Washington stood adamantly against the attempts of the government's civilian creditors to give muscle to their demands for repayment by an alliance with the disgruntled army. He was equally firm in his opposition to plots afoot among his officers to send petitions to the Congress threatening not to disband until paid, or even to seize power until the fiscally delinquent state legislatures were reformed. The turning point came at a meeting of his officers where he quelled the rebellion by the force of his own estimable character. During the meeting his exhortations of good faith, patience and civil responsibility failed to carry the day. But in a scene that has taken on mythic proportions, his simple act of putting on a pair of eyeglasses with the remark, "Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country," (*Washington: The Indispensable Man*, page 174) dissolved the hostile audience in a wave of admiration and devotion to their leader. As Jefferson later remarked, "The Moderation and virtue of a single character probably prevented this Revolution from being closed, as most others have been, by a subversion of that liberty it was intended to establish." (*Washington: The Indispensable Man*, page 175)

So great was Washington's reputation with both the army and the civilian population that at the end of the war he had no lack of over-zealous admirers to suggest he should step into the power vacuum created by a weak and discredited Continental Congress and become king. Instead, Washington hastened at the earliest opportunity to resign his commission, which he did before the Congress in Annapolis on December 23, 1783, closing his farewell remarks thus:

> Saving now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theater of Action; and bidding an Affectionate farewell to this August body under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my Commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life.

As Gary Wills has written:

> At that moment the ancient legend of Cincinnatus—the Roman called from his plow to rescue Rome, and returning to his plow when danger had passed—was resurrected as a fact of modern political life. The fame of the deed sped around the world. The painter John Trumbull wrote his brother from London (May 10, 1784) that it
>
> > excites the astonishment and admiration of this part of the world. 'Tis a Conduct so novel, so inconceivable to People, who, far from giving up powers they possess, are willing to convulse the Empire to acquire more. (*Cincinnatus*, page 13)

Thus a seminal example was set, a concrete action to give substance to the constitutional precept of military submission to civilian government that would be adopted as the law of the land less than a decade later.

The U.S. Constitution established civilian control of the military by (1) making an elected civilian president commander-in-chief (Art. II, Sec. 2, clause 1) and (2) giving Congress the power to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and make rules for regulation of the land and naval forces (Art. I, Sec. 8, clauses 12-16). Although finally adopted in 1789, the Constitutional establishment of two separate centers of civilian control was not enough to allay the deep American mistrust of military power without a sharp national debate.

In Federalist Paper No. 41, James Madison expounded the view that ultimately carried the day:

> The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered her the mistress of the world.
>
> Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision....A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

b. Early 1800's

Between 1789 and the Civil War, Americans' attitude toward the military did not change. As historian Henry Adams wrote in the early nineteenth century, "antipathy to war (and all manifestations of the martial spirit) ranked first among political traits" of Americans. (*History of the United States of America during the Second Administration of James Madison*, Vol. 3, page 226) During this period there was only one instance of the military exceeding the bounds of its authority. As recounted by David Lockwood, General Andrew Jackson invaded Florida in 1817 without authorization:

> At that time, it will be recalled, Florida was a possession of Spain, whose government was not prepared to sell the territory to the United States. Georgia as well as other neighboring Southern states were especially annoyed by this uncompliant attitude because Florida had become a refuge for runaway slaves. As commander of the armed forces in the South, General Jackson wrote to President Monroe asking for permission to invade Florida in order that he might "restore the stolen Negroes and property to their rightful masters." He asked for the President's reply through a Tennessee Congressman. President Monroe said nothing, but General Jackson proceeded on his own initiative to seize Florida, burning Indian and Negro villages and hanging two suspected English agents in the process. There was great discomfort in Washington when news of these exploits reached the nation's capital. The Spanish ambassador threatened war; the British representative fumed in indignation. President Monroe lamely explained that he had been ill when he received the letter and had not been given enough time to study it properly. (*A Brief History and Analysis of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States*, page 30).

The American population at large celebrated Jackson's actions, but Jackson's enemies in the Congress did not:

> A senatorial committee undertook an investigation, and its members began to carry arms after Jackson, raving "like a

> madman," allegedly threatened to cut off the ears of any who reported against him. (Thomas Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, page 171)

In the end, after a 27-day debate, the Congress rejected four resolutions condemning Jackson's action. For their part, President Monroe and his Cabinet, save one, believed Jackson's raid constituted an unsanctioned act of war against Spain. Jackson's only ally was Secretary of State John Quincy Adams who saw Jackson's foray as strengthening his hand in negotiations with Spain for the acquisition of Florida. According to Adams' logic, which proved persuasive not only to Monroe and the Cabinet but also the Spanish, Jackson's foray had been in self-defense and demonstrated that Spain could no longer control Florida or its Indians. Less than a year later, Spain ceded Florida to the United States.

c. Civil War Period

The Civil War provided the next significant episodes in the history of civilian authority over the military.

In an early incident, General John C. Fremont, whom Lincoln had appointed commander of the Western Department of the War (with headquarters in St. Louis), not only overstepped the bounds of military authority but in doing so almost caused irreparable damage to the Union cause. In August 1861, rebels defeated Union troops and moved into Missouri. In response, a panicky Fremont issued a proclamation declaring martial law in the state and ordering rebels' slaves to be seized and freed. Lincoln had no prior knowledge of the proclamation, which far exceeded the existing law—the "confiscation act"—authorizing the seizure of slaves used by the rebel military.

It was the slave provision that raised a storm of controversy. Abolitionists and radical Republicans enthusiastically supported Fremont's initiative. This was precisely what they had been, and would be, pushing Lincoln to do for months. Thus, it was politically embarrassing for Lincoln to be placed in this position.

But more importantly, the Union slave-holding border states — Kentucky, Tennessee and Maryland —interpreted Fremont's proclamation as an official and extremely unwelcome emancipation act. Lincoln was warned that if he sustained Fremont's act, Kentucky would be lost to the Union and the other border states would be in jeopardy.

So Lincoln acted, with the tact and restraint which always marked his behavior with his difficult generals: he *asked* Fremont to *modify* the proclamation to conform to the confiscation act. In a letter hand-delivered by his wife, Fremont refused to change his order unless Lincoln publicly commanded him to. In addition, Mrs. Fremont had harsh words for Lincoln, proclaiming that she and her husband understood better than he the politics of the war. To which Lincoln replied:

> "This was a war for a great national idea, the Union, and that General Fremont should not have dragged the negro into it." Bristling, she warned Lincoln that it would be hard on him if he opposed her husband. If he did, she asserted, then Fre-

> mont would "set up for himself." (Stephen B. Oates, *With Malice Toward None*, page 281)

Finally, Lincoln commanded Fremont to modify his proclamation and, as requested, sent a copy to the press—thereby bringing down upon himself the wrath of abolitionists and radical Republicans. Lincoln did not reprimand Fremont, but the general was relieved of command without incident six weeks later, following a congressional investigation which found large-scale abuse of public funds in Fremont's Department.

Fremont was not the only general to cause Lincoln distress in the early years of the war. In fact, Lincoln was beset with problems concerning generals who would not fight. Their reasons were legion for not carrying out the orders of their commander-in-chief—not enough men, not enough supplies, "overwhelming" enemy numbers. The history of the opening years of the war is the history of Lincoln's patience with his recalcitrant generals, in the face of public and congressional cries for battles and victories. Lincoln the civilian was reluctant to overrule military judgment, but his increasing frustration led him to borrow books on military strategy from the Library of Congress to educate himself so that he might do what his generals refused to do for him. Thus, only after many failures and lost opportunities by a succession of generals did Lincoln in desperation begin exercising his powers as commander-in-chief to their fullest extent.

The following incident is representative of the extent of Lincoln's involvement, if unique in terms of his active on-site participation:

> On May 6, 1861, Lincoln sailed for the Peninsula with [Secretary of the Treasury] Chase and [Secretary of War] Stanton....When he reached Fort Monroe, he found that the commander—fusty old John Wool—hadn't even tried to seize Norfolk, which served as base for the Virginia [a Confederate ship]. Damn! Lincoln threw his stovepipe hat on the floor. Was the army full of timid incompetents? All right, then, he would take command of Wool's troops and capture Norfolk himself. At Lincoln's orders, Union gunboats shelled rebel batteries protecting the city and Union soldiers crowded into transports for an amphibious assault. Lincoln even reconnoitered the Norfolk coast—he and Stanton in a tug and Chase in a revenue cutter, all looking for a place to land Wool's men. They went ashore and walked along the beach, with its ocean smells and lapping waves, until Chase located a perfect spot for a landing. At last Union troops swarmed ashore and drove against Norfolk, forcing the rebel garrison to blow up the Virginia and abandon the city. "So has ended a brilliant week's campaign of the President," Chase recorded in his diary, as Lincoln and his two Secretaries sailed back to Washington rather pleased with themselves. (*With Malice Towards None*, page 326)

One general above all others exemplified the civil-military disputes which marred and hampered the Union war effort for several years. General George McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, the major eastern Union army, deserves to be noted in any recounting of the problems of civilian control which beset Lincoln. McClellan stands as a representative case study of those generals "who would not fight"—Buell, Rosecrans, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade, among others, who drove Lincoln to distraction as he watched inferior rebel forces gain the advantage time and again.

The following passage accurately conveys the tenor of Lincoln's relations with most of his early commanders and consequently, the considerable problems he had in conducting the war:

> Portentous news from Richmond: on May 31 and June 1, [1862] the rebel army fell on McClellan in the battle of Seven Pines, but McClellan repulsed the attack. Wild with excitement, McClellan wired Washington that he'd just fought "a desperate battle" against "greatly superior numbers." "Our loss is heavy, but that of the enemy must be enormous."
>
> Lincoln expected McClellan to counterattack. But McClellan didn't budge. In truth, the battle of Seven Pines unnerved him. He couldn't bear the sight of all his dead and wounded men. This was not the way to fight a war. In his mind, war was a game in which you defeated your opponent by brilliant maneuvers with minimal loss of life. McClellan loved his soldiers, and the feeling was mutual....They looked up to him as no other general in the army. How could he sacrifice their lives by hurling them insanely against a superior foe? So, no, he did not counter-attack. Once again he dug in and called for reinforcements. Once again he upbraided the administration for not supporting "this Army." When Lincoln and Stanton sent him one of McDowell's divisions, McClellan found other reasons for delay. Continuous rains had lashed the marshy plains east of Richmond. McClellan reported that his artillery and wagon trains were bogged down in muddy roads, his army immobilized. Before he could move against Richmond, the general must build footbridges, must corduroy the roads....
>
> In Washington, Lincoln threw the dispatches aside. The rebels attacked in bad weather, Lincoln complained. Why couldn't McClellan? The general seemed to think that Heaven sent rain only on the just. Then on June 25 came an even more alarming letter from the front. McClellan declared that the rebel army now had 200,000 men (it actually numbered about 85,000; McClellan had 100,000 men) and was preparing to attack him. In righteous indignation, the general bemoaned his "great inferiority in numbers," chastised the government for scorning his pleas for help, and announced that he would die with his troops. And if the rebels did annihilate his "splendid Army," the responsibility must "rest where it belongs."
>
> Lincoln had just about had enough of this. Your complaints "pain me very much," he informed McClellan. "I give you all I can." Anyway, Lincoln feared that McClellan's outburst was just another excuse for not advancing on Richmond. He really should never have let the general go down to the Peninsula. (McClellan had insisted on his plan, and Lincoln had been reluctant to overrule military judgment) McClellan should've launched his big battle at Manassas, should've struck the rebel army while it was there. Now the enemy was entrenched in front of Richmond with a stronger force, McClellan was belligerently inert, Union commands in Virginia badly spread out,

> the chances of a victory increasingly dim. (*With Malice Towards None*, pages 328–329)

However, as the war progressed and Lincoln found generals, such as Grant, whom he could trust to execute his strategic plans for the war, Lincoln determinedly refused to interfere with their operational plans.

McClellan also won his own unique place in any history of civilian control of the American military by virtue of a single incident that occurred when Lincoln relieved him of command in November, 1862, after 16 rancorous months of service. When McClellan said his farewell to his army:

> The soldiers gave him an almost hysterical farewell, cheering themselves hoarse, and doing a power of cursing as well. McClellan said that "many were in favor of my refusing to obey the order and of marching upon Washington to take possession of the government," and European officers who were present muttered that Americans were simply incomprehensible—why did not this devoted army go to the capital and compel the President to reinstate its favorite general? But there never had been much danger that this might really happen, regardless of the loose words that had been uttered; it is extremely hard to imagine McClellan actually leading an armed uprising...and it is quite impossible to imagine the Army of the Potomac taking part in one. (Bruce Catton, *Terrible Swift Sword*, page 478)

Undeniably the Army of the Potomac possessed a politicized officer corps due to its long service in the environs of Washington, D.C. And undeniably the politics of the Army were Democratic, as were those of its commander, who was to be the Democratic presidential candidate in 1864. Furthermore, McClellan's contempt for both Lincoln, whom he referred to privately as a "gorilla", as well as for the Republican Congress, was well-known at the time. But despite the loose camp talk and wild rumors circulating in Washington, McClellan always swore he was loyal to the Union, and Lincoln did not doubt him.

d. World War II

The current framework in which civilian-military relations are played out is in large part the outgrowth of the structure which developed during World War II. Its beginnings lie in a Military Order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt in July 1939 which took the Joint Army-Navy Board, the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board and additional procurement agencies from the Military Departments and consolidated them into the Executive Office of the President, thus making the members of the Joint Army-Navy Board the President's chief military advisors with direct access to the President. In 1942 the board was reconstituted as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This was very much in keeping with Roosevelt's approach to governing:

> Within his cabinet and within his administration generally, he permitted and encouraged a duplication of effort, an over-

> lapping of authorities, and a development of personal antagonisms amounting in some cases almost to civil wars. Whatever his motives, the effect was to increase, and at the same time often to disguise, his own authority. The Military Order of 1939 had, on the whole, that effect. As concerned foreign policy, strategy, and military procurement, it left Roosevelt the sole co-ordinating link between the various subordinate agencies in these fields. Co-ordination as a consequence was not very effective....through its very dispersion of subordinate authority, the Military Order of 1939 gave the President powers of decision in the military field which were real and not merely apparent, for in many areas of military concern, he, the Commander in Chief, alone could decide. (Ernest May, *The Ultimate Decision*, pages 138–139)

Thus, civilian control became largely a matter of presidential control for the purpose of conducting the war. Roosevelt did actively exercise this power often in the pre-war and early war years, making decisions over the opposition of his chiefs of staff.

> However, with the coming of war, the Commander in Chief found himself at the apex of a vast structure of military command. In theory the machinery was under his control and supervision. In fact the immensity of the war panorama as well as the burden of Roosevelt's other concerns as President meant that his control could be only partial and somewhat indirect in its working. The relative independence of the theater commanders, the central position and influence of the planning staffs, the wide powers and public respect enjoyed by his chiefs of staff—all these factors placed real limits on the Commander in Chief's independence of action which had not existed during the pre-war period. His role had become highly institutionalized. (*The Ultimate Decision*, page 151)

Consequently, as far as policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war. As Samuel P. Huntington has observed:

> When the nation went to war, it went wholeheartedly, turning the direction of the conflict over to those who made that their business. The national aim of total victory superseded all else. The military became the executors of the national will,... (*The Soldier and The State*, page 317)

Huntington quotes a Representative who typified Congress' view of its proper role vis a vis the military commanders under the circumstances of the war:

> I am taking the word of the General Staff of the War Department, the people who are running this show. If they tell me this is what they need for the successful prosecution of this war and for ultimate victory, I am for it. Whether it staggers me according to its proportions or not, I am still for it. (*The Soldier and The State*, page 317)

Thus even the Truman Committee, which spearheaded Congress' involvement in the war effort, did not consider participation in, or critique of, strategy and policymaking to be an appropriate part of its function. This contrasted sharply with the Committee's very active involvement in economic mobilization and production where they were sometimes very critical of the military, siding with the civilian Office of War Mobilization and War Production Board against the armed forces.

In the Executive Branch, the military found itself confronting a power vacuum created by the lack of a high-level agency, particularly some sort of civil-military board, to establish the government's policy on the conduct of the war. The lack of such an agency was due to President Roosevelt's own particular style of administration. As discussed above, the consequence was an almost complete loss of civilian control below the presidential level during the war and in the formulation of U.S. policy in the immediate post-war period. Their special relationship with the President and Roosevelt's method of operation gave the Joint Chiefs little choice but to fill the power vacuum in order to fight the war effectively. The result was that Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Knox had no formal authority in formulating military strategy, nor did they attend the inter-allied war conferences. It was instead the Joint Chiefs who accompanied the President. They were not even on the list for routine distribution of JCS papers.

However, their remoteness from the decision-making process paled in comparison to the complete isolation in which Secretary of State Cordell Hull was placed. He was never included in meetings in which the war was discussed; he was merely informed of decisions after they were made. As a result, during the course of the war, the military became involved in diplomacy and negotiations as well as international politics and economics. Huntington sums up the transformation in the military role this way:

> Originally, the War Department did not like this situation, but by the end of the war, the pressure of events had "overcome all scruples on the part of OPD (Operations Division of the General Staff) about getting into matters that traditionally were none of the Army's business. Considerably more than half the papers OPD prepared for the 1945 Potsdam conference were devoted to matters other than military operations. (*The Soldier and The State*, page 324)

e. Korean War

The most celebrated exercise of civilian control over the military in this century was President Truman's dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. The fundamental disagreement between MacArthur and his Commander-in-Chief was over the nature and scope of the Korean War.

Nothing in MacArthur's personality or previous military service had prepared him to fight the kind of limited war of murky and shifting goals that he found prescribed by the military directives emanating from Washington, in consultation with the United Nations allies. It was MacArthur's and America's first experience with a modern military conflict in which the civilian leadership established political objectives that were a substitute for victory. In fact, MacArthur's frustrations foreshadowed those of the military during the Vietnam War. Unlike the commanders of the later war, MacArthur's personal authority and prestige were such that he was able to successfully challenge civilian directives on the conduct of the war on several occasions prior to the incident which led to his dismissal.

The circumstances of the most notable of these incidents indicate a significant lack of firmness and policy coherence in the conduct of the war on the part of both MacArthur's military and civilian superiors. On September 27, 1950, after the victory at Inchon, MacArthur was told to "conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of the destruction of the North Korean armed forces", with two conditions: no aircraft was to be sent over Sino-Soviet territory and only South Korean troops were to approach the Yalu River. A month later MacArthur ordered his forces into the northeastern provinces which border the Soviet Union and China.

This looked very much like a flouting of his September 27 orders from the Joint Chiefs. Acheson later wrote: "If General Marshall and the Chiefs had proposed withdrawal to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and a continuous defensive position under united command across it —and if the President had backed them, as he undoubtedly would have —disaster probably would have been averted. But it would have meant a fight with MacArthur." The Pentagon was unwilling to risk that fight. Intimidated by the victor of Inchon, the Chiefs timidly radioed him that while they realized that CINCFE (MacArthur/Commander-in-Chief, Far East) "undoubtedly had sound reason" for his move, they would like an explanation, "since the action contemplated" was a "matter of concern" to them. MacArthur replied that he was taking "all precautions," that the September 27 order was not a "final directive" because Marshall had amended it two days later by telling him that he wanted SCAP (MacArthur/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) to "feel unhampered tactically and strategically" in proceeding "north of the 38th Parallel," and that "military necessity" compelled him to disregard it anyhow because the ROKs (Republic of Korea troops) lacked "strength and leadership." If the Chiefs had further questions, he referred them to the White House. The entire subject, he said, had been "covered" in his "conference with the President at Wake Island."

> That was news to Harry Truman. On Thursday he weakly told a press conference that it was his "understanding" that only South Koreans would approach the Yalu. Informed of this, the General contradicted him through the press, saying, "The mission of the United Nations forces is to clear Korea." The Pentagon advised the President to ignore this challenge from SCAP because of a firmly established U.S. military tradition—established by Lincoln with Grant in 1864—that once a field commander had been assigned a mission "there must be no interference with his method of carrying it out." That, and MacArthur's tremendous military prestige, persuaded Truman to hold his tongue. He did more than hold it; he endorsed SCAP's strategy in a statement declaring that he would allow North Koreans to take refuge in a "privileged sanctuary" across the Yalu. (William Manchester, *American Caesar*, pages 599-600.)

It was in this climate that MacArthur began to challenge Truman's conduct of the war through public statements which were not submitted for the required clearance from Washington. In taking this approach, MacArthur was feeding the flames of virulent criticism of Truman's policies by congressional Republicans. The crisis came when Truman notified MacArthur he was preparing to propose peace negotiations before considering any further significant drive above the 38th Parallel. Four days later, MacArthur released, without clearance from Washington, what he called a military appraisal of the war, but what was really an ultimatum so insulting to the Chinese that it effectively scuttled any possibility of China accepting Truman's proposal.

The appraisal declared that China:

> ..."lacks the industrial capacity" for "the conduct of modern war"....Its troops had displayed "an inferiority of ground firepower." Even under the inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces" China had "shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea. The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision by the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse." Therefore he stood "ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed." (*American Caesar*, page 634)

Truman then unceremoniously relieved MacArthur of command. The public furor caused by this act and MacArthur's subsequent return to the United States was high drama. The Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate held two months of hearings on MacArthur's dismissal and Truman's foreign/military policy. In the end, the committees did not issue a formal report. Most significant about the hearings, and in fact about the entire MacArthur dismissal crisis, was that while many criticized Truman's conduct of the war and his judgment in dismissing MacArthur, no one seriously questioned his right, as Commander-in-Chief, to act as he did. Thus, due to the deeply ingrained belief in the constitutional prerogatives of a civilian President, what could have been a grave constitutional crisis for the country became simply a political crisis for the Truman Administration.

f. Vietnam War

The most recent example of the military exceeding the bounds set by civilian authorities was that of General John D. Lavelle during the Vietnam War.

General Lavelle was the commander of the Seventh Air Force who in 1971-72 stretched the "Rules of Engagement" governing bombing North Vietnam to the point where "Protective Reaction Strike" became in fact "Pre-emptive Strike." The Rules of Engagement would not permit pilots to engage certain ground targets unless the targets had first fired on or engaged the planes. The operational reports on these unauthorized bombing raids, of which there were no more than 28 in all, were falsified by the General's staff to include the key criteria of "enemy reaction" to the planes' presence over North Vietnam, when in fact the planes had not been engaged by the enemy.

The falsification came about because General Lavelle's Director of Communications misinterpreted a comment the General made to the effect that his pilots must not report "no enemy reaction" to their presence. The Director of Communications thus set up a system of falsifying the mission reports. The system lasted only a short time because a sergeant could not square it with his conscience and wrote his Senator, Harold Hughes, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Armed Services Committee launched an extensive investigation of the matter, during which Lavelle's military superiors testified they believed Lavelle had exceeded a reasonable interpretation of the bombing Rules of Engagement. Lavelle testified that in a meeting in December 1971, Secretary of Defense Laird advised him to take full advantage of the authority at his disposal and assured him the Department would support him. This is what Lavelle believed he was doing.

The key factors that led to the Lavelle incident were:

> Ambiguous rules of engagement that also proved to be unresponsive to the increasing demands for protection of U.S. Air Force pilots;
>
> Faulty judgment on Lavelle's part in deciding to bend (break) the rules on "protective reaction" strikes in the absence of formal authority from higher levels and on the basis of equivocal statements by Secretary of Defense Laird and other senior level officials; and
>
> Negligence on Lavelle's part in issuing ambiguous instructions on reporting procedures and, then, failing to detect the falsified reports. (*A Brief History and Analysis of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States,* page 8)

But in sum, whatever Lavelle's faults, they did not include a deliberate intent to subvert the constitutional principle of civilian authority.

D. ANALYSIS OF U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

As can be seen from the foregoing historical review, the military has never posed a serious threat to civilian control in the United States in terms of the three traditional threats to civilian control.

1. Man-on-Horseback

During two centuries of American history, numerous military leaders possessed substantial personal authority and charisma and had wide public support. Yet, none posed the threat of a "man-on horseback."

Generals Washington, McClellan, and MacArthur are probably the best examples. However, each of these generals eschewed any temptation to wrest control from civilian authorities. The cases of the rebellious generals —McClellan, Fremont, and MacArthur —illustrate the fundamental difference in perspective which has rendered "the Man on the White Horse" an improbable event in the

United States. The crucial distinction lies in these commanders' attitude towards their civilian superiors. They were undeniably contemptuous of the *particular* civilians they served under, but not of the principle of civilian supremacy. It is revealing that each of these generals was allied with the political party out of power at the time, and each desired to be elected as a civilian to the Nation's highest office. In fact, McClellan and Fremont did run unsuccessfully for President.

Thus, all significant conflict between U.S. military commanders and their civilian superiors has taken place within the context of the American political system rather than as a challenge to the system.

This is all the more remarkable when one considers that although Americans possessed an innate distrust of standing armies, this distrust was not, for a century, coupled with adherence to a policy of keeping the armed forces free of the influences of partisan politics. The national attitude towards military participation in politics has changed substantially as U.S. governmental institutions have developed. In the Nineteenth Century, it was not unusual for officers to participate in politics. This was due to the "spoils system" approach to Federal hiring, both civil and military. However, by the turn of the century, a civil service employment act had been adopted and the tide began to turn against politically active soldiers as well.

In this century, regulations were adopted which forbade active duty military personnel from engaging in political activity. Echoing the MacArthur incident, but occurring in peacetime, two recent examples of disciplinary action against generals demonstrate that public political action or speech is not permissible in the U.S. armed forces. In the first instance, General Edwin Walker, USA, commander of the 24th Infantry Division in West Germany, was admonished by the Kennedy Administration for distributing right-wing propaganda to his troops and for publicly criticizing Administration policies. He subsequently resigned his commission. In 1978, General John Singlaub, USA, Chief of Staff of the U.S.—South Korean Combined Forces Command, was removed from his position after publicly condemning Carter Administration policies. He subsequently retired from the Army following a second similar incident.

2. Benign, Objective Takeover

Similarly, the American approach refutes another major theory of civil-military relations: the benign, objective military takeover when the civilian government's inability to govern has thrown a country into crisis. Even in the gravest national emergency faced by the United States, the Civil War, there was not a serious threat that the military would take over the government. Furthermore, in those instances in which Federal troops have been used to enforce civil laws, such as the veterans march on Washington in 1932 or, more recently, in the civil disturbances of the 1960's, the forces have always remained under civilian control and have surrendered their responsibilities to civilian law enforcement authorities when ordered to do so.

3. Commander Taking Actions on His Own Initiative

Popular though the Dr. Strangelove image is, instances of American commanders overstepping the bounds of their authority have been rare. General MacArthur's actions in Korea come close to such action and, in that case, his actions were more insubordination than exceeding his authority. Indeed, the most prevalent occurrence is that of a senior officer who voices an opinion on a political subject, such as Generals Walker and Singlaub. None of these examples pose any serious threat to civilian control of the military.

The greatest threat, of course, is that an officer could initiate armed action on his own. This threat runs all the way from the rifleman on the East German border, to the Captain of a nuclear armed submarine, and to more senior commanders. The assurance against such action is discipline and an ingrained sense of the subordination to civilian control. In the realm of nuclear weapons, great security precautions have been taken to prevent anyone other than the President from initiating a nuclear attack.

4. Overview

Thus, from Washington to Lavelle, throughout American history, an inculcated belief in the right of civilians to control the country's armed forces has triumphed over threatening circumstances and individual egos. As the Steadman Report on the national military command structure in 1978 concluded:

> We find that the concept of civilian control over the military is unquestioned throughout the Department. It is a non-issue. Our military forces are fully responsive to the command and control of the duly constituted civilian authorities; the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary. (page 40)

The historical review supports this conclusion.

The current attitudes, both in the society at large and in the military, were framed by the experiences of World War II. As discussed above, President Roosevelt gave the military extraordinary power during World War II and, although he retained absolute control, he was physically able to make only the very largest decisions. All of the lesser decisions, including ones related to diplomacy and economics —areas usually reserved for civilians —were left to the military. It is therefore no surprise that the early proposals of the Joint Chiefs for the postwar organization of the Department of Defense preserved for the military great responsibility and direct access to the President. In enacting the National Security Act of 1947, Congress rejected these proposals in favor of the National Security Council, a Secretary of Defense and firm civilian control.

But the attitude of many military men that they should have very broad responsibility and authority in the national security field is still seen. Indeed some of the current writings on DoD organization suggest that the balance between military and civil authorities should be shifted in favor of increasing the authority and responsibility of military officers at the expense of civilians. The argument is made that civilian authorities are not competent to deal with many of the technical questions of national security which should properly be left to the military.

On the other hand, many people have criticized President Roosevelt's decision-making authority because it gave too much authority to the military, particularly in areas such as diplomacy. It is sometimes said that "we won the war but lost the peace". This view is that the military, particularly in Europe, did not take adequate cognizance of the political considerations which would govern postwar Europe. Subject to particular criticism are the failure to move further east with our forces and the failure to establish a land corridor to occupied Berlin. Some have suggested that if a civilian diplomat had been present during the final negotiations for the arrangements governing Berlin, the civilian might have foreseen the need to have guaranteed land access to Berlin. The absence of such a provision permitted the Soviets to blockade Berlin in 1948 which was broken only by a massive American airlift. (See e.g., Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, pages 262–263)

But these arguments go to the relative balance between civil and military authorities, not to the underlying principle that, in the end, civilians control the military.

There are a number of other trends in civil-military relations which affect the degree to which civilians are able to control the military. Chief among these is the blurring of military and civil relations.

The United States' role as a world power has created international commitments and interests which have blurred the division between civilian and military responsibilities. Several factors have led to increased civilian involvement in what were formerly areas left to the military in peacetime, and *vice versa*.

The advent of nuclear weapons has placed greater requirements on civilian control than have been necessary at any time in American history. The dangers and responsibilities of nuclear forces, combined with modern communications, both require and enable civilians to exercise minute control of crises around the world. The Cuban missile crisis was a prime example of such micro-management. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the Cuban missile crisis and how some elements of the military resisted detailed questions from Secretary of Defense McNamara.) Some critics feel that civilian direction pursued to this extent represents an unwarranted intrusion into the realm of military responsibility and expertise. However, the President is within his rights as Commander-in-Chief to exercise or delegate such control. Furthermore, the complexity of modern international politics and the potential for distant incidents to escalate into major international crises compel civilian political leaders to be more actively involved than would have previously been necessary.

In addition, strategic military considerations have come to carry unprecedented weight in peacetime planning and policy decisions. Yet, some critics have expressed concern that civilian officials are not devoting adequate time and attention to reviewing military contingency plans. They allege that, as a result, when contingency plans are reviewed during crises, they are often not realistic because they do not reflect the political realities which the civilian decision-makers must confront.

While it is true that political considerations impinge on military prerogatives in the modern world, it is also true that many so-called foreign policy issues deeply involve the military and require them to become involved in what, heretofore, would have been a purely civilian domain. A significant example of this phenomenon is U.S. policy towards the Middle East. Assuring continued access to Middle East oil is a major component of U.S. policy towards the region; however, even barring a crisis where the use of force becomes necessary, a U.S. military presence in the region plays an important part in sustaining this policy. For example, in 1983, Marines were sent to Lebanon on an essentially political mission.

An additional problem that diminishes civilian control over the military is the collusion between the military Services. This occurs when the Services agree on a course of action, before rendering advice to the civilian authorities. The drive for unanimity within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as discussed in Chapter 4, means that the advice given is often tailored to the least common denominator. As a result, the value of the military advice is diluted. Moreover, the Secretary is confronted by all four Chiefs of the uniformed Services who have taken a unified stand on a position. As such, it is very difficult for him to overrule the Chiefs even if he believes their advice is poor. This dilutes his ability to control the Chiefs.

Any effort to reorganize the Department of Defense cannot diminish the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense and other senior civilian authorities to control the Department of Defense. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense must have adequate authority to carry out his responsibilities. It is not fair to expect a civilian Secretary of Defense to carry all these responsibilities himself. He must be able to delegate them to subordinates who are also civilians. Any scheme must also provide protection for a weak Secretary of Defense who must confront strong military leadership.

Any system must assure that the President and the Secretary of Defense are able to control detailed military operations in a crisis. Our experience of the last few years is that when military force is applied, the President and the Secretary of Defense have sought to control the operation with great precision. Some may question whether this is wise; none should question whether it is within their authority. Indeed, in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, such as the Cuban missile crisis, it is imperative that the President and the Secretary be able to exercise very careful control over U.S. military forces.

Finally, as noted at the outset, there is no readily available definition of the meaning of civilian control. However, the experience of nearly two centuries of American history suggests that this absence of a definition has served us well. As with other constitutional doctrines which are broad and do not have specific definition, civilian control of the military has given the system the political flexibility that is needed to maintain the essence of the principle, i.e., that the President as Commander-in-Chief must be able to control the use of the armed forces. But, at the same time, it has not crippled the valuable professional advice or the role played by the professional military officer. It also preserves the ability to adjust the system to changing circumstances and new challenges.

E. CONCLUSIONS

This section presents the conclusions of this chapter relating to the operational dimension of civilian control of the military.

1. Throughout the course of American history, the lack of consensus on a definition of civilian control has not undermined its effectiveness as one of the governing tenets of the American republic.

2. The concept of civilian control of the military is unquestioned throughout the Department of Defense today; accordingly, fears that the U.S. military might threaten American political democracy are misplaced.

3. As long as American civil and military leaders continue to exercise respect for civilian control, there should be strong confidence in the ability of American political institutions to control the military under a range of possible structures for the Nation's highest military command.

4. As the world becomes more complex and demands on U.S. civilian and military establishments increase accordingly, the United States cannot afford to become complacent about the apparent balance in civil-military relations.

5. Any changes contemplated to the U.S. military establishment must be carefully assessed for their impact on civil-military relations.

6. No changes can be accepted which diminish civilian control over the military; the recommendations of this study either strengthen civilian control over the military or leave the balance as it currently exists.

APPENDIX A

TRENDS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

There are a number of significant trends in American civil-military relations, which have primarily emerged in the post-World War II era. They reflect an expansion of the military as an institution in American society.

A. EXPANDING PUBLIC CONTACT OF THE U.S. MILITARY

Traditionally, the small standing military forces of the United States stayed so removed from the mainstream of American life, save in time of war, that the vast majority of the American public had very little knowledge of who they were or what they did. The first significant break with this tradition came after World War I when the Army, instead of retreating into its customary isolation, instituted the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program. From this beginning, all military Services have increased their contact with the public, developing a variety of institutions to disseminate information about themselves. Examples of these organizational devices include: public information and education programs conducted by the National War College and similar institutions across the country; the military associations —Association of the U.S. Army, Navy League, Air Force Association —who, though technically independent of the Services whose names they bear, represent a significant force for promoting the views held by the Services, not only to the public at large but to Members of Congress and other policymakers; and finally, the substantial public and congressional relations efforts of the military Services and the Department of Defense itself.

B. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

In his farewell speech, President Eisenhower warned of the growing influence of the "military industrial complex." That warning was not directed at the highly unlikely event that military officers and industrialists would conspire to take over the government of the United States. Rather, it was a recognition that the sheer size and economic power of the defense establishment give a relatively few men enormous influence. The defense budget is so large, and so many dollars and jobs are at stake, that political power and influence are also at stake. As such, when the interests of the armed Services and the defense contractors coincide, they form a very powerful political force. This poses no immediate threat, but one should not lose sight of this potential threat to the ability of the civilians, both in the Executive and Legislative Branches, to control the whole defense establishment.

C. CONTROL OVER RESOURCES AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Effective control of defense expenditures is one of the major modern challenges to civilian control. More than a budgetary matter, it involves the fundamental issues of who in fact, not theory, establishes national security policy and determines the allocation of finite resources to fulfill security needs.

It is in this area that the Congress exercises the greater part of its responsibilities for civilian control of the military. To the Congress, the Constitution gives the powers of appropriation of funds, and raising and supporting a military establishment. The extent to which the Congress is responsible and effective in executing these powers represents the extent to which it has played a role in maintaining effective civilian control over the vast and complex defense establishment. Thus, when critics speak of the undue influence which individual programs, parochial interests, or institutions, such as the National Guard, have upon the allocation of defense resources, they are not addressing a problem created by an inherent flaw in our system of civilian control, but a problem created by the Congress' decision to exercise its control in a particular fashion. Of course, the Congress is not alone in being susceptible to these sorts of influence, but by the very nature of its institutional structure, it is more vulnerable to them.

D. APPOINTMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS TO CIVILIAN POSITIONS

A less dramatic theme concerning civil-military relationships has to do with the gradual encroachment of the military on civilian authority through the appointment of military officers to civilian positions. As discussed previously, the Congress required that the Secretary of Defense be appointed "from civilian life" and forbade anyone serving as Secretary within 10 years after leaving active duty as a commissioned officer. The principal historical example of this separation of civilian and military roles was the appointment in 1950 of General George C. Marshall, USA (Retired) to be Secretary of Defense. For Marshall to be confirmed, the Congress had to waive section 202(a) of title 10, United States Code, which stipulated that the Secretary of Defense be a civilian who has not been on active duty in the armed Services within the previous ten years. The Congress approved the waiver in Marshall's case, but not without debate over the dangers inherent in the blending of the two roles. This ingrained suspicion of military influence notwithstanding, where not specifically prohibited by law, military officers do occasionally fill less senior, traditionally civilian, positions in government without doing noticeable harm to civilian control.

A variation on this theme is the increasing service of retired military officers on presidential commissions whose work may have significant influence on U.S. policy. A prime example of this trend was the appointment of General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Retired) to be Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. The Scowcroft Commission's mission was to present the MX missile in a framework which would make it acceptable to the Congress. The commission succeeded not only in keeping the MX alive, but also in instigating the creation of the small mobile ICBM program.

CHAPTER 3

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A. EVOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Introduction

The first proposal to establish a single executive department for the U.S. military establishment was published in March 1921. This proposal was among an extensive series of recommendations for Federal administrative reorganization written by Frank Willoughby of the Institute for Government Research (now the Brookings Institution). Willoughby wanted to place the two existing military departments—Department of War and Department of the Navy—and a supply department in a single executive agency, to be entitled the Department of National Defense.

Willoughby's proposal received wide attention and became the basis for unification proposals considered by the Congress from 1921 until 1926. Both the War and Navy Departments opposed these unification proposals and continued to argue against unification throughout the 20-year period leading up to World War II.

Between 1921 and 1945, Congress looked at some 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. In his book on the early history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, entitled *The Formative Years 1947-1950*, Steven L. Rearden discusses these legislative proposals:

> . . . Proponents of these measures included advocates of "scientific management" and governmental reform, legislators who sympathized with the movement for increased autonomy of military aviation, and economy-minded congressmen in search of cures for the Great Depression. (page 17)

Given the opposition of the War and Navy Departments, only one of these bills reached the floor of the House of Representatives, where it was defeated in 1932 by a vote of 153 to 135. In general, prior to World War II, the idea of unification of U.S. armed forces rarely received serious consideration.

During World War II, however, it became increasingly evident that the nature of warfare was undergoing radical change. World War II demonstrated that modern warfare required combined operations by land, sea, and air forces. This, in turn, required not only a unity of operational command of these forces, but also a coordinated process for achieving the most effective force mixture and structure. As President Eisenhower was to express it in his Message to Congress on April 3, 1958, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever".

The single direction of U.S. military components during World War II became a prerequisite to the success of the U.S. effort and a necessity for the harmonious cooperation of U.S. and allied, especially British, military command structures. This experience virtually ruled out a return to the pre-war separation of the Services, but by no means did it suppress the divergent pressures that derived from traditional attitudes within the Services and from institutional balances between the Executive Branch and the Congress.

Following World War II, the Army became an advocate of close unification. The Army's position was greatly influenced by pre-war organizational arrangements in the War Department and by the experiences of attempting to provide unified direction for the war effort.

The Army's position was strongly supported by President Truman. Based upon his experiences in the Senate and his wartime responsibilities, President Truman concluded that the "antiquated defense setup" was in need of a drastic overhaul. He had suggested that the only effective solution was "a single authority over everything that pertains to American safety." (*The Formative Years*, page 20).

In working for this objective, the Army was assisted by proponents of air power, motivated by a strong desire for co-equal status for air forces with land and sea forces. The Navy —fearing for the future of its naval air power and the Marine Corps —wanted at the time no part of unification, particularly of unified command in Washington.

In his Message to the Congress on December 19, 1945 concerning the need for greater military unification, President Truman stated:

> With the coming of peace, it is clear that we must not only continue, but strengthen, our present facilities for integrated planning. We cannot have the sea, land, and air members of our defense team working at what may turn out to be cross purposes, planning their programs on different assumptions as to the nature of the military establishment we need, and engaging in an open competition for funds.

The experiences of World War II were the major impetus for changing the organizational structure of the U.S. military establishment. The history of the U.S. military establishment since World War II and of the Office of the Secretary of Defense within it is clearly told in a series of evolutionary organizational changes, commencing with the National Security Act of 1947.

2. The National Security Act of 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 reflected a compromise of diverse currents and pressures. The Congress acknowledged the need for military "unification"; this action was tempered, however, by the reluctance of the Congress to bestow on the President any additional powers that might weaken the congressional role in civilian control of the military.

The Act, in addition to creating a National Security Council for better coordination of foreign and military policy and a Central Intelligence Agency for coordination of intelligence, created the position of Secretary of Defense to provide the President a principal staff assistant "in all matters relating to the national security."

The characteristics of compromise were most significantly reflected in the powers granted to the Secretary of Defense. Rather than presiding over one single Department of the Executive Branch, as recommended by President Truman, he was to preside over the National Military Establishment, which consisted of three Executive Departments —Army, Navy, and Air Force —each headed by a Cabinet-level Secretary.

The Secretaries of each of the Military Departments retained all their powers and duties, subject only to the authority of the Secretary of Defense to establish "general" policies and programs, to exercise "general" direction, authority and control, to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the logistics field, and to supervise and coordinate the budget.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) came into being as a result of the National Security Act of 1947. As the offices of Cabinet secretaries were not generally established by law, OSD did not have a statutory basis, but emerged "as an extension of the secretary and developed gradually as Forrestal [the first Secretary of Defense] and his successors enlarged their authority over the vast defense organization." (*The Formative years,* page 57)

In the National Security Act of 1947, the Secretary of Defense was given three Special Assistants. He could also hire as many professionals and clerical aides as he required and could request the Services to detail military officers as assistants and personal aides to him. The number of employees in OSD rose to 173 by the end of January 1948 and to 347 by the beginning of 1949.

The Act, in an effort to prevent a repetition of the haphazard economic mobilization of World War II, created a Munitions Board and a Research and Development Board, but made the representatives of the Military Departments on each board co-equal with the Chairman of the Board.

The resulting organization was aptly characterized some years later by President Eisenhower as "little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units."

Each subsequent step in the evolution of the U.S. military establishment was to be characterized by debate centered upon the powers required by the Secretary of Defense to assure properly unified armed forces and their efficient management.

3. The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act

In 1949, armed with the findings of the Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security Organization, the public plea of Secretary of Defense Forrestal in his 1948 Annual Report, and the Eberstadt Task Force report, all of which documented the weaknesses of the 1947 Act and recommended greater powers for the Secretary of Defense, President Truman renewed his insistence for more effective unification of the military establishment.

The resulting changes in military organization once again reflected a compromise of the existing pressures and influences, but on balance, represented a major step in the direction of unification. The Department of Defense became an Executive Department, with the Secretary of Defense responsible for general direction. The three Special Assistants to the Secretary of Defense were converted to Assistant Secretaries. The Executive Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were reduced to Military Departments —with the proviso, however, that they should be separately administered. The President's request for a transfer to the Secretary of Defense of the statutory functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board was denied. The Secretary of Defense was specifically prohibited from transferring assigned combatant functions among the Military Departments and was limited in the transfer of noncombatant functions by a requirement for pre-notification of Congress.

Subsequent to his submission of the request for the statutory changes in the National Security Act of 1947, but before the Congress enacted the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, the President submitted to the Congress Reorganization Plan No. 4, by which the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board were transferred to the Executive Office of the President. By selecting only these two boards for transfer to the Executive Office of the President, the Reorganization Plan and the language of the President's message of transmittal, by omission, supported the implication that the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were parts of the Department of Defense, and as such, subject to the "general direction" of the Secretary of Defense. The statutes were uniformly silent as to the organizational location of all five entities.

4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

President Eisenhower, shortly after his election, appointed the Rockefeller Committee to examine defense organization. Further changes in defense organization came in 1953, based upon the recommendations of this Committee, in the form of Reorganization Plan No. 6 submitted to the Congress by President Eisenhower. Under the provisions of that plan, which became effective on June 30, 1953, the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, the Defense Supply Management Agency and the Director of Installations were all abolished and their functions transferred to the Secretary of Defense. Six additional Assistant Secretary positions, supplementing the three in existence, and a General Counsel of equivalent rank, were established to provide more adequate assistance to the Secretary of Defense.

5. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act

Faced by continuing inter-Service rivalry and competition over the development and control of strategic weapons, and under the impetus of the successful launching of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union in October 1957, President Eisenhower in 1958 requested, and the Congress enacted, substantial changes in the military organization. The basic authority of the Secretary of Defense was redefined as "direction, authority and control," which was as strong as the Congress knew how to write it. In addition, the Secretary of Defense was given substantial power to reorganize the Department of Defense, specifically in the logistics area. The authority of the Secretary of Defense over research and development programs of the Department was also strengthened, and the Secretary was provided with a Director of Defense Research and Engineering. In addition, the 1949 requirement that the Military Departments be "separately administered" was relaxed to "separately organized."

6. Developments Since 1958

No major statutory changes have occurred since 1958. The changes in defense organization since 1958 have flowed primarily from the reorganizational powers granted to the Secretary of Defense in the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. The most significant changes resulted from the creation of Defense Agencies and, more recently, DoD Field Activities. Significantly, each new Agency and Field Activity represented a consolidation of a functional diffusion among the Services. There were numerous changes in the establishment and disestablishment of certain assistant secretaries and other senior OSD positions. These changes reflected the management needs of various Secretaries of Defense, shifts over time in functional areas that required more or less attention, and efforts to provide for improved integration of the overall defense effort.

B. KEY ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS

1. Personnel End Strengths of OSD and Subordinate Components

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense

During the period of 1947-1950, the Office of the Secretary of Defense experienced rapid growth in the number of assigned civilian and military personnel. By 1950, the authorized strength of OSD was 2,004 civilian and military personnel. While the personnel strength of OSD fluctuated considerably in the following 33 years, by the end of 1983 the OSD staff was slightly smaller than in 1950 with 1,896 civilian and military personnel assigned.

While changes in the staff size were influenced by the addition or elimination of certain functions and by personnel reduction efforts, the most important influence was staff increases during the Vietnam conflict. The peak of this Vietnam buildup occurred in 1968 when 3,213 personnel were assigned to OSD. The history of these fluctuations and the major causes are shown in Table 3-1.

TABLE 3-1.—HISTORY OF PERSONNEL FLUCTUATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

End of year	Authorized strength (civilian and military)	Notes
1947	[1] 173	National Military Establishment and OSD created.
1948	856	Staffs of the Munitions Board and Research and Development Board included in figures.

TABLE 3-1.—HISTORY OF PERSONNEL FLUCTUATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—Continued

End of year	Authorized strength (civilian and military)	Notes
1949	1,551	Deputy Secretary and three assistant Secretaries authorized. Added Personnel Policy Board, Military Liaison Committee to Atomic Energy Commission, and the Weapons System Evaluation Group.
1950	2,004	Structure of organization changed to accommodate the Deputy Secretary and three assistant secretaries. Added Consolidated Office of Public Information (a department-wide activity), U.S. Mission to NATO, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
1953	2,200	Reorganization Plan #6 implemented. A General Counsel and six additional assistant secretaries authorized (Health and Medical, Research and Development, Applications Engineering, Supply and Logistics, Properties and Installations, International Security Affairs).
1958	1,669	DoD Reorganization Act implemented. Personnel reductions made. Director of Defense Research and Engineering established. Two R&D assistant secretaries eliminated.
1961	1,751	Assistant Secretary (Civil Defense) established. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) initiated. Other internal reorganizations made with no basic change in functions.
1964	2,217	Civil Defense function transferred to Army.
1965	2,407	Systems Analysis function expanded and given assistant secretary rank. Vietnam buildup begun.
1968	3,213	Peak Vietnam buildup reached providing increased management of supply, transportation, training, purchasing, auditing, research and development, and policy coordination.
1970–1971	2,621	New organizations created to exercise staff supervision over Intelligence and Telecommunications. Size of OSD reduced by Deputy Secretary Packard due to Vietnam drawdown.
1972	2,403	Second Deputy Secretary (primarily focused on Intelligence) established. Further reductions directed by Deputy Secretary Packard. Defense Security Assistance Agency established as a Defense Agency with 71 Military Assistance Program (MAP) funded OSD spaces. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency established as a Defense Agency (reducing OSD by 184 spaces). Intelligence, Telecommunications, and Test and Evaluation functions expanded.
1976	2,184	Defense Audit Service (DAS) established and 110 spaces transferred from OASD (Comptroller) to DAS. Inspector General for Intelligence established.

TABLE 3-1.—HISTORY OF PERSONNEL FLUCTUATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—Continued

End of year	Authorized strength (civilian and military)	Notes
1977	1,583	Personnel reductions directed by Secretary Brown. Transferred operating functions with 261 spaces to establish Washington Headquarters Services (administrative services, computer support, statistical reporting); 76 other spaces transferred to Military Departments and Defense Agencies (small groups of spaces and functions from throughout OSD). Eliminated a net of 209 other spaces while establishing an Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), a Deputy Under Secretary (Policy Review), and providing increased emphasis on NATO. Second Deputy Secretary of Defense eliminated.
1981	1,667	Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy) established. Defense Legal Services Agency established, transferring 51 spaces from the OSD General Counsel. Assistant to the Secretary (Review and Oversight)—ATSD (R&O)—established.
1982	1,773	DoD Inspector General established. ATSD (R&O) subsumed by the DoD Inspector General.
1983	1,896	Emphasis placed on intelligence; command, control, and communications; NATO standardization; acquisition management; and technology transfer.

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[1] January 1948.

b. Defense Agencies

There has been, however, substantial personnel growth in the last two decades in subordinate organizations which report directly to OSD: Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities. The growth in these agencies and activities resulted from the McCormack-Curtis Amendment to the Reorganization Act of 1958. This amendment authorized the Secretary of Defense, whenever he determined that it would be advantageous in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, to provide for the performance of any common supply or service by a single agency or such other organization as he deemed appropriate. This amendment allowed the Department of Defense some organizational flexibility and facilitated the integration of common functions.

Two Defense Agencies antedate the McCormack-Curtis Amendment. In November 1952, the National Security Agency was established by Presidential directive and placed under the Secretary of Defense. The Advanced Research Projects Agency was established under the Secretary in February 1958, but it did not formally gain status as a Defense Agency until 1972. The first Defense Agency to be formed following the 1958 Reorganization Act was the Defense Atomic Support Agency in May 1959 (which in 1972 became the Defense Nuclear Agency). None of these initial agencies involved functions in which the Services had any great proprietary interest.

But Service functions and interests were involved in the establishment of several of the Defense Agencies that followed; notable in this category were the agencies to consolidate and integrate communications, supply, and intelligence.

Currently, there are 15 Defense Agencies including the DoD Inspector General and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. (While the Court of Military Appeals has often been included in the Defense Agency category, it is excluded from this discussion because OSD has only administrative responsibilities for this organization.) The Defense Agencies are listed below in the order that they or their predecessor organization (date in parentheses) came into existence, with the date showing when they gained official Defense Agency status:

DEFENSE AGENCIES

National Security Agency	1952
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (1958)	1972
Defense Nuclear Agency (1959)[a]	1972
Defense Communications Agency	1960
Defense Intelligence Agency	1961
Defense Logistics Agency (1961)[b]	1977
Defense Contract Audit Agency	1965
Defense Security Assistance Agency	1971
Defense Mapping Agency	1972
Defense Investigative Service	1972
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences	1972
Defense Audiovisual Agency	1979
Defense Legal Services Agency	1981
DoD Inspector General	1983
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization	1984

[a] Formerly Defense Atomic Support Agency
[b] Formerly Defense Supply Agency

The growth in the number of Defense Agencies and an expansion of their responsibilities were accompanied by substantial growth in assigned manpower. Between 1960 and 1983, the civilian and military personnel strengths of the Defense Agencies grew from 8,669 to 74,565. (Due to classification, personnel strengths for the National Security Agency have been excluded from these totals.) While this latter number includes both civilian and military personnel, the vast majority —92.3 percent —are civilians.

c. DoD Field Activities

DoD Field Activities also perform selected support and service functions, but of a more limited scope than Defense Agencies. The creation of DoD Field Activities is a more recent initiative with the first activity established in 1974. There are currently eight DoD Field Activities, established in the following years.

DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

Department of Defense Dependents Schools	1974
Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS)	1974
American Forces Information Service (AFIS)	1977
Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)	1977
Office of Economic Adjustment	1978
Defense Medical Systems Support Center	1985
Defense Technology Security Administration	1985
Defense Information Services Activity	1985

Between 1975 and 1983, military and civilian manpower assigned to these activities increased from 417 to 11,366 personnel.

d. Summary

Table 3-2 provides a detailed track of the personnel strengths of OSD and subordinate components between 1960 and 1983 in 5-year increments. These personnel strengths are summarized in the following table.

PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF OSD AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1983
OSD	1,748	2,407	2,732	2,255	1,605	1,896
Defense agencies	8,669	47,513	73,017	77,492	69,490	74,565
Field activities	0	504	231	417	9,699	11,366
Total	10,417	50,424	75,980	80,164	80,794	87,827

2. Number of OSD Political Appointees

The following table shows the number of senior appointments in OSD and the percentage of those appointments that are political (non-career). This table shows:

- ○ some growth in senior executive positions and absolute numbers of political (non-career) appointments; and
- ○ political appointments have continued over the last 10 years to represent between 20-25 percent of total senior executive positions.

TABLE 3-2

Civilian and Military Actual End Strengths in OSD and Subordinate Organizations

	1960			1965			1970		
	Civilian	Military	Total	Civilian	Military	Total	Civilian	Military	Total
OSD Staff	1,344	404	1,748	1,786	621	2,407	1,914	818	2,732
Defense Agencies									
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency									
Defense Audiovisual Agency									
Office of the Inspector General									
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency									
Defense Communications Agency	118	332	450	976	1,378	2,354	1,640	1,849	3,489
Defense Contract Audit Agency							3,655	-	3,655
Defense Intelligence Agency				2,186	1,546	3,732	3,297	2,451	5,748
Defense Investigative Service									
Defense Legal Services Agency									
Defense Logistics Agency 1/				33,844	898	34,742	54,931	1,133	56,064
Defense Mapping Agency									
Defense Nuclear Agency 2/	2,097	6,122	8,219	2,053	4,592	6,645	1,706	2,317	4,023
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences									
Court of Military Appeals				40	-	40	38	-	38
TOTAL, Defense Agencies	2,215	6,454	8,669	39,099	8,414	47,513	65,267	7,750	73,017
DoD Field Activities									
Washington Headquarters Services									
American Forces Information Service				417	87	504	155	76	231
Civilian Health & Medical Program of the Uniformed Services									
Tri-Service Medical Information System									
Office of Economic Adjustment									
DoD Dependents Schools									
TOTAL, DoD Field Activities				417	87	504	155	76	231
TOTAL	3,559	6,858	10,417	41,302	9,122	50,424	67,336	8,644	75,980

1/ Formerly Defense Supply Agency
2/ Formerly Defense Atomic Support Agency

	1975			1980			1983		
	Civilian	Military	Total	Civilian	Military	Total	Civilian	Military	Total
OSD Staff	1,635	620	2,255	1,172	433	1,605	1,383	513	1,896
Defense Agencies									
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	115	30	145	100	26	126	106	25	131
Defense Audiovisual Agency				16	6	22	261	15	276
Office of the Inspector General				379	-	379	592	31	623
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency	649	-	649						
Defense Communications Agency	1,692	1,615	3,307	1,547	1,434	2,981	1,639	1,641	3,280
Defense Contract Audit Agency	3,406	-	3,406	3,423	-	3,423	3,750	-	3,750
Defense Intelligence Agency	2,583	1,909	4,492	2,569	1,736	4,305	2,850	1,931	4,781
Defense Investigative Service	1,279	1,206	2,485	1,506	177	1,683	3,260	46	3,306
Defense Legal Services Agency							54	2	56
Defense Logistics Agency	52,265	1,039	53,304	45,169	961	46,130	46,092	950	47,042
Defense Mapping Agency	7,595	828	8,423	8,135	436	8,571	8,737	430	9,167
Defense Nuclear Agency	620	543	1,163	630	518	1,148	670	504	1,174
Defense Security Assistance Agency	71	10	81	89	19	108	91	30	121
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences				502	73	575	685	131	816
Court of Military Appeals	37	-	37	39	-	39	42	-	42
TOTAL, Defense Agencies	70,312	7,180	77,492	64,104	5,386	69,490	68,829	5,736	74,565
DoD Field Activities									
Washington Headquarters Services				326	94	420	433	109	542
American Forces Information Service	160	87	247	131	43	174	130	58	188
Civilian Health & Medical Program of the Uniformed Services	145	-	145	205	7	212	212	7	219
Tri-Service Medical Information System				23	23	46	30	26	56
Office of Economic Adjustment							28	3	31
DoD Dependents Schools	25	-	25	8,847	-	8,847	10,330	-	10,330
TOTAL, DoD Field Activities	330	87	417	9,532	167	9,699	11,163	203	11,366
TOTAL	72,277	7,887	80,164	74,808	5,986	80,794	81,375	6,452	87,827

SENIOR POLITICAL (NON-CAREER) APPOINTMENTS IN OSD*

	Total appointments	Non-career appointments	
		Number	Percentage
1970	222	28	12.6
1975	199	42	21.1
1978	221	52	24.4
1980	237	52	21.9
1983	289 (239)**	69 (44)**	23.9 (18.4)**

* Includes Presidential appointees and Senior Executive Service (SES) and GS-16–18's prior to SES. Defense agencies and OSD field activities are excluded. Figures provided by the Office of Personnel Management.

** Figures in parentheses were provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

3. Hierarchical Structure of OSD

As of April 1959, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense had 14 officials in OSD and OSD subordinate organizations reporting directly to them: seven assistant secretaries, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the General Counsel, three assistants to the secretary, and the Directors of the National Security Agency and of the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

As additional staff support was provided to the Secretary of Defense and as Defense Agencies were created, the number of officials reporting to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense continued to increase. By 1977, when Dr. Harold Brown assumed the position of Secretary of Defense, 34 officials reported directly to him and his Deputy.

Secretary Brown instituted a number of organizational changes and staff reductions to reduce the excessive number of individuals and functions reporting to him and to streamline his own and subordinate staffs. These changes reduced the size of the OSD staff from 2,065 to 1,519 personnel. Secretary Brown's major changes included the following:

- elimination of two Assistant Secretaries of Defense;
- elimination of one of the two Deputy Secretary of Defense positions;
- creation of two new Under Secretary of Defense positions, one for Policy and the other for Research and Engineering;
- transfer to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering of the major weapon systems acquisition responsibilities previously carried out by the Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics);
- consolidation of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Director, Telecommunications, Command

and Control Systems under a new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence);

- consolidation of manpower, reserve affairs, installations and logistics responsibilities in a new Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) in lieu of the prior breakout under two Assistant Secretaries, one for manpower and reserve affairs and the other for installations and logistics;
- establishment of a NATO affairs advisor reporting to the Secretary; and
- assigning supervisory responsibility of Defense Agencies to OSD officials, rather than the Secretary, as a further means of reducing the number of individuals and offices reporting directly to the Secretary.

Currently, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have 24 OSD and Defense Agency officials reporting to them (excluding their immediate assistants and the Executive Secretariat):

- two under secretaries
- ten assistant secretaries
- the General Counsel
- Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
- Director, Net Assessment
- Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
- Director, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
- Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO
- Assistant to the Secretary (Intelligence Oversight)
- DoD Inspector General
- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Director, National Security Agency
- President, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

4. Functional Organization of OSD

a. Emergence of Functional Areas in OSD

When James Forrestal took office as the first Secretary of Defense in September 1947, "he had no office, no staff, no organization chart, no manual of procedures, no funds, and no detailed plans" in the words of the 1948 Eberstadt Task Force. Forrestal formed an *ad hoc* committee to survey his staff requirements and make recommendations on the organization of his office. This committee felt that a small staff would be sufficient and recommended that Forrestal divide the activities of his office into functional areas: legal and legislative matters, budgetary and fiscal affairs, and public relations. The three special assistants authorized by the National Security Act were to serve as the principal coordinators in these three functional areas.

Throughout this study, the terms "functions" and "functional organization" are frequently used. Given the central role of these terms and the concepts that they represent in subsequent portions of this study, they need to be fully understood. In traditional management terminology, the term "functions" means the primary activities that an organization is to perform. In the business world, these primary activities include manufacturing, marketing, distribution, engineering, research and development, finance, and employee relations. DoD performs many of these activities, but has other major activities. Functions of DoD include research and development, manpower, policy formulation, installations, logistics, and finance (comptroller). The three primary bases for structuring organizations are by (1) functions, (2) products, and (3) geography. "Functional organization" means the use of functions to divide the organization into major units.

Forrestal received different recommendations on the organization on his office from Donald C. Stone of the Bureau of the Budget. Stone stressed the Secretary's need for a staff composed heavily of specialists to analyze substantive issues and interpret programs and plans. Regarding the special assistants, Stone argued that "the most effective use of these assistants will be for work which cuts across organizational lines." He added, "the broad objective should be to establish an arrangement under which the special assistants can render the maximum assistance to the Secretary of Defense and have to that end the maximum breadth of point of view and experience in day-to-day operations." (*The Formative Years*, page 59)

Forrestal was apparently sympathetic to Stone's views and incorporated many of his thoughts into the job descriptions of his special assistants. However, the organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense along functional lines was the predominant theme. This organizational theme has continued throughout the history of OSD. As OSD has grown in size and as new responsibilities have been added, the office has been organized strictly along functional lines.

OSD currently provides staff assistance to the Secretary of Defense in 20 functional areas. Twelve of these were established by 1953 with others added as additional functional support for the Secretary became evident. Two other functional activities—special operations and civil defense—were briefly performed by OSD offices during the late 1950's and early 1960's respectively. The following table shows when the current 20 functional areas became part of the responsibilities of OSD; functional areas were viewed as becoming part of OSD responsibilities when a distinct organizational entity was created to handle that function.

1947-1949
1. comptroller
2. legal
3. legislative affairs
4. administrative
5. public affairs

1953

6. international security affairs
7. research and engineering
8. supply and logistics
9. properties and installations
10. manpower and personnel
11. reserve affairs
12. health and medical

1958

13. atomic energy

1965
14. program analysis

1971

15. intelligence
16. telecommunications
17. net assessments

1977

18. policy

1978

19. intelligence oversight

1982

20. inspector general

Between 1953 and 1983, there have been numerous changes in the grouping and separating of these staff functions as well as the title of the senior official for various offices. The reasons for these changes included the management style and needs of the Secretary of Defense, the skills of senior officials to which these various responsibilities were to be assigned, and the substantive or political importance attached to certain areas. Figure 3-1 presents the history of these changes. As Figure 3-1 shows, the greatest changes have occurred with respect to five functional areas: supply and logistics, properties and installations, manpower and personnel, reserve affairs, and health and medical.

FIGURE 3-1

Changes in the Organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense


1949
1953
1958
1961
1964
1965
1970
1971
1973
1977
1978
1981
1983
1985
ASD (COMPTROLLER)
ASD (ADMINISTRATION)
ASD (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)
DIRECTOR PA&E
a
ASD (PA&E)
DIRECTOR PA&E
ASD (ADMINISTRATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASD (LEGISLATIVE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ATSD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
ASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
ATSD (LA)
ASD (LA)
ASD (LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
GENERAL COUNSEL
UNDER SECRETARY (POLICY)
ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
DIRECTOR NET ASSESSMENT
ATSD (FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY AFFAIRS)
ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASD (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT)
ASD (APPLICATIONS ENGINEERING)
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
UNDER SECRETARY (R&E)
ASD (RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY)
ASD (DEVELOPMENT & SUPPORT)
ASD (ACQUISITION & LOGISTICS)
ASD (INTELLIGENCE)
b
ASD (TELECOMMUNICATIONS)
ASD (C³I)
DUSR&E (C³I)
ASD(C³I)
ASD (SUPPLY & LOGISTICS)
ASD (PROPERTIES & INSTALLATIONS)
ASD (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)
ASD (MRA&L)
ASD (MANPOWER & LOGISTICS)
ASD (FORCE MANAGEMENT & PERSONNEL)
ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASD (MANPOWER & PERSONNEL)
ASD (MANPOWER & RESERVES)
ASD (MANPOWER & RESERVES)
ASD (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASD (HEALTH AND MEDICAL)
ASD (HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT)
c
ATSD (ATOMIC ENERGY)
ATSD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
ASD (CIVIL DEFENSE)
ATSD (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)
DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL

[a] Between 1973 and 1977, the title of this position was changed three times: ASD (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in 1974; Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) in 1976; and ASD (PA&E) in 1977.

[b] In 1973, this position was retitled Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems.

[c] This position was later retitled ASD (Health Affairs).

The following observations can be drawn from the emergence of various functional areas in OSD:

1. the initial functional areas (1947-1949) enabled the Secretary to administer his office, to interact with the external domestic environment, and to exercise some financial control.
2. the functional areas added in 1953 primarily added functional resource areas, but also provided staff support for interacting with the international environment.
3. additions since 1953 have added three, more specialized, functional resource areas (atomic energy, intelligence, and telecommunications); however, most of the additions have been to strengthen the Secretary's policy, program review, and oversight responsibilities.

b. Shifts in OSD Functional Emphasis

Shifts in functional emphasis in OSD over time are difficult to evaluate. The history of personnel strengths of various functional offices would be a strong indicator of such shifts. However, the conversion of certain activities from OSD offices, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and various administrative offices, to Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities makes such analyses difficult.

Table 3-3 provides a history of OSD personnel assigned to six broad functional categories. (It should be noted that there are some inconsistencies between the OSD personnel totals in Table 3-3 and Table 3-2). This table shows that:

- OSD has placed increased emphasis on financial control and program review, international security affairs and policy, and research and engineering in that order of degree; and
- OSD has placed less emphasis on manpower, installations, and logistics and considerably less emphasis on administrative, legal, and public affairs functions.

TABLE 3-3

OSD Personnel Strengths by Major Functional Areas

	1960		1965		1970		1975		1980		1981 (Estimate)	
Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Immediate Offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary	14	0.8	13	0.5	14	0.5	15	0.7	16	1.0	14	0.8
Defense Research and Engineering a/	330	18.9	527	21.9	530	20.0	628	29.1	343	22.1	455	24.6
Comptroller and Program Analysis b/	174	9.8	345	14.3	524	19.7	199	9.2	290	18.6	354	19.1
Manpower, Installations, and Logistics c/	409	23.4	483	20.1	554	20.9	477	22.1	327	21.0	367	19.8
Administration, Public Affairs, and Legal d/	510	29.2	749	31.1	676	25.5	556	25.8	236	15.2	220	11.9
International Security Affairs and Policy e/	308	17.7	290	12.0	357	13.4	280	13.0	343	22.1	441	23.8
	1,745		2,407		2,655		2,157		1,555		1,851	

a/ Includes offices with the following functions: research and engineering (including Advanced Research Projects Agency and Weapons Systems Evaluation Group), atomic energy, intelligence, telecommunications, command, and control, small business, and operational test and evaluation.

b/ Includes comptroller and systems analysis/program analysis and evaluation.

c/ Includes installations and logistics, manpower, health and environment/health affairs, and Reserve affairs.

d/ Includes administration, general counsel, legislative affairs, public affairs, special staff assistants, special programs, administrative support group, miscellaneous activities, intelligence oversight, and executive secretariat.

e/ Includes international security affairs, U.S. Mission to NATO, policy, and net assessment.

5. Summary of Key Organizational Trends

For some of the areas presented in this section, the trends are clear and obvious. In others, the data are not precise, or there were changes which make useful analyses difficult. Accordingly, it is appropriate to summarize what can be concluded with some degree of confidence about organizational trends in OSD.

- While the personnel strength of OSD has fluctuated considerably since 1950, the OSD staff was slightly smaller in 1983 than in 1950.
- Certain activities once performed by OSD are now accomplished in organizations subordinate to OSD: the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities.
- The most significant organization trend is the creation of 15 Defense Agencies and 8 DoD Field Activities which now have combined personnel strengths of about 86,000.
- The Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities represent a major effort to integrate common supply and service functions within the Department of Defense.
- Since 1970, there has been little change in the relative number of political appointees in OSD.
- Since as early as 1959, the hierarchical structure of OSD has been such that many officials report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- This has resulted in persistent span of control problems for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- Since its creation, OSD has been organized exclusively on a functional basis.
- The number of functional areas addressed by the OSD staff has steadily increased to a total of 20.
- Beginning in 1965, certain functions have been assumed by the OSD staff which seek to strengthen the Secretary of Defense's policy, program review, and oversight responsibilities.
- In particular, the emergence of the program analysis (1965), net assessments (1971), and policy (1977) functions demonstrates a trend toward staff capabilities that had a broader perspective than the narrow, functional, specialist orientation that had previously been the exclusive focus within OSD.

C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF OSD AND SUBORDINATE OFFICES

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is the principal staff element of the Secretary in the exercise of policy development, planning resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities. OSD includes the immediate offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, Assistants to the Secretary of Defense, and such other staff offices as the Secretary establishes to assist in carrying out his responsibilities.

CHART 3-1

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
UNDER SECRETARY (POLICY)
UNDER SECRETARY (RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (TRADE SECURITY POLICY)
DIRECTOR NET ASSESSMENT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
DEFENSE ADVISOR U.S. MISSION NATO
DIRECTOR SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS AND TECHNOLOGY)
DIRECTOR TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (TACTICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (RESEARCH AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY)

PREPARED BY
DIRECTORATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
AND MANAGEMENT PLANNING
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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JULY 1985

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Chart 3-1 presents the current organization and primary offices of OSD. The responsibilities of these offices are briefly described below.

a. *The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy* is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for policy matters relating to international security policy and political military affairs.

b. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)* provides advice and recommends policies, formulates programs, develops plans, and issues guidance to DoD components regarding political-military activities related to international affairs, excluding NATO, other European countries and the USSR. He exercises oversight over DoD activities relating to the Law of the Sea. In addition, the Assistant Secretary supervises the areas of security assistance (i.e., Foreign Military Sales Program and Military Assistance Program), Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions, and the negotiation and monitoring of agreements with foreign governments, excluding NATO, other European countries, and the USSR.

c. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)* serves as the focal point for long and mid-range policy planning on strategic international security matters, with responsibility for developing and recommending policy positions and coordinating all matters concerning disarmament, arms control, and East-West security negotiations. The Assistant Secretary formulates policy relating to strategic offensive and defensive forces, theater nuclear matters and capabilities, and the relationship between strategic and theater force planning and budgets. His responsibilities also include oversight of DoD activities related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and East-West economic policy, including East-West trade, technology transfer, and the defense industrial mobilization base.

d. *The Director of Net Assessment* prepares net assessments for the Secretary of Defense.

e. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)* is responsible for the following functional areas: Total Force management, military and civilian manpower, military and civilian personnel matters, manpower requirements for weapons support, education and training, and equal opportunity.

f. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics)* is responsible for management of DoD acquisition, logistics, installations, associated support functions, and other related matters. He also serves as the DoD Acquisition Executive.

g. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)* is responsible for Department of Defense health and sanitation matters, which include the care and treatment of patients, preventive medicine, clinical investigations, hospitals and related health facilities, medical material, health promotion, drug and alcohol abuse control, and the recruiting, education and training of health personnel.

h. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)* is responsible for National Guard and Reserve affairs, including facilities and construction, logistics, training, mobilization readiness and other related aspects.

i. *The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation* formulates the force planning, fiscal, programming, and policy guidance upon which DoD force planning and program projections are to be based. The staff analyzes and evaluates military forces, weapons systems, and equipment in relation to projected threats, U.S. objectives, resource constraints, and priorities established by the Secretary of Defense.

j. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)* is responsible for advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and DoD components in the performance of the Secretary's programming, budgeting, fiscal management, organizational and management planning, administrative functions, and the design and installation of resource management systems throughout the Department of Defense.

k. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)* maintains direct liaison with the Congress, the Executive Office of the President, and other government agencies with regard to legislative investigations and other pertinent matters affecting the relations of the Department of Defense with the Congress. The Assistant Secretary provides advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and other officials of the Department of Defense on congressional aspects of departmental policies, plans and programs.

l. *The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)* is responsible for operational test programs of DoD components, to include their independent operational test facilities and organizations, and coordination of independent OT&E activities; joint Service operational testing of major weapon systems; and analyses of OT&E results on all major acquisition programs.

m. *The Assistant to the Secretary (Intelligence Oversight)* conducts oversight of DoD intelligence and counterintelligence activities to ensure their compliance with the law and standards of propriety.

n. *The General Counsel* is the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense with responsibility for all legal services performed within or involving the Department of Defense. In addition, the General Counsel is responsible for preparation and processing of legislation, executive orders, and proclamations.

o. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C^3I))* provides policy, oversight, management, and coordination of Service and Defense Agency programs for the command, control, and communications of strategic and theater nuclear forces and theater and tactical forces. This position also is responsible for providing policy and technical support for domestic and international telecommunications activities. In addition, the Assistant Secretary (C^3I) provides resource management oversight of the complete range of DoD intelligence activities.

p. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)* directs DoD public and internal information and audiovisual activities, community relations, and programs in compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). He assists the information media and national and civic organizations in understanding the activities of the Department of Defense.

q. *The Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO* is responsible for advising and assisting the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in the formulation, coordination, and presentation of DoD policies pertaining to NATO. He is the senior DoD civilian official serving on the staff of the U.S. Ambassador to NATO.

r. *The Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU)*, under the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, administers Departmental responsibilities under the Small Business Act (92 Stat. 1760; 15 U.S.C. 631), as amended. The Director, SADBU, assures that a fair share of the Department's procurements are placed with small businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, and women-owned small businesses.

s. *The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E)* is the principal advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for DoD scientific and technical matters; basic and applied research; environmental services; and the development of weapons systems. This functional area has responsibility for research, development, and testing of all DoD weapons systems.

t. *The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Technology)* is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USDR&E for DoD oversight of the maintenance of a superior U.S. technology base and for the improvement of the DoD approach to selecting the best technology programs to achieve and maintain a qualitative lead in deployed systems. The Assistant Secretary (Research and Technology) also serves as the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and as the principal technical advisor to the USDR&E on space-related matters.

u. *The Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy)* serves as the principal staff assistant for DoD atomic energy matters. Included in the responsibilities of this position is promoting coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding on atomic energy policies, plans, and programs within DoD and between DoD and other Federal agencies.

2. Defense Agencies

There are 15 Defense Agencies that report to OSD. This includes 13 organizations most frequently identified as Defense Agencies as well as the Office of the Defense Inspector General and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. As Chart 3-2 shows, five of the agencies (National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of the Defense Inspector General, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, and Strategic Defense Initiative Organization) report directly to the Secretary of Defense while the remainder report to principal staff assistants of

CHART 3-2

DEFENSE AGENCIES


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDERSEC (POLICY)
ASD(COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
ASD (COMPTROLLER)
DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION
ASD (ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS)
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
GENERAL COUNSEL
DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
DEFENSE AUDIOVISUAL AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DoD INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES
UNDERSEC (RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING)
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PREPARED BY:
DIRECTORATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
AND MANAGEMENT PLANNING
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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the Secretary. The responsibilities of these agencies are briefly described below.

a. *The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)* manages high-risk basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise by adversaries and offer potential for major increases in U.S. defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA uses the services of the Military Departments, other government agencies, private industry, educational and research institutions, and individuals.

b. *The Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)* provides audiovisual production, acquisition, distribution, and depository services and certain other audiovisual services which can be performed more efficiently on a centralized basis.

c. *The Defense Communications Agency (DCA)* is responsible for engineering and management of the Defense Communications System and system architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems. DCA provides engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Communications Network. DCA also procures leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

d. *The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)* assists Department of Defense procurement authorities worldwide in achieving sound contract pricing by evaluating proposals submitted by contractors, verifying the propriety and acceptability of costs charged to flexibly priced government contracts, and deterring contractors' inefficient practices. The agency also provides contract audit services to about 30 other Federal agencies at contractor locations where DoD has a continuing audit interest, or where it is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view.

e. *The Office of Defense Inspector General (DIG)* was established by law in fiscal year 1983. The resources of the Defense Audit Service, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Review and Oversight, the Defense Logistics Agency's Inspector General, and certain elements of the Director of Audit Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), were all transferred to the new agency. The Defense Inspector General serves as an independent and objective official in DoD who is responsible for conducting, supervising, monitoring, and initiating audits and investigations of DoD programs and operations.

f. *The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)* produces finished, all-source foreign general, military, scientific,and technical intelligence. DIA provides DoD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Estimates. DIA determines information gaps and validates intelligence collection requirements; provides plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities; and manages and operates the

Defense Attache Service. DIA manages the production of general military intelligence by the military services, unified and specified commands, and produces or manages the production of all DoD scientific and technical intelligence. DIA serves as the J-2 of the Joint Staff and manages and coordinates all DoD intelligence information systems programs and the interface of such systems with the intelligence community and DoD systems.

g. *The Defense Investigative Service (DIS)* conducts personnel security investigations, law enforcement investigations for DoD components, and other investigations directed by the Secretary of Defense. It also administers defense industrial security programs on behalf of DoD and other Federal departments and agencies.

h. *The Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)* consolidates the functions of the OSD legal staff with the legal staffs of the Defense Agencies. The legal staffs of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities remain with their current organizations while operating under the supervision of the DoD General Counsel who also serves as the Director, DLSA.

i. *The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)* provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the Military Departments, other DoD components, Federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence, and medical goods, industrial and construction material, general supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property disposal, documentation services to the research and development community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System. DLA is the largest of the Defense Agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities.

j. *The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)* provides Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other DoD components through the production and worldwide distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapons systems. It serves as program manager and coordinator of all DoD MC&G resources and activities and carries out statutory responsibilities for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data.

k. *The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)* is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. It also manages DoD nuclear weapons testing and nuclear weapons effects research programs.

l. *The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)* is responsible for the management of the DoD Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.

m. *The Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)* provides education in health sciences to individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

n. *The National Security Agency (NSA)*, under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, is responsible for centralized coordination, direction, and performance of highly specialized intelligence functions in support of U.S. government activities. NSA carries out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense to serve as Executive Agent for U.S. government signals intelligence and communications security activities.

o. *The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization* was established in FY 1984 to manage the research and technology programs of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program. This comprehensive program will develop key technologies associated with the concepts of defense against ballistic missiles.

3. DoD Field Activities

Between 1974 and 1985, eight DoD Field Activities were established. These six organizations perform selected support and service functions of a more limited scope than Defense Agencies. As Chart 3-3 shows, none of these activities report directly to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, but instead to one of the principal staff assistants to the Secretary. The responsibilities of these activities are briefly described below.

CHART 3-3

DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES


SEC DEF
DEP SEC DEF
ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASD (COMPTROLLER)
ASD (FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL)
OFFICE OF CIVILIAN HEALTH AND MEDICAL PROGRAM OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES
DEFENSE MEDICAL SYSTEMS SUPPORT CENTER
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE
DEFENSE INFORMATION SERVICES ACTIVITY
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES *
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPENDENTS SCHOOLS
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

* COLLATERAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
DASD (ADMINISTRATION)

PREPARED BY:
DIRECTORATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
AND MANAGEMENT PLANNING
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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a. *The American Forces Information Service (AFIS)* was established in 1977 under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). The AFIS mission is to provide information, through print and audiovisual products, to DoD and other appropriate personnel in support of DoD policies and programs.

b. *The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS)* was established in 1974. Under the policy guidance of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics), the DODDS is charged with providing quality education, from kindergarten through grade twelve, to eligible minor dependents of military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense stationed overseas.

c. *The Office of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS)* was established in 1974 under the policy guidance and operational direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). The mission of OCHAMPUS is to administer a civilian health and medical care program for spouses and dependent children of active duty, retired, and deceased service members.

d. *The Office of Economic Adjustment* plans and manages DoD economic adjustment programs and assists Federal, State, and local officials in cooperative efforts to alleviate any serious social and economic side effects resulting from major DoD realignments or other actions.

e. *The Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC)*,under the policy guidance and operational direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), was established in 1985. Upon its establishment, DMSSC incorporated the Tri-Service Medical Information System (TRIMIS) which had been established in 1976 as a DoD Field Activity. The DMSSC mission is to improve health care delivery by the Military Departments by applying automatic data processing techniques to health care information systems.

f. *Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)* was established in 1977. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) serves in a dual capacity as the Director, WHS. The WHS mission is to provide administrative and operational support to certain Department of Defense activities in the National Capital region. Such support includes budget and accounting, personnel management, travel, building administration, computer services, information and data systems, voting assistance program, and any other required administrative support.

g. *The Defense Technology Security Administration*, established in 1985, administers the DoD Technology Security Program to review the international transfer of defense-related technology, goods, services, and munitions consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

h. *The Defense Information Services Activity*, established in 1985, implements assigned DoD policies and programs relating to the provision of information to the media, public forums, and the American people.

4. OSD Advisory Committees

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has 18 Advisory Committees comprised of non-government specialists. The majority of these Advisory Committees provide expert opinion on technical research and engineering issues or certain manpower-related issues. Accordingly, eight of these committees report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and seven to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics). These Advisory Committees were created because of a lack of expertise within DoD or the desire to avoid conflicts of interest.

Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)

1. Ada Board (computer language)
2. Advisory Group on Electron Devices
3. Board of Visitors, Defense Systems Management College
4. Chemical Warfare Review Commission
5. Defense Science Board
6. Defense Policy Advisory Committee
7. DoD University Forum
8. President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)

9. Board of Visitors, Equal Opportunity Management Institute
10. Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Training
11. Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
12. DoD Educational Benefits Board of Actuaries
13. DoD Wage Committee
14. DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries
15. Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Handicapped Dependents

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

16. Special Operations Policy Advisory Group

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

17. Secretary of Defense Media Advisory Council

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

18. Sizing DoD Medical Treatment Facilities

D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

Before useful proposals can be put forth to improve organizational arrangements or decision-making procedures, it is critical that a meaningful diagnosis of problem areas and their causes be prepared. This section discusses six problem areas that have been identified within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and presents analyses of the contributing causes. There are other problems associated with the position of Secretary of Defense, most notably his role in the chain of command. As these problems involve his relationships with organizations other than OSD, they are more usefully addressed in subsequent chapters of this study. In particular, the chain of command problem is addressed in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands. In addition, there are concerns about the quality of DoD strategic planning for which OSD has major responsibilities. This shortcoming is addressed in Chapter 7 dealing with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

1. LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION OF THE OVERALL DEFENSE EFFORT

This subsection discusses limited mission integration within OSD. As the term "mission" has different applications within DoD, it would be useful to identify the missions which are the focus of this discussion.

In fulfilling U.S. national security objectives and in implementing U.S. defense strategies, the Department of Defense has six major missions, three of which are worldwide in nature and three of which are regional. The major worldwide missions and their goals are:

> *nuclear deterrence*—essential equivalence with the strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union;
>
> *maritime superiority*—controlling the seas when and where needed;
>
> *power projection superiority*—deploying superior military forces in times of crisis to distant world areas which are primarily outside the traditional system of Western alliances.

The major regional missions are:

> defense of NATO Europe, including both the northern and southern flanks;
>
> defense of East Asia, particularly Northeast Asia; and
>
> defense of Southwest Asia, especially the region's oil resources.

While DoD has other regional missions (e.g., Western Hemisphere and Africa), these relatively smaller, while important, missions are included in the mission of power projection superiority.

a. Comparing Unification, Centralization, and Mission Integration.

Since the end of World War II, the central issue in proposals to reorganize the U.S. military establishment has been the extent to which the distinct military capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps need to be integrated to prepare for and conduct effective, joint military operations in times of war. This central issue has been referred to as either unification or centralization. But, in fact, neither term describes the real goal of the search for a more effective and, perhaps, a more efficient U.S. military organization. Mission integration, the ability of the Services to take unified action to discharge the major military missions of the United States, is a more appropriate term. Mission integration was and remains the real goal of proposals to reorganize the U.S. military establishment. In comparing these three terms, unification relates to form; centralization relates to process; and mission integration relates to substance. It would be useful to discuss unification, centralization, and mission integration in more detail in order to understand why the first two are inappropriate terms for describing the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense.

(1) Unification

Since 1789, U.S. armed forces have, in fact, been unified under the President, the Commander-in-Chief. The organizational structure supporting the Commander-in-Chief, however, has changed over time. The National Security Act of 1947, the most dramatic alteration since the establishment of the Department of the Navy in 1798, provided the President with a new deputy for military affairs who would devote his entire efforts to the coordination of the armed forces, whereas the President could spend only limited time on such responsibilities.

A unified structure was created to support the President's new deputy for military affairs. "Unification" under the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments produced the Department of Defense with three Military Departments under a single Executive Department. (It should be noted that unification has never meant abolition of the four separate Services.) Unification also produced statutory authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands.

While the term "unification" was used extensively during the debates on reorganization of the U.S. military establishment —a period of more than 25 years —that led to the National Security Act of 1947, it does not accurately describe the organizational arrangements that resulted from this legislation. As Dr. Lawrence J. Korb notes in his paper, "Service Unification: Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies":

> The 1947 act did not really unify the national military establishment. Like most pieces of legislation in the American political system, the act was a compromise between those who favored a monolithic structure and those who supported a decentralized organization. It created a confederation rather than a unified or even a federal structure. The act did provide for two central or supra-service organs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, it placed so many limitations on the activities of these central organs and reserved so many prerogatives to the separate services that it was difficult for the Secretary of Defense or the JCS to bring about coordinated action.
>
> ...Nevertheless, the 1947 act was a significant breakthrough. It established the principle of unification and shifted the terms of the debate about military organization. Since then unification has not been the issue. Rather, the debate has focused upon how to give the central organs of DoD the ability to control the activities of the department and to produce an efficient and effective defense policy without simultaneously eliminating the separate services. (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, *Naval Review 1976*, pages 175-176)

While unification produced a framework that made mission integration possible, whether the necessary degree of integration has resulted is another question. As Dr. Lawrence J. Legere, Jr. states in *Unification of the Armed Forces*:

> ...unification meant and means nothing in a vacuum. It gains significance only as it affects the processes of peacetime planning and wartime planning and direction of military operations. (page 388)

It is these processes —here termed "mission integration" —that are the focus in this study.

(2) Centralization

Secretaries of Defense have taken different approaches to the degree of centralization of the management decision-making process. For example, Secretary McNamara favored highly centralized management authority while Secretary Laird favored participatory management. The continuing controversy over centralization and decentralization is really an argument over where certain decisions should be made. In the absence of an organizational structure and decision processes in DoD that support mission integration more adequately than the current ones, it seems that Secretaries of Defense will be forced to rely more often than not on a highly centralized approach involving themselves and a few key aides. Even in those areas where the Department of Defense would benefit from a more decentralized approach, the Secretary of Defense currently cannot effectively delegate decision-making authority to lower levels in the organization. Under current organizational arrangements, less senior officials, both in OSD and the Military Departments, do not have the necessary perspective or breadth of responsibility to make decisions that provide the greatest benefits in terms of the overall strategic goals or missions of the Department of Defense.

In essence, centralization tendencies are the result of an inadequate level, or put another way, a poor quality of mission integration. However, while centralization can marginally lessen the impact of poor integration mechanisms, it cannot achieve the appropriate level of mission integration. Moreover, overcentralization has its own problems in that the complexity of modern defense issues is too great for a small group of decision-makers to handle by themselves. This is even more true today than during Secretary McNamara's tenure. It is largely for this reason that Service predominance in resource decisions—with all of its negatives—has been allowed to persist.

(3) Mission Integration

To discuss limited mission integration in DoD, two concepts must be put forth: differentiation and integration. The term differentiation refers to the process of developing specialized differences. How much differentiation should exist among an organization's various groups depends upon what internal characteristics each group must develop to effectively interact with its assigned part of the external environment. Integration denotes the process of making something whole or complete by adding or bringing together its parts to achieve the organization's strategic goals. There is a strong inverse relationship between differentiation and integration.

DoD is a highly differentiated organization which is necessary given the great diversity and complexity of the tasks of the three Military Departments and of the main units within each Department. This is evident when one considers the different skills and capabilities necessary for tank warfare, submarine operations, and air-to-air combat. However, as noted previously, the tasks to be performed with the resources provided to the three Military Departments are highly interdependent.

Given a highly differentiated organization and highly interdependent tasks, the effort required for effective integration is substantial. This is so for two reasons: (1) the greater the differentiation, the larger and more numerous are the potential conflicts, and it takes more effort to resolve these conflicts in ways that benefit the entire organization; and (2) the more interdependent the tasks of subordinate organizations are, the more information processing is required among them, and thus more effort is required for effective integration. In their book, *Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action*, Lawrence and Lorsch indicate that highly differentiated organizations cannot rely on the basic management hierarchy for achieving integration:

> ...organizations faced with the requirement for both a high degree of differentiation and tight integration must develop *supplemental* integrating devices, such as individual coordinators, cross-unit teams, and even whole departments of individuals whose basic contribution is achieving integration among other groups. (page 13)

Mission integration can be defined as the efforts by joint organizations —those that have a multi-Service perspective (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commands) —to aggregate the capabilities of the four Services in a manner to provide the most effective combat forces to fulfill the major military missions of DoD. In his paper, "The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) cites the need for mission integration:

> ...To be prepared to defend U.S. interests, however, the separate Services must be melded together into an integrated fighting team. (page 6)

Mission integration does not seek to interfere with differentiation within DoD; the Services and Military Departments retain full authority and responsibility for manning, equipping, supplying, and training their forces. Mission integration, however, will help establish priorities and guidelines for the efforts of the Services and Military Departments.

(4) Summary

In sum, unification has produced a framework that makes mission integration possible. However, within this framework, the organizational structures and decision-making mechanisms necessary for effective mission integration have not been developed. Centralization of decision-making authority has on occasion been used in attempts to overcome the absence of effective mission integration structures and mechanisms. However, centralization is not the answer, especially in light of the broadening scope and increasing complexity of defense issues. Decentralization has even less utility; given the current organizational relationships, decentralization exacerbates the problems associated with attempting to secure unified direction of the overall defense effort.

Focusing on mission integration, the desired end product of organizational activity within DoD, offers greater prospects for understanding DoD's organizational deficiencies. Working backward from the desired outcome, the underdeveloped nature of the current framework and the appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization may be better understood

b. Current Efforts at Mission Integration

Mission integration is necessary at both of the distinct organizational levels of DoD: the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations, and the operational level, consisting of the unified and specified commands. In the post-World War II period, there has been agreement in principle on the need for mission integration at the operational level. Despite this agreement, there is limited mission integration in the field. This situation is discussed at length in Chapter 5 concerning the unified and specified commands and, therefore, will not be addressed in this chapter. There has been considerable disagreement, however, about the need for mission integration at the policymaking level of DoD. Discussion of limited mission integration in this chapter will focus on the policymaking level of DoD.

The integration that does occur at the DoD policymaking level is primarily functional integration and not mission integration. This results from the organizational structure of the Washington Headquarters of DoD. OSD, OJCS, and the Military Departments are organized exclusively along functional lines (manpower, research and development, installations and logistics, etcetera). As a result, DoD can integrate, as an example, the manpower function and can, therefore, do manpower planning on a Department-wide basis. Effective integration on a mission basis in the Washington headquarters, however, is minimal. There is limited ability to integrate the separate Service programs in major mission areas such as nuclear deterrence or defense of NATO. DoD, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, has failed to develop the extensive, supplemental integrating devices that it needs to achieve effective mission integration. The integrating devices have focused solely on achieving functional integration.

c. Deficiencies Resulting from Limited Mission Integration

Deficiencies resulting from limited mission integration are numerous. Among them are:

> There is no organizational focus on the strategic goals or major missions of DoD. As a result, DoD has focused on resource inputs and not on outputs (capabilities needed to fulfill major missions). Moreover, the absence of an organizational focus on strategic goals serves to inhibit strategic planning in DoD.
>
> There are no organizations in the Washington headquarters that are fully attuned to the operational requirements of the unified commanders.
>
> Service interests rather than strategic needs play the dominant role in shaping program decisions. This occurrence is re-

inforced by the tendency of all Services (and the JCS system) to approve the force structure goals and weapon system objectives of each other.

The role of Service interests in shaping forces and programs leads to imbalances in military capabilities. Functions (e.g., airlift, sealift, close air support) which are not central to a Service's own definition of its missions tend to be neglected.

Service dominance in determining programs tends to produce an overemphasis on procurement and investment as opposed to readiness.

Tradeoffs between programs of different Services that can both contribute to a particular major mission (e.g., Air Force tactical air and Army land forces for NATO defense) are seldom made.

Opportunities for non-traditional contributions to missions (e.g., Air Force contributions to sea control) are neither easily identified nor pursued.

In sum, limited mission integration of the separate aspects of the defense program is a major organizational and management problem in the Department of Defense today. The existence of this problem is presented in more detail in the discussion of its four basic causes.

d. Causes of Limited Mission Integration

(1) Inadequate Mission Integrating Support for the Secretary of Defense

It is important to note that, at the present time, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman are the only effective mission integrators within DoD. (For purposes of this discussion, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense are treated as one entity.) This is true because at present they are the only DoD officials in a position to view the total organization and its major mission efforts. The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* highlighted this fact:

> The lack of convergence of responsibilities for functional areas at an organizational point in OSD below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary level inhibits the flexibility to delegate responsibilities within OSD, for no one below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary level has the requisite breadth of purview or responsibility. (page 25)

The Secretary appears to have sufficient authority to bring about necessary planning and resource integration along mission lines. However, he lacks sufficient assistance —both from OSD and OJCS —to effectively perform this role. This is the first cause of the lack of sufficient integration.

Regarding assistance from the JCS system, the Secretary of Defense has two separate sources: OJCS as an organization and the JCS Chairman as an individual. This discussion will address the former source; the latter will be highlighted in the following subsection.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, the OJCS was to operate as an OSD staff agency. This relationship began to weaken as the OJCS sought and secured a more independent posture. This search for a greater degree of independence was greatly aided by the 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act, according to Paul Hammond in his landmark book, *Organizing for Defense*. Hammond states:

> ...The language of the 1958 reorganization legislation, for instance, puts the JCS outside of OSD, an exclusion which can support claims for the JCS of greater independence from the Secretary of Defense. (page 379)

Moreover, beyond the weakened ties between the JCS system and the Secretary of Defense, the closed staff nature of the OJCS has inhibited the flow of useful information from OJCS to the Secretary of Defense and the OSD staff and has greatly limited the interplay between DoD's most senior military and civilian organizations. The closed staff problem is discussed in detail in the chapter on the OJCS; it is mentioned here because of its impact on OJCS assistance to the Secretary of Defense.

With respect to OJCS assistance, the unified military advice that the Secretary does receive is inadequate —a fact that is well documented in the chapter of this study that addresses the OJCS —and he must rely on OSD civilians for much of his advice on mission and program integration issues. However, OSD is not able to provide sufficient support on integrative issues because it is organized on input functional lines (manpower, research and engineering, health affairs, etc.) and not along mission or output lines. The Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) has the potential to assist the Secretary in his integrator role; however, it does not have the hierarchical position or breadth of responsibility to provide the Secretary with the degree of assistance that he needs.

The functional structure of OSD deserves careful analysis because it is the source of major organizational and management deficiencies in the Department of Defense. This fact was recognized by Hammond when *Organizing for Defense* was published in 1961. Hammond noted that the functional structure produced ever increasing attention by OSD on business administration operations and did not assist the development of general policy (which would facilitate mission integration at the DoD policymaking level). Hammond states:

> The pressures for centralization, the established prestige and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the public status of the Defense Department, have all pushed OSD more and more into active functional control of the business management activities of the service departments. The pattern which has unfolded in the development of Department of Defense administration has been the continual increase in the number of functional controls held and the amount of actual operating performed in OSD, which has been all out of proportion to the small increase in the systematic making by the Secretary of Defense of general policy for the military establishment or in the augmentation of his capabilities of developing a general program. (page 312)

Hammond summarizes the situation as follows:

> ...OSD has tended to be confined to a management outlook in its supervision of the military establishment. There have been, it should be emphasized, sufficient problems to be dealt with by a business management approach to challenge and absorb the best talent available to the defense establishment. With the enormous magnitude of the Defense Department and its material activities, coupled with the changing tasks of administration, problems of business efficiency promise to remain worthy of the attention of the ablest administrative talent. Of course business efficiency is not the only objective, and in any case efficiency must be defined in terms of some other objective by which the organization product can be evaluated.
>
> In all the major fields of defense organization it is evident that the shortcomings of the business approach have been perceived. In some, it has led to a search for program —for some way to formulate general policies —which will provide more adequate guidance to management efforts. (pages 314 and 315)

Beyond these problems, the functional structure produces perspectives in the OSD staff which are varied, much narrower, and incompatible with the perspective of the Secretary of Defense. In his book, *Management*, Peter F. Drucker notes this problem in his discussion of the weaknesses of functional structure in large and complex organizations such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense:

> ...it is difficult for anyone, up to and including the top functional people, *to understand the task of the whole* and to relate their work to it....functional design demands from functional people little responsibility for the performance and success of the whole....it also makes people in the functional unit prone to subordinate the welfare of other functions, if not of the entire business, to the interests of their unit. (pages 559-560).

(2) Limited Authority and Staff Support for the JCS Chairman

Some assert that a major cause of poor integration at the policymaking level of DoD is the limited authority of the JCS Chairman. This subject is discussed at length in the chapter of the study dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Predominant Influence of the Military Departments

While the primary mission of the Military Departments is to organize, train, and equip forces, they have maintained substantial influence on questions of strategy, policy, and broad resource allocations. The Military Departments' influence is exercised by their dominance of the JCS system as well as of the unified commands. This overwhelming influence of the Military Departments sometimes works at cross-purposes to efforts to integrate the U.S. military establishment. This is not the fault of the Military Departments. They have correctly pursued their interests vigorously through capable and tenacious headquarters staffs. What is missing is the organizational structure and supporting mechanisms that would provide for an equally vigorous and capable integration effort along mission lines —to balance the influence of the Services on basic issues of strategy, policy, and resource allocation.

Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense, commented on the problems of predominant Service influence:

> Nevertheless, the division into four military services has led to some large and wasteful overlaps. The most obvious is the maintenance of four separate tactical air forces. Others include separate medical services, separate development and procurement of communications equipment, competing public relations organizations, and duplication of expensive military bases and facilities.
>
> Service divisions have increasingly contributed to operational difficulties. In Vietnam, for example, the air war was directed in part by the theater commander in Vietnam, in part by the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces in Hawaii. U.S. Army and Air Force units in Europe have difficulty communicating because their systems were developed separately and are not interoperable. Because the Navy and Air Force use different refueling equipment, tanker aircraft of one cannot refuel fighters of the other without an equipment change. Until recently, even that option was not available. Each service has its own model of transport helicopters, and crews are generally not cross-trained.
>
> Conflicts also exist over service roles and missions. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force all see a role for themselves in space systems and operations; these ambitions compete. Both the Navy and the Air Force operate parts of the strategic deterrent forces. The Army and the Marines have differing views on which service should take the lead in providing the ground forces for the Rapid Deployment Force. The services themselves cannot eliminate the waste, correct the operational difficulties, or resolve the conflicts over roles and missions. (*Thinking About National Security*, pages 207-208).

It would be useful at this point to comment on interservice rivalry in resource allocation and force planning. (Interservice rivalry also exists in operational matters, but as later portions of this study will demonstrate, rivalry in these matters is highly destructive and should not be tolerated.) Competition between the Services in resource allocation has often been criticized as wasteful and counterproductive. This criticism has some merit, but it needs to be put into a proper context.

Inherently, competition among the Services for missions and resources should serve the best interests of national defense. Business organizations have successfully used internal competition. In their book, *In Search of Excellence, Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies*, Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr. state:

> Internal competition as a substitute for formal, rule—and committee-driven behavior permeates the excellent companies. It entails high costs of duplication —cannibalization, overlapping products, overlapping divisions, multiple development projects, lost development dollars when the sales force won't buy a marketer's fancy. Yet the benefits, though less measurable, are manifold, especially in terms of commitment, innovation, and a focus on the revenue line. (page 218)

Similarly, Mr. James Woolsey, former Under Secretary of the Navy, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services stated:

> ...I do think that in the area of force planning, that is, deciding what we are to buy, what is to be developed, we should not be too hard on inter-Service rivalry.
>
> It does serve in some cases a useful function. Some degree of overlapping in competition is not necessarily unwise. (Part 6, page 246)

Some aspects of the current competition among the Services for missions and resources may, in fact, serve the best interests of national defense. Beyond the innovation and new approaches that can result, the competition among the Services for military capabilities and corresponding resources —even though motivated sometimes by parochial Service interests —permits senior civilian decision-makers to consider a wider range of divergent views on complex issues of national security. This ensures that key decision-makers, especially the Secretary of Defense, will be given more than one option by the military professionals from which to choose. In *Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions*, Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell comment on this benefit of competition:

> Encouraging competition between departments, divisions, and other units enables the firm to make comparisons that greatly aid in control. (page 297)

In other words, interservice competition, when properly channeled, can offer substantial benefits in terms of innovation and consideration of alternatives.

However, the current framework for competition is defective in three major ways. First of all, arbitrary constraints have been placed upon the competition by the Key West Agreement of 1948 which set Service roles and missions in concrete. These arbitrary rules —which the Services are adamant on preserving —may lead to less than optimal results in certain instances.

Second, the competition between the Services should be for capabilities that most effectively meet the needs and fulfill the goals of the overall DoD organization, in other words, the major missions and central strategic purposes. Too often this is not the case. Rather, the Services compete for resources to promote Service interests. Part of the fault for this predominant Service focus on its own interests must be borne by more senior organizations —OSD and OJCS. The failure of these organizations to articulate the strategic goals of DoD, to establish priorities, and to provide a useful framework in which resource decisions can be made has left the Services great freedom to pursue their narrow interests.

Third, the Services, primarily through the JCS system, seek to limit competition and to minimize objective examination of alternatives. In its search for compromises and unanimity, the JCS collude and negotiate "truces" that preclude real competition for missions and resources. This undesirable situation is discussed at length in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Thus, the constructive consequences of inter-Service rivalry are diminished by these three deficiencies. Moreover, competition between organizations also has destructive consequences. In DoD, the destructive consequences of inter-Service rivalry —which include suspicion, jealousy, and refusal to cooperate and coordinate —are substantial. In sum, while competition among the Services could have many benefits, that competition has not yet fulfilled its potential.

(4) Limited Input by Unified Commanders

A fourth major cause of poor integration is the limited contribution that the unified commanders can make to policy and resource allocation decisions. Given the weaknesses of the JCS system and the relative isolation of the unified commanders from the Secretary of Defense, the unified commanders do not have sufficient influence over the readiness of their assigned forces, their joint training, their ability to sustain themselves in combat, or the future capabilities of their forces that derive from development and procurement decisions. As a result, a key force for integrated functioning of the defense establishment —the unified commands —plays only a minor role in the most important defense decisions.

While the limited input from the unified commands reduces the integrating staff support readily available to the Secretary of Defense, it is a major problem for the unified commanders themselves because they have limited ability to influence policy or resource allocations affecting their commands. Accordingly, this deficiency is addressed in Chapter 5 concerning the unified and specified commands.

2. MANY OFFICES IN OSD ARE NEITHER ADEQUATELY SUPERVISED NOR COORDINATED

a. Span of Control Problem

The basic cause of this problem is that the hierarchical structure of OSD violates normal standards of span of control for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Currently, the Secretary and his Deputy have 24 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials reporting to them as well as the JCS Chairman and members, the three Service Secretaries, and nine unified or specified commanders for a total span of control of 41 subordinates.

Span of control (or span of management) is a fundamental issue for every organization as it must decide how many subordinates each superior can effectively manage. In *Organization and Management*, Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig discuss span of control as follows:

> The span of control, or span of supervision, relates to the number of subordinates that a superior can supervise effectively. It is closely related to the hierarchical structure and to departmentalization. Implicit in the span of control concept is the necessity for the coordination of the activities of the subordinates by the superior. It emphasizes superior-subordinate relationships that allow for the systematic integration of activities. Traditional theory advocates a narrow span to enable the executive to provide adequate integration of all the activities of subordinates. It does not recognize the possibility of other

means for coordination. (pages 239-240)

The narrow span of control advocated by traditional theory is less than ten subordinates with the ranges of 3 to 7 and 4 to 8 often cited as ideal. As Koontz and O'Donnell note:

> . . . Students of management have found that this number is usually four to eight subordinates at the upper levels of organization and eight to fifteen or more at the lower levels. (*Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions*, page 249)

While many studies of actual organizations show the median span of control to be 7 or 8 subordinates, numerical guidelines have been increasingly questioned. In his paper, "Span of Control: A Review and Restatement," David D. Van Fleet comments on this occurrence:

> . . . the numerical guideline approach has been faltering. Perhaps this is because the span of control concept has been misinterpreted to mean "Magic" numbers whereas it is not intended to provide a "magic" number, and possibly because it is not reasonable to expect that one particular size of span will be ideal for all situations. (*Akron Business and Economic Review*, Winter 1974, page 35)

In discussing factors that have an impact on effective spans of control, Van Fleet lists eleven:

- *routine work* —If the work performed by subordinates is routine, more individuals can be effectively supervised; if the work performed is quite varied and complex, fewer subordinates can be effectively supervised.
- *ability of subordinates* —If the subordinates are highly trained and capable, more of them can be effectively supervised.
- *non-supervisory activities* —If the superior official must spend considerable time in non-supervisory activities, he can effectively supervise fewer subordinates.
- *supervisor's ability* —A more capable official can effectively supervise more subordinates.
- *personal assistants* —If an official has assistants to help him, he will be able to supervise a greater number of subordinates.
- *rate of change* —If the rate of change in personnel and operations is relatively low, the superior can supervise a larger number of subordinates.
- *geographic or physical dispersion* —If the subordinates are geographically or physically dispersed, the superior will be unable to effectively supervise as many subordinates.
- *need for coordination* —If the work requires greater coordination, control, or closeness of supervision, the number of individuals that can be effectively supervised will be reduced.
- *similarity of functions* —If the functions involved in the work of subordinates are relatively similar, a greater number of subordinates can be effectively supervised.
- *formalization* —The increased use of the formal organization techniques (e.g., standard reports and communications) will

enable a superior to supervise a greater number of subordinates.

◦ *sharing supervision* —If a superior's subordinates receive some supervision from others, he will be able to effectively supervise a greater number of individuals. (pages 36 and 37)

For key DoD managers, especially the Secretary of Defense, these eleven factors in the aggregate suggest the need for a small span of control. In particular, the Secretary of Defense spends much of his time in non-supervisory activities—managing relations with the White House, other Executive Branch power centers, the Congress, and allies. Moreover, the work of his subordinates is non-routine, involves a rapid rate of change, requires substantial coordination, and involves dissimilar functions. In addition, some of his subordinates—the unified and specified commanders—are geographically dispersed.

For the Secretary of Defense and other senior DoD managers, six of the above factors can clearly be categorized as favoring a smaller span of control, and two favor a larger span. It was not possible to categorize three factors —ability of subordinates, supervisor's ability, and formalization —due to their more subjective nature.

Smaller span of control	Larger span of control
non-routine work	personal assistants
substantial non-supervisory activites.	
high rate of change	shared supervision
geographic dispersion	
substantial need for coordination	
dissimilar functions.	

In general, an analysis of organizational needs in the Department of Defense suggests that smaller spans of control for senior civilian and military officials would enhance organizational performance.

Given that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary must spend much of their time on relations with external organizations (the White House, the Congress, alliances, etc.), they are too busy to actively manage OSD and those Defense Agencies that report directly to them. Essentially, they manage OSD and subordinate organizations by exception (e.g., only when a problem arises) which fails to provide the desired level of supervision and coordination.

In particular, the Defense Agencies are poorly controlled and supervised by OSD. The *Defense Agency Review* conducted in 1979 by Major General Theodore Antonelli, USA (Retired), found that overburdened OSD officials are unable to devote the time necessary to adequately oversee the agencies; as a result, the agencies are essentially free of OSD supervision. Apparently, the focus of OSD is on the budgets of the Military Departments and not on the budgets of Defense Agencies. One negative consequence of this inadequate supervision is that the Defense Agencies are more oriented to peacetime activities and efficiencies than to supporting combat forces in wartime.

The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* discussed the span of control problem and associated problems:

> The expanding parallel organization of OSD has contributed to the excessive span of control of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense. Twenty-seven major offices of the Department report directly to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary, and of these, twelve are in OSD. No formal mechanism exists to assure proper coordination among the parallel elements of OSD. This unsatisfactory organization structure results in frequent contradictions in policy guidance, frictions between the various elements of OSD, and the necessity for extensive and time-consuming coordination with little assurance that it has achieved its purpose. (page 25)

Similarly, Secretary Brown discussed this problem 8 years later in the fiscal year 1979 Annual Report to the Congress:

> The Secretary's span of control was too broad for effective management. At that time, 29 major offices of the Department, plus seven Unified/Specified Commands reported to me. Of these, almost half were within the Office of the Secretary itself. Furthermore, the fragmentation of executive authority among independent offices within the Office of the Secretary, several of which had closely related functions and responsibilities, created the need for excessive and time-consuming coordination and required the elevation of far too many decisions to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary for resolution. Virtually every review of the Department's organization in the past several years concluded that these conditions hampered effective management. (page 349)

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Secretary Brown made an effort in 1977 to reduce the span of control problem. His actions did not go far enough in this direction. Moreover, the problem has been further compounded by the addition since 1977 of other OSD offices reporting directly to the Secretary.

b. Piecemeal Addition of OSD Offices

The second cause of inadequate supervision and coordination of OSD offices is that many OSD offices have been added, especially by the Congress, without restructuring the overall organization. Many of these offices were established and given positions in the hierarchy for political purposes. In particular, the Congress has specified that these newly created offices report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences are good examples. The problem with this congressional direction is that the Secretary cannot adequately manage these offices, so they, in essence, report to no one. Furthermore, given the specificity of congressional direction, OSD organizational planners believe that they are inhibited by outside constraints from seeking more streamlined arrangements.

3. INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN SENIOR LEVELS OF OSD

Too often, key positions in OSD are filled by individuals who lack a substantial background in military strategy, operations, budgeting, and the like which are so important if one is to contribute immediately to effective policy formulation and management. DoD can no longer afford to fill senior positions with on-the-job trainees. Equally troublesome is that OSD has poor continuity in its most senior positions. In a field as complex as defense management, this is a fundamental weakness in achieving a sound U.S. national security program. This severe shortcoming must be overcome if civilian control of the military is to remain compatible with the level of organizational effectiveness required by today's complex international security environment.

In OSD, there are currently 18 Presidential appointees and 51 additional senior political appointees. This number of political appointees becomes a problem only because of their relative inexperience, their high turnover rate, and the lengthy breaks between departures and arrivals of political appointees.

a. Experience Levels of Senior DoD Officials

In his book, *U.S. Defense Planning —A Critique*, John Collins makes the following observation on the experience levels of senior DoD officials:

> The U.S. defense planning system installs few leaders who possess first-class credentials before they take defense planning posts. A distinct minority during the last 37 years could be considered professionally qualified to supervise the process and select politico-military alternatives until they had been in office for lengthy periods. (pages 199–200)

Similarly, the *Departmental Headquarters Study* recommended

> . . . continuing emphasis on the importance of selecting high calibre, well-qualified people for Presidential appointments, and encouraging their service for periods long enough to be effective. (page 27)

Some observers argue that the overriding solution to DoD organizational problems is to improve the caliber of senior officials. General Krulak presented this view in testimony before the Committee on September 20, 1983 when he argued: "Someone once said in referring to an organization chart, it is not the boxes on the chart, it is the blokes in the boxes." (part 2, page 106)

While improving the quality of DoD's senior leadership is an important initiative, it should not, however, be seen as a substitute for necessary organizational reform. Although good people can, to a certain extent, overcome a deficient organizational structure, a well-designed structure will support a higher level of sustained effectiveness than a poor structure will. As Dr. James R. Schlesinger testified before the Committee on November 2, 1983:

> I have no wish to exaggerate nor to suggest that structural reform is a panacea that can solve our many military problems. Structural reform is no substitute for capable leadership or for suitable, well-trained and ready forces. Cynics will point out that only a limited amount can be achieved by what is described as "tinkering". Nonetheless, in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation. (Part 5, page 186)

Similarly, Peter F. Drucker emphasizes the importance of sound organizational structure:

> . . . Few managers seem to recognize that the right organization structure is not performance itself, but rather a prerequisite of performance. The wrong structure is indeed a guarantee of nonperformance; it produces friction and frustration, puts the spotlight on the wrong issues, and makes mountains out of trivia. (*Harvard Business Review on Management*, page 624)

Paul Hammond in his book, *Organizing for Defense*, offers the following thoughts:

> Formal organization is not all-important. In large-scale organization, however, it is an unavoidable starting point of inquiry. Men are important, too. But men in government —at least in the American government —do not last. The things that last are the institutional arrangements which impart continuity to policy and meaning (however valid) to process, and the modes of thought which make both significant. (page 4)

Nevertheless, structural form cannot compensate for individuals who lack required expertise for the positions they occupy. According to Hammond, "...Organizations are made up of men; there is no substitute for their quality." (page 4)

b. High Turnover Rates

As to turnover rates, Secretaries of Defense have served on the average for only 2.3 years; and Deputy Secretaries, for only 1.8 years. Average longevity in senior OSD positions is considerably less than 3 years. For example, Assistant Secretaries of Defense (International Security Affairs) have served on the average for only 1.6 years since this important position was established in 1953.

c. Vacancies

Many positions remain vacant following departures of political appointees. The report of the Chairman's Special Study Group indicates that, among approximately 30 presidential appointee positions in OSD and the Military Departments, extended vacancies have occurred 146 times since 1960 with an average duration of 5 months. (page 42)

d. Causes

There are two basic causes of the problem of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior levels of OSD: (1) extensive use of OSD appointments to repay political debts or to provide representation for special interest groups; and (2) substantial financial disincentives for individuals appointed to such positions.

(1) extensive use of OSD appointments to repay political debts or to provide representation for special interest groups

The problem of filling key civilian leadership positions in OSD with individuals who lack sufficient qualifications is in no small measure the result of the excessive influence in the selection process of the White House staff in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Key OSD leadership positions have been filled with individuals who have either faithfully served in the campaign of a winning Presidential candidate or who have satisfied the perceived political need for special interest group representation. Often, there is little regard for the qualifications and suitability of these individuals.

(2) substantial financial disincentives

A second cause contributing to this problem is the congressionally imposed limitations on compensation and financial holdings of civilian leaders of the Department of Defense. The annual compensation of senior DoD officials is set at $72,200. Although it has long been recognized that government service necessarily involves some financial sacrifice, if that sacrifice is allowed to become prohibitive, some of the most able people simply will be unable to enter government service.

Another aspect of this cause is the conflict of interest statutes and regulations applicable to senior civilian officials throughout the Federal Government and the special provisions of the Senate Committee on Armed Services relating to divestiture of conflicting assets. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Richard C. Steadman indicated the Committee's special provisions in this area often result in a prospective appointee being faced with a forced sale of their major assets as a requirement to accepting a Department of Defense position. He further observed that the result, after taxes, of such a forced sale could be an immediate one-third decrease in an individual's assets. There can be little doubt that such a result could be a real impediment to some of the most highly qualified individuals accepting positions in OSD and elsewhere in DoD.

4. OSD MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF SERVICE PROGRAMS

The Military Departments have consistently held the view that OSD has been engaged in extensive micro-management of internal Service programs. The term "micro-management" means the over-involvement of higher authority in details that can be better managed by subordinate organizations. While observers differ as to whether this exists, the weight of testimony suggests that there is some degree of OSD micro-management. For example, the *Depart-*

mental Headquarters Study noted: "The study disclosed some evidence of undue involvement by the OSD staff in details better left to Military Department management." (page 34) The General Accounting Office report, "Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense," dated April 20, 1976, expressed similar concern:

> ...The increasing involvement in service program execution at the OSD level reduces the autonomy of the Service Secretaries and thereby reduces their ability to make decisions on issues which are more relevant to them or on which they often have more expertise....Since the military departments are separately organized and the Service secretaries are resource managers, it is logical that they may be given the authority to manage. They are, in effect, presidents of operating companies. (pages 50 and 51)

In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor said,

> ...There has been the tendency that I found both as the Secretary of the Navy and as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, for the OSD staff to micromanage the Services with respect to intraservice problems.
>
> Now, the OSD has got to manage interservice problems and problems that involve overall strategic planning. I found that a great many of the staff of the different Assistant Secretaries of Defense were really trying to run the internal affairs of the Services because they thought they knew better than the people in the service about service matters. (Part 3, page 124)

In addition, Secretary Claytor explained that once strategic policy and overall planning have been determined, the execution should be left to the Services and not to the staff of the OSD. Secretary Claytor said,

> ...I found all kinds of small decisions the services are much better able to make in procurement of specific weapons and how you procure them, and that sort of thing was being made by civilian staff in OSD which, frankly, in many cases I didn't think knew as much about it as the people in the services did. (Part 3, page 128)

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, a former Secretary of Defense, also noted OSD micro-management in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> ...without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micro-management within the individual Services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff. (Part 5, page 189)

a. Human Nature

The primary cause of this problem is human nature: OSD officials —like everyone else —prefer to work on narrower and more manageable issues than the complex issues that should be the primary focus of OSD.

b. Inadequate Supervision

A second cause of OSD micro-management is the failure of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to police OSD micro-management of Service programs. Micro-management is contrary to OSD policies as clearly indicated by Secretary Carlucci's memorandum of March 27, 1981 concerning "Management of the DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System". However, issuance of memoranda has limited impact without an active management review of implementation. This is currently lacking.

c. Congressional Micro-Management

OSD micro-management is also caused by congressional short-term (year-to-year) and microscopic emphasis on program management. In response to congressional micro-management, OSD places an equivalent emphasis on details that could be better left to the Military Departments.

d. Non-Compliance by the Services

A fourth cause of OSD micro-management is that the Services have failed to adhere to OSD guidance in program development and management. In particular, the Service Secretaries appear to have failed to effectively discharge their responsibilities to ensure full Service compliance with the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Non-compliance by the Services caused OSD to become involved in the details of implementation in order to preserve the decisions of the Secretary of Defense.

e. Large OSD Staff

A fifth cause may be that some OSD staffs, particularly in the research and engineering area, have become too large. Larger staff sizes often result in a weaker focus on principal responsibilities and major issues.

f. Emphasis on Functional Areas

OSD micro-management may also result from limited mission integration mechanisms. In the absence of important mission integration efforts, OSD has emphasized functional integration. This is likely to lead to overinvolvement with Service programs which are also functionally organized.

Paul Hammond in *Organizing for Defense* identified OSD's functional structure as a cause of OSD's micro-management of the Services:

> As the Defense Department continued to grow more centralized in administration, the Office of the Secretary of Defense remained weighted in favor of business administration operations. The services have been expected to perform the major functions of a military establishment at the same time that OSD has been developing duplicate functions. The result has been a growing duplication of staffs and the "re-reviewing", as one Congressional committee put it, of work already adequately reviewed and sufficiently supervised. The point was overstated, for there have been substantial reasons for the "re-reviewing," but it nevertheless has substance. If the secretariat in either OSD or the service departments were primarily concerned with the development of general policies which spanned military and business administration interests, their activities

might be less duplicative. But both are concerned largely with business administration, to the exclusion of the development of a general program; and the supervision by both suffers from the same consequent limitations. (page 313)

5. PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ARE UNILATERAL, NOT COALITION, ORIENTED

The United States, following World War II, developed a broad network of alliances and mutual defense treaties to protect her interests. The foundation of U.S. national security is a coalition strategy with appropriate coalition policies. However, both the United States and her allies are guilty of what General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired), has called "the sin of unilateralism" in that planning and programming are still approached on essentially a national rather than a multi-national basis. Most coalition-oriented efforts, such as NATO's Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) program, have been tremendous disappointments. Much of the blame for NATO's failures in cooperative efforts lies with the United States as the Alliance's leader.

Ambassador Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, noted the unilateral perspective of DoD planning and programming in his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD":

> Nor does the planning/programming process take adequately into account the needs created by our pursuit of a largely *coalition* policy and strategy, reflecting the broad network of alliances and other commitments entered into after World War II....This is partly because of a lack of organizational focus within the United States or other governments on coalition issues. For example, until the author became Advisor to SecDef [Secretary of Defense] on NATO Affairs in 1977, no single U.S. government official above the level of office director dealt exclusively with NATO matters—our largest single overseas commitment. But this organizational innovation too disappeared when the next administration took over. (pages 25 and 26)

There are four causes of this unilateral approach in OSD:

- absence of organizations with major mission orientations;
- ineffective strategic planning;
- limited influence of unified commanders in planning and programming; and
- limited influence of OSD policy experts on resource decisions.

The first three causes are addressed in detail elsewhere in this study. As to the limited influence of OSD policy experts, the basic problem is that the policy experts do not have sufficient expertise on programmatic issues nor sufficient influence to alter the recommendations of OSD and Service resource managers who are, for the most part, oriented to the unilateralist perspective.

6. INADEQUATE OSD REVIEW OF NON-NUCLEAR CONTINGENCY PLANS

Currently, only the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have access to non-nuclear contingency plans prepared by the unified and specified commanders. Nuclear war planning is not an issue because the civilian leadership has long insisted on being regularly briefed on it and on related war games. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary do not, however, have sufficient time to adequately review these important plans for action by conventional forces during crises. The Steadman Report shares this conclusion:

> ...present arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas [contingency plans]. (page 43)

The cause of the absence of OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans is that the JCS have jealously guarded non-nuclear contingency plans. The Steadman Report notes:

> The JCS are sensitive to the fact that only the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are in the operational chain of command and, thus, strictly interpreted, only they have a "need to know" regarding operational plans. (page 43)

This posture has been based in part on security grounds, but is more directly linked with the JCS view that OSD review would be an unwarranted civilian intrusion into strictly military matters—an attitude which apparently contradicts the principle of civilian control.

The current Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, believes that contingency plans receive adequate civilian review:

> ...These [contingency] plans are then briefed to me and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on an annual basis and as changes occur, and these plans are changed if these briefings indicate to me that changes are required.
>
> Thus, the principle of civilian control of the military for non-nuclear contingency planning is preserved by keeping the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense informed of the assumptions, procedures, and results of the overall planning process, and particularly by a final review of the plans themselves by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

Despite Secretary Weinberger's views, it does not seem possible that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense —who share other enormous and demanding responsibilities —can effectively review the numerous contingency plans and ensure that they are consistent with national security policy.

Absence of meaningful OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans is a problem because (1) it is a vital area where civilian control of the military is not properly exercised; (2) the plans may not be realistic in terms of actions that the President may be prepared to take in certain situations; (3) higher authority may lack an understanding of what can be done with existing resources leading to inconsistencies in the strategic planning process during which objectives are linked to resources; and (4) there is no process to ensure that plans are receiving sufficient attention and an exposure to new alternatives at the unified and specified command level.

There is another OSD problem area associated with contingency plans. This relates to inadequate civilian guidance to be used by military officers in developing contingency plans. This problem area is addressed in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

In this section, possible solutions to OSD problem areas are described. These include previously proposed solutions along with newly developed ones. The list of possible solutions covers those that would require legislative action and those that require only management attention. Because OSD is at the pinnacle of the DoD hierarchy, a number of solutions to OSD problem areas involve structural or management changes in organizations outside of OSD. While these non-OSD solutions are addressed in detail in chapters of the study dealing with other DoD organizations, they are briefly described in this section to draw attention to their potential contribution to improved performance by OSD.

Regarding previously proposed solutions, there have been five major studies since 1970 that address one or more of the OSD problem areas identified in this report:

- the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* chaired by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh and submitted in July 1970;
- the *Departmental Headquarters Study* directed by Paul R. Ignatius and submitted in June 1978;
- the *National Military Command Structure Study* directed by Richard C. Steadman and submitted in July 1978;
- the *Defense Agency Review* directed by Major General Theodore Antonelli, USA (Retired) and submitted in March 1979; and
- the Final Report, entitled *Toward a More Effective Defense*, of the Defense Organization Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) chaired by Philip A. Odeen and completed in February 1985.

Relevant recommendations of these studies have been linked to problem areas identified in this study as accurately as possible. Due to the differences in approach as well as the brevity of certain recommendations in these studies, the correlation of problem areas and recommendations required certain interpretations which may not be exact.

It should be noted that the options to solve a problem area presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1—LIMITED MISSION INTEGRATION OF THE OVERALL DEFENSE EFFORT

The principal guideline for solving this problem area is to strengthen the integrating staff support for the Secretary of Defense and to strengthen the authority of and the integrating staff support for the JCS Chairman. Proposals that would strengthen the authority of the JCS Chairman are addressed in Chapter 4; this chapter will, therefore, focus only on strengthening the integrating support for the Secretary of Defense and JCS Chairman. With these objectives in mind, four options have been developed. These options propose that portions of OSD and OJCS be organized along major mission lines.

No element of the Washington Headquarters of DoD is organized along major mission lines. While there are small offices within various OSD, OJCS, and Military Department organizations that focus on a functional area relating to a major DoD mission, such as policy for defense of NATO Europe, there is no major organizational entity that has a comprehensive, multi-functional, mission orientation. Only at the unified and specified command, or operational, level —which is far removed from Washington —is there a true mission orientation.

Since institutions should be organized, both at their policymaking and operational levels, to execute their major responsibilities, the current organizational arrangements at the policymaking level of DoD, which emphasize functional inputs, and not mission outputs, are a major shortcoming. In essence, these arrangements are a major roadblock to improved mission integration. Alternative arrangements include:

- Option 1A —create an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Program Integration whose office would include assistant secretaries for three major mission categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional (other world regions) defense and force projection

In a previous portion of this chapter, it was asserted that DoD has six major missions:

- nuclear deterrence
- maritime superiority
- power projection superiority
- defense of NATO Europe
- defense of East Asia
- defense of Southwest Asia

These six missions are used as the basis for forming mission-oriented offices in OSD.

Under this proposal, the missions of nuclear deterrence and defense of NATO, given their paramount importance, would each be assigned to an assistant secretary. The other four missions —maritime superiority, power projection superiority, defense of East Asia, and defense of Southwest Asia —would be assigned to a third assistant secretary, to be entitled regional defense and force projection. The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, included major portions of this option as one of its recommendations. (pages 25–27)

Under this option, these three assistant secretaries would report to an Under Secretary for Policy and Program Integration. The current position of Under Secretary for Policy would be expanded to assume the program integration responsibilities. Expanding the responsibilities of this under secretary to include program integration is a logical extension of the current duties of this position. DoD Directive 5111.1, which specifies the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, lists the following function first: "integration of DoD plans and policies with overall national security objectives." In essence, the integration responsibilities of this position would be expanded from only policy planning to include programs and resource decisions.

Under this alternative, portions of current OSD functional offices —policy and program analysis and evaluation being key examples —would be transferred to the offices of the new assistant secretaries. For example, the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Deterrence would have reporting to him the following offices:

	current organization
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy)	OUSD (Policy)
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Negotiations Policy)	OUSD (Policy)
Deputy Director (Strategic Programs)	Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation

Similar transfers would be made to the other mission-oriented assistant secretaries.

As to the location of the current international policy and international affairs offices in this proposed organization, the Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy) would be divided between the assistant secretaries for nuclear deterrence and NATO defense. The Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) would be incorporated in the office of the assistant secretary for regional defense and force projection.

To provide these assistant secretaries with expertise and influence on the range of resource issues that would be of concern in their mission areas, it will be necessary to provide them staff capabilities in the traditional resource-oriented functional areas: research and development, manpower, logistics, installations, and command, control, communications, and intelligence. This capability could be provided in two ways.

First, the mission-oriented assistant secretaries could be assigned a resource office that would have a small cell of staffers to address each functional area. This arrangement would enable the mission-oriented assistant secretaries to have an effective voice in resource issues without impeding the functional integration role of the functional-oriented under and assistant secretaries.

The second method of providing resource expertise to the mission-oriented assistant secretaries would be to transfer to them entire subunits that have mission-oriented responsibilities from the functional offices. For example, the Deputy Under Secretary (Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces) could be transferred from the Office of the Under Secretary (Research and Engineering) to the office of the Assistant Secretary (Nuclear Deterrence). Similarly, the Director of Strategic and Theater Forces Command, Control, and Communications could be transferred from the Office of the Assistant Secretary (C^3I) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary

(Nuclear Deterrence). Such transfers would not be possible from all functional offices due to the inability to divide some offices along mission lines. This second method would greatly reduce the roles of the functional under and assistant secretaries and make functional integration in DoD more difficult.

Under either approach, certain OSD functional areas would remain unaltered, such as comptroller, general counsel, public affairs, legislative affairs, and acquisition.

- ○ Option 1B —create under secretaries in OSD for three major mission categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection.

Instead of creating three mission-oriented assistant secretaries reporting to a single under secretary, this option proposes the creation of three mission-oriented under secretaries who would report to the Secretary of Defense. Options 1A and 1B differ only in regard as to whether these mission-oriented offices would be headed by assistant or under secretaries and whether these offices would report to an under secretary or directly to the Secretary of Defense.

As in Option 1A, appropriate cells or portions of current OSD functional offices would be transferred to the offices of the new under secretaries. Chart 3-4 presents an illustrative diagram of the major offices that would report to these three under secretaries; the diagram is based upon the approach of having one resource office for each under secretary with staff cells for various resource-oriented functional areas.

CHART 3 – 4

MAJOR OFFICES OF MISSION-ORIENTED UNDER SECRETARIES


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY
OTHER OSD OFFICES
UNDER SECRETARY (NUCLEAR DETERRENCE)
UNDER SECRETARY (NATO DEFENSE)
UNDER SECRETARY (REGIONAL DEFENSE & FORCE PROJECTION)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (NUCLEAR FORCES & ARMS CONTROL POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (NEGOTIATIONS POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAM ANALYSIS)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (NUCLEAR DETERRENCE RESOURCES)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (EUROPEAN & NATO POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRADE & SECURITY POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (NATO PROGRAM ANALYSIS)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (NATO DEFENSE RESOURCES)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (REGIONAL POLICY)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (LOW INTENSITY WARFARE & SPECIAL OPERATIONS)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (REGIONAL & FORCE PROJECTION PROGRAM ANALYSIS)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (REGIONAL & FORCE PROJECTION RESOURCES)
R & D CELL
MANPOWER CELL
LOGISTICS CELL
INSTALLATIONS CELL
C^3I CELL
POLICY ELEMENTS
PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION ELEMENTS
RESOURCE ELEMENTS

One of the offices subordinate to the Under Secretary (Regional Defense and Force Projection) deserves special attention. That is the office which would focus on low intensity warfare and special operations. At the present time, low intensity warfare and special operations would not qualify as a major DoD mission; it is properly included as a subordinate mission of the regional defense and force projection mission.

Despite this judgment, there is a substantial need to create a strong multi-Service, multi-functional, organizational focus for low intensity warfare and special operations. This is so for six reasons: (1) the threat to U.S. interests from the lower end of the conflict spectrum is becoming more serious; (2) the capabilities needed to respond to these threats are not among the traditional ones of the Services; (3) the Services have a tendency in force planning to focus on high intensity conflicts upon which their resource programs are principally justified; (4) there is a need to coordinate the activities of the Services as they seek to develop required capabilities in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; (5) there is a need for innovative thinking and new approaches to these threats; and (6) a clear organizational focus may help ensure that these capabilities receive the proper attention and priority. While the proposals for offices subordinate to the under secretaries may be considered as illustrative, the establishment of an office for low intensity warfare and special operations is a specific proposal.

Chart 3-5 presents one possible organizational diagram of OSD that could result from the creation of mission-oriented under secretaries. The set of organizational changes proposed in this diagram also seeks to solve the span of control problems (problem area #2) of the Secretary of Defense by grouping offices under the most logical senior official. Key among these changes is the creation of an Under Secretary for Readiness, Sustainability, and Support whose office would have responsibility for manpower, reserve affairs, health affairs, installations, and logistics. Chart 3-5 also reflects a recommendation of Chapter 7 (PPBS) that the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) be created.

This proposal —despite the detail in which it is portrayed —is provided only for illustrative purposes. Chart 3-5 represents only one of many possible schemes for organizing OSD with three mission-oriented under secretaries. Accordingly, it should not be considered a recommended course of action. The purposes of Chart 3-5 are solely to: (1) serve as a starting point for efforts to design an OSD staff with improved mission integration capabilities and a more manageable span of control; and (2) identify for the Congress the underlying principles to be addressed in legislation.

CHART 3 – 5

OSD WITH MISSION-ORIENTED UNDER SECRETARIES


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY (NUCLEAR DETERRENCE)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY)
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION
UNDER SECRETARY (NATO DEFENSE)
DEFENSE ADVISOR, U.S. MISSION TO NATO
UNDER SECRETARY (REGIONAL DEFENSE & FORCE PROJECTION)
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
UNDER SECRETARY (READINESS, SUSTAINABILITY, & SUPPORT)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARIES FOR – FORCE MGMT & PERSONNEL – RESERVE AFFAIRS – HEALTH AFFAIRS – INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES
UNDER SECRETARY (RESEARCH & ENGINEERING)
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS & INTELLIGENCE)
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
DEFENSE AUDIO VISUAL AGENCY
GENERAL COUNSEL
DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (STRATEGIC PLANNING)
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMPTROLLER)
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ACQUISITION)
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, SMALL & DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION

The top portion of Chart 3-5 shows the six major OSD organizations, three of which are mission integrators (nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection) and three of which are functional integrators (readiness, sustainability, and support; research and engineering; and command, control, communications and intelligence). Highlights of the proposed changes are as follows. Offices not shown on this chart would continue to report to their current senior authority.

- the Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy) and the Defense Nuclear Agency would report to the Under Secretary (Nuclear Deterrence) instead of the Under Secretary (Research and Engineering);
- the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization would report to the Under Secretary (Nuclear Deterrence) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO would report to the Under Secretary (NATO Defense) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Defense Security Assistance Agency would report to the Under Secretary (Regional Defense and Force Projection), but would coordinate with the Under Secretary (NATO Defense) on security assistance programs within the European region;
- the position of Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) would be created;
- the positions of Assistant Secretary (Force Management and Personnel), Assistant Secretary (Reserve Affairs), and Assistant Secretary (Health Affairs) would be retitled Deputy Under Secretaries and would report to the Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the installations and logistics functions would be transferred from the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) to a Deputy Under Secretary (Installations and Logistics) who would report to the Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support);
- the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences would report to the Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the new position of Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning) would be created to replace the Under Secretary (Policy); reporting to this Assistant Secretary would be the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency (both of which currently report to the Secretary of Defense) and the Office of the Director, Net Assessment and Defense Investigative Service (both of which currently report to the Under Secretary (Policy));
- the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation would report to the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Assistant to the Secretary (Intelligence Oversight) would report to the DoD Inspector General instead of the Secretary of Defense;

- the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) would be retitled Assistant Secretary (Acquisition); and
- the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) instead of the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 1C —create a matrix organization with mission-oriented under secretaries and functional-oriented under and assistant secretaries.

This proposal is the same as Option 1B with one major exception: the functional cells or subunits placed within each mission-oriented office would retain an organizational link across all such functional activities within OSD. For example, each mission-oriented office would have a policy office in its vertical organization. These offices would also report horizontally to the senior policy official in OSD, who, in this proposal, would be the Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning).

Matrix organizations, pioneered by the aerospace industry in the late 1950's and 1960's, are employed successfully by a number of large, diversified private businesses with organizational problems similar to those of OSD. The identifying feature of a matrix organization is that some officials report to two bosses rather than to the traditional, single boss. In essence, there is a dual rather than a single chain of command. In OSD, these dual command responsibilities would be to functional offices (strategic planning; program analysis and evaluation; research and engineering; readiness, sustainability, and support; and command, control, communications and intelligence) and to mission offices. The former are oriented to functional efforts or specialized inhouse activities while the latter focus on outputs. In the matrix proposed for OSD, power would not be balanced equally between the dual chains of command. The mission-oriented chain would be dominant; the other chain would serve to complement the dominant chain.

The functional structure that currently exists in OSD and elsewhere in the Washington headquarters of DoD was the hallmark of U.S. businesses for much of the first half of this century. As certain companies became larger and more diversified, they switched to a product organization with functional offices underneath, an organizational concept known as federal decentralization. Many private businesses were perplexed as to whether a functional or a product line organization better suited their needs. The matrix organization is designed to gain the best of both approaches.

Upon reflection, one might conclude that DoD currently has a federal decentralization organization with the Military Departments being the product lines. This is not the case. The Military Departments do not represent the central "products" or "businesses" of DoD, because DoD is not seeking separate land, sea, or air products. The "businesses" of DoD are the previously described major missions: nuclear deterrence, defense of NATO Europe, defense of East Asia, defense of Southwest Asia, maritime superiority, and power projection superiority.

CHART 3 – 6

OSD WITH A MISSION-FUNCTION MATRIX


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY (NUCLEAR DETERRENCE)
UNDER SECRETARY (NATO DEFENSE)
UNDER SECRETARY (REGIONAL DEFENSE & FORCE PROJECTION)
OTHER OSD OFFICES:
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
GENERAL COUNSEL
COMPTROLLER
DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL
ACQUISITION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (STRATEGIC PLANNING)
POLICY ELEMENTS
POLICY ELEMENTS
POLICY ELEMENTS
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
ANALYSIS ELEMENT
ANALYSIS ELEMENT
ANALYSIS ELEMENT
UNDER SECRETARY (READINESS, SUSTAINABILITY & SUPPORT)
MANPOWER, INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS CELLS
MANPOWER, INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS CELLS
MANPOWER, INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS CELLS
UNDER SECRETARY (RESEARCH & ENGINEERING)
RESEARCH & ENGINEERING CELL
RESEARCH & ENGINEERING CELL
RESEARCH & ENGINEERING CELL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS & INTELLIGENCE)
C^3I CELL
C^3I CELL
C^3I CELL

Chart 3-6 presents a detailed diagram of one possible OSD matrix organization. The offices in the upper right hand box of the chart would not be part of the matrix. The offices of the mission-oriented under secretaries are shown vertically with their policy, analysis, and resource elements. The matrix is formed with five functional offices. At least three Defense Agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Communications Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency) that report to these functional offices would also be included, either directly or indirectly, as part of the matrix. Two of these functional offices —strategic planning and program analysis and evaluation —have only staff responsibilities. The other three —research and engineering; readiness, sustainability, and support; and command, control, communications and intelligence —have important functional integration responsibilities.

The five functional offices overlay the mission-oriented offices in the horizontal dimension. These offices would seek to improve coordination among the various functional subunits located within the mission-oriented offices. The unbroken lines within the vertical, mission-oriented offices signify that this is the dominant command chain in the matrix. The dashed horizontal lines connecting the functional offices and functional cells or subunits signify a coordination —not a power sharing —responsibility.

- ○ Option 1D —replace the current Joint Staff functional (J-1, J-2, etc.) organization with a mission-oriented organization.

As in the case with OSD, the Joint Staff is organized along functional lines. As might be expected, this organizational arrangement focuses on the functional perspective. It is not clear, however, that this perspective is desirable in an organization that is responsible for providing unified military advice which must give careful consideration to missions and operational requirements.

This option proposes that the functional organization of the Joint Staff be replaced with a structure that includes mission-oriented offices. Under this option, there would be Directors of Joint Staff Directorates for each major mission area and a Director for Joint Resources who would continue to focus on the unfulfilled responsibilities of the current functional offices.

The same organizational principles used in proposing OSD mission-oriented offices would be applied to the Joint Staff. The following positions would be established:

- ○ Director, Nuclear Deterrence
- ○ Director, NATO Defense
- ○ Director, Regional Defense and Force Projection
- ○ Director, Joint Resources

and the following positions abolished:

- ○ Director, J-1 (Manpower and Personnel)
- ○ Director, J-3 (Operations)
- ○ Director, J-4 (Logistics)
- ○ Director, J-5 (Plans and Policy)
- ○ Director, C^3 Systems

Appropriate portions of the existing functional directorates would be transferred to the mission-oriented offices. Functional areas that should not be divided would be placed under the Director, Joint Resources. However, if the JCS Chairman were given substantial responsibilities for providing personnel management of military officers in joint assignments (as proposed in Option 2J of Chapter 4), it would be necessary to retain, and possibly expand, the J-1 office.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—INADEQUATE SUPERVISION AND COORDINATION OF OSD OFFICES

The thrusts of solutions to this problem are to reduce the Secretary of Defense's span of control by streamlining OSD, to improve the control of the Defense Agencies, and to create a coordination office or under secretary to help manage OSD. A total of seven options are presented in these three categories.

a. Create additional under or deputy secretaries to serve as managers/coordinators and group assistant secretaries and lesser officials under them.

- ◦ Option 2A —create two additional under secretaries for evaluation and readiness, sustainability, and support.

In addition to the Under Secretaries for Policy and Research and Engineering, which currently exist, two other under secretary positions would be created for evaluation who would have responsibility for evaluation, including testing, and control type activities. Readiness, sustainability, and support who would have responsibility for manpower, reserve affairs, health affairs, installations, and logistics.

CHART 3 – 7

OSD WITH FOUR UNDER SECRETARIES


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY (POLICY)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
DEFENSE ADVISOR, U.S. MISSION TO NATO
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNDER SECRETARY (EVALUATION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMPTROLLER)
DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION
UNDER SECRETARY (READINESS, SUSTAINABILITY & SUPPORT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FORCE MANAGEMENT & PERSONNEL)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES
UNDER SECRETARY (RESEARCH & ENGINEERING)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY)
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
DEFENSE AUDIOVISUAL AGENCY
GENERAL COUNSEL
DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY
DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ACQUISITION)
DIRECTOR, SMALL & DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS & INTELLIGENCE)
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY

Chart 3-7 presents one possible organizational arrangement with four under secretaries of defense. Under this arrangement, the Secretary of Defense's span of control would be reduced from 24 to 10 OSD and Defense Agency officials. In addition to the four under secretaries, only six other OSD officials would report directly to the Secretary of Defense: General Counsel, Assistant Secretary (Legislative Affairs), Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs), the DoD Inspector General, Assistant Secretary (Acquisition), and Assistant Secretary (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). The major changes reflected in this chart are:

- the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency would report to the Under Secretary (Policy) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO, would report to the Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs), Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy), and Director, Net Assessment would report solely to the Under Secretary (Policy) instead of the current arrangement which also provides a link with the Secretary of Defense;
- the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization would report to the Under Secretary (Research and Engineering) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller), Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation would report to the Under Secretary (Evaluation) instead of the Secretary of Defense; the DoD Inspector General could also report to the Under Secretary (Evaluation) if it were determined that he would retain sufficient independence in such an organizational arrangement; under this option, this official would continue to report to the Secretary of Defense;
- the Assistant to the Secretary (Intelligence Oversight) would report to the DoD Inspector General instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the Assistant Secretary (Force Management and Personnel), Assistant Secretary (Reserve Affairs), Assistant Secretary (Health Affairs), and Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences would report to the Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) instead of the Secretary of Defense;
- the installations and logistics functions would be transferred from the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) to the Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics) who would report to the Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support);
- the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) would be retitled Assistant Secretary (Acquisition); and
- the Director, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) instead of the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 2B —create three mission-oriented under secretaries for nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection and an under secretary for readiness, sustainability, and support.

This option has been discussed in detail earlier in this chapter under Option 1B. It is repeated here primarily in recognition of its contribution to solving the problem of inadequate supervision and coordination of OSD offices as well as improving mission integration. In addition to these four new under secretary positions, the current Under Secretary (Research and Engineering) would be retained. Under this option, the Secretary of Defense's span of control would be reduced from 24 to 13 OSD and Defense Agency officials.

- Option 2C —create three deputy secretaries for military operations, resource management, and evaluation.

This proposal, put forward by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, envisioned deputy secretaries for:

> *Military operations* who would have responsibility for military operations, unified commands, operational requirements, intelligence, telecommunications, international security affairs, and the Defense Communications Agency.
>
> *Management of resources* who would have responsibility for the Military Departments, research and advanced technology, engineering development, installations and procurement, manpower and reserve affairs, health and environmental affairs, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
>
> *Evaluation* who would have responsibility for evaluation and control-type activities, including comptroller, program analysis and evaluation, test and evaluation, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency.

CHART 3 – 8

BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL RECOMMENDATION


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
COORDINATION GROUP
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP
LONG RANGE PLANNING GROUP
DEPUTY SECRETARY (MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH & ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INSTALLATIONS & PROCUREMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS)
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STAFF
DEPUTY SECRETARY (EVALUATION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (TEST & EVALUATION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PROGRAM & FORCE ANALYSIS)
DEPUTY SECRETARY (OPERATIONS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INTELLIGENCE)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (TELECOMMUNICATIONS)
OPERATIONAL COMMANDS
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY)
PENTAGON SERVICES
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)

In addition to these three deputy secretaries, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended the establishment of a Long Range Planning Group, Net Assessment Group, and a Coordination Group. Chart 3-8 presents these organizational arrangements as recommended by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Under this exact arrangement, the Secretary of Defense's span of control within OSD would be reduced from 24 to 11 officials. However, if the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations were made consistent with changes that have occurred since 1970, the Secretary's span of control would be reduced to nine OSD officials. In the broader DoD context, this option would reduce the Secretary of Defense's span of control from 41 to 14 officials.

b. Improve the control of Defense Agencies.

While reassigning four of the five Defense Agencies that report directly to the Secretary of Defense to other OSD officials (as Options 2A and 2B propose) may improve their supervision and control, these realignments would not solve the problem of inadequate control for the ten agencies that currently report to lesser OSD officials. Two options to improve the control of Defense Agencies have been developed.

- ○ Option 2D —have some Defense Agencies report through the JCS Chairman to the Secretary of Defense.

This alternative would focus on three Defense Agencies with important wartime support missions: Defense Communications Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. By having these agencies report solely to the JCS Chairman, they may be more closely supervised.

- ○ Option 2E —create an office in the Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) solely to review the program submissions of the Defense Agencies

Given the weaknesses of OSD control and supervision of the Defense Agencies, it may be useful to create a Deputy Director of PA&E whose office would be responsible for reviewing the program proposals of each Defense Agency. While this option would not improve the day-to-day supervision of Defense Agencies, it could strengthen control of the agencies' major programs.

c. Create a coordination office or under secretary to help manage OSD

If it is not possible to streamline the organization of OSD, an alternative approach would be to attempt to shift the burdens of managing OSD from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to other officials in OSD. Two options have been developed along these lines: (1) create a Coordinating Group in the immediate office of the Secretary and (2) create a permanent under secretary.

- ○ Option 2F —create a Coordinating Group

A detailed description of such a Coordinating Group is included in one of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel:

> A Coordinating Group should be established in the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense. The responsibilities of

this Group should be to assist the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretaries of Defense in coordinating the activities of the entire Department in the scheduling and follow-up of the various inter-Departmental liaison activities; to staff for the Secretary the control function for improvement and reduction of management information/control systems needed within the Department and required from Defense contractors; and to assure that each organizational charter of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is of proper scope and coordinated and in accordance with the assigned responsibility of the organization. The responsibility for the Department's Directive/Guidance System, currently assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), should be assigned to this group. This coordinating group should be headed by a civilian Director, who should also serve as executive assistant to the Secretary of Defense. (page 7)

- Option 2G —create a permanent (career position) under secretary to focus on management and coordination tasks.

This under secretary would be responsible for providing more careful oversight of the work agendas of various OSD offices and essentially serving as an OSD management inspector general. If such an official were appointed from the career service (as is proposed here), he could serve as a valuable source of continuity during periods of management transition.

The British Ministry of Defence does have a permanent under secretary position with substantial responsibilities. The incumbent of this position, entitled Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence, is the permanent head of the Ministry of Defence and the principal accounting officer. His responsibilities, as listed in *The Central Organisation for Defence*, include:

> (a) the organisation and efficiency of the Ministry including the management of all civilian staff, the co-ordination of its business, and establishment of such machinery as may be necessary for this purpose; (b) the long-term financial planning and budgetary control of the defence programme, the associated allocation of resources, and the proper scrutiny of the requirement for all proposals with expenditure implications; (c) advice on the political and parliamentary aspects of the Ministry's work and relations with other Government Departments. (page 3)

3. PROBLEM AREA #3—INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN OSD

Options to correct this problem area can be grouped into two categories: (1) attempt to ensure that OSD political appointees have increased levels of relevant experience and to lengthen their terms of service; and (2) reduce the number of political appointees and improve the skills of career officials. A total of six options has been developed.

a. Provide for more experienced and longer serving political appointees

- Option 3A —require that political appointees have strong defense management credentials.

In many instances, the defense management credentials of senior OSD officials seem to have been given low priority in their selection by the Executive Branch. In many cases, political debts were apparently the pivotal consideration. Not only has the Executive Branch failed to give sufficient consideration to the extensive management demands of these senior positions, but the Senate, especially the Senate Committee on Armed Services, has not challenged nominated officials who lack relevant experience. If the Executive Branch cannot discipline itself to nominate more qualified officials, the Senate could establish more rigorous standards. This option is also discussed in the chapter of this study dealing with the Military Departments.

- Option 3B —require a longer commitment of service from OSD political appointees.

It is reported that Secretary Laird requested political appointees serving during his tenure to commit themselves to a minimum term of service. In addition to such an approach, the Senate Committee on Armed Services could seek a commitment from each senior political appointee during his or her confirmation hearing.

- Option 3C —formulate monetary incentives or lessen the monetary disadvantages for political appointees.

A major drawback in recruiting senior officials to serve in OSD is the substantial financial disincentive. Salaries of even the most senior OSD positions are considerably below those of comparable positions in private business. In addition, to avoid potential conflicts of interest, nominated officials are required to divest defense-related financial holdings. This requirement often results in a substantial financial setback. Three specific actions could be taken:

- increase the salaries of senior civilian officials in OSD;
- alter conflict of interest statutes and regulations to require only notice of conflicts and *ad hoc* disqualifications; and
- alter Federal tax laws with respect to forced sale of assets to permit the financial gain from such sale to be reinvested in similar assets without applying tax on the gain at the time of the forced sale.

b. Reduce the number of political appointees and improve the skills of career officials

- Option 3D —place a limit, at a reduced level, on the number of political appointees.

If the negatives of political appointments cannot be lessened, it may be necessary to limit the number of political appointees in OSD. There are presently 69 senior OSD political appointees. The Congress could specify in law a lesser number of senior OSD noncareer appointees.

- Option 3E —give greater attention to the development and retention of a strong group of senior civil servants.

The complexities of modern defense management require senior career officials with a wide range of skills and experience. OSD may want to consider a more ambitious executive development program, particularly one that makes adequate provision for cross-training senior officials in new disciplines. While this is an important topic, detailed consideration of this option is beyond the scope of this study.

- Option 3F —create a permanent (career position) under secretary to provide for greater continuity.

This option, which is the same as Option 2G, proposes that a position for a permanent under secretary of defense be created to provide continuity and to lessen the problems of inexperienced political appointees and their high turnover rates. It is envisioned that this senior official would remain in place during the transition from one administration to the next.

4. PROBLEM AREA #4—OSD MICRO-MANAGEMENT

Six possible solutions to this problem area have been suggested. These include reducing the size of the OSD staff, improved management attention, and lessening outside factors that contribute to the micro-management tendency.

a. Reduce the size of the OSD staff

- Option 4A —reduce the size of the OSD staff.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, in recommending an OSD staff size of not more than 2,000 personnel, stated: "...many of the individual elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense have become so overstaffed as to reduce their capability." (page 31) Secretary Brown, however, reduced the staff size considerably below this number in 1977 by a personnel reduction of approximately 25 percent. The *Departmental Headquarters Study* did not recommend a size for the OSD staff although it did indicate that some officials interviewed by the study recommended a 50 percent reduction. If one were convinced that OSD was performing the full range of its responsibilities but merely going beyond these responsibilities into micro-management in certain areas, it would be possible to construct personnel reductions that would solve this problem. However, when, as the case appears, OSD is micro-managing in some areas and is not fulfilling its responsibilities in others —like mission integration and strategic planning --it is much more difficult to determine a proper staff size.

Nevertheless, it appears that a rationalization of work responsibilities between OSD and the Military Departments and between OSD and OJCS does offer the potential for some reduction in the size of the OSD staff.

b. Improved management attention.

- Option 4B —draw the micro-management problem to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and seek more clear-cut guidance on OSD staff responsibilities.

If the Secretary of Defense were convinced that OSD was engaging in micro-management of the Services' internal programs, he may undertake initiatives to curtail this disruptive and inefficient practice. Included in such an effort might be more specific guidelines on the division of responsibilities between OSD and the Military Departments. In this regard, the *Department Headquarters Study* stated that one opportunity for improved management is:

> A more precise delineation of where OSD's responsibilities end and those of the Military Departments begin. (page 26)

- Option 4C —reorient OSD's attention away from functional micro-management and toward mission integration.

If one believed that OSD was engaged in activities which are not its responsibility and was failing to perform others, it would be appropriate to reorient OSD toward its unfulfilled responsibilities. Options 1A, 1B, and 1C, which emphasize mission integration, could result in such a reorientation and indirectly lessen functional micro-management.

- Option 4D --create a permanent (career position) under secretary to police OSD micro-management

This proposal is the same as Option 2G (inadequate supervision problem area) and Option 3F (inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity problem area). The management responsibilities of this position, as envisioned in these previously presented options, would be specifically expanded to provide for careful policing of OSD micro-management of internal Service programs.

c. Lessen outside factors that contribute to the micro-management tendency.

- Option 4E —lessen congressional interest in program details.

Lessening congressional interest in details would lessen the needs of OSD to be involved with program details.

- Option 4F —hold Service Secretaries more accountable for conformance to guidance from the Secretary of Defense.

Such an effort should reduce OSD's concerns about non-compliance by the Military Departments in executing the decisions of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or of senior DoD decision-making bodies. Success in such an effort would depend upon the extent to which the Service Secretary had an independent political base and the relative emphasis he placed on loyalty to the Secretary of Defense versus his Service.

5. Problem Area #5—Unilateralism

There are four options that could strengthen a coalition orientation in DoD planning and programming.

- Option 5A —create a position in OJCS for a 3-star military officer responsible for coalition matters.

Creation of this position would be designed to ensure that the coalition nature of our strategies was considered in issues addressed in the JCS system. This senior military official would report directly to the JCS Chairman.

- Option 5B —make the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) responsible for coalition matters.

Again, the logic behind this proposal is to assign one official with the responsibility of raising coalition considerations in DoD decision-making processes.

- Option 5C —strengthen the position of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International Programs and Technology).

One of the major failures of our coalition efforts has been poor defense industrial cooperation with our allies. The Deputy Under Secretary (International Programs and Technology), located in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), is a key force for multinational armament cooperation. Strengthening his role in relevant decisions may result in enhanced cooperation.

- Option 5D —create mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries who would be assigned responsibilities for coalition matters in their mission areas.

As the mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries, proposed in Options 1A, 1B, and 1C, would have both policy and resource elements, they may have more success in coordinating the various aspects of our coalition policies and programs.

6. PROBLEM AREA #6—INADEQUATE REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

Two options have been developed to overcome this perceived problem area.

- Option 6A —create an OSD office, staffed by a combination of civilian and military officers, to review contingency plans.

This office would report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) in the current organization or to the mission-oriented assistant secretaries proposed in Option 1A. In organizational arrangements (Options 1B and 1C) with mission-oriented under secretaries and an Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning), it could report either to appropriate under secretaries or to the strategic planning office, or to both. Given the need for tight security for these contingency plans, it would appear appropriate to consolidate this work in one office —most logically, the Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning).

- Option 6B —create a joint OSD/OJCS office to review contingency plans.

This office would be manned by both civilian and military officials and would report to both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman or their designees.

F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming OSD that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF LIMITED MISSIONS INTEGRATION

- ○ Option 1A —create an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Program Integration whose office would include assistant secretaries for three major mission categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection.

This option would essentially entail the creation of three powerful positions in OSD, whose occupants would be able to cut across functional areas and Service priorities in order to ensure that fundamental DoD missions receive the highest priority. Under the present arrangement, the responsibility for these major missions is divided among so many offices and officials that their priority has become obscured and a certain focus has been lost. As Samuel Huntington has argued in his paper, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy":

> The most striking deficiency in U.S. defense organization today is the absence of any single official or office in the Pentagon with overall responsibility for any one of these strategic missions —and *only* for that mission. Individual officials and organizations are responsible for parts of each of these missions; other officials, such as the Chairman of the JCS and the Undersecretary for Policy, have a general responsibility for all these missions. The Secretary of Defense knows where to turn when he wants the individual officials responsible for the Air Force or the Marine Corps, for research and development or intelligence, for manpower or the budget. But where does he find an official with overall and exclusive responsibility for strategic deterrence? There is none. Nor is there any single official responsible for NATO defense or for force projection in the Third World. These are precisely the major strategic purposes of American defense policy, and they are virtually the only important interests in defense that are not represented in the defense organization. (page 33)

There is, at present, no senior OSD official below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary who watches out for these mission priorities, and the military officers who do so —the unified commanders —do not have a strong voice or advocate in Washington. The three mission-oriented assistant secretaries could become important spokesmen within OSD for the interests of the unified commands. Their very existence would tend to draw attention to how various procurement, research and development, and operations and maintenance decisions and trade-offs affect the overall capability to fulfill key military missions.

Creating mission-oriented offices also has benefits in terms of other OSD and PPBS problem areas. It could strengthen strategic planning by diminishing OSD's focus on resources (Option 1A of Chapter 7) and by strengthening the mission orientation of organizations that contribute to the strategic planning process (Option 1I of Chapter 7). In addition, mission-oriented offices could reorient OSD's attention away from functional micro-management (Option 4C) and strengthen efforts to achieve coalition-oriented planning and programming (Option 5D). In sum, mission-oriented offices would help to overcome the serious deficiencies of a functional structure in a large and complex organization.

On the negative side, the creation of these three assistant secretaries and the transfer of numerous offices and subunits to their jurisdiction would cause considerable confusion during the transition period. While it is true that more attention needs to be paid to major missions, it is less clear that the creation of three civilian assistant secretaries is the best way to achieve this. Alternative approaches involving the JCS system might be more effective and less disruptive.

Moreover, in some cases at least, the transfer of various units and subunits to the purview of the proposed mission-oriented assistant secretaries might result in less efficient or useful analysis and work. For example, if the program analysis and evaluation (PA&E) function were divided among three mission-oriented offices, there would be more attention devoted to cost-benefit tradeoffs within mission categories, but less attention devoted to tradeoffs that cut across mission categories and that embrace the entire defense budget (although this need could be fulfilled by the smaller PA&E office to be assigned to the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller)). Why break up functional offices that may require a certain critical mass in size in order to accomplish their function?

These arguments on the disadvantages of a mission organization versus a functional organization represent the traditional business dilemma of a product line versus a functional organization.

- ○ Option 1B —create under secretaries in OSD for three major mission categories: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection

This option might be more disruptive than Option 1A, primarily because it would create three powerful mission-oriented under secretaries. On the other hand, a single under secretary with mission-oriented assistant secretaries under him would have considerably less ability to cause mission-oriented integration to actually happen than three under secretaries who focus on well-defined areas of responsibility. Moreover, given the fact that officials heading these mission-oriented offices would be responsible for the central strategic purposes of DoD, it would seem reasonable that they should be among the most senior officials in OSD and not lower in the hierarchy than functional-oriented officials. In addition, decisions on policy and resource allocation priorities among these three mission areas are among the most fundamental and important ones to be made in DoD. It can be argued that the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense should be making these decisions and not the proposed Under Secretary for Policy and Program Integration. In many respects, the influence and decision-making responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Policy and Program Integration, proposed in Option 1A, could exceed those of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

It is clear from organizational trends in OSD that Secretaries of Defense are searching for improved mechanisms to help integrate the overall defense effort. Part 4 (Functional Organization of OSD) of Section B of this chapter indicates that: "most of the additions [to OSD functional areas since 1953] have been to strengthen the Secretary's policy, program review, and oversight responsibilities." These capabilities are primarily oriented toward seeking improved integration of the policies and programs of the Military Departments.

While these relatively new integration capabilities in OSD have not taken an explicit mission orientation, there has been a recent precedent for establishing mission-oriented offices. During the early years of the Carter Administration, Ambassador Robert W. Komer served as the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs. While he did not have a formal organizational structure to support his work (as is proposed for the assistant or under secretary for NATO defense), he was able, primarily due to his hierarchical position, to cut across functional and Service lines to give the NATO mission high priority. In this regard, Ambassador Komer made substantial contributions, including development of NATO's Long-Term Defense Program and planning the deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe. Ambassador Komer essentially served as the proposed under secretary for NATO defense.

- ○ Option 1C —create a matrix organization with mission-oriented under secretaries and functional-oriented under and assistant secretaries.

If one were convinced of the need for continued functional coordination in OSD as well as the need for mission-oriented offices, a mission-function matrix organization could be employed. The advantage would be effective coordination on both a mission and functional basis.

The major disadvantage would be the complexity of a matrix organization. The complexity problem would be compounded by the fact that OSD would just be emerging from a traditional functional organization to one that included mission-oriented offices. Adding a matrix at the same time that mission offices were created may be too much organizational change in OSD at one time. It might be better to follow a two-step process: create mission-oriented offices first and add the mission-function matrix later.

On the other hand, it might be preferable to make all of these changes at one time. It is clear that creating mission offices would be the more disruptive change. The matrix would be a rather modest step by comparison and might serve to ease the transitional process by providing continued functional coordination. Furthermore, the matrix proposed for OSD is a simple one. In any case, a mission-function matrix organization in OSD probably ought not to be a matter for legislation, but at most a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

The business literature, especially Davis and Lawrence in their book, *Matrix*, indicate that organizations turn to matrix organizations when three conditions apply:

> There is considerable pressure for balanced decision-making that focuses on two or more organizational dimensions —in OSD's case, on both missions and functions;
>
> There is considerable pressure for high rates of information exchange because of uncertainty, complexity, and interdependence in the issues confronting the organization; and
>
> There are internal demands to achieve greater economies of scale and to meet high quality standards with scarce financial and human resources.

All three of these conditions apparently apply to OSD.

A matrix organization has numerous advantages. The matrix's most basic advantage over more familiar structures is that it facilitates a rapid management response to changing requirements. Multiple expertise from the various matrix dimensions is brought to bear on a problem to solve it in a manner that benefits the entire organization. The matrix forces simultaneous consideration of all relevant factors —mission, function, and geographic —and enhances prospects for agreement on the best course of action. Resources can be allocated more rationally and with greater effect, primarily because the matrix helps middle managers (assistant secretaries and their deputies) to make trade-off decisions from a general management (Secretary of Defense) perspective, an orientation which is not now possible in OSD.

A matrix organization also increases the potential for more effective control and coordination. The matrix permits better control over mission and functional issues because it avoids an exclusive focus on one dimension. More than any other structural format, the multiple reporting relationships and flexibility of a matrix encourage communication and coordination.

The disadvantages of a matrix are associated with making it work. Peter F. Drucker has argued that the matrix "will never be a preferred form of organization; it is fiendishly difficult". Key among the disadvantages is the potential for power struggles between the matrix dimensions. Because the matrix formalizes the conflict that already exists between mission and functional points of view, power struggles could result because the authority and responsibility of the two dimensions would overlap. This would be less of a problem in OSD because power would not be balanced between the mission and functional dimensions; the mission dimension would be dominant.

In their book, *In Search of Excellence —Lessons From America's Best-Run Companies*, Peters and Waterman are critical of matrix organizations in large corporations:

> Along with bigness comes complexity, unfortunately. And most big companies respond to complexity in kind, by designing complex systems and structures....Our favorite candidate for the wrong kind of structure, of course, is the matrix organization structure. (page 306)

However, this criticism is focused on those organizations that have created large, complex, and often four-dimensional matrices. For those companies who have kept their matrices simple, Peters and Waterman are more positive:

> Just to be clear, we are not overly concerned about the organizational form that a few early users of the technique —such as Boeing and NASA —called "matrix" management. The key to making these systems work is the same key that makes structures work in the rest of the excellent companies. *One dimension* —e.g., product *or* geography *or* function *—has crystal-clear primacy*. (pages 307-308)

The mission-function matrix proposed for OSD appears to fit into this latter category. It is a simple, two-dimensional matrix involving only eight OSD offices. Furthermore, the mission dimension would have "crystal-clear primacy."

A second disadvantage of the matrix arises from the dual chain of command. The system of two bosses —even if one is dominant — places new demands on middle managers. This could lead to resistance to the matrix concept. Moreover, some corporations have found that people under a matrix organization are not certain to whom and for what they should report. The all too common question was "Which boss do I report to on this one, or do I keep everyone informed?" This breeds staffers who gain and retain substantial power by ensuring that everything stays complex.

- ○ Option 1D —replace the current Joint Staff functional (J-1, J-2, etc.) organization with a mission-oriented organization.

Creating mission-oriented offices in OJCS could be undertaken in lieu of or in addition to creation of such offices in OSD. Given the extensive mission integration staff support that the Secretary of Defense needs, it does not appear that the Secretary could rely exclusively on the OJCS. Although the involvement of the OJCS in resource allocation issues can be important, it is not nearly of the same scope as that of OSD. If the Secretary of Defense desires extensive mission integration support, he will need to organize OSD to provide it.

As to whether a part of OJCS should mirror mission-oriented offices in OSD, it might be useful to have a military input with the same perspective as the OSD mission-oriented offices. Such an arrangement could provide the Secretary with a wider range of views on the most fundamental defense issues.

On the other hand, it may be disruptive to make substantial structural changes in the two most senior defense organizations (OSD and OJCS) at the same time. In addition, it is unclear whether the Secretary of Defense would benefit more from two mission-oriented inputs or whether it would be more beneficial for OJCS to approach issues from a different organizational perspective.

As a last point, it is not clear that the Congress should play a forceful role in organizing the Joint Staff. It may be preferable to allow the professional military to continue to specify the structure of the Joint Staff.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE SUPERVISION AND COORDINATION OF OSD OFFICES

- ○ Option 2A —create two additional under secretaries for evaluation and readiness, sustainability, and support.

This option has three principal advantages: (1) it reduces the Secretary's span of control from 24 to 10 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials; (2) it provides the potential for improved coordination between similar functional areas; and (3) by creating an under secretary focused on readiness, sustainability, and support issues, it may produce a better balance between investment and readiness allocations. In addition, of the proposals offered for restructuring OSD, this option is the least disruptive.

While this option has numerous advantages, it fails to address the most serious problem in OSD which is limited mission integration. In addition, coordination across the functional groupings that would report to the four under secretaries would not be improved. Moreover, an additional layer would be placed between the Secretary and his functional specialists.

- Option 2B —create three mission-oriented under secretaries for nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection and an under secretary for readiness, sustainability, and support.

This option reduces the Secretary's span of control from 24 to 13 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials. Other points of evaluation are included under Option 1B.

- Option 2C —create three deputy secretaries of defense for military operations, resource management, and evaluation.

Of all the options put forth for streamlining OSD, this proposal of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel is by far the most extensive. In addition to changing reporting relationships in OSD, this option would alter the officials to whom the Service Secretaries and unified and specified commanders would report. For the former, they would report to a Deputy Secretary (Management of Resources); the latter, to a Deputy Secretary (Operations). If this option were applied to the current organization, the number of DoD officials — OSD and elsewhere —reporting to the Secretary of Defense would be reduced from 41 to 14. Within OSD, the reduction would be from 24 to 9 officials.

In addition to reducing the Secretary's span of control problem, this option offers several advantages. It would provide clearer lines of authority and responsibility throughout DoD. It would also provide the potential for increased coordination among the programs of the Services. Moreover, civilian oversight of non-nuclear contingency plans would likely be improved through the creation of a Deputy Secretary (Operations).

There are, however, a substantial number of negatives. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense arrangement has traditionally been one where one incumbent focused on day-to-day management of DoD, and the other on budget justification, Cabinet-level policy interactions, and political and congressional liaison and influence. Even if it were always the Secretary who has the latter role, he would have to add to his responsibilities refereeing disputes among the three Deputy Secretaries. Since military operations would set requirements, resource management would develop programs to meet requirements, and evaluation would decide whether requirements are met, it is not hard to foresee a large role for a referee. This option may ostensibly reduce the Secretary's span of control, but not his workload.

Further, and most important, it would hinder integration of effort along mission lines where development, procurement, and readiness must be balanced to achieve the maximum level of mission output for the resources available. This approach would be a step backward in tying together strategy, policies, and resource allocations.

In addition, the role of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unclear under this proposal. They would be distanced from military operations which has traditionally been a principal responsibility of OJCS.

As a last point, the creation of a pure planning staff to do long-range planning is likely to be an unworkable arrangement. Long-range plans produced solely by staff planners have not been readily accepted by line management organizations. Staff planners can only start the process and, later, help it to continue.

- ○ Option 2D —have some Defense Agencies report through the JCS Chairman to the Secretary of Defense.

OJCS is more likely than OSD to ensure that the Defense Agencies are more oriented to supporting combat forces in wartime. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the supervision or control of certain defense agencies would be improved by their transfer from OSD to OJCS. In fact, the current organizational deficiencies of the JCS system may lead to less efficient supervision and control of these Defense Agencies.

- ○ Option 2E —create an office in the Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) solely to review the program submissions of the Defense Agencies.

This option has the advantage of concentrating authority, responsibility, and oversight of the Defense Agencies. However, there are OSD functional offices other than PA&E which have more direct interests in individual agencies. This option would not improve oversight by these other OSD offices. Strengthened oversight by OSD functional offices would appear to be a more beneficial alternative when compared to creation of a new office within PA&E.

- ○ Option 2F —create a Coordinating Group.

The creation of a Coordinating Group in the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense would probably do much to increase the effective integration of the far-flung programs and offices of the Department of Defense —provided that individual Secretaries of Defense used the group effectively and gave it considerable authority. But by itself, such a group could accomplish little; its authority and influence would derive a direct proportion to the management competence of and effective delegation by the Secretary of Defense.

Management style would probably be a critical factor. Secretaries who wanted to maintain tight control of the Department and run it in a fairly authoritative, hierarchical fashion would probably find a Coordinating Group of immense value. Since the loyalty of the group would be to the Secretary alone, he could overcome some of the problems associated with Service Secretaries and under and assistant secretaries in OSD being coopted to a degree by the organizations over which they preside. The Coordinating Group could cut across such dual loyalties and help ensure that the Secretary's will was carried out.

On the other hand, a Secretary who preferred to run the Department as a vast conglomerate, delegating large amounts of his decision-making authority to the Service Secretaries and OSD under and assistant secretaries, might find a Coordinating Group to be merely a nuisance. In addition, a Coordinating Group may result in overcentralization with all of its negative attributes. For this reason, such a group probably out not to be established in law, but might better be set up by individual Secretaries of Defense, according to their preferences and needs.

In addition, it is unclear how the work of this group would differ from the immediate assistants to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and from three existing coordinating bodies: the Armed Forces Policy Council, the Defense Resources Board, and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Moreover, the establishment of mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries and multi-functional under secretaries offers greater potential for coordination without overcentralization.

- Option 2G —create a permanent (career position) under secretary to focus on management and coordination tasks.

The option of creating a position for a permanent under secretary was offered as a solution to three OSD problem areas: (1) inadequate supervision and coordination; (2) inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity; and (3) micro-management of the Services. The general management responsibilities envisioned in these options for this senior career official are very similar. For this reason, all three options will be evaluated under this heading. The basic arguments raised for Option 2F (Coordinating Group) also apply to an under secretary performing the same role; therefore, they will not be repeated here.

If this official were viewed as sufficiently apolitical as to enjoy the confidence of political appointees, he could play a useful role in numerous management areas. He could help the Secretary of Defense to improve supervision and coordination of OSD offices. In particular, he could play a forceful role in ensuring that OSD does not perform duties that should be the responsibility of the Military Departments. This permanent under secretary could offset the relative inexperience of political appointees especially during periods of transition. Such a senior career official could provide an important institutional memory.

The British Ministry of Defence has successfully employed a permanent senior official with both broad management and policy responsibilities. The U.S. Department of State also has had a senior career official —the Under Secretary for Political Affairs —although his responsibilities have focused on policy rather than management. Nevertheless, he has provided a useful source of experience and continuity.

On the other hand, it is unclear how the authority of this position would compare to that of politically appointed under or assistant secretaries. Inevitable conflicts in this regard would require higher authority to resolve. For this official to effectively perform his duties, the Secretary of Defense would have to give him broad authority and support. Whether the Secretary of Defense would be prepared to share his power with a career official whom he did not select is uncertain. It is also possible that this official could be frozen out by incoming administrations if he were judged to be political or closely associated with previous policies.

3. OPTIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN OSD

- Option 3A —require that political appointees have strong defense management credentials.

This option is intended to resolve the serious problem of numerous political appointees coming to their positions with little experience in national security affairs or knowledge of DoD. The result is a generally weak management layer imposed on top of the permanent bureaucracy.

There are really no disadvantages to this option, for it clearly would be desirable to appoint OSD officials with the highest possible level of defense management abilities. There is, however, little that can be done about this by direct legislation. The Senate can play a certain rearguard role by applying more rigorous standards in its own review of candidates. However, the real key to improvement in this area would be a greater awareness of the problem and a greater commitment on the part of the present and future administrations to finding higher quality appointees and refraining from using key civilian positions in OSD and the Military Departments largely as political rewards.

It is clear that the Senate has the authority to insist on appointees with greater defense management experience and skills. The extent to which the Senate is prepared to challenge the President on political appointments is uncertain, particularly in light of a general conviction in the Senate that the President should have considerable leeway in appointing senior Executive Branch officials. There may be some small legislative initiatives that the Congress could take, such as enacting a resolution or requiring a report on the subject, that might heighten awareness of this issue, but that is probably all that could be achieved by direct legislation. A more viable initiative would be for the Senate Committee on Armed Services to adopt more stringent professional standards for nominees who appear before it for confirmation.

- Option 3B —require a longer commitment of service from OSD political appointees.

Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to induce most political appointees to remain longer unless substantially greater compensation were paid to them, and that is a problem that may lie beyond the scope of changes within DoD. Individual Secretaries of Defense might, however, seek longer commitments of service from their appointees during the initial hiring process. The Senate Committee on Armed Services could seek similar commitments during the confirmation process. While this option presents a desirable goal, forceful mechanisms for achieving it do not appear to be available.

- Option 3C —formulate monetary incentives or lessen the monetary disadvantages for political appointees.

The three specific actions considered under this option are separately evaluated as follows:

a) increase the salaries of senior civilian officials in OSD

Although this study has not attempted to conduct a detailed analysis of the salary levels of senior OSD officials, a number of studies have found the salaries of such officials to be substantially below that of private sector business leaders having similar authority and responsibility. Likewise, there is a substantial body of evidence that the relatively low salary levels of OSD officials is a substantial impediment to both recruiting and retaining individuals who are well qualified for these positions.

This possible action is made more complex because of the present salary structure in effect for the entire Executive Branch. If OSD officials' salaries are to be raised, it is quite likely that there will be strong pressure to increase the salaries of other officials in the Department of Defense and in other Executive Branch agencies.

b) alter conflict of interest statutes

The Senate Committee on Armed Services' interpretation of conflict of interest rules requires a nominee to divest himself within 90 days after appointment of any interest in any business, stocks, securities, or other asset which could result in a potential conflict of interest. In the past, rarely have potential appointees held substantial investments that would pose potential conflicts of interest. It perhaps can be argued that the Committee's interpretation of the rules has served as a barricade for highly qualified persons with substantial defense-related investments from even considering appointive positions in DoD. Whether this is true is open to speculation.

Some observers have indicated, however, that the interpretations applied by the Senate Committee on Armed Services to conflict of interest statutes and regulations go beyond that needed to protect public interest and, in fact, work against the public interest by preventing highly qualified personnel from accepting senior positions in OSD because of financial ramifications.

Those who offer this option argue that the public is adequately protected from conflicts of interest by merely requiring a public disclosure by potential appointees of all business or financial interests or by such disclosure accompanied by a disqualification of the official in matters directly affected by that business or financial interest.

The opposing view notes that the additional requirements imposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee's interpretation of conflict of interest rules were the result of less stringent requirements clearly not serving the public in the past and efforts to ensure public confidence in DoD officials by attempting to remove all potential for conflicts of interest.

c) alter Federal tax laws with respect to forced sale of assets

Rather than alter the requirement that a potential appointee divest himself of business and financial assets which are potential sources of conflict of interest, this possible action would attempt to reduce the impact such requirements have upon potential appointees.

This action would seem to be a small step which could be of some value. It would not alter conflict of interest practice and should not reduce public confidence in OSD officials. However, it would reduce the immediate financial impact upon an individual who accepts an appointment and is required to divest assets by permitting the gain from that divestiture to be rolled over into other non-conflicting assets, thereby postponing the payment of Federal capital gains tax. In this way, the U.S. Treasury would not be deprived of the revenue; the receipt of the revenue would only be postponed.

An alternative approach would be the use of "blind trusts", rather than divestiture. Blind trusts, however, would not seem to be a practical alternative for two reasons. First, while the assets would be placed in a blind trust, the appointee would still be aware that he owned certain investments until such time as he were informed that some taxable transaction had occurred involving the corpus of the trust. Second, if the trustee were to divest the trust of the ownership of the potentially conflicting investments, there would no longer be a need for the blind trust, but the tax consequences to the appointee would be the same as if the divestiture had occurred without the blind trust.

◦ Option 3D —place a limit, at a reduced level, on the number of political appointees.

Reducing the number of political appointees would somewhat alleviate the underlying problem, but it might also make the Department of Defense even more the province of professional civil servants whose predilections and biases might tend toward caution and routine, rather than toward innovation and reform. Their outlook and approaches to problems might also run sharply contrary to the direction of given administrations, who would have an even harder time controlling the Department with fewer political appointees.

◦ Option 3E —give greater attention to the development and retention of a strong group of senior civil servants.

Detailed consideration of this option is beyond the scope of this study.

◦ Option 3F —create a permanent (career position) under secretary to provide for greater continuity.

This option is evaluated under Option 2G.

4. OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF OSD MICRO-MANAGEMENT

◦ Option 4A —reduce the size of the OSD staff.

While OSD may be engaging in activities that might be better left to the Military Departments, it is not clear that reductions in the size of OSD could be justified. There are many responsibilities which OSD is not adequately performing at present. Improved performance in these areas may be necessary before judgments can be made on whether there is excessive staffing in OSD.

There is a second dimension to the issue of the size of the OSD staff. Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discusses the tendency of Secretaries of Defense to rely on the OSD staff for advice and analyses that he cannot obtain from the JCS system. If the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system were corrected, it might be possible to reduce the size of the OSD staff. The Chairman's Special Study Group concludes that reductions would be possible:

> ...as the OJCS gains in effectiveness, the Service Staffs and OSD can and should be reduced. (page 73)

In addition to interactions with the Military Departments and OJCS, the size of the OSD staff is also influenced by outside demands. Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger discussed this fact in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> It must firmly be borne in mind, however, that many of the problems of the OSD come from outside. The growth of the staff reflects the enormous increase in the interest and power of outside entities. There must be continued responses to members of Congress, to congressional staffs, to the General Accounting Office —all of which have expanded exponentially — as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to such older institutions with expanded powers like the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget. If one is concerned about the size of the OSD staff, the initial place to start is probably outside. (Part 5, page 189)

This study has several general themes that might have a potential effect on the required size of the OSD staff: (1) reorient OSD's attention to mission integration, strategic planning, and other broad responsibilities; (2) eliminate OSD micro-management of the Services; (3) improve the effectiveness of OJCS and reduce OSD and Service staffs that are overinvolved in joint military advisory matters; and (4) lessen outside demands on OSD. When combined, these themes suggest that a reduction of the size of the OSD staff would be both possible and desirable. Unfortunately, any reductions proposed would probably have to be somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, the justification for such reductions would be dependent upon the implementation of all of the above themes.

- Option 4B —draw the micro-management problem to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and seek more clearcut guidance on OSD staff responsibilities.

The most promising solution to the OSD micro-management problem appears to be corrective action by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary and Deputy Secretary fail to object to the work agenda of OSD, they implicitly give their approval to it.

- Option 4C —reorient OSD's attention away from functional micro-management and toward mission integration.

If one were convinced that limited mission integration is a serious problem, there are no apparent disadvantages to this option.

- Option 4D —create a permanent (career position) under secretary to police OSD micro-management.

This option is evaluated under Option 2G.

- Option 4E —lessen congressional interest in program details.

This option is evaluated in Chapter 9 dealing with the Congress.

- Option 4F —hold Service Secretaries more accountable for conformance to guidance from the Secretary of Defense.

This option would not be desirable if it inhibited the ability of a Service Secretary to effectively and completely present the point of view of his Service prior to decisions being made by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense, or senior DoD decision-making bodies. If this could be avoided, ensuring Military Department conformance with the final decisions of higher civilian authority would be extremely beneficial. Evaluation of such efforts is also included in the chapter of this study dealing with the Military Departments.

5. OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF UNILATERALISM

- Option 5A —create a position in OJCS for a 3-star military officer responsible for coalition matters.

The problem with this option is that coalition affairs ultimately are handled at a level much higher than that of a 3-star billet on the JCS. Such a position would increase the involvement of the JCS in more routine matters of coordination among allies, but it would only marginally increase their influence in larger national policies on NATO and other alliances. Given the right combination of personalities and circumstances, a 3-star officer might be able to sensitize the Nation's top military to coalition issues —such as the "two-way street" —or he might not. But it is certain that he would have only minimal impact on the much larger political issues that affect the NATO Alliance, such as burdensharing and nuclear strategy. If such a position were to be created largely for symbolic reasons and for improving inter-military coordination within the North Atlantic Alliance on relatively routine matters, it might serve its purpose. If it were expected to accomplish more than that, the results would likely be disappointing.

- Option 5B —make the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) responsible for coalition matters.

By assigning formal responsibility for coalition matters to one official, they might consistently receive attention of higher quality. However, the Under Secretary (Policy) currently has general responsibility for coalition matters. It is unclear how delegating this responsibility to his immediate subordinate would substantially improve the situation.

- Option 5C —strengthen the position of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International Programs and Technology).

This option does not appear to offer substantial prospects for solving the unilateralism problem. This official has neither the position in the hierarchical structure nor the breadth of responsibility to have the necessary degree of influence. Moreover, his responsibilities are limited to armament cooperation whereas the range of coalition matters is much broader.

- Option 5D —create mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries who would be assigned responsibilities for coalition matters in their mission areas.

The functional organization of OSD is one of the major causes of unilateralism. Because there is limited mission integration in OSD, functional areas are not sufficiently attuned to the needs of the coalition strategies. Mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries with functional cells or subunits would be able to provide coordination across functional areas and, thereby, substantially enhance the prospects for comprehensive and effective coalition approaches. Furthermore, these offices could ensure that the inputs of unified commands on coalition issues were adequately considered.

6. OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE REVIEW OF CONTINGENCY PLANS.

- Option 6A —create an OSD office, staffed by a combination of civilian officials and military officers, to review contingency plans.

The Steadman Report offers support for this option:

> ...there is a need for at least an annual review by the Secretary and selected key assistants of the principal military plans to assure that their political assumptions are consistent with national security policy. Such briefings also would broaden the understanding of key policymakers of military capabilities and options in the event of crisis or conflict. (page 43)

The critical words in this quote are "and selected key assistants." It is not possible for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense to conduct comprehensive reviews without staff assistance.

If mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries were established, the review of contingency plans (and a review of readiness standards) affecting their areas would be a normal course of business in relating ends to means. This would simply be a part of the iterative strategy-policy-resources decision process that would go on to make goals coherent with capabilities.

In the absence of mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) might be a natural place for basing a small team to review contingency plans. In either case, such a team would probably focus not on the military value and quality of the plans, but solely on their possible political impact and their conformance with established national policies.

If the team were staffed by military officers alone, the impression would be created that a tiny group from OJCS was simply transferred on paper to an OSD office, but that no effective civilian control was taking place. That impression could only be alleviated if the assistant or under secretaries themselves played a significant part in the review (an additional time-consuming burden for them) or if a small number of civilian officials beneath them were involved. The tightest security arrangements and the most careful selection of the civilians would be required in order to assure that the military retained confidence in the security of the contingency plans.

The responsibility for review, however, should not be confused with the responsibility for authorship. Authorship would continue to rest with the unified and specified commands and the OJCS. If it were not to become a nuisance and were not to lose the confidence of the JCS, the office would have to exert authority to mandate changes in contingency plans only when an overriding policy consideration suggested the necessity. The office would lose all credibility if it started to rewrite contingency plans or to insist that minor changes be made for no clearly overriding reason.

- ○ Option 6B —create a joint OSD/OJCS office to review contingency plans.

The same general criteria would apply to this option as to Option 6A. Precisely where the review office is based may be less important than how it is organized and how it functions, but only if its findings were clearly made part of the iterative strategy-policy-resources decision process. This option, through its joint OSD/OJCS nature, does offer the potential for much greater interplay of civilian and military officials. If this office ever lost the confidence of the JCS, great pressures to abolish it would result.

On the other hand, OSD review of contingency plans would be very different than that of OJCS. OSD reviewers would focus on ensuring that political assumptions of the contingency plans are consistent with national security policy and that the options presented in such plans are politically realistic. In contrast, OJCS would focus on the quality of the military strategy of the contingency plans. Given the different scope of these reviews, it does not appear that it would be useful to attempt to combine them.

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions). Excluded from this list are recommendations that are more appropriately presented in subsequent chapters.

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. Mission integration is the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense.	

Conclusions	Recommendations
2. Mission integration is necessary in both of the distinct organizational levels of DoD: the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations, and the operational level, consisting of the unified and specified commands.	
3. Mission integration at the policymaking level of DoD needs to be substantially improved; DoD has failed to develop the extensive, supplemental integrating devices that it needs to achieve effective mission integration.	
4. The functional organization of OSD is a major impediment to the promotion of mission integration at the policymaking level.	4A. Establish three mission-oriented under secretary positions for (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) NATO defense, and (3) regional defense and force projection.
	4B. Assign to the office of each mission-oriented under secretary portions of current policy and program analysis offices that have corresponding mission-related responsibilities and cells of functional specialists in resource areas.
	4C. Establish an office for low intensity warfare and special operations within the office of the under secretary for regional defense and force projection.

Conclusions	Recommendations
5. Close coordination between newly established mission-oriented offices (recommendation 4A) and function-oriented offices would be beneficial, especially during the transitional period.	5A. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he consider the creation of a mission-function matrix organization which would include the offices of the three mission-oriented under secretaries and five functional offices: Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning); Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Under Secretary (Research and Engineering); Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support); and Assistant Secretary (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).
6. Many OSD offices are inadequately supervised and coordinated, primarily due to the Secretary of Defense's excessive span of control.	6A. Group assistant secretaries and lesser officials in OSD under new or existing under or assistant secretaries (in line with recommendation 4A) in order to streamline the organization and to reduce the Secretary of Defense's span of control from 24 to 13 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials.
	6B. Create the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) to help streamline the organization.
7. Improvements to OSD organizational arrangements and decision-making procedures should emphasize *both* structural change and enhancement of the defense management skills of senior officials.	

Conclusions	Recommendations
8. OSD suffers from inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in its senior management positions.	8A. Require that OSD political appointees have strong defense management credentials.
	8B. Seek a longer commitment of service from OSD political appointees.
	8C. Alter Federal tax laws with respect to forced sale of assets by appointed OSD officials to permit the gain from such sale to be reinvested in similar assets without applying tax on the gain at the time of the forced sale.
9. OSD is engaged in some degree of micro-management of internal Service programs; OSD's functional structure is a cause of this micro-management problem.	9A. Reduce the size of the OSD staff.
	9B. Reorient OSD's attention away from functional micro-management and toward mission integration by creating mission-oriented offices (recommendation 4A).
	9C. Hold Service Secretaries more accountable for conformance to guidance from and decisions by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
10. Planning and programming in OSD are unilateral, not coalition, oriented.	10A. Create mission-oriented under secretaries who would be assigned responsibility for coalition matters in their mission areas (recommendation 4A).
11. The absence of OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans is inconsistent with the principle of civilian control of the military.	11A. Create an OSD office, staffed by a combination of civilian officials and military officers, to review contingency plans.

CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

A. EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. The JCS in World War II

Before World War II, a Joint Board of the Army and Navy prepared joint war plans and worked on other issues that required interservice coordination. However, it was not designed to direct the Army and Navy in wartime operations and served only in an advisory capacity.

Shortly after the United States entered World War II, President Roosevelt informally created the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to work with the British Chiefs of Staff in a new supreme military body, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The latter body had been set up by the United States and Great Britain to direct their mutual war effort against Nazi Germany. As originally established, the JCS was an informal body that was organized simply by identifying the U.S. officers whose responsibilities most closely matched those of the members of the British Chiefs of Staff.

Nonetheless, the JCS played an important leadership role during the war, particularly in the European theater. Working closely with the President (the only civilian in the chain of command), the Joint Chiefs exercised a great deal of flexibility in carrying out their duties. From its position in the chain of command immediately below the President, the JCS planned and directed U.S. military operations.

Initially the JCS consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Later, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief was added to serve as an intermediary between the President and the Service Chiefs.

2. The National Security Act of 1947

Virtually all plans for the postwar unification of the Services into one national military establishment took for granted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be continued. Two years after the end of the war, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 80-253), which has remained, with amendments, the foundation for the U.S. national security establishment. This Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a permanent body with a Joint Staff limited to 100 officers drawn in approximately equal numbers from each of the Military Departments. The Act restricted membership of the JCS to four individuals: the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, "if there be one." In practice, the latter position was never filled. The Act also created the position of Director of the Joint Staff, to be appointed by the JCS.

The National Security Act of 1947 defined the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —

> (1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;
>
> (2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
>
> (3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;
>
> (4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;
>
> (5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;
>
> (6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and
>
> (7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

In comparison with the Nation's other defense institutions, the JCS has changed remarkably little over the years. The basic concept underlying the institution has survived intact for over 37 years. However, amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 passed by Congress in 1949, 1953, 1958, 1967 and 1978 did make some changes in the statutory organization of the JCS and beyond those statutory changes, the organization has experienced some evolution in its nature.

3. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949

In 1949, under the impetus of recommendations made by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and by the Hoover Commission, President Truman sent a message to Congress recommending the unification of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in a new Executive Department to be known as the Department of Defense. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 81-216) responded to Secretary Forrestal's conviction that there should be a "responsible head" for the JCS by creating the position of Chairman. The former billet on the JCS for "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one," was abolished. The President was to appoint a Chairman, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve for a term of two years, with one reappointment possible. He was to serve as presiding officer of the JCS, but was to have no formal vote in its deliberations. The 1949

Amendments also enlarged the Joint Staff to a maximum of 210 officers.

4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

In 1953, President Eisenhower submitted a reorganization plan to Congress that set forth certain proposed changes in the organization of the Department of Defense. In a message to Congress accompanying this reorganization plan, the President also described a number of changes he intended to make by executive action. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, as it was called, required no positive legislative action, but was subject only to possible Congressional disapproval. As neither the House nor the Senate took unfavorable action within 60 days, the plan became effective on June 30, 1953.

This reorganization plan, together with the executive actions undertaken by the President, affected the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a number of ways. It made the selection of the Director of the Joint Staff by the JCS, and his tenure, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The selection and tenure of members of the Joint Staff was made subject to the approval of the Chairman of the JCS. Finally, the responsibility of the JCS for managing the Joint Staff and its Director was transferred to the Chairman. The net effect of these changes was to strengthen the authority of the Chairman. However, while the Chairman was to manage the Joint Staff, the JCS as a corporate body continued to possess control and authority over it and to assign tasks to it, in accordance with the administrative regulations worked out for implementing the reorganization plan.

The President's 1953 message to Congress also called for a major change in the chain of command. To implement this change, the Secretary of Defense issued a revision of the 1948 memorandum known as the Key West Agreement. (Attachment to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff"; January 13, 1954). That memorandum had given the Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to designate one of its members as its executive agent for a unified command. However, it had created a widespread perception that the JCS was in the chain of command, and in practice, it had functioned as though that were the case. The revision of 1953 sought to restore the original intent of the National Security Act of 1947 that the JCS would serve as advisors and planners, but not directly as commanders. The new directive specified that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the JCS, would designate in each case a Military Department to serve as the executive agent for a unified command. This change to the chain of command clarified the status of the JCS and ensured that they did not exercise operational command, but played only an advisory and planning role. In practice, however, it led to the cumbersome arrangement of a chain of command that ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of whichever Military Department was the executive agent for a unified command to the Service Chief of that particular Service to the unified commander. By 1958, President Eisenhower had determined that this arrangement was too unwieldy and again sought to change it by executive action.

5. The 1958 Defense Department Reorganization Act

In his State of the Union address to Congress in January 1958, President Eisenhower listed the reorganization of the national defense as the first of eight priority tasks. In April he submitted to Congress his recommendations for changes in the organization of the Department of Defense. Congress made a few amendments to the President's proposal before passing the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599), the last major reorganization of the Department.

This Act amended the National Security Act of 1947 in several important ways. With regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Act made the Chairman a voting member of that body and made the Commandant of the Marine Corps a member of the JCS whenever matters directly concerning the Marine Corps were under consideration. The Act also added several provisions dealing with the Joint Staff. The Act raised the statutory limit on the size of the Joint Staff to 400 officers, but it restricted the terms of Joint Staff members (including the Director) to three years in peacetime, with further restrictions on reassignment. The Act expressly prohibited the Joint Staff from functioning as an overall General Staff and from exercising any executive authority. The Act also made a number of changes in the wording of the National Security Act of 1947 with respect to the responsibilities of the JCS and the Chairman. The Chairman of the JCS, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was now to select the Director of the Joint Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman was to manage the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", and the Joint Staff could be given assignments by the JCS or the Chairman.

In his message to Congress in connection with the 1958 legislation, President Eisenhower indicated his dissatisfaction with the chain of command. On December 31, 1958, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy issued a directive establishing two command lines: one for the operational direction of the armed forces and the second for the direction of support activities through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. (Revision to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components"; December 31, 1958). The operational chain of command was to run "from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands." It was generally understood that the word "through" implied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be transmitters, and not originators, of command orders.

6. Developments Since 1958

In 1967, Congress initiated and passed legislation establishing four-year terms for the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and for the Chief of Naval Operations, paralleling already existing law setting the term of the Marine Corps Commandant. (Public Law 90-22) The Defense Authorization Act of 1979 (Public Law 95-485) included a provision making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a full participating member of the JCS, no longer formally restricted to voting only on matters directly concerning the Marine Corps.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff has proven to be one of the most stable and enduring institutions within the Department of Defense. The basic concept underlying the institution has remained intact since 1947, and its organization and structure have changed but little since the Reorganization Act of 1958. The JCS has evolved, of course, but only modestly, and principally as the result of changes undertaken internally over the years, rather than as the result of legislation.

B. KEY ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS

The preceding section briefly reviewed the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This section describes several important organizational trends that have emerged during the evolution of the JCS.

1. Size of the OJCS Staff

The number of personnel working under the Joint Chiefs of Staff has grown considerably since its creation. In fact, this growth has outstripped the increases in the statutory limitation on the number of military officers who may serve on the Joint Staff. This has been made possible by distinguishing between military officers who are members of the Joint Staff, on the one hand, and several other categories of personnel, on the other hand: enlisted military personnel on the Joint Staff, civilian personnel on the Joint Staff, and military and civilian personnel who are not on the Joint Staff but who work for the larger, umbrella Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).

Table 4-1 sets forth the military and civilian personnel strengths of the OJCS for each year since 1948. The OJCS staff grew at a fairly steady rate for the first 20 years of its existence, reaching a peak of about 2,000 personnel in 1968-1969 at the height of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. During the subsequent decade (1969-1978), the OJCS gradually contracted to about 1,250 personnel —a reduction of roughly 37 percent. Since 1978, the staff of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has experienced modest growth.

TABLE 4-1

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WORKING IN OJCS

1948-1983

Year[1]	Military Personnel	Military Officers[2]	Civilian Personnel	Total Personnel
1948	214	164	151	365
1949	257	191	184	441
1950	272	172	177	449
1951	308	184	192	500
1952	325	207	190	515
1953	323	202	188	511
1954	338	211	183	521
1955	310	243	187	497
1956	312	252	173	485
1957	322	251	175	497
1958	328	257	199	527
1959	594	449	303	897
1960	635	480	311	946
1961	654	468	317	971
1962	645	453	385	1,030
1963	773	544	403	1,176
1964	1,173	719	417	1,590
1965	1,201	733	426	1,627
1966	1,238	750	453	1,691
1967	1,338	805	470	1,808
1968	1,438	862	486	1,924
1969	1,571	877	441	2,012
1970	1,325	782	383	1,708
1971	1,272	754	370	1,642
1972	1,305	765	379	1,684
1973	1,308	778	356	1,664
1974	1,234	729	342	1,576
1975	1,141	706	344	1,485
1976	1,049	641	303	1,352
1977	999	619	278	1,277
1978	976	612	270	1,246
1979	996	632	257	1,253
1980	1,017	633	261	1,278
1981	1,039	676	271	1,310
1982	1,077	719	274	1,351
1983	1,122	752	283	1,405

[1] Dates for the years 1948-1976 are as of June 30 each year; dates for the years 1977-1982 are as of September 30; and the date for 1983 is as of December 31.

[2] Subset of Military Personnel category

Table 4-1 also makes it clear that most of the growth in the OJCS staff has occurred through the addition of military personnel rather than civil servants. In the early years of the OJCS, the number of civilian personnel assigned to it lagged behind the number of military personnel by a relatively small amount. However, by 1960, there were more than twice as many military as civilians in the OJCS; by the end of 1963, this disparity had grown to nearly four to one. In other words, the growth in the size of the OJCS staff cannot be attributed to increasing civilian involvement in its work. Instead, Table 4-1 would suggest that, if anything, civilian influence in the OJCS has declined since its early history.

2. Increasing Organizational Complexity of the OJCS

As it has grown in size, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has also developed a complicated structure of units and functions. Just as the size of the OJCS reached a peak around 1968, so also did its complexity. Since then, however, the structure has been somewhat streamlined; nonetheless, it still includes many units and performs many functions that were not necessarily envisioned in its early history.

A staff organization to support the new Joint Chiefs of Staff took shape piece by piece during 1942. Reflecting the informal nature of the JCS itself, the staff consisted of inter-Service committees composed of Service staff officers on part-time assignment to the JCS. Only a relatively small number of officers served full-time on the JCS staff.

After World War II, the system of part-time inter-Service committees continued without fundamental change until 1958. That year, President Eisenhower redirected the chain of operational command to run from the Secretary of Defense directly to the unified commands rather than through the Military Departments. To implement this change, the President informed the Congress that "the Joint Staff must be further unified and strengthened in order to provide the operational and planning assistance heretofore largely furnished by the staffs of the military departments." (*A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1979*; JCS Historical Division, page 47)

Because he found the existing JCS staff system "laborious", President Eisenhower directed Secretary of Defense McElroy to discontinue the JCS committee system and to add "an integrated operations division". (*Concise History of the OJCS*, page 47) The Joint Staff that emerged from this reorganization consisted of the numbered J-Directorates of a conventional military staff: J-1 (Personnel), J-2 (Intelligence), J-3 (Operations), J-4 (Logistics), J-5 (Plans and Policy), and J-6 (Communications—Electronics). This structure was designed to make it easier for the Joint Staff to work with the similar staff structure of the unified and specified commands. During the year following the 1958 reorganization, the growth in the size of the OJCS staff accelerated as the institution assumed its enhanced operational responsibilities.

During the 1960's, agencies and groups proliferated within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, the Joint War Games Agency, and Special Assistants for Disarmament Affairs, for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, for Strategic Mobility, and for Environmental Services were among the new offices created in the 1960's — often in response to the pressures of the Vietnam War.

So many new staff units had been established by the late 1960's that there was an effort to streamline the OJCS staff by consolidating groups and agencies under the J-Directorates. This countertrend continued during the 1970's in response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and budget pressures for reduced defense spending.

Despite the consolidation that took place during the 1970's, the JCS staff remains a much more elaborate and complicated organization than the one that operated during World War II and in the immediate post-war era. Like other elements of the Defense Department, the evolving structure of the OJCS has reflected the dramatic growth in the complexity of warfare since World War II.

3. Consolidation of the Position of the JCS

Since its creation in early 1942, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has consolidated its position in both the law and in the national security policymaking apparatus. By 1961, this process of consolidation had progressed to the point that Paul Hammond could describe the JCS as "the kingpin of the unification structure" in his book, *Organizing for Defense* (page 159).

The previous section described the highly informal way in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created shortly after the United States entered World War II. To facilitate cooperation with the British Chiefs of Staff, the JCS "simply sprang into being as a group of American opposite numbers composed, coincidentally, of the three senior members of the old Joint Board". (Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., *Unification of the Armed Forces*, page 259) Even after its spontaneous formation, the JCS continued to function without a formal charter and without the specific approval of Congress. Legere concludes about the JCS that "it would be difficult to imagine anything less the result of considered study of organizational problems". (pages 259-260)

Although it lacked a formal charter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enjoyed a great deal of authority and prestige in the strategic direction of the American war effort. The stature of the Chiefs themselves (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold) and their close working relationship with President Roosevelt enabled the JCS to become "next to the President, the single most important force in the overall conduct of the war..." (Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, page 318)

After World War II, the extraordinary status achieved by the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff inevitably suffered. In the absence of wartime pressures, the JCS institution was forced to consolidate its position within a national security establishment that was taking on a shape very different from the one that existed during World War II. Although the 1947 National Security Act finally provided the JCS with a statutory charter, it also subjected it for the first time to the loose control of a newly created Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Service Secretaries reasserted their statutory authority over the individual Chiefs.

Within these new limitations on its authority, the JCS gradually developed a distinctive role for itself in the emerging Department of Defense. During their first 2 years under the 1947 Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff negotiated with Secretary of Defense Forrestal the so-called "Key West Agreement" on the Services' roles and missions. Then, in the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the new position of JCS Chairman was created and the statutory ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff was raised from 100 to 210 officers.

This process of consolidation was interrupted in 1953 when President Eisenhower removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the "executive agent" system of command and re-routed the chain of command through the Military Departments. However, as was explained earlier in this section, he discarded this cumbersome system 5 years later. Again, the JCS assumed a corporate role in the operational chain of command that has continued to the present.

Once the 1958 reorganization was implemented, the JCS institution had essentially completed the consolidation of its position within the Defense Department. During the 16 years that had elapsed since its highly informal emergence in 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had firmly established itself both in law and in practice as a distinct and somewhat exclusive organization with a broad range of responsibilities.

C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING PROCEDURES OF OJCS

The first section of this chapter noted that the statutory responsibilities of the JCS have not changed significantly since they were initially established by the National Security Act of 1947. They can be distilled into two basic functions: (1) to provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; and (2) to plan for the employment of U.S. forces in contingencies. A third basic function —to support and oversee the execution of contingency plans and other military operations by the combatant commands —has evolved from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The DoD Directive issued to implement that legislation specified that "the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and *through the Joint Chiefs of Staff* to the commanders of unified and specified commands. Orders to such commanders will be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense, *or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense*." (emphasis added) (Revision to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components", December 31, 1958)

The first two JCS responsibilities, to advise and to plan, are relatively well known and understood. However, the third function has often been misinterpreted to mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are actually *in* the chain of command for military operations. Instead, the role of the JCS is to *transmit* orders from the President or the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands. The JCS itself cannot initiate operational orders; it can only communicate them. In the "execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and other time-sensitive operations", however, the Chairman is authorized by another DoD Directive to represent the JCS in transmitting orders to the unified and specified commands. (Department of Defense Directive 5100.3, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)", December 2, 1971) The confused role of the JCS in the chain of command is addressed in detail in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands.

The military advice and plans of the JCS are requested most often by three organizations: the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the unified and specified commands. These "customers" constantly ask the JCS for its views on a variety of specific national security issues. At the same time, they receive a stream of plans and studies which the JCS generates on a regular cycle.

The JCS actually constitutes only one element in the larger Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to the JCS itself, the OJCS consists of the Office of the JCS Chairman, the Joint Staff, and certain supporting agencies and special offices. Charts 4-1 and 4-2 provide a graphic depiction of the OJCS. At the end of 1983, about 1,400 people worked in the OJCS (of which 400 officers serve on the Joint Staff). Slightly more than one-half of these 1,400 people were officers; the remainder were enlisted personnel and civilians. Officer billets are equally divided among the three Military Departments with the Marine Corps assigned about 20 percent of the spaces allocated to the Department of the Navy.

CHART 4-1

ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
VICE DIRECTOR
ASST DIRECTOR FOR JCS SUPPORT DIA
SUPPORT SERVICES DIRECTORATE
JCS REPRESENTATIVES
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
J-1 MANPOWER & PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY JCS
J-3 OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
J-4 LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE
J-5 PLANS & POLICY DIRECTORATE
C3 SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE
JOINT ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE
STAFF MONITOR

CHART 4-2

ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY
JOINT STRATEGIC CONNECTIVITY STAFF
U.S. REP TO NATO MIL COMM
U.S. REP U.N. MIL STAFF COMM
JCS REP MBFR 1
JCS REP LOS 2
JCS REP CTB 3
JCS REP START
JCS REP INF
JCS REP ASAT
JCS REP PANAMA CANAL TREATY
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT MATERIEL PRIORITIES & ALLOCATION BOARD
JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD
U.S. DEL INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
U.S. SECTION JOINT MEXICAN U.S. DEFENSE COMMISSION
U.S. MIL REP JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE CANADA U.S.
U.S. SECTION CANADA U.S. MIL COOP COMM
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

[1] Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations

[2] Law of the Sea treaty negotiations

[3] Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations

The central organizational characteristic of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since its inception in 1942 has been the membership of the Chiefs of the military Services. The four Service Chiefs function both as the military leaders of their individual Services and as members of the JCS. The only JCS member without formal concurrent duties in his parent Service is the Chairman.

To guide the Service Chiefs in the performance of their dual responsibilities, Secretary of Defense Wilson promulgated a DoD Directive in 1954 which specified that "The Joint Staff work of each of the Chiefs of Staff shall take precedence over all other duties." (Department of Defense Directive 5158.1, "Method of Operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Their Relationship With Other Staff Agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense," July 26, 1954) As a result, the Service Chiefs are supposed to free themselves for their JCS responsibilities by delegating much of the daily management of their Services to their Vice Chiefs.

The same 1954 Directive "broadened and strengthened" the functions of the Deputies to the Service Chiefs charged with responsibility for operations (the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations; the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations; and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations). These 3-star Operations Deputies play a crucial role in representing their Service Chiefs during the consideration and resolution of joint issues. For example, the Director of the Joint Staff chairs meetings of the Operations Deputies to consider less important issues or to screen major issues before they reach the Joint Chiefs themselves. The Operations Deputies also supervise the large Service Staffs which work closely with the Joint Staff to refine proposals for the JCS.

The following elements form the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Presiding over the JCS is the Chairman, the highest-ranking military officer in the armed forces. Despite his senior rank, he exercises little statutory authority independently of the other JCS members. Instead, he is specifically authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to only preside over the JCS, to provide agendas for JCS meetings, to assist the JCS in conducting its business as promptly as practicable, to determine when issues under consideration shall be decided, and to inform the Secretary of Defense and the President of those issues upon which the JCS have not agreed.

The Chairman performs two of his most important duties on behalf of the JCS corporate body. First, Presidents have invited JCS Chairmen to participate as military advisors in meetings of the National Security Council. Second, the Chairman manages the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." In carrying out both of these duties, the Chairman is supposed to represent the corporate views of the JCS.

Within the Joint Staff is a small cell of officers which works directly for the JCS Chairman. A three-star flag or general officer serves as Assistant to the JCS Chairman. In that position, he usually functions as the Chairman's "outside man" or as his representative to the organizations with which the JCS must work closely (i.e., the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State.) Serving below the Assistant to the Chairman are five to seven officers who are designated as the Chairman's Staff Group. This small staff element is distinguished from the much larger Joint Staff in that it directly assists the Chairman in his participation in JCS deliberations.

2. The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff itself is organized along traditional military staff lines for the purpose of preparing plans and reports for consideration by the JCS. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, limits the size of the Joint Staff to no more than 400 officers. Its major elements are briefly described below:

a. The *Director of the Joint Staff* (a three-star flag or general officer) serves as the "inside man" for the JCS and the JCS Chairman. He is responsible for supervising the Joint Staff and providing guidance to certain specialized activities of the OJCS.

b. The *Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1)* performs the following major functions:

(1) develops JCS positions on personnel issues;

(2) develops policies on joint and inter-service professional military education;

(3) provides policy guidance and staff supervision to the National Defense University;

(4) monitors U.S. manpower authorizations in joint and international activities that report to or through the JCS; and

(5) plans and manages the selection and assignment of military personnel, except flag and general officers, for duty in the OJCS.

c. The *Defense Intelligence Agency* functions as the Intelligence Directorate (J-2).

d. The *Operations Directorate (J-3)* assists the JCS in carrying out its operational responsibilities as the military staff in the chain of command. J-3 performs the following major functions:

(1) reviews operations plans submitted by unified and specified commands and international treaty organizations to determine their feasibility;

(2) maintains information on the readiness status of forces assigned to unified and specified commands;

(3) manages the JCS military exercise program and coordinates for the OJCS all matters relating to exercises conducted by the unified and specified commands and the Services; and

(4) supervises the National Military Command System.

e. The *Logistics Directorate (J-4)* performs the following major functions:

(1) reviews the logistic elements of joint operations plans;

(2) monitors and evaluates mobility assets and programs;

(3) coordinates with the Joint Deployment Agency and the transportation operating agencies (the Army's Military Traffic Management Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Air Force's Military Airlift Command); and

(4) coordinates base development and pre-positioning programs for Southwest Asia.

f. The *Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)* performs the following major functions:

(1) prepares strategic plans and studies;
(2) provides politico-military advice;
(3) monitors and supports JCS participation in international negotiations; and
(4) assists the JCS and the Chairman in addressing programmatic and budgetary matters.

g. The *Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (C^3S)* develops policies, plans, and programs to ensure adequate C^3 support to unified and specified commands for joint military operations.

3. OJCS Elements Outside the Joint Staff

Outside the Joint Staff but still within the umbrella Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are several staff elements that are considered to support the JCS less directly than the J-Directorates. This arbitrary distinction is primarily designed to circumvent the statutory ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff. An example of its artificial nature is the assignment of the Office of the JCS Chairman (which was described earlier) *outside* the Joint Staff.

In addition to a few offices that perform mostly administrative tasks, the OJCS beyond the Joint Staff includes the following significant staff elements:

a. The *National Military Command System* continuously monitors the worldwide military, political, and economic situation and assists the JCS in exercising operational direction over the combatant commands.

b. The *Joint Analysis Directorate* (formerly the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency) prepares studies of military forces and plans, conducts joint war games and interagency politico-military simulations, and attempts to improve tools of analysis.

c. The *Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency,* established in 1984, carries out the following functions:

(1) analyzes the warfighting requirements and resources of the unified and specified commands;
(2) assesses inputs to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); and
(3) assists the JCS Chairman in his role as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).

4. OJCS Staffing Procedures

Although there is no statutory or administrative requirement for unanimity, the JCS and the Joint Staff rarely resolve issues without first reaching a consensus among the Services. Before most plans, studies, or recommendations for the Secretary of Defense or the President can represent the corporate position of the JCS, they must be refined and approved at several levels of the OJCS and the Services. This iterative system ensures that decisions on complex national security issues are not made without full consideration of the different experiences, expertise, and points of view of the four Services.

The staffing process for developing JCS positions, presented in Chart 4-3, generally unfolds in the following manner. (This description of the JCS staffing process is paraphrased and, in some passages, copied from an answer for the record provided to the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee by General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired).) Upon receiving a request for the views of the JCS, the Director of the Joint Staff forwards it to the appropriate directorate. An officer (a Major/Lieutenant Commander or a Lieutenant Colonel/Commander) within that directorate is assigned responsibility for preparing a draft paper that explains the issue and proposes a solution. At the same time, each of the Services is informed of the request and designates an action officer to work with the Joint Staff action officer.

CHART 4-3

PROCESSING JOINT ACTIONS


WHITE HOUSE
NSC
SECDEF
SERVICES
AGENCIES
CINCs
JCS POLICY TO BE DETERMINED?
YES
NO
MOP 132 1
IS IT URGENT?
NO
YES
DRAFT
AO MEETING
DRAFT
PLANNERS MEETING
REPORT
SILENT ASSENT
OR
PHONE VOTE
OR
AGENDA
5 DAYS
DRAFT REPORT
PHONE VOTE
OR
AGENDA
APPROVED
SHOULD THE CHIEFS PERSONALLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE?
YES
NO
WILL IT SAY NO TO A CINC?
YES
NO
MOP 133 2
SERVICE COORDINATION
SERVICE OBJECTION?
YES
NO
(APPROVED DECISIONS UNDER MOP 133 ARE NOT RED STRIPED)

* OPTIONAL

[1] Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 132: required staffing process if major JCS policy is to be determined, if requested by any JCS member, or if likely to result in rejection of a CINC's request.

[2] Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 133: expedited staffing process that can be used if it is likely to result in approval of a CINC's request and if it is consistent with already-established JCS views.

At this point, the course that the staffing process takes depends upon the amount of time available to answer the request, the magnitude of the task, and the relationship of the current assignment to other recent or ongoing JCS efforts. If necessary, the staffing process can be shortened to yield a rapid response. For example, if the JCS had recently completed a relevant assessment as part of the Joint Strategic Planning System —the formal administrative mechanism for inserting JCS views into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System —the Chiefs might simply forward this product in response to the request. In addition, the Joint Staff and Service action officers may be directed to work closely with their immediate superiors, the Joint Staff and Service planners (Colonels/Captains), in order to compress the lower levels of the normal iterative process.

Assuming that ample time is allowed and that no recent or ongoing JCS effort is applicable, the staffing process continues with a meeting between the Joint Staff and the Service staff action officers. At the initial meeting, they establish a schedule for preparing the response and discuss the issue to be addressed. The Joint Staff action officer has general guidance from his Director on the content of the paper. Similarly, the Service action officers have received guidance from their Service Operations Deputies. If time allowed, the Joint Staff might request the views of the appropriate unified and specified commands. Otherwise, the Joint Staff attempts to represent their views.

After this first meeting, the Joint Staff action officer must prepare the initial draft of the response (formerly called the Flimsy). In creating this initial draft, the staff of each Service or a combatant command might write a portion of the paper or the Joint Staff might undertake the entire task. Generally, because the Service staffs are larger and have data and analysis not available to the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff action officer must rely a great deal on Service staff contributions.

Once the initial draft is prepared, the Joint Staff and Service action officers meet to discuss each Service's position on the content of the paper. Suggestions to change it are considered. For a substantive paper of some length, each Service may offer as many as 100 changes. The Joint Staff action officer then reflects the consensus of the meeting in a second iteration of the paper (formerly called the Buff). Minority views which are not incorporated into this second draft can be argued again in the next step of the process.

The same review process is now repeated by the Service and Joint Staff planners (unless they had already participated in the first review with the action officers). These officers, who work directly for the Service Operations Deputies, normally have previous experience in JCS matters and have demonstrated an ability to articulate the various perspectives of the Services. Their full-time responsibility is to represent their Services in the JCS staffing process.

At this level of review, as many as 20 issues may be left to be resolved. The planners generally are able to settle all but two or three of them. The Joint Staff planner then changes the second draft to reflect the consensus of the planners and publishes another iteration (formerly called the Green).

The Service action officers and planners present this third draft to their Operations Deputies (on some occasions, an additional layer of review at the level of the Assistant Operations Deputy is added). The Operations Deputies then meet with the Director of the Joint Staff to discuss the paper. On many topics of lesser importance, the Operations Deputies, if in full agreement, will approve or "red-stripe" the Green paper, enabling the Director to sign and transmit it on behalf of the JCS.

The differences which cannot be settled by the Operations Deputies and the Director are highlighted for the Joint Chiefs themselves to consider. In those cases in which disagreements persist among the Chiefs, the dissenting Chief or Chiefs may add divergent views to the paper finally transmitted. However, this has been a rare practice as the JCS has been able to almost always reach full agreement on responses to requests for its views.

D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

During February 1982, General David C. Jones, USAF, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in an article, entitled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change" (*Directors & Boards*, Winter 1982), that structural problems diminish the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His remarks were soon followed by similar criticism of the JCS system by General Edward C. Meyer, USA, then Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The public expression of these views by two incumbent members of the JCS renewed serious consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regardless of their disparate views on needed changes, many observers agree that the JCS system suffers from organizational and procedural problems that hamper it from fully carrying out its responsibilities. Others argue, however, that the current JCS structure is effective because it draws upon the varied experiences of the most senior military officer from each of the four Services.

The institution does not seem able to provide the quality of professional military advice that the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense should have when they are resolving complex defense issues. Testimony from former Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, Secretaries of Defense, and JCS members indicates that the institutional views of the JCS corporate body often take too long to complete; are not in the concise form required by extremely busy senior officials; and, most importantly, do not offer clear, meaningful recommendations on issues affecting more than one Service. Deficiencies in JCS advice have encouraged senior civilian officials to rely on civilian staffs for counsel that should be provided by professional military officers. Some assert that the failure of the JCS to offer more useful military advice results from organizational problems while others believe that it results from shortcomings in the leadership qualities of JCS Chairmen. The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* supports the former view: "The difficulty is caused by the system, not the people." (page 34) The Chairman's Special Study Group reached a similar conclusion:

> . . . One must infer that the fault lies not with any particular group of military and civilian executives, but rather with the implementation of the JCS concept itself. (page 27)

At least some of the Service Chiefs serving in 1982 also held this view as noted in the following comment which they made to the Chairman's Special Study Group:

> The JCS cannot carry out their statutory responsibilities. It is wrong to say that there is nothing wrong with the JCS organization. The basic organization concept is flawed. (page 28)

In criticizing the JCS system, Generals Jones and Meyer do not recommend that the responsibilities of the Joint Chief of Staff, as prescribed by section 141, title 10, United States Code, be changed. Instead, their concern is that the JCS system is not organized and operated to effectively perform its functions. In testimony before the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee during June 1983, the then-serving members of the JCS also concluded that "those are the correct duties and responsibilities for the JCS." (HASC No. 98-8, page 63) This study accepts the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that are directed by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and, therefore, assesses the effectiveness of the JCS system largely by how well the institution carries out these duties.

This section discusses three problem areas that have been identified within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and presents analyses of the contributing causes. These problem areas are: (1) inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice; (2) inadequate quality of the OJCS staff; and (3) insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans. There is a fourth problem area concerning the JCS: the confused chain of command. This problem area is addressed in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands.

1. INABILITY OF THE JCS TO PROVIDE USEFUL AND TIMELY UNIFIED MILITARY ADVICE

Section 141(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Since the responsibility of being "the principal military advisers" was assigned in 1947, the JCS have consistently been unable to provide useful and timely advice. As General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired) has noted:

> . . . the corporate advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful or very influential. And that advice is often watered down and issues are papered over in the interest of achieving unanimity, even though many have contended that the resulting lack of credibility has caused the national leadership to look elsewhere for recommendations that properly should come from the JCS. (HASC No. 97-47, page 54)

Similarly, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger criticized JCS advice in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff....The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.
>
> The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is important not to rock the boat...The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure. (Part 5, page 187)

The inadequacies of JCS advice have been observed for more than three decades. The following quotes from various studies of DoD organization substantiate this fact. The 1949 Eberstadt Committee found that,

> . . . it has proved difficult to expedite decision on the part of the Joint Chiefs, or to secure from them soundly unified and integrated plans and programs and clear, prompt advice. (page 53)

In 1960, the Symington Report stated:

> Action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes place, if at all, only after prolonged debate, coordination and negotiation... (page 6)

The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel found that:

> The increase in frequency of unanimity in the recommendations and advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by no means conclusive proof of subjugation of particular Service views. Such frequency of unanimity can just as cogently support a conclusion that the basis of such recommendations and advice is mutual accommodation of all Service views, known in some forums as 'log rolling,' and a submergence and avoidance of significant issues or facets of issues on which accommodations of conflicting Service views are not possible. (page 33)

In 1978, the Steadman Report

> . . . found a generally high degree of satisfaction with the military advice which the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally provide the Secretary...[but] the formal position papers of the JCS, the institutional product, are almost uniformally given low marks by their consumers —the policymakers in OSD, State, and the NSC staff —and by many senior military officers as well. (page 52)

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group stated:

> ...The JCS generally have been seen by civilian leaders as unable to provide useful Joint advice on many issues. Joint Staff work often comes across as superficial and predictable, and of little help in resolving issues. (page 11)

And finally, in 1985, the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Toward a More Effective Defense*, stated:

> ...Although civilian leaders consistently praise the advice they receive from the individual chiefs of the services, they almost uniformly criticize the institutional products of the JCS as ponderous in presentation, predictably wedded to the status quo, and reactive rather than innovative. As a consequence, civilians have filled this void, serving as the major source of advice to the secretary on matters for which concise, independent military inputs would have been preferred. (page 12)

a. Symptoms of Inadequate Unified Military Advice

Symptoms of inadequate unified military advice are found in many aspects of organizational activity within DoD including strategic planning, programming, operational planning, force employment, roles and missions of the Services, revision of the Unified Command Plan, organization of the unified commands, and development of joint doctrine. The JCS are viewed as the key military advisors on a substantial range of important strategy, resource, operation, and organization issues. Shortcomings in their ability to meaningfully address these issues has had a serious impact on the ability of DoD to prepare for and to conduct military operations in times of crisis. Moreover, the JCS have failed to provide adequate staff support to the Secretary of Defense in his mission integrator role. The Steadman Report summarizes the impact of these shortcomings and failures as follows:

> ...many of the issues on which effective joint advice is not being provided by the JCS are of fundamental importance to the ability of the United States to deter war and to fight one successfully, if necessary. The development of force structures and weapons systems within feasible budgets and the resolution of contentious joint military issues are the very decisions most difficult for the Secretary, the President, and the Congress to make. Thus, the joint military voice does not carry the weight it could in the decision process, especially in areas where it could be most useful and influential. (page 58)

The major symptoms of inadequate unified advice are briefly described below.

(1) inability to formulate military strategy

Section 141(c) of title 10, United States Code, specifies the following among the duties of the JCS: "prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces." The JCS system does participate in the strategic planning process through the preparation of the Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). Neither of these documents can be considered to provide "military strategy" because they are not constrained by fiscal realities. The military strategy that is formulated as part of the resource allocation process is developed by civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as part of the Defense Guidance. By their refusal or failure, as the case may be, to consider fiscal constraints in strategy formulation, the JCS have abandoned one of the important tasks of their responsibility as principal military advisers. Some observers believe that the JCS have not formulated a fiscally constrained strategy because the Service Chiefs do not want the JCS system to provide a more structured framework for evaluating Service force structures and programs. In the absence of such a framework, the Services can be much more independent in pursuit of their parochial interests.

(2) inability to provide meaningful programmatic advice

Section 141(c) of title 10 specifies the following among the duties of the JCS: "review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistics plans." As leaders of their individual Services, the Service Chiefs are deeply involved in DoD's resource allocation process. However, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exerts very little influence in determining the composition of the DoD budget. The joint military perspective on warfare and operational requirements that the JCS is uniquely qualified to offer is not seriously considered in the programming and budgeting phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The 1978 Steadman Report found that:

> The nature of the [JCS] organization virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues involving allocation of resources among the Services, such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement of new weapons systems —except to agree that they should be increased without consideration of resource constraints....The joint system plays virtually no role in this [resource] allocation process. (pages 52 and 53)

The Chairman's Special Study Group shared this assessment:

> ...the JCS and the Joint Staff do not have a significant role in setting objectives or in resource allocation. (pages 12 and 13)

PPBS presents a formal opportunity for the JCS to provide programmatic advice through the submission of the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). In effect, the JPAM represents the Joint Chiefs' response to the Services' programming plans as presented in their Program Objective Memoranda (POM's). The JPAM has never been a useful document. It has never provided an independent assessment of the Service Program Objective Memoranda (POM's). The JPAM merely accommodates the disparate desires of the individual Services because as General Jones stated:

> ...each service usually wants the Joint Staff merely to echo its views. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 20)

The limited utility of the JPAM is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

The members of the JCS attend meetings of the Defense Resources Board during the Program Review Process. However, the Service Chiefs' role during these sessions is to defend the programs contained in their Services' POM's. While the JCS Chairman also attends the DRB meetings, he cannot provide, due to his inadequate staff support, the quality of joint military programmatic advice that is needed. General Jones commented as follows on this situation:

> ...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only military member of the Defense Resources Board and can offer independent opinions, but the chairman has only five people working directly for him to sift through the various issues. (The Joint Staff belongs to the Joint Chiefs' corporate body, not to the chairman.) Consequently, chairmen traditionally focus on a few critical items. In my case, they were readiness, command and control, and mobility. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 20)

General George S. Brown, USAF, also commented on the absence of staff support available to him as JCS Chairman when offering advice on programmatic issues:

> I had to discuss these very important programmatic and weapons systems problems and draw on things I knew before I got the job, with no help from a staff. (*The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy*, American Enterprise Institute, 1978, page 9)

(3) inability to effectively represent the operational commanders on resource allocation issues

Section 141(c) of title 10 directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, to "establish unified commands in strategic areas". In addition, DoD Directive 5100.1 assigns the JCS the responsibility for transmitting orders from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. These two statutory and administrative authorities, as well as historical practice, have contributed to the role of the JCS as spokesman for the unified and specified commands within DoD.

Thus, one of the principal tasks of the JCS is to represent the operational commanders on the full range of issues affecting their commands. The JCS have failed to provide this representation because of the dominance of single Service perspectives in JCS deliberations. The Steadman Report comments on the poor representation of the operational commanders:

> ...most CINC's have limited power to influence the capability of the forces assigned to them....The Services (and the components) thus have the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible. (page 33)

The Chairman's Special Study Group also found:

> ...The CINCs are in a particularly good position to advise on operational problems such as shortages of space parts, muni-

> tions, and manpower, but they have been remote from, and poorly represented in, the programming and budgeting process. (page 13)

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands addresses in detail the failure of the JCS to adequately represent the operational commanders in the context of the imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their influence over resource decisions. The absence of representation of the operational commanders in the resource allocation process is a serious deficiency because in the words of DoD Directive 7045.14:

> The ultimate objective of the PPBS shall be to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. (page 1)

(4) undue Service parochialism in operational matters

In providing advice to the Secretary of Defense during crises or wars, the JCS have traditionally given undue emphasis to Service interests. Each Service wants to be involved in responding to the crisis or war whether or not its forces are suited to the mission. The resulting JCS recommendations are designed more to balance Service interests than provide the most effective fighting force. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger stated:

> ...At the present time, each of the services wants a piece of the action and, therefore, those crises responses are coupled together in an atmosphere in which each service is demanding that it have a piece of the action and is demanding usually that it control its own forces. (Part 5, page 201)

Similarly, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the following lesson could be learned from the Iranian hostage rescue mission:

> One basic lesson is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration. (SASC Hearings, Part 11, page 503)

(5) inability to provide for effective organization and command arrangements within the unified commands

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands addresses the organizational deficiencies of the unified commands, especially regarding the absence of unification at subordinate levels of the commands. There are two basic causes of the problem of insufficient unification within the unified commands: (1) the refusal of the Services to accept substantial unification within the unified commands; and (2) absence of agreement on appropriate command relationships, especially concerning the principle of unity of command. The JCS must be held responsible for these deficiencies because they result primarily from organizational and procedural arrangements specified in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces.

(6) absence of an objective review of the Unified Command Plan

Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands also discusses the inability of the JCS to objectively review the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Decisions regarding the UCP affect important Service interests; therefore, the JCS have been incapable of effectively addressing these difficult, multi-Service issues. The Steadman Report comments on the controversial nature of the UCP within the JCS system:

> ...changes to the UCP are usually controversial, producing split opinions among the JCS. There are many reasons for this, such as pride of Service and allocation of four-star billets. (page 7)

(7) inability to settle role and mission disputes

In his book, *The 25-Year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) discusses the inability of the JCS to settle role and mission disputes:

> There are other areas in which the JCS could do a better job than they have done in the past. They should be able to sort out issues arising out of role and mission conflicts, especially when brought on by advancing technology. Technological change is inevitable and no service or its chief can prevent it. Examples of the issues involved are the roles and mission implications of missiles versus aircraft, coordinating air defense and air operations, and coordinating electronic warfare operations. A good example occurred during the Vietnam War. In chapter one I described how the secretary of defense had to decide on an interservice controversy over the helicopter, a controversy that extended from Washington to Vietnam. The JCS should have settled this role and mission issue among themselves. (page 199)

The Steadman Report also noted the inability of the JCS to resolve roles and mission issues. In discussing contentious issues in which important Service interests or prerogatives are at stake, the Steadman Report states:

> ...addressal in the system of such contentious issues as control of close air support of ground forces is initiated only when the pace of technological change or Secretarial directives force it. Changes in these contentious areas are approached reluctantly and deferred to the extent possible. This difficulty is basically systemic, although it is also related to inherent military conservatism. There is a natural tendency to be comfortable with what one understands and knows will operate and a natural skepticism to accept theoretical assertions of improvement. This tendency (pejoratively labeled by some "fighting the last war over again") needs to be challenged more often, but challenges are difficult within the existing system which provides many avenues for delay. (pages 55 and 56)

In their paper, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin are highly critical of the Key West Agreement of 1948 which remains the basis for the current assignment of Serice roles and missions:

> ...while Key West and the subsequent agreements have clarified service responsibilities and missions, they have contributed to some of the most glaring failures and shortcomings of American military policy in the postwar era. (*Foreign Policy*, #53, Winter 1983–1984, page 114)

As the most senior body of joint advisors, the JCS must bear the major responsibility for the failure to more adequately address roles and missions issues.

(8) poorly developed joint doctrine

JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the term "doctrine" as follows:

> Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (page 113)

The joint operational effectiveness of military forces is dependent upon the development of joint doctrine and sufficient joint training to be able to efficiently employ it. JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, specifies one of the functions of the JCS as: "To establish doctrines for (1) Unified operations and training." (page 12) The JCS have given limited attention to the development of joint doctrine.

In *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, General John H. Cushman, USA (Retired) discusses the absence of joint doctrine:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff have themselves published no doctrine to harmonize the operations of tactical air and land forces. Indeed, they have published no 'how to fight' doctrine at all. UNAAF [Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Publication 2]...is not 'how to fight' guidance but rather guidance on organization and command relationships.
>
> Instead, the JCS, in UNAAF and in their interpretation of the statute, hold the Services responsible for the development of essentially all operational doctrine, with provisions for coordination between the Services and for referring disputes to the JCS for resolution. (pages 4-1 and 4-2)

The absence of JCS emphasis on joint doctrine means that Service doctrine dominates operational thinking. This becomes a problem because the Services are diverse and have different approaches to military operations. When U.S. military forces are jointly employed, Service doctrines clash.

General Cushman summarizes the situation as follows:

> What some describe as rather incoherent United States military doctrine stems from this lack of homogenity [of the Services] perhaps as much as it does from the absence of joint institutions which have the mission of thinking about military doctrine, or having the mission do not fulfill it. (page 4-8)

b. Causes of Inadequate Unified Military Advice

Eight causes of the problem of inadequate unified military advice have been identified.

(1) dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs

The dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs, often referred to as "dual-hatting", to their individual Services and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to be the central feature of the JCS system. On balance, "dual-hatting" appears to both enhance and discourage the development of useful and timely unified advice.

a) conflict of interest

On the one hand, the principle that authority and responsibility should remain inseparable is cited in support of retaining the Service Chiefs as JCS members. Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Retired), a former Chief of Naval Operations, emphasized this principle in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> There is another reason why the service chiefs should not be removed even partially from the function of military advisers. To do so would separate authority and responsibility. The service chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, and training their forces; the Chairman is not. Because they are responsible for the readiness and performance of those units, the chiefs must therefore be involved in the chain of command to the authority that directs the employment of those forces. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 37)

Admiral Holloway and the many military officers who join him in making this argument go on to explain that establishing authority and responsibility in a Service Chief means that he is accountable for his Service's actions. Removing him from the joint arena in which operational recommendations are made would free him of responsibility for the way in which his forces are used. In this way, accountability would be diffused and, therefore, weakened.

On the other hand, recommendations to modify or eliminate "dual-hatting" are based on the assertion that Service Chiefs are unable to subordinate the interests of their parent Services to the larger interests of national defense. Those that make this argument describe "dual-hatting" as a "conflict-of-interest". As General Jones has stated:

> ...Chiefs are judged by their peers and services on their success in obtaining funding for their own major systems and on protecting service interests in the three afternoons a week they spend in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, a service chief, who is a service advocate in one hat and supposedly an impartial judge of competing requirements in his other hat as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has a fundamental conflict of interest. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 21)

Critics of the current JCS structure believe that Service Chiefs cannot continue to successfully lead their Services if they subsume their Service needs and goals to larger joint needs and goals. Chiefs who fail to preserve and even advance their Services' interests in JCS deliberations lose the respect and dedication of their subordinates. Critics argue that this possibility discourages the Service

Chiefs from putting aside their Service interests when that is required to reach a joint position.

Therefore, "dual-hatting" yields weak JCS advice that simply reflects whatever level of compromise is necessary to achieve the four Services' unanimous agreement. Rather than rely on such advice, senior defense officials have turned to civilian sources for more useful analysis.

The conflict of interest in the dual responsibilities of Service Chiefs has long been identified as a problem. According to the Steadman Report, "problems inherent in the dual roles...have been recognized by every major study of DoD organization as well as in the Congressional debates on the various amendments since the 1947 law." (pages 48 and 49) For example, Secretary of Defense Lovett concluded in 1952:

> It is extremely difficult for a group composed of the Chiefs of the three Military Departments and charged, with the exception of the Chairman, with heavy responsibilities placed upon them by law with respect to each individual Service to decide matters involving the splitting of manpower, supplies, equipment, facilities, dollars, and similar matters. (*The Department of Defense 1944 —1978*, page 120)

President Eisenhower found that the problem persisted in 1958:

> I know well, from years of military life, the constant concern of service leaders for the adequacy of their respective programs, each of which is intended to strengthen the Nation's defense....But service responsibilities and activities must always be only the branches, not the central trunk of the national security tree. The present organization fails to apply this truth.

The Symington Report in 1960 declared:

> No different results can be expected as long as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retain their two-hatted character, with their positions preconditioned by the Service environment to which they must return after each session of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (page 6)

The Steadman Report in 1978 agreed:

> A Chief's responsibility to manage and lead his Service conflicts directly with his agreement in the joint forum to recommendations which are inconsistent with programs desired by his own Service. A Chief cannot, for example, be expected to argue for additional carriers, divisions, or air wings when constructing a Service budget and then agree in a joint forum that they should be deleted in favor of programs of other Services. In doing so he would not only be unreasonably inconsistent, but would risk losing leadership of his Service as well. (page 53)

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group stated:

> What the current system demands of the Chiefs is often unrealistic. They have one job that requires them to be effective advocates for their own Service; they have another that re-

> quires them to subordinate Service interests to broader considerations; and they are faced with issues where the two positions may well be antithetical. It is very difficult for a Chief to argue in favor of something while wearing one of his 'hats', and against it while wearing the other. Yet that is what the current system often asks of the Service Chiefs. (page 26)

The 1985 CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, confirmed that the conflict of interest problem still exists:

> ...Each member of the JCS, except the chairman, faces an inherent conflict between his joint role on the one hand and his responsibility to represent the interests of his service on the other....Although the 1947 National Security Act mandates that a service chief's joint role should take precedence over his duties as leader of a service, this does not occur in practice — and for good reason. If a chief did not defend service positions in the joint forum, he would lose the support and loyalty of his service, thus destroying his effectiveness. (page 12)

Theoretically, the current JCS system is the organizational optimum. It brings together the administrative and operational lines of DoD. Substantial benefits should flow from this arrangement. The Service Chiefs bring their superior expertise on Service force capabilities and programs to the joint arena, and they take from the JCS deliberations the broader perspective on national defense to be used in their individual Service responsibilities.

In theory, this arrangement looks good. In practice, it has been a failure. The Service Chiefs were expected to balance their responsibilities in the administrative and operational lines. Throughout the history of the JCS, the Service Chiefs have failed to provide this balance. As General Jones has noted:

> To provide a balance, the services must share some of their authority, but they have proved to be consistently unwilling to do so. A service chief has a constituency which, if convinced that he is not fighting hard enough for what the service sees as its fair share of defense missions and resources, can destroy the chief's effectiveness. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 23)

The risks to a Service Chief of attempting to provide a balance between his Service and joint responsibilities was most dramatically demonstrated by the "revolt of the Admirals" in 1949. In this instance, Secretary of Defense Johnson arranged to have the JCS vote on the continued construction of a super, flush-deck carrier for the Navy. With the support of a split vote (Admiral Louis A. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in lone dissent), Secretary Johnson cancelled further construction. This decision and Secretary Johnson's instructions to reduce defense expenditures placed Admiral Denfeld in a difficult position. Paul Hammond discusses the subsequent events in *Organizing for Defense*:

> ...Admiral Louis A. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations, had tried to preserve his status as the major spokesman for Navy interests at once within the Navy Department and within the Defense Department through the JCS. He failed no-

> tably to bridge the gap between Johnson's office and the naval high command. The Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, stepped forward to be the spokesman of Navy interests while Denfeld maintained his relations with Johnson and Matthews [Secretary of the Navy]. When, in the drama of a Congressional hearing, Denfeld sided with the rest of the Navy, he was fired as CNO.
>
> The intricate development of events which thus ended his naval career is not our concern here, but its significance is. Denfeld had found it impossible as Chief of Naval Operations to play simultaneously the two roles thrust upon him: chief spokesman for the professional Navy and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the two diverged, he favored the second role, only to find that he had been virtually deprived of the first. When the House Armed Services Committee hearings on "Unification and Strategy" finally opened in October, 1949, he found himself in growing isolation from his service, and Admiral Radford was at the tiller. When Denfeld finally sided with the rest of the Navy high command, it was only to acknowledge that the playing of his second role, as a member of the JCS, depended upon the performance of his first, as spokesman for the Navy. His firing was therefore a true administrative tragedy, for the seeds of his destruction were inherent in the office which he held. (page 246)

Hammond reaches the following conclusion from these events:

> ...As Admiral Denfeld's experience as Chief of Naval Operations suggests, a service Chief remains in effective control of his service only so long as he maintains its confidence; and nothing can cause the loss of that confidence faster than his abandonment of the role of service spokesman in the JCS. (page 349)

In sum, the Service Chiefs cannot effectively fulfill both roles assigned to them. They cannot balance Service and joint interests. As the previously quoted statement from the Chairman's Special Study Group notes: "What the current system demands of the Chiefs is often unrealistic." More than 40 years of experience with the JCS system has shown the theoretical model to be invalid. The JCS have consistently failed to provide the quality of joint military advice that the Secretary of Defense and other senior decisionmakers vitally need.

b) insufficient time to perform both roles

It is also claimed that "dual-hatting" overburdens Service Chiefs by requiring them to shoulder more responsibilities than one person can handle. Simply performing all the duties entailed in leading a military Service is enough to fully consume the time and energy of a single individual. As serious as this problem might be in peacetime, it, of course, would be exacerbated during a prolonged crisis or war.

In 1958, an effort was made to correct this problem by authorizing the Service Chiefs to delegate duties to the Service Vice Chiefs.

In his message to the Congress on the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, President Eisenhower explained this change:

> I therefore propose that present law be changed to make it clear that each chief of a military service may delegate major portions of his service responsibilities to his vice chief. Once this change is made, the Secretary of Defense will require the chiefs to use their power of delegation to enable them to make their Joint Chiefs of Staff duties their principal duties. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 181)

The effort to shift burdens from the Service Chief to the Vice Chief has not been successful. The Service Chiefs continue to be substantially involved in Service matters. The Chairman's Special Study Group noted this outcome:

> ..Legislation was passed to permit the Service Chief to delegate his Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief, and thus free himself for Joint matters. But, in practice, no Service Chief can or will do that. The Chief is still the Chief, by tradition, inclination, and expectation. Furthermore, just managing their Service can keep both the Chief and his Vice Chief fully occupied. (page 55)

The reluctance of a Service Chief to delegate responsibilities to his Vice Chief is an important point. Basically, a Service Chief wants to remain involved in Service matters because that is where his real interests lie. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb in his book, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, addresses this fact:

> The problem of the service chief is not that he cannot divest himself of his service duties. The real problem is he does not want to. The man who spends nearly forty years as a follower in his service sees his appointment to the JCS as the opportunity to remake his service in his own image. He does not view it as an opportunity to serve as a principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense. (page 20)

Similarly, the Chairman's Special Study Group concludes:

> It should be expected that the Service Chiefs would have mixed feelings about the time they spend on Joint matters. Their Joint advice is not in demand. Their main interest and their constituencies lie with their Services. They cannot deal with many major Joint issues to their satisfaction because they cannot reach agreement without compromising their Service positions or waffling their advice. Many of the Joint issues they deal with they consider unnecessarily time-consuming. (page 24)

The fact that the Service Chiefs do not have sufficient time to perform their two roles has been recognized for a long time as the following quotes from previous studies show. The 1949 Eberstadt Report stated that:

> A further source of the deficiencies of the Joint Chiefs lies in the fact that they are, as individuals, too busy with their service duties to give to Joint Chiefs of Staff matters the attention their great importance demands. (page 69)

President Eisenhower emphasized in his 1958 Message to Congress that:

> ...the Joint Chiefs' burdens are so heavy that they find it very difficult to spend adequate time on their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This situation is produced by their having the dual responsibilities of chiefs of the military services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem is not new but has not yielded to past efforts to solve it.

And the problem persisted, as found by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970:

> The numerous functions now assigned to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff impose an excessive workload and a difficult mix of functions and loyalties. Some of these functions must consequently suffer, and the evidence indicates both the strain on individuals who have served in such capacity and a less than desirable level of performance of the numerous functions assigned. This result has occurred despite the outstanding individual ability and dedication of those who have served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and despite attempts to shift a portion of the load from the Chiefs of Service to their Vice Chiefs. (page 34)

The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 highlighted another aspect of the problem of excessive time demands:

> ...the Chiefs must travel extensively to meet their own Service leadership obligations...Their travel schedules make it hard for the JCS to maintain continuity as a working group; ...only one-quarter of the time [over the past five years] were all five principals present [at JCS meetings] and 40 percent of the time two or more were gone. (page 25)

(2) limited independent authority of the JCS Chairman

Though having the title of chairman, the JCS Chairman is by law one of five equals. His limited independent authority was discussed by the Chairman's Special Study Group:

> ...his potential effectiveness is, by law and by practice, curtailed. As one of five equals, he cannot speak authoritatively for the other members of the JCS as a corporate body unless they all agree or he states the positions of the individual Service Chiefs; he is not the "chairman of the board." Unlike the Service Chiefs, he manages few resources, and resources are an important source of influence. With regard to personnel, he controls no promotions and few assignments, so has little sway over the officers assigned to the Joint Staff and other Joint organizations, including the Unified Commands. (page 18)

The inability of the JCS Chairman, the only JCS member with no Service responsibilities, to exercise more than limited authority independently of the Service Chiefs makes it difficult for him to advance his unique joint perspective on issues affecting more than one Service.

However, it should be noted that some argue that the JCS Chairman should only have limited independent authority if civilian control of the military is to be ensured. Those that make this argument believe that the full consideration of the four Services' experiences and expertise ensures that senior civilian decision-makers have the benefit of competitive points of view. This argument is, however, inconsistent with the pattern of JCS advice. Senior civilian decision-makers do not receive the benefit of competitive points of view; the JCS pre-negotiate issues and normally provide only one alternative for consideration by higher authority. General Jones has commented as follows on this argument:

> ...It is ironic that the services have, with considerable help from outside constituencies, been able to defeat attempts to bring order out of chaos by arguing that a source of alternative military advice [the JCS Chairman] for the President and Secretary of Defense runs the risk of undermining civilian control. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 21)

A convincing argument can be made that a more independent JCS Chairman would lead to a greater diversity of views and better defined choices and, as a result, provide for more effective civilian control.

The JCS consists of a presiding officer with more influence but less control than the other four members. In such a collegial organization, the personality and leadership style of the Chairman are crucial to its effective operation. Of course, JCS Chairmen have differed in these personal qualities and, hence, in their effectiveness. However the JCS is organized, the leadership skills of its Chairman will determine to a great extent its success. Indeed, some assert that the JCS has been an ineffective institution principally because of the personality and leadership shortcomings of its Chairmen rather than because of deficiencies in the organizational structure.

The determination of the JCS to reach a consensus on issues (instead of distinct alternatives) minimizes the independent authority of the JCS Chairman. Rather than developing and pressing his own views, he must be concerned with harmonizing the competing views of the Services. In doing so, however, the Chairman cannot rely on any executive authority over the Service Chiefs; instead, he must simply hope to persuade them to accept his suggestions. General Jones discusses the JCS Chairman's difficult position in the following terms:

> Only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unconstrained by a service constituency, but he is in a particularly difficult position. His influence stems from his ability to persuade all his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on a course of action and any disagreement requires by law a report to the Secretary of Defense. A Chairman jeopardizes his effectiveness if, early in his tour, he creates dissension within the corporate body by trying to force the services to share some of their authority. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 23)

Despite their lack of statutory freedom to volunteer military advice in their own right, former JCS Chairmen have provided their personal views on an *ad hoc* basis to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Apparently, these personal views have often differed from the institutional views of the JCS. Former Secretaries of Defense have testified that this informal guidance was very helpful—usually more useful than the written advice generated by the JCS staff process. Again, however, it appears that JCS Chairmen have been able to offer their own military advice only to Secretaries of Defense and Presidents with whom they enjoyed personal relations of trust and confidence. In any organization, the willingness of a superior to accept the advice of a subordinate is seldom a function of formal organizational relationships, particularly in cases where the superior has no control over the selection of his subordinates. Rather, relationships of trust and confidence, like those that should exist between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, largely depend upon personalities and perceived confidence. Such relationships cannot be legislated.

If the Chairman's informal practice of providing his own advice is to be expressly authorized and encouraged by law, he would be constrained by the current legal requirement that he manage the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff". (Section 141(d), title 10) That mandate would hinder the Chairman from drawing upon the Joint Staff for the kind of support which he would require to develop his own views.

(3) desire for unanimity

Section 142(b) of title 10, United States Code, specifies the following as one of the duties of the JCS Chairman:(3) inform the Secretary of Defense, and, when the President or the Secretary of Defense considers it appropriate, the President, of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed.

The elaborate staffing procedures established by the Joint Chiefs to develop their corporate views reflect their strong interest in achieving unanimity. Although there is no statutory or administrative requirement, successive groups of Joint Chiefs have labored to develop unanimous positions on all but a small number of matters. Apparently, the JCS has believed that its recommendations carry more weight if they reflect the agreement of all of the Chiefs. Rather than offer policy alternatives to the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs have considered it their responsibility to debate and refine the options into a single recommendation. The effective result is that the Services can frustrate an agreement on most Joint Staff actions.

In his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD," Ambassador Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), comments on the negative impact of the JCS desire for unanimity:

> *Because of the way it operates, the JCS system is the prisoner of the services which comprise it.* The rule of unanimity which the JCS deliberately impose on themselves in order to achieve a unified view vis-a-vis the civilians permits in effect a single service veto. This means in turn that JCS advice on any controversial issue almost invariably reflects the lowest common denominator of what the Services can agree on. In effect, while this JCS system deprives the nation's military of an adequate voice in defense decisionmaking, this must be regarded as mostly a self-inflicted wound. (page 13)

In discussing formal JCS advice, the Steadman Report also noted:

> In formal papers argumentation and recommendations usually have had such extensive negotiation that they have been reduced to the lowest common level of assent. (page 52)

The desire for unanimity not only forces JCS advice to the lowest common denominator, but also greatly limits the range of alternatives that a Secretary of Defense can consider. As General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) has written:

> It is dangerous to submerge divergent views on important issues, and a disservice to civilian authority to infer JCS agreement when, in fact, the chiefs disagree. (*The 25-Year War*, pages 198–199)

Much has been written about the problems of inter-Service rivalry. Within the JCS system, however, the opposite appears to be the dominant case. There is limited competitive and objective examination of issues, but rather a search for compromises, often useless or ineffective, to which all Services can agree. In the work of the JCS, collusion and collegiality are the dominant features. General Jones has commented on the imbalance of Service and joint interests and the desire for unanimity:

> It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in "negotiated treaties" which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests. Such a "truce" has its good points, for it is counterproductive for the services to attack each other. But the lack of adequate questioning by military professionals results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in our defense capabilities. What is lacking is a counterbalancing system, involving officers not so beholden to their services, who can objectively examine strategy, roles, missions, weapons systems, war planning and other contentious issues to offset the influence of the individual services. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 22)

(4) closed staff character of JCS system

Despite its critical position in DoD as the source of unified military advice, the JCS has placed strict limits on its interactions with others. This has been termed a "closed staff." Paul Hammond addresses the closed staff character of the JCS in his book, *Organizing for Defense*:

> ...By closed we mean that the JCS as a corporate body, as distinct from its individual members carrying out their responsibilities as military Chiefs in their respective services, kept the deliberations by which it finally reached its corporate will relatively unfettered and unobserved. (page 171)

Hammond discusses the closed staff character of the JCS during World War II and indicates that its procedures "suggest an analogy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the U.S. Supreme Court." (page 173) Hammond notes the problems that this caused because military and judicial councils are so different.

Hammond discusses the reasons for the closed staff character of the JCS as follows:

> This insuperability of service interests in the JCS is probably the major explanation for the closed military staff characteristics of the JCS: the refusal to delegate authority (to let, that is to say, anyone representing the JCS commit it in any way), the insistence upon taking exclusive jurisdiction over questions, the requirement (less successfully enforced) that agency viewpoints, even those of the State Department, be final before the JCS will review them, the refusal of the JCS to alter its military character by including nonmilitary experts in the Joint Staff or as advisors to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the difficulties in communication between the JCS and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, or with anyone else as a matter of regular procedure, the slowness of JCS action on many important matters, and the inadequacy of their action, as viewed from the requirements of responsible administrators. Since its establishment the JCS has maintained a barrier against anyone and everyone, including the service Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and all the defense reorganization studies. Its tactics have undoubtedly been successful. It has not had to "negotiate" in the open, where inter-service conflicts could be exacerbated (although on occasion inter-service disputes have brought its deliberations into the open)....
>
> Without the tactics of closed diplomacy it is doubtful that the JCS could have survived World War II as a viable agency, for what held it together was not its own cohesion, but its shield against division....Even though most of the evidence presented above on the operation of the JCS was drawn from its early postwar history, the continuity in its external facade, supplemented by the data which is available concerning its behavior in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, make it fairly evident that these characteristics have not changed. (pages 349–351)

Since these words were written by Paul Hammond in 1961, the JCS system has become somewhat more open. The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* in 1970 noted this trend:

> There is an increasing "openness" to the JCS, quite in contrast to the closed nature of the organization in the past. The Joint Staff has become considerably more open to informal channels and something like a normal relationship has grown under which discussions can take place prior to rather than after JCS positions are officially and formally reached. It is generally felt that considerable progress has been made in coordinative activity and flow of information and opinion among the Joint Staff, OSD, and the State Department. This cooperative atmosphere should allow the Secretary of Defense to provide more useable policy guidance to the JCS and, in return, enable them to provide him increasingly with more useful broad gauged military advice. This movement toward flexibility and openness, it should be added, is generally approved by the military. (Appendix N, page 9)

There are logical reasons, given its current composition, for the JCS to retain a closed staff. Yet, this approach does limit the quality and timeliness of JCS advice and inhibit the important interactions between the Joint Staff and OSD.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Retired), a former Chief of Naval Operations, noted in his book, *On Watch*, a negative impact of the JCS closed staff on its own work:

> ...the Joint Staff was almost totally useless as an instrument to monitor what other parts of the government were doing or thinking. Working, as it had to, strictly through the prescribed channels of communication and command, it was generally the last to know what was happening in Washington's bureaucratic labyrinth. (page 285)

(5) limited joint experience of JCS members

In his book, *U.S. Defense Planning, A Critique*, John M. Collins evaluates the credentials of the 48 military officers who have served as JCS Chairmen or Service Chiefs between World War II and 1982. He concludes:

> Neither education nor experience equipped a majority of the Joint Chiefs to perform well in the joint arena....A lifetime of uniservice employment suited them perfectly to deal with Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps matters, but not in combination....Nearly a third lacked any kind of joint assignment in their entire careers. (pages 49-50)

Collins explains the absence of joint experience as follows:

> A practical reason perpetuates that pattern. Joint assignments have not been, and are not now, considered stepping stones to success. They divert officers from the main stream of their respective Military Services into channels where duties may even conflict with narrow Service interests. (page 50)

General Jones has also noted this deficiency:

> ...The services control most of the money and the personnel assignments and promotions of their people wherever assigned, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the Unified Command Staffs. Officers who perform duty outside their own services generally do less well than those assigned to duty in their service, especially when it comes to promotion to general or admiral. The Chiefs of Staff of the services almost always have had duty on service staffs in Washington but almost never on the Joint Staff. Few incentives exist for an officer assigned to joint duty to do more than punch his or her ticket, and then get back into a service assignment. I cannot stress this point too strongly: He who controls dollars, promotions and assignments controls the organization —and the services so control, especially with regard to personnel actions. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 22)

Whatever the reason, JCS members have traditionally not had a strong background of joint service. This situation has contributed to the inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified advice.

(6) cumbersome staffing procedures

The OJCS staffing procedures are described in detail in Section C of this chapter. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel characterized this staffing system as follows:

> *The system used to process JCS actions and decisions reflects the nature and intent of the JCS structure.* It is a system which is based not only on coordination with the Services but on their concurrence. It is a mechanism which maximizes the opportunities for compromise and resolution of disagreement at every step from the inception of the paper to consideration by the Joint Chiefs. It is a process of negotiation and unabashedly so. (Appendix N, page 14)

The extensive negotiation that results from OJCS staffing procedures and the Service veto at each step of the process produces staff recommendations that have been "watered down" to the lowest common level of assent. The negative impact of OJCS staffing procedures on the quality of unified military advice has long been identified. For example, the 1960 Symington Report found:

> ...Nor can the Joint Staff become fully effective in developing the basis for clear military judgments unless the present degree of influence exercised by separate Service thinking is sharply reduced. (page 6)

The 1978 Steadman Report concluded:

> ...the present system makes it difficult for the Joint Staff to produce persuasively argued joint papers which transcend Service positions and difficult for the JCS to arrive at joint decisions in many important areas. These limitations are related in part to JCS/Joint Staff procedures and style of presentation as well as to inherent tension between Service interests and a joint perspective. (page 57)

The Chairman's Special Study Group was highly critical of OJCS staffing procedures:

> ...Service staff executives actually have effective veto power on most Joint Staff actions....the JCS and the Joint Staff do not reach decisions by executive staff process; they seek unanimous consensus among the Services...(pages 8 and 9)..it is possible, and indeed likely, for a JCS paper to go through four levels of staffing, each with multiple iterations of drafting, commenting, and revising. This admittedly thorough but prolonged process of trying to reach some mutually satisfactory compromise among the Services tends not to sharpen and hone the issues, but rather to bury them. The more iterations this process involves, the longer the process takes, and the less substantive the paper becomes. The objective becomes one of agreement, at the expense of content. (pages 47 and 48)

And finally, in 1985, the CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, found:

> ...the JCS have constructed an array of Joint Staff procedures for drafting and coordinating documents which ensure that all services pass on every item at several levels. In effect, each service has a veto over every joint recommendation, forcing joint advice toward the level of common assent. (page 12)

Although the JCS have recently attempted to expedite their work by compressing the levels of staff review, the staffing procedures remain lengthy, cumbersome, and, most importantly, open to the Service veto at each step of the process.

(7) unfavorable incentives for OJCS officers

Like the Service Chiefs, military officers who serve in OJCS have a conflict of interest. While they are suppose to provide a joint perspective on issues, there are tremendous incentives for them to pursue the point of view of their parent Services. The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, comments on this situation with respect to Joint Staff officers, but it applies to all military officers in OJCS:

> ...the officers who serve on the Joint Staff have strong incentives to protect the interests of their services in the joint arena. Joint Staff officers usually serve only a single tour there, and must look to their parent service for promotions and future assignments. Their performance is judged in large part by how effectively they have represented service interests. (page 12)

Given this situation, Service interests play the dominant role in OJCS staff work. Thus, even before the JCS focus on an issue, the joint perspective has been relegated to a secondary role.

(8) absence of mission orientations

The Joint Staff is organized along the traditional military functional lines (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, etcetera). Secretary Weinberger views this functional arrangement to be appropriate:

> The Unified Commands, as the headquarters of our fighting forces in the field, are mission-oriented in purpose and outlook. These headquarters staffs, as well as the staffs of the Service Component Commands, are organized functionally in a manner which is designed to most effectively accomplish their assigned military missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are responsible for providing strategic direction to the Unified and Specified Commands, and for serving as the military staff of the Secretary of Defense and the National Command Authorities, have organized the Joint Staff along parallel functional lines. Accordingly, organizational arrangements for command, control, and employment of U.S. military forces are compatible across all operating elements and activities. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

Despite Secretary Weinberger's view, it does appear that the absence of a multi-functional, mission orientation in the Joint Staff inhibits the ability of the JCS to articulate mission requirements. In fact, given that the JCS system is expected to balance Service and joint interests, the functional structure which mirrors the Services' organizational arrangements tilts the balance toward the Services. If the Joint Staff were focused on missions, as the unified commands are, it might be more supportive of the operational requirements of the combatant commands.

2. INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

The second problem area is the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff. In this context, quality has three dimensions: (1) the inherent skills and talents as professional military officers; (2) the necessary education and experience; and (3) a sufficiently long tour to become effective and to provide continuity.

As Table 4-2 shows, there are about 9,000 active duty military officers assigned to "joint duty" in the Department of Defense. Joint, or non-Service, duty in the broader context includes service in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including the Joint Staff), unified command headquarters, Joint Deployment Agency, NATO headquarters, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Defense Agencies. The number of active duty officers so assigned represents 5 percent of all officers, 19 percent of all flag rank officers, and 11 percent of all colonels and Navy captains. (Chairman's Special Study Group, page 2)

TABLE 4-2

OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO JOINT DUTY[a]

	Grade					
Activity	O-3	O-4	O-5	O-6	General/Flag	TOTAL
OSD	19	68	176	156	19	438
OJCS	2	70	368	211	31	682
JDA	5	26	30	9	4	74
Unified Commands	236	730	850	291	47	2,154
NATO Commands	162	405	478	209	45	1,299
Subtotal	424	1,299	1,902	876	146	4,647
Percent of Total Grade	<1%	3%	6%	6%	13%	3%
Defense Agencies	545	986	882	380	35	2,828
Other Activities[b]	159	440	501	347	29	1,476
Total	1,128	2,725	3,285	1,603	210	8,951
Percent of Total Grade	1%	5%	10%	11%	19%	5%
Army						(3,317)
Navy/Marine Corps						(2,400)
Air Force						(3,234)

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[a] As of 28 September 1981. Source is the report of the Chairman's Special Study Group. Excludes officers assigned to the Service staffs whose principal or part-time responsibilities are in support of their Service Chiefs in joint activities.

[b] Aerospace Defense Command; National Defense University; Armed Forces Staff College; Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff; Joint Electronic Warfare Center; Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff; Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center; Inter-American Defense Board; Defense Attache System; and Security Assistance Activities.

In this subsection, the focus will be on the roughly 750 military officers assigned to OJCS which includes the 400 officers on the Joint Staff. While previous discussions of staff quality have focused on the Joint Staff, addressing the larger and all—encompassing OJCS staff is more useful for the purposes of this study. While the focus here is on the OJCS staff, the range of identified problems frequently apply to other joint duty assignments, especially on the joint staffs serving the unified commanders.

In this regard, the Chairman's Special Study Group noted:

> . . . They [the CINC's] have practically nothing to say about the officers assigned to them; just as the Joint Staff has difficulty getting officers qualified in Joint duty, so too do the CINCs. (page 32)

The problem of the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff also contributes to the first problem of inadequate unified military advice. The absence of a high quality OJCS staff would obviously diminish the work product of the JCS system. Despite this relationship, the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff is of sufficient concern that it merits discussion as a distinct problem area.

However the OJCS staff is organized, the officers assigned to it should be among the best of their Services and fully prepared for joint duty. Unfortunately, the quality of these officers has been uneven and disappointing. As General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) notes: "...Like it or not, the image of the Joint Staff is not a good one..." ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", pages 28 and 29) This is not to say that OJCS officers are not on the whole very capable. They are, but they do not include an appropriate portion of the most talented officers. Despite the capable nature of the OJCS staff, the constraints under which they operate greatly diminish the quality of their work. For the most part, officers do not want OJCS assignments; are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their Services while serving in OJCS; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs. In his book, *A Genius for War*, Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) states that the objective of the Prussian General Staff was to institutionalize excellence. (page 24) Whatever the real or imagined deficiencies of the General Staff concept, it is clear that the OJCS staff is at the other end of the spectrum; at best it can be described as the institutionalization of mediocrity. The discussion of the causes of this problem area will further explain why this is the case.

It should also be noted that the Services have no interest in improving the quality of OJCS staff work. An ineffective OJCS staff permits Service perspectives to dominate. John Kester reaches this conclusion in his paper, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff":

> . . . It is no accident that the joint staff has gone on for this long with little improvement, even though the deficiencies have been recognized for decades. The difficulties have their roots not in lack of management skill, but in the JCS itself and the power balance struck between the forces of jointness on the

> one hand and the services on the other. Except for the chairman, the chiefs themselves —institutionally, though not necessarily personally —by virtue of their service roles have an interest in *not* having an effective joint staff. (*AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, Volume Two, Number One, February 1980, page 17)

There are six causes of the problem of the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff: (1) an unfavorable historical pattern of promotions and assignments; (2) negative attitudes of parent Services; (3) limited OJCS staff influence; (4) complex staffing procedures; (5) limited joint experience or education; and (6) rapid turnover rates. The first four causes contribute to the first dimension of inadequate quality: the assignment to OJCS of military officers who are not among the most skilled and talented. The fifth and sixth causes directly relate to the two other dimensions: insufficient education and experience and brief joint tours.

a. Unfavorable Historical Pattern of Promotions and Assignments

The historical pattern of promotions and assignments of military officers subsequent to tours of duty on the OJCS staff is a major disincentive. Overall, officers in OJCS staff assignments have not been as successful as their peers in competing for promotions and command positions. As the Chairman Special Study Group notes, this negative pattern has had an impact on attitudes toward joint assignments within the professional officer corps:

> The general perception among officers is that a Joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact, within one Service it is flatly believed to be the "kiss of death" as far as a continued military career is concerned. In contrast, Service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete accomplishments and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for Service assignments rather than risk a Joint-duty assignment. (page 44)

Recently, however, the Services have attempted to enhance advancement opportunities for their officers on the OJCS staff.

b. Negative Attitude of Parent Services

The Services do not generally believe that it is vital to their interests to be represented by their best officers on the OJCS staff. Rather, the Services seek to retain their best officers for more important "in-house" or joint positions (e.g., in the Office of the Secretary of Defense). The Steadman Report cites this approach by the Services:

> . . . The problem [of Joint Staff performance] has been compounded by the historic unwillingness of the Services to heed the pleas of various Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the JCS to assign their most highly qualified officers to the Joint Staff. The Services have not perceived such duty as being of the highest priority and have made their personnel assignments accordingly. Many of the best officers have noted this fact and thus avoid a Joint Staff assignment if at all possible. In consequence, while the Joint Staff officers are generally ca-

> pable, the very top officers of the Services more frequently are on the Service staffs. (page 51)

Of course, the attitude of their parent Services strongly discourages excellent officers from volunteering for duty on the OJCS staff.

c. Limited OJCS Staff Influence

The widely held perception is that the OJCS staff exercises little influence in resolving significant defense questions. As a result, many military officers foresee limited opportunities to make meaningful contributions as a member of OJCS.

d. Cumbersome Staffing Procedures

Another disincentive is the cumbersome staffing process followed by the OJCS staff to integrate the views of the Services into a JCS position. These procedures were identified previously in this section as a cause of inadequate unified military advice; they also have a negative effect on the quality of the OJCS staff. The perception among OJCS action officers that this cumbersome staffing process is unproductive inhibits outstanding officers from seeking Joint Staff duty. The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 concluded that the JCS staffing process:

> . . . tends to water down or 'waffle' both the exposition of the issue and the recommended position as the constraints imposed by the protection of Service interests are applied at each echelon. The process is viewed as unproductive by most action officers, one of the reasons many fine officers do not seek Joint Staff assignments. It is also perceived as unproductive by its civilian consumers, one of the reasons that JCS formal advice is frequently not requested or heeded. (page 9)

e. Limited Joint Experience or Education

Most OJCS staff officers lack previous joint experience or education. The Chairman's Special Study Group determined that in 1982 only 2 percent of the officers serving in OJCS had any previous Joint Staff experience and only 36 percent had ever worked on a Service staff and noted:

> . . . Most [Joint Staff officers] have come directly to Washington from specialized field operations where they have had little contact with the complex issues with which the Joint Staff must deal. (page 7)

Moreover, only 13 percent had attended the 5-month resident course at the Armed Forces Staff College, the school specifically designed to train young officers for joint duty. (Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Chairman's Special Study Group, *The Organization and Functions of the JCS*, April 1982, page 41.) The obvious effect of this lack of prior experience or training is to require new OJCS staff officers to learn "on the job" how to analyze major political-military issues, develop national security objectives, and oversee the preparation of joint military plans. The result of this situation was summarized by the Chairman's Special Study Group:

> The combination of lack of staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of Joint activities, and lack of formal preparation

through the Joint school system, all coupled with short tours, makes it very difficult for Joint Staff officers, no matter how capable (and many are very capable), to deal effectively with these major staff responsibilities. The result is that the Chairman lacks the support he needs to carry out his responsibilities, and the Secretary of Defense is not provided the kind of military staff support he needs, has a right to expect, and could be provided if the Services gave greater weight to Joint-duty positions in their management of officer personnel. (page 43)

f. Rapid Turnover Rates

Compounding limited experience and education is the departure of officers from the OJCS soon after they develop some expertise in their joint assignments. The average tour lengths of officers serving in the OJCS is less than 30 months. Even worse, the Joint Staff leadership positions occupied by general and flag officers normally change every 24 months. (Chairman's Special Study Group, page 42) The rapid turnover of officers who already lacked previous joint experience or education makes it extremely difficult for the OJCS staff to perform its important staff responsibilities. Moreover, as the Chairman's Special Study Group notes, because of these short tours: "there is virtually no corporate memory." (page 42)

3. INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

In Chapter 3 (OSD), the absence of effective civilian review of non-nuclear contingency plans was identified as a problem area. Contributing to this problem was the JCS view that the Secretary of Defense, and possibly his Deputy, were the only civilians (because of the Secretary's command function) who had a need to have access to contingency plans. While the JCS have full and free access to contingency plans prepared by the operational commands, they have given limited attention to reviewing these plans. Inattention to this important duty has been identified as the third problem area in OJCS.

Military contingency plans present only one set of options that should be available to the President during a crisis. There should be diplomatic and economic options developed by agencies other than DoD to provide the full range of alternative courses of action. This comprehensive array of options —military, diplomatic, and economic —should be coordinated in the interagency planning process under the direction of the staff of the National Security Council. Evaluation of interagency planning is beyond the scope of this study. The focus will be exclusively on military contingency planning conducted within DoD.

Global and regional military contingency plans are developed through a JCS system, entitled the Joint Operation Planning Systems (JOPS). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), prepared annually by the JCS, is the document that initiates contingency planning. JSCP lists the planning tasks for commanders of combatant commands and allocates combat forces for planning purposes. Contingency plans are prepared by the combatant commanders in response to JSCP tasking and are submitted to the JCS for review and approval. The *Joint Staff Officers Guide*, Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, makes an interesting observation about JOPS:

> There is no formal relationship between the PPBS and JOPS, but each system obviously exerts a strong influence on the other. It is the military Services that provide a real link, if not a formal one, between the PPBS and JOPS. (pages 5-13)

The combined failure of senior civilian officials and the JCS to give adequate attention to contingency plans and to connect them to the resource allocation process is one of the gravest shortcomings of DoD. Two deficiencies result from this failure: (1) the plans for military action in a crisis or war may not be adequate or realistic, especially from a political perspective; and (2) the useful feedback that contingency plans could provide to future resource allocations is lost. In his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD", Ambassador Robert W. Komer is highly critical of the current contingency planning process:

> . . . the non-nuclear war planning process has become routinized, without much imaginative consideration at CINC or JCS level of strategic alternatives. All too few war plans over the last 15 years have called for changing operational strategy in any significant respect. By and large the strategy they call for remains the same, and the whole focus is on getting more resources to execute them. (page 19)

John Kester has also criticized the quality of work in the JCS system on operational plans:

> The plans prepared by the joint staff often have dismayed outsiders who had occasion to read them. No "canned" plan, of course, will perfectly fit a real-world situation. But too often it has been discovered when a crisis was at hand that the relevant JCS plans assumed away the hardest problems —by focusing, for example, only on a single contingency involving full-scale enemy invasion; or by assuming that military forces elsewhere would be unaffected and available; or by scheduling reinforcements either too rapidly for available transport or too slowly to arrive before the war was over. Sometimes plans have offered presidents few options between "do nothing" or "shoot the works" by all-out commitment of forces. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", page 12)

In his report, *National Security Policy Integration*, Philip Odeen cited one instance in which a Secretary of Defense found available contingency plans inadequate. According to Mr. Odeen, after the 1969 shoot down of a U.S. EC-121 aircraft by North Korea:

> . . . Secretary Laird directed the OSD staff to assess selected JCS contingency plans because of his dissatisfaction with the contingency options available when the crisis occurred. (page 38)

Many of the professional military officers who provided comments to the Chairman's Special Study Group were critical of the limited OJCS emphasis on contingency plans and the planning process itself. For example, some Service Chiefs believe that:

> Organizational changes within the Joint Staff to improve responsiveness and effectiveness are needed, with particular emphasis on improved war planning. (page 29)

Some operational commanders held a similar view:

> There needs to be more emphasis on war planning in the Joint Staff. Moreover, the process used to develop military operation plans takes too long. (page 33)

There are three basic causes of insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans: (1) contingency plans are not central concerns of the Services and the Service Chiefs; (2) inadequate guidance from the civilian leadership to set the framework for contingency plans; and (3) inadequate quality of the OJCS staff. As the previous quotations suggest, the contingency planning process may also be deficient. It was not possible within the scope of this study to validate problems within this process.

a. Absence of Service Interest

The Chairman's Special Study Group summarizes JCS tasks as follows:

> The basic tasks of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are these: (1) to develop and present Joint military advice to the Secretary and the President on a wide variety of issues involving military strategy, objectives, plans, and programs; (2) to guide the development, by the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands (the CINCs), of military operation plans for U.S. forces operating jointly and in combination with allied forces; and (3) to support and oversee the execution of those plans by the CINCs, as the agent of the Commander in Chief. (page 2)

By far, the greatest Service interest is in the first task because of its impact on the allocation of resources. Given the mission of the Services to equip, man, train, and supply combat forces, their attention is focused almost exclusively on resources. Naturally, this becomes the greatest interest of the Service Chief. As was previously noted, this is one of the reasons that Service Chiefs do not delegate Service responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs. Given the limited time that a Service Chief can devote to his JCS duties, it is understandable why contingency plans do not receive adequate attention.

The third JCS task —execution of contingency plans —receives considerable attention during a crisis. Each Service Chief wants to ensure that his Service gets "a piece of the action" and appropriate recognition of its capabilities and contributions.

The second task —the actual development of contingency plans —is very low on Service priorities. It, therefore, receives limited attention.

b. Inadequate Civilian Guidance

Given that only the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have access to contingency plans, there is no mechanism for providing civilian guidance to be used in developing contingency plans. Regarding contingency plans, the Steadman Report states:

> ...present arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas. (page 43)

Only once has the civilian leadership attempted to provide formal guidance for contingency plans. In 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown issued a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning (PGCP). According to Ambassador Komer, this document was:

> ...designed to provide broad policy guidelines and assumptions consonant with national policy and SecDef's own defense guidance. ("Strategymaking in DoD", page 18)

The absence of civilian guidance has forced military officers to develop their own assumptions and guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans. John Kester notes this situation:

> ...the drafting of plans is done by officers in the joint staff who often can find little specific direction in the department's general policy and program documents. They have in the past received little guidance from senior military officers, and usually none from the civilians in the Department of Defense. (page 16)

The Commanders in Chief (CINC's) of the operational commands also reflected this fact in their comments to the Chairman's Special Study Group:

> The CINCs sometimes get fuzzy guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCs recognize that JCS guidance must be based on OSD guidance that may itself tend to lack certain specifics; but it is virtually impossible for a military commander to deal with a military mission that depends on guidance objectives such as 'deter', or 'dissuade'. (page 34)

The absence of civilian guidance clearly undermines the entire contingency planning process and may encourage senior military officials, including the Service Chiefs, to devote limited time to it.

c. Inadequate Quality of the OJCS Staff

The inadequate quality of the OJCS staff has been previously discussed. This deficiency is mentioned here because OJCS staff officers seldom have the credentials to be effective joint planners.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

Throughout the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —a period spanning over 40 years —there have been at least 20 major studies and proposals on the organization of the U.S. military establishment, all of which have recommended some changes in the JCS. In addition, a host of individual studies and proposals for reform have originated from scholars and retired military officers. Few of these countless proposals and recommendations have been taken seriously, and an even smaller number have actually been adopted. The JCS remains substantially the same institution that was first established formally in 1947. The few changes that have occurred —such as those instituted in 1958 and 1984 —did not alter the fundamental nature of the institution.

In this section, possible solutions to problem areas of the JCS system are described. It should be noted that the options presented in this section to solve a problem area may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1—INADEQUATE UNIFIED MILITARY ADVICE

Proposals to correct this problem area can be grouped into three categories: (1) remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice; (2) enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman; and (3) make other changes to enhance the prospects for useful and timely unified military advice. Within these three categories, a total of 12 options have been developed.

a. remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

The dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs have proven to be a major impediment to the formulation of useful and timely unified military advice. Accordingly, options to eliminate the inherent conflict of interest of these dual responsibilities are worthy of careful consideration. Should a proposal to remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice be adopted, it may be necessary to ensure that Service representation on the Defense Resources Board be made a permanent feature of that decision-making council.

○ Option 1A —establish a Joint Military Advisory Council

This option proposes the replacement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a Joint Military Advisory Council. This council would have the same responsibilities as are now assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in section 141 of title 10, United States Code. Under this option, however, the Service Chiefs would no longer have responsibilities for providing unified military advice. Instead, they would dedicate all their time to serving as the military leaders of their Services.

The JCS Chairman would become the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council. In addition to the Chairman, the council would consist of a 4-star military officer from each Service. These officers should have had substantial joint experience, preferably having served a tour as a commander of a unified or specified command. Service on the Joint Military Advisory Council would be the final tour of duty for all members. To provide the necessary continuity, one of the members of the council would be designated as the Deputy Chairman. The Chairman and his Deputy would be from different Service pairs: one would be from the Army or Air Force and the other from the Navy or Marine Corps.

Proposals to create a military advisory council are not new. General Omar N. Bradley, USA, then JCS Chairman, recommended in 1952 the creation of a National Military Council consisting of military elder statesmen from each of the Services. In his book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, published in 1959, General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Retired) recommended the establishment of a Supreme Military Council, consisting of a 4-star officer from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. (page 176) In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services during December 1982, General Taylor reiterated this recommendation, calling for the formation of a National Military Council. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 33) The 1960 Symington Report recommended the establishment of "a group of senior officers from all Services to be known as the Military Advisory Council." (page 13) More recently, the Steadman Report carefully examined the option of establishing a body of National Military Advisers. In 1982, General Meyer, USA, recommended the formation of a National Military Advisory Council.

◦ Option 1B —establish a Chief of the Joint Staff

This option envisions the disestablishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the redesignation of the JCS Chairman as the Chief of the Joint Staff. The Chief of the Joint Staff would serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. He would be assisted in these duties by the Joint Staff which would be responsible to him alone. In addition, a 4-star military officer from a different pair of Services than the Chief of the Joint Staff would serve as a Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff.

Proposals to create such a position have been put forth under a number of different titles: (1) Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Collins Plan in 1945); (2) Chief of Staff, National Command Authority (General Taylor); and (3) Chief of Combined Military Staff (Secretary Brown). Despite these different titles, all of these proposals would make a single officer the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

b. enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman

The second category of options to correct the problem of inadequate unified military advice is actions to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman. The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 has already made a number of changes to title 10, United States Code, that will serve to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman. These changes were:

- the JCS Chairman is to act as the spokesman of the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements;
- the JCS Chairman is to determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided; and
- the JCS Chairman is to select officers to be assigned to the Joint Staff.

While these changes do provide some increase in the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, they are insufficient, by themselves, to correct the problem of inadequate unified military advice. Accordingly, additional options to strengthen the role of the JCS Chairman are presented in this subsection.

Beyond options presented in this subsection to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, there are options presented in other portions of this study that would potentially have this effect. These include: (1) the JCS Chairman's role in the chain of command which is addressed in Chapter 5 dealing with the unified and specified commands; and (2) the JCS Chairman's influence over officer promotions and assignments which are addressed in the following subsection dealing with the problem of the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff.

- Option 1C —designate the JCS Chairman as a statutory member of the National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) has four statutory members: the President, Vice President, and Secretaries of State and Defense. Like the Director of Central Intelligence, the JCS Chairman serves as an advisor to the NSC. In that capacity, he attends NSC meetings at the invitation of the President. Appointing the JCS Chairman to full statutory NSC membership would be designed to (1) enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman; and (2) ensure that military advice is directly provided to the NSC.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983 (H.R. 3718), passed by the House of Representatives during the 98th Congress, included a provision that would make the JCS Chairman a statutory NSC member. The rationale for this provision in the report accompanying H.R. 3718 is:

> This measure is intended to ensure that joint military advice, the corporate advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the individual advice of the chairman, receives a full hearing before national security issues are decided. (page 8)

- Option 1D —authorize the JCS Chairman to provide the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense with military advice in his own right

At present, the JCS Chairman lacks statutory authority to formally present his own views on military issues. He can speak for the JCS when they agree; however, in the case of disagreement, he must present the various views of the Service Chiefs. The JCS Chairman does privately convey his own views when requested by higher authority. By formally recognizing what is now informally done, this option seeks to encourage the JCS Chairman to spend less time accommodating the views of the individual Services and more time developing his own views.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman would be able to state his own views independent of the JCS corporate position or the views of the Service Chiefs. If the JCS Chairman is to enjoy more influence, it is important that he be specifically authorized to develop and advance his own views.

- Option 1E —authorize the JCS Chairman to independently manage the Joint Staff

Section 143(c) of title 10 provides:

> ...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the Joint Staff and its Director, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under this provision, the Joint Staff reports to the corporate JCS and not to the JCS Chairman.

This option would alter this reporting relationship. The Chairman would be given authority to bypass the Service Chiefs and direct the Joint Staff to prepare position papers independent of any Service perspective. The Joint Staff would work only for the Chairman and would be responsible only to him in preparing papers in support of the joint perspective presumably embodied in his person.

- Option 1F —establish the position of Deputy JCS Chairman

Currently, the JCS Chairman is the only senior civilian or military official in DoD without a deputy. This option would create a four-star billet for a Deputy or Vice JCS Chairman who would assume the authority of the Chairman whenever he was out of Washington (which is quite often). This would give the Chairman an additional ally within the JCS who was independent of any Service, and it would enable him to sustain greater continuity and control in integrating Service policies. Most proposals for a Deputy JCS Chairman assume that he would be sixth in order of protocol behind the JCS Chairman and the Service Chiefs, though an even more forceful arrangement would be to make him the second-ranking U.S. military officer.

Under this option, the JCS Chairman and the Deputy JCS Chairman would be military officers from different Service pairs. For example, if the JCS Chairman were an Army or Air Force officer, the Deputy Chairman would be from the Navy or Marine Corps.

- Option 1G —authorize a 5-star grade for the position of JCS Chairman

Section 142(c) of title 10, United States Code, provides in part:

> While holding office, the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] outranks all other officers of the armed forces.

There is no confusion about this statutory provision.

Despite clarity concerning his order of rank, the JCS Chairman has limited authority, power, and influence. This option would seek to enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman by making him the only 5-star officer in the U.S. Armed Forces during peacetime.

c. make other changes to enhance the prospects for useful and timely unified military advice

While the most forceful options to correct the problem of inadequate unified military advice involve (1) removing the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified advice or (2) enhancing the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, there are a number of other changes that could be made to improve the performance of the JCS system. One of these options (Option 1I) would be relevant only if the Service Chiefs remained part of the JCS system. The other four options would be appropriate regardless of whatever fundamental changes are made to the JCS system.

- Option 1H —lessen the pressures for unanimity in JCS advice

The JCS labor to produce a unanimous position on issues that they address. This may result from the requirement that the JCS Chairman inform the Secretary of Defense "of those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed." (section 142(b) of title 10) Alternatively, the JCS may be responding to internal pressures based upon their view that a unanimous position will carry more weight with higher authority. Whatever the case, the JCS do a disservice to senior civilian decision-makers when they fail to present the full range of relevant, alternative courses of action.

The pressures for unanimity could be lessened by amending title 10, United States Code, to specify that one of the responsibilities of the JCS is to inform higher authority of all legitimate alternatives. The JCS system is an advisory, not a decision-making system. When the JCS offer only one recommendation to higher authority, they, in essence, become the decision-makers. This option would amend title 10 to ensure that the JCS remains an advisory body.

- Option 11 —remove barriers to effective interactions with the JCS system, especially for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

DoD Directive 5100.1 "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," specifies that the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense." (page 4) In implementing this function, DoD Directive 5158.1, "Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense", assigns the following responsibilities:

> C. To insure that planning and operations will be of the highest order:
>
> > 1. All elements of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall cooperate fully and effectively with appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In all stages of important staff studies, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall avail itself of the views and special skills in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As a normal procedure, specialized data necessary for the preparation of such studies will be obtained from or through the appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
> >
> > 2. The Directors of the various Directorates of the Joint Staff shall maintain active liaison with appropriate offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This shall include, but not be limited to, the exchange of information, interchange of technical advice, and guidance for mutual benefit. The heads of offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall maintain similar liaison and make representatives available to meet formally or informally with appropriate members of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> F. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall have the authority and responsibility for:
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> > 5. Arranging for the provision of military advice to all offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (pages 2–4)

DoD Directive 5158.1 envisions a close, cooperative relationship between OJCS and OSD. This relationship has failed to develop. OJCS has, for the most part, traditionally viewed OSD as an adversary, and has held the Secretary's civilian staff at arms' length. This is due, at least in part, to the closed staff characteristics of the JCS system. However, the major cause of these poor relations is the JCS view of their independence from OSD. The *Report of the*

Blue Ribbon Defense Panel comments on this different JCS perception of their role:

> ...A fundamental problem in an earlier period, no longer as severe but still quite apparent, pertains to the view that the JCS hold of themselves vis-a-vis OSD. They have tended to conceive of their role to the Secretary of Defense quite differently from the rest of OSD charged with advising the Secretary of Defense on other aspects of defense policy. The JCS still seem to assume an autonomy and to view the relationship to the Secretary of Defense as one of separateness compared with other OSD agencies. They have always made a point of setting themselves apart from the rest of OSD. They stress their legal obligation to be independent military advisors, and imply that this stance is not compatible with total subordination to OSD. They feel, in short, more of an independent agency than the rest of OSD. It took many years for the JCS to begin to accept the obligation that they should basically serve the Secretary of Defense, are responsive to his interests and concerns, and should provide him with advice and analysis that is specifically relevant to his needs and his wishes. The advice they have offered has often been designed primarily to serve their interests rather than his. (Appendix N, page 8)

In his paper, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," John G. Kester notes the same attitude in the JCS system:

> ...Many in the joint staff probably still see the JCS as a semi-autonomous fiefdom rather than an integral part of the defense bureaucracy. Agencies outside the Department of Defense often seem to view the JCS the same way. (page 7)

To preserve this autonomy, the JCS have continually fought to maintain a status independent of OSD. Paul Hammond's discussion of this effort is noted in Chapter 3. Kester also notes this JCS objective:

> ...In 1958 the JCS successfully averted a plan to include language in a DoD directive which would have described the JCS as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," footnote, page 7)

As previously noted in this report, the JCS system is much more open now than during World War II and the immediate post-war period. However, the JCS system has retained too much of a "closed staff" character to effectively fulfill its role as the Secretary of Defense's "military staff". As the Chairman's Special Study Group noted in 1982:

> ...In short, the JCS and the Joint Staff could be much more the 'military staff' of the Secretary than they are now. (page 12)

The concern is not focused on the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS system. The Secretary can through perseverance break down barriers between himself and the JCS system. The real problem arises from the relatively limited interaction between OJCS and OSD. The dialogue between the Secretary's military and civilian staffs is insufficient to be able to effectively serve the Secretary of Defense.

This option proposes that barriers to effective OJCS —OSD interactions be removed. Actions to achieve this objective could include:

- specifying in statute the desired relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and between OJCS and OSD;
- making OJCS part of OSD;
- requiring a greater degree of cooperation and coordination between various Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Directors of Joint Staff functional areas;
- increasing the use of OJCS —OSD working groups;
- removing physical barriers, such as the restricted access to OJCS work areas, that impede OJCS —OSD staff interactions; the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* criticized restricted access to JCS areas in the following terms:

> The JCS, by restricting access to all their space, have tended to inhibit the interchange that should take place between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (pages 178 and 179)

- providing for increased OSD oversight and review of the output of the Joint Operation Planning System; and
- increasing the flow of information between OJCS and OSD.

- Option 1J —strengthen the requirement for joint experience for promotion to Service Chief of Staff

As previously noted, the Service Chiefs have dual responsibilities: military leaders of their Services and JCS members. In selecting Service Chiefs, too much emphasis has been placed on their credentials for the former role and too little for the latter role. The Service Chiefs have been prepared by their careers to lead their Services. Their level of experience on joint matters is too limited to justify their assumption of responsibilities as JCS members.

This option proposes that a specified level of joint experience be established as an absolute requirement for promotion to Service Chief of Staff.

- Option 1K —authorize the JCS Chairman to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff

Many studies of DoD organization have concluded that changes to OJCS staffing procedures would improve the effectiveness of the JCS system. Suggested changes include:

- require that joint papers be authored by Joint Staff action officers (Chairman's Special Study Group);
- provide more guidance from senior OJCS levels prior to formal staffing (Steadman Report and Chairman's Special Study Group);
- require that joint papers be organized to present alternatives (Steadman Report and Chairman's Special Study Group);
- require the Joint Staff to merely include differing Service views in joint papers rather than requiring coordination (Steadman Report); and

- reduce Service staff involvement in joint papers to providing information and advice and then only at the request of the Joint Staff (Chairman's Special Study Group).

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman be given authority to specify the OJCS staff procedures. He would be able to implement any of the above suggestions or alternative approaches that would enhance the quality, utility, and objectivity of OJCS staff work.

This option would be a logical extension of Option 1E which proposes that the JCS Chairman be authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff.

- Option 1L —substantially reduce the Service staffs who work on joint matters

The Chairman's Special Study Group indicates that there are at least 675 officers assigned to Service staffs whose principal or part-time responsibilities are in support of their Service Chiefs in joint activities. (page 45) This is nearly equal to the number of military officers serving in OJCS. The Chairman's Special Study Group comments on this situation:

> ...Counting the Service staffs, there are really five staffs engaged in Joint activities in support of the Chiefs, not one. Much of the work they do is redundant, with the several staffs analyzing the same issues in parallel....The Service Chiefs depend on their own Service staffs to prepare them for JCS meetings. They are seldom briefed by officers on the Joint Staff, and have relatively little interaction with them. (page 58)

Elsewhere in the same report, Joint Staff members made the following statement:

> ...The Chiefs get most of their preparation on Joint issues from their own Service staffs, which hardly grants them a Joint orientation. (page 35)

This option proposes that the Service staff who may work full or part time on joint matters would be limited to not more than 25 military officers for each Service. This option has three objectives: (1) free the OJCS staff from the substantial Service constraints that currently inhibit consideration of the joint perspective; (2) eliminate the redundancy in OJCS and Service staff work; and (3) force the Service Chiefs to rely primarily on the OJCS staff on joint matters. The last objective is in line with one of the recommendations of the Chairman's Special Study Group:

> Require the Joint Staff to brief, interact with, and prepare the Service Chiefs for JCS meetings, and to support the Chiefs generally in the resolution of the Joint issues they address. (page 68)

If either Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council) or Option 1B (Chief of the Joint Staff) were implemented, substantially reducing the Service staffs who work on joint matters would be an automatic extension of these options.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 made a number of changes to title 10, United States Code, which were designed to help improve the quality of the Joint Staff:

- the JCS Chairman is to select officers to be assigned to the Joint Staff;
- the restrictions on the tenure of the Director of the Joint Staff and his reassignment to the Joint Staff in peacetime were removed;
- the Secretary of Defense was required to ensure that military promotion, retention, and assignment policies give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff;
- the 3-year limitation on service on the Joint Staff was increased to 4 years; and
- officers may be reassigned to the Joint Staff after 2 years instead of 3 years, and the Secretary of Defense is authorized to approve exceptions to this limitation.

While these changes do provide the potential to improve the quality of the Joint Staff, they are insufficient, by themselves, to provide the desired quality of Joint Staff officers. Accordingly, additional options to attain this objective are presented in this subsection. Moreover, these additional options have been broadened, where appropriate, to address the entire OJCS staff in some cases and the entire joint duty community in others.

Options to improve the quality of the OJCS staff and other joint duty staffs can be grouped into three categories: (1) change promotion policies to increase interest in OJCS and other joint assignments; (2) improve the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments; and (3) provide for improved personnel management of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments. Within these categories, a total of ten options have been developed.

a. change promotion policies to increase interest in joint assignments

Three options involving promotion policies have been developed. The first option is designed to protect officers assigned to OJCS duty in future promotions and assignments. The other two options are designed to provide promotion incentives for joint assignments and, thereby, raise the quality of officers assigned to joint duties.

- Option 2A —give the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotion and assignment of officers who are serving or have served in OJCS

As long as the Services retain absolute control over the promotions and assignments of those officers who are serving or have served in OJCS, such officers will have strong incentives to comply with their parent Services' positions in their joint work.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman have a representative on all promotion boards that would review candidates with prior or current OJCS service. In addition, the OJCS would establish procedures for monitoring assignments of officers with OJCS experience. Should the JCS Chairman find that an officer's assignments have been negatively influenced by his joint duty, he should seek to have this situation corrected by the Service Chief. Failing in such an effort, the Chairman should be authorized to bring the issue to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 2B —strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank

DoD Directive 1320.5, "Assignment to Duty with Joint, Combined, Allied and Office of the Secretary of Defense Staffs", provides:

> ...a requirement is established that all officers... will serve a normal tour of duty with a Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD Staff before being considered qualified for promotion to general or flag officer rank. (page 1)

This directive does provide for a waiver of this requirement, subject to approval of the appropriate Service Secretary.

The current Directive is widely circumvented by liberal waivers and by the broadest possible interpretation of what constitutes joint service. This loophole could be closed either by legislation or by directive of the Secretary of Defense (the latter clearly being preferable).

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman specify the assignments that will meet the requirement for Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD staff duty. Furthermore, this option would grant authority only to the Secretary of Defense to waive this requirement upon the recommendation of a Service Secretary.

- Option 2C —require the JCS Chairman to evaluate all nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions on the basis of their performance in joint duty assignments

H.R. 3718, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983, included this option as one of its provisions. H.R. 3718 would require the JCS Chairman to submit such evaluations to the President. The rationale for such a requirement is presented in the report (H.R. Report No. 98-382) accompanying H.R. 3718:

> Because the demands and complexity of Joint Staff work require talented and dedicated officers, the committee is convinced that performance at the Joint Staff level should be considered a mark of distinction deserving special attention by promotion boards. (page 8)

b. improve the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments

The House Committee on Armed Services Report 98-691 accompanying the Department of Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1985 requested a DoD report (with supporting studies by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on alternatives to improve the capabilities of joint duty officers. This reporting requirement and the report of the Chairman's Special Study Group in April 1982 have increased attention on the issue of the preparation and experience levels of officers serving in joint duty assignments.

In his December 24, 1984 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense forwarding the JCS supporting study to fulfill the congressional reporting requirement, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, states that considerable progress has been made since April 1982 in improving the capabilities of joint-duty officers. He cites the following:

> An annual 8-week CAPSTONE course for newly selected general/flag officers was implemented in 1983. [The CAPSTONE curriculum is designed to enhance understanding of key factors and issues influencing the planning for and employment of U.S. military forces in joint and combined operations.]. A joint policy document on PME [Professional Military Education] recently developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff focuses on objectives and policies for NDU [National Defense University] and the Service schools. The document provides guidance and objectives for all officer education programs at the primary, intermediate, senior, and general and flag officer level. Goals for the use of Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) graduates have been established effective CY [Calendar Year] 1985. Assignment of AFSC graduates to joint-duty billets has increased steadily from 36 percent in 1982 to 63 percent in 1984. A Joint Staff Officers Training System currently under development will provide computer-based instruction in 25 topic areas for officers assigned to the Joint Staff. This course will be exportable to the unified commands and other joint activities. Inter-Service education and exchange programs have experienced modest growth in recent years. During the coming year, the Services will explore the feasibility of establishing a joint skill identifier for officers with joint-duty education and training or experience, of expanding their inter-Service education programs, and of adding a second general and flag officer CAPSTONE course each year.

These developments will help to improve the preparation and experience levels of joint duty officers. By themselves, these developments will provide only modest improvements. Accordingly, five options for expanding this trend are presented. The first involves increased cross-Service assignments for military officers. The second proposes the development of a personnel management system to ensure that the graduates of joint colleges actually serve in joint duty assignments. The third option would authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation. The fourth and fifth options involve the creation of a joint duty career path.

○ Option 2D —increase the number of cross-Service assignments of military officers

The Chairman's Special Study Group recommended this option:

> In another step designed to reflect greater awareness of Joint needs, a program should be established for increasing the frequency of cross-Service assignments aimed at improving the awareness within each Service of the characteristics, traditions, capabilities, and problems of the other Services. (page 70)

This option would be designed to give military officers a broader vision than just that of their own Service. This would clearly be of value in preparing officers for joint duty. At the same time, cross-Service experience would also be useful in Service assignments.

The following table shows the current number of cross-Service assignments of military officers.

DISTRIBUTION OF INTER-SERVICE EXCHANGES[a]

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Army		11	6	1	18
Navy	11		35	5	51
Air Force	6	34		6	46
Marine Corps	1	5	6		12
Total	18	50	47	12	127

[a] Source is a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated December 24, 1984, subject: "Study on Improving the Capabilities of Joint-Duty Officers", page F-2.

- ○ Option 2E —establish a personnel management system to ensure that joint college graduates actually serve in joint duty assignments

Currently, there is no personnel management system that ensures that graduates of the three joint colleges of the National Defense University (NDU) —the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), National War College (NWC), and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) —actually serve in joint duty assignments. As these colleges are to be the source of education for joint duty, their utility is diminished if graduates do not enter joint assignments.

Data on assignments of AFSC graduates show the following percentages of officers initially assigned joint duty positions:

1982	36 percent
1983	40 percent
1984	63 percent

This substantial increase is attributed to the attention placed on this issue by the Chairman's Special Study Group. On May 11, 1984, the JCS established a goal of 50 percent of AFSC graduates to receive first assignments in joint duty positions. This goal is to be applied to graduating classes beginning in 1985. In addition, the JCS have encouraged the Services to achieve a goal by 1990 of assigning 75 percent of AFSC graduates to joint duty.

The increase of AFSC graduates assigned to joint duty is not as the above figures indicate. In making these calculations, the definition of joint duty includes in-Service positions that have a "joint interface." For example, in 1984, the Navy met the goal of assigning 50 percent of AFSC graduates to joint duty; however, half of these assignments were joint interface billets within the Department of the Navy. (Letter to Senator Goldwater from Secretary Weinberger, May 16, 1985, page 14) As the following table shows, only 37 percent of AFSC graduates in 1984 received non-Service, joint assignments.

While progress has been made with respect to AFSC graduates, the issue of assignments of graduates of the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) have not been addressed. For 1984, only 17 percent of NWC and 15 percent of ICAF graduates were assigned to joint duty immediately following completion of their education. The following table shows the percentage of NDU graduates in 1984 who received various joint and Service assignments.

ASSIGNMENTS OF NDU GRADUATES IN 1984[a, b]

[In percent]

	OJCS	Unified or combined command	Defense activity	Outside DoD	Service
NWC	6	3	6	2	83
ICAF	1	3	6	4	85
AFSC	5	18	14	([c])	63

[a] Does not include civilians, Reserve establishment officers, or Regular officers without an assignment at the time the data were prepared.

[b] Source is letter to Senator Goldwater from Secretary Weinberger, May 16, 1985, page 15.

[c] Less than one percent.

Based upon this situation, Secretary Weinberger has directed that the following actions be taken:

1. Strengthen they policy on assignment of NDU graduates;
2. The basic policy will:
   a. Cover all NDU schools;
   b. Encourage the Services to plan the selection of students based on the best estimate of joint requirements;
   c. Include the idea that the first assignment consideration for a graduate should be joint duty;
   d. Not count in-Service assignments as equivalent to a joint tour for reporting purposes;
   e. Recognize that it is important to assign NDU graduates to key billets within their own Military Service;
   f. Eliminate the percentage goal and substitute a goal of increasing the number of officers going to joint and intergovernmental activities;
   g. Require the Services to emphasize the assignment of former NDU graduates to joint activities regardless of whether the officers were previously assigned to a joint activity;
   h. Include an adequate system to report information on the first assignment of officers graduating from NDU. (Letter to Senator Goldwater from Secretary Weinberger, May 16, 1985, page 16)

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman would establish a personnel management system to implement Secretary Weinberger's policy decisions which are designed to ensure that the full benefit of education at all three joint colleges is realized. While this management system would focus on initial assignments, it should also provide a formal procedure for monitoring subsequent assignments of NDU graduates.

- Option 2F —authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation

In the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, the length of possible tours of service on the Joint Staff by military officers was increased from 3 years to 4 years. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense be authorized to extend the tours of Joint Staff officers beyond 4 years. The objectives of this option would be to retain military officers who have substantial joint duty experience and improve continuity within the Joint Staff.

- Option 2G —establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty

In 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group recommended the establishment in each Service of a joint duty career specialty open to selected officers in the grade of 0-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) and above. Such officers would be nominated by the Service Chiefs and approved by the Chairman, both for selection in the specialty and for later assignments to joint duty positions. (page 69) This recommendation was endorsed in the CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*. (page 15)

Appendix E of the Chairman's Special Study Group describes this option in detail. Appropriate portions of that appendix are presented here:

> ...Service officers at the 0-4, 0-5, or even higher level, evidencing a talent and desire for Joint Staff work, would apply for assignment to the Joint-duty specialty. Upon acceptance, their assignments, education, and career patterns would be steered by their Service personnel management systems toward Joint duty, though from time to time they would be assigned to field positions in their parent Services to maintain currency.
>
> Not all Joint positions would be filled by such officers. Officers not in the career specialty would continue to serve on the Joint Staff and in the Unified Command headquarters as they do now. The mix would be decided by the Chairman and the Chiefs. If 50% of the officer positions in Joint headquarters eventually were filled by officers in the new specialty, about 2,300 positions would be involved at any given time. If, in turn, officers in the specialty spent about half of their time in Joint assignments, a group of about 5,000 officers in the specialty would be needed in a steady-state situation.
>
> ...While this initiative can properly be viewed by the Services as incremental in an organization sense since it would be phased over a period of years, it would be a fundamental change for officers actually selected. The personnel management implications would be far-reaching. Grade structure, career patterns, promotion opportunities, and a host of other issues would have to be planned with care. A personnel management office in the Joint Staff (a true "J-1") would be

needed to work with the Services in handling position management and personnel support. The Chairman would need to have a role in selecting the officers and in helping to assure that officers in the Joint-duty specialty (including those of flag rank) received their fair share of promotions and key assignments. An important step in this regard would be to appoint a senior officer from a Joint headquarters to sit on each Service promotion board involving the selection of officers to the rank of 0-5 or above, and to furnish each such promotion board with clear guidance concerning the need for fair treatment of officers in the Joint-duty specialty. Officers would have to have evidence that if they excelled in the Joint-duty specialty they would have at least as good an opportunity to be promoted as their contemporaries, and indeed could aspire to four-star rank.

Training for the Joint-duty specialty would begin at the Armed Forces Staff College. Its curriculum is designed to provide such training for officers at the 0-3 and 0-4 levels. There is now no systematic means for assuring that AFSC graduates ever get to Joint duty assignments. That would be changed to be consistent with the development of the career field.[1]

Formal training would continue for selected officers at the 0-5 and Junior 0-6 level at either the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As with the AFSC, priority would be placed on making sure that NWC and ICAF graduates actually serve in Joint duty, and that officers destined for Joint duty, if selected for senior service college, are sent to NWC or ICAF.

The schools themselves would give greater emphasis to preparing officers for Joint duty. The NWC would emphasize preparation for Joint and combined planning and operations. Likewise, the ICAF would emphasize Joint planning and management of mobilization and deployment. Both schools would limit their emphasis on generalized studies of the politico-military environment and instead concentrate on preparing officers for near-term Joint assignments. Because so few officers have professional familiarity with their sister Services, assuring that officers on the Joint Staff and in other Joint headquarters have a broader comprehension of the nation's Armed Services would be an important objective for NDU.

A high percentage of the graduates of the Joint schools would be assigned to Joint duties, either immediately upon graduation or in an early subsequent tour. While the Services would find personnel management difficulties in meeting such goals, there are two important facts to bear in mind: First, effective Joint duty is vital to the nation's security interests, and so the preparation of officers so assigned should be taken as seriously as, say, pilot training; second, because it costs from $25,000 to $75,000 or more to send an officer through AFSC (5-month course) or NDU (10-month course), these schools should not be treated simply as alternatives to their Service "equivalent" schools. These are Joint schools; they are costly, and they have little justification if not so used. This is not to say that some graduates should not be assigned to Service staff positions, only that a plan should be developed that explicitly responds to the needs of the Joint community. (pages E-2 through E-5)

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[1] Consideration might be given to revision of the AFSC curriculum to aim it at slightly more senior officers in order to make it possible for an officer in the Joint-duty specialty to attend *both* the command and general staff college (or equivalent) of his parent Service and the AFSC.

- Option 2H —establish a General Staff in place of the current Joint Staff

Section 143(d) of title 10, United States Code, provides in part:

> The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.

A longstanding American aversion to the concept of a General Staff led to the enactment of the above prohibition as part of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. While American hostility to the General Staff concept pre-dated World War II, it intensified considerably during the war and the immediate postwar period. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. Army employed a General Staff concept beginning in 1903. The Army's General Staff was authorized by the Congress in the General Staff Act of 1903.

Despite this hostility, a number of former DoD officials have recently spoken out either in favor of a General Staff or in efforts to clarify misconceptions about this staff concept. Among them are two former Secretaries of Defense, Dr. Harold Brown and Dr. James R. Schlesinger. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Secretary Schlesinger sought to counter the American antipathy to the General Staff concept:

> ...At the close of World War II, we sought, above all, to avoid the creation of a dominating general staff —reflecting a fear of the German General Staff, that revealed both a misreading of history and a susceptibility to our own wartime propaganda. Whatever the paramount position of Ludendorff in Imperial Germany during World War I, the German General Staff in World War II had little power to control or influence Hitler's regime. Moreover, the issue was quite separate from that of unification, for the German General Staff controlled only Germany's ground forces. In any event those concerns, whether real or invented, bear little relevance to the conditions of today and bear all the earmarks of another era. (Part 5, pages 186 and 187)

Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) defines a General Staff as follows in his book, *A Genius for War*:

> A General Staff is a highly trained, carefully selected group of military generalists whose function in peace or war is to assist the nation's military leadership —or a general commanding a field force of combined arms elements —in planning, controlling, directing, coordinating, and supervising the activities of all military subordinate elements in the most effective possible, mutually supporting efforts to achieve an assigned goal or objective, or in maximum readiness to under-

> take such efforts. The leader or leadership makes decisions and gives commands; the General Staff's responsibility is to provide all possible support to assure that the decisions and commands are timely, sound, and effective. (page 48)

This option proposes a General Staff concept with the following elements:

- a General Staff would be created in place of the current Joint Staff and would perform the same duties;
- the General Staff would be drawn from all of the Services with selection to be made at the 0-3 (Captain or Navy Lieutenant) or 0-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) level;
- candidates for the General Staff would be nominated by the Service Chiefs, but would be selected by the JCS Chairman after a rigorous screening process;
- once selected, an officer would remain a member of the General Staff for the remainder of his or her career;
- the General Staff would be responsible to the JCS Chairman alone;
- the JCS Chairman, under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, would have responsibility for promotions of General Staff officers;
- General Staff officers would rotate between General Staff positions and assignments with field forces of their parent Services to maintain currency;
- the National Defense University would revise the curricula of its three joint colleges to better meet the educational needs of the General Staff; and
- General Staff officers would be eligible for selection for major joint commands such as commander of a unified or specified command.

Individual supporters of a General Staff system would undoubtedly disagree with some of these elements. Some would go further, advocating a far-reaching overhaul of the military academies and other training programs, as well as earlier selection of General Staff officers. Others might not go as far. The common thread of unity in all General Staff proposals is that an elite group of officers whose career path is divorced from any one Service should be established so that it can execute critical staff functions with greater objectivity and independence.

It would be useful to briefly compare Option 2G (Joint Duty Specialty) and Option 2H (General Staff), both of which involve the creation of a joint duty career path. There are only two fundamental differences: (1) promotion authority over officers in the joint duty career path; and (2) the extent to which the Joint Staff or General Staff would be comprised of joint duty careerists. Option 2G would retain promotion authority in the parent Services while providing the JCS Chairman with some input on promotions. In contrast, Option 2H would place promotion authority in the hands of JCS Chairman.

On the second difference, Option 2G proposes that only 50 percent of Joint Staff officers would be joint duty careerists. Under

Option 2H, all officers serving on the General Staff would be dedicated to joint duty careers.

c. provide for improved personnel management of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments

Two options have been developed in this category. The first deals only with OJCS. It proposes that the distinction between the Joint Staff and other military officers serving in OJCS be eliminated in order to provide for improved personnel management. The second option would authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty.

- ○ Option 2I —remove the distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS military officers and eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff

The distinction between the 400 military officers serving on the Joint Staff and the 350 military officers serving elsewhere in OJCS inhibits effective personnel management. It would be more useful to eliminate this artificial distinction and manage all OJCS military officers under the same policies.

Section 143(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, specifies:

> There is under the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Staff consisting of not more than 400 officers selected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff is a part of the larger office, entitled Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), that works for the JCS. There is no statutory restriction on the size of OJCS which had an authorized strength of 1,444 military and civilian personnel at the end of 1983.

The adjustable personnel framework provided by OJCS alleviates the management problems caused by the limit of 400 officers on the size of the Joint Staff. Nonetheless, removing the artificial constraint on the Joint Staff would provide the JCS greater flexibility in organizing and tasking the entire staff which works for them.

This option proposes that the statutory restrictions on the size of the Joint Staff be eliminated. Removing this limit was one of the provisions of the legislative proposal submitted by DoD. The forwarding letter for this proposal dated April 18, 1983 provides the following rationale:

> ...In the context of a continuously increasing workload, greater demands for sophisticated military planning, and the organization of our combatant forces into unified and specified commands, arbitrary numerical limitations are no longer appropriate. In the case of the Joint Staff, as well as other assignments to duty, the goal should be the wisest use of military manpower among competing requirements, with due recognition to the increasingly joint utilization of personnel in the combatant commands.

Should this option be enacted, there would be no reason to retain the distinction between the Joint Staff and OJCS. Accordingly, all personnel working for the JCS would comprise the Joint Staff. As such, all provisions enacted as part of the DoD Authorization Act, 1985 referring to the Joint Staff would apply to what has been previously termed the OJCS staff.

- Option 2J —authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty

The problems for military officers caused by joint duty assignments are similar regardless of the specific joint organization in which they serve. Previous discussions of these problems as well as proposed solutions have focused on the Joint Staff which is clearly the most visible of all joint duty assignments. The Joint Staff, however, represents less than 5 percent of all military officers serving in joint duty assignments.

This option proposes that the JCS Chairman be authorized to manage all military officers assigned to joint duty. This would cover the roughly 9,000 officers who are serving in non-Service positions. Most of these assignments are in joint military organizations (OJCS, unified command headquarters, NATO commands). However, positions in various civilian organizations —OSD and the Defense Agencies —would also be involved. In this latter case, the JCS Chairman would act as executive agent for the Secretary of Defense.

In administering this personnel management system, the JCS Chairman would have the major influence on (1) selection of officers; (2) promotions and assignments; (3) education and training; (4) tour lengths; and (5) reassignment to joint duty. He would be expected to maintain close liaison with the unified commanders to ensure that their personnel requirements were being met. In addition, it would be logical for the JCS Chairman to play a more forceful role in managing the three joint colleges of the National Defense University.

3. PROBLEM AREA #3—INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

Many of the options proposed to solve the first two OJCS problem areas may indirectly ameliorate this third problem area. If Service dominance of the JCS system were lessened, important joint tasks, such as review and oversight of contingency plans, may receive more attention. Likewise, improving the quality of the OJCS staff would increase the likelihood that officers with strong joint planning credentials would be assigned to work on contingency plans.

Two specific options for correcting the problem of insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans have been developed. The first option proposes the annual preparation of a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning. The second option suggests the development of a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans.

- Option 3A —require that the Secretary of Defense annually promulgate a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning

This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense annually provide guidance to the JCS and operational commanders to be used as the basis for contingency planning. This guidance should include: (1) crisis situations for which plans must be prepared; (2) domestic and international political constraints; (3) other planning assumptions; (4) broad policy guidance including a clear statement of U.S. interests; and (5) an indication of the range of options that should be developed. This document could be modeled on the Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning issued by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in 1980.

- Option 3B —develop a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans

In the Fall of 1978, DoD conducted an exercise of a major war plan for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. This exercise, entitled Nifty Nugget, was highly beneficial. The *National Security Policy Integration* study discusses the benefits of Nifty Nugget:

> ...The exercise brought to light a number of flaws in the plans and planning process as well as weaknesses in our capability to carry out the plans. The result has been beneficial for both planning and program/budgeting. (page 35)

This option proposes that a continuing series of these major exercises be conducted. The objectives of this option would be to: (1) evaluate the quality of various contingency plans; (2) identify deficiencies in the plans; and (3) increase the level of interest in the contingency planning process.

F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

Prior to evaluating specific options, it may be useful to put the institution of the JCS into context. The report of the Chairman's Special Study Group begins with the following quote from the introduction to *Common Sense* written by Thomas Paine:

> A long habit of not thinking a thing *wrong* gives it a superficial appearance of being *right*, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom.

As the Chairman's Special Study Group implied, this situation clearly applies to the JCS. As John Kester has noted: "The JCS are a product of history, not of logic." ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", page 23) Despite this fact, there has been great reluctance and strong opposition to questioning the logic of the JCS institution.

The performance of the JCS in both war and peace clearly support a careful analysis of the institution. For example, in *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond, writing in 1961, concludes:

> ...From the vantage point of a decade and a half after the end of World War II the question can be a considerably more limited one: does its record in that war justify the confidence

> placed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a principal institution in the postwar organization of the military establishment? The answer is, quite unmistakably, that it does not.
>
> During World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked effectively in handling the larger problems of strategy and operations which were its primary *raison d'etre* only briefly and with respect to a limited range of issues. In addition, it kept its own counsel to a degree that caused considerable difficulties within the service departments and for civilian agencies whose functions were related to military strategy and operations. While its closed mode of operation was usually justified on grounds of military security, another reason was evidently the necessity which arose from its structure and situation. Its limited success, diminished by the costs which success incurred, does not justify the conclusion that World War II was a test of the JCS which established its value beyond substantial doubt. (page 185)

Dr. Lawrence J. Korb in *The Joint Chiefs of Staff* makes the same point:

> Because the United States won such an overwhelming victory in World War II, much credit was heaped upon the JCS system....
>
> However, the wartime success of the JCS was more apparent than real. During the war the chiefs reached agreement only by numerous compromises and after long delays. Moreover, coordination in material and administrative matters was incomplete and was largely forced upon the Joint Chiefs by circumstances arising from the war. The JCS functioned effectively as a strategic planning and direction agency only in the European theater from mid-1943 until May 1944. Before that time the chiefs were unable to agree on basic strategy in the light of the President's wishes. After May 1944, the JCS took a back seat to General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force. Finally, the Joint Chiefs actually had very little to do with the Pacific war. For all intents and purposes, the Navy directed the Pacific campaigns. Nevertheless, in spite of these World War II difficulties, all the postwar unification plans took the JCS as a *fait accompli*. No one apparently wanted to quarrel with success, and the only question that arose was the exact delineation of the powers of the JCS within the military establishment. (page 15)

Dr. Korb summarizes these events as follows:

> The JCS evolved accidentally in the early stages of World War II. The success of the allied war machine obscured the weaknesses of the Joint Chiefs and created false expectations for their future performance. Contrary to the intentions of some of its framers, the National Security Act and its amendments did not create a unified military establishment, and the JCS is not the cause but the reflection of that diversity. (page 179)

These historical analyses are cited not to argue that the JCS should be reformed. Their purpose is to present the case for rigorous evaluations of the JCS and alternative organizational arrangements. Such evaluations have been precluded in the past by "a formidable outcry in defense of custom."

1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE UNIFIED MILITARY ADVICE

All options that can be envisioned for an institution to provide joint military advice involve some degree of conflict of interest. Such institutions will be comprised of military officers whose careers have largely been duty in one Service. Loyalties and, in some options, formal responsibilities to their Services pose a dilemma for officers whose principal duty is to provide advice from a joint perspective. While this conflict of interest cannot be eliminated, the first two options in this subsection would considerably lessen its intensity. The conflict of interest in the current JCS arrangement is so sharp that it greatly limits the utility of the institution.

○ Option 1A —establish a Joint Military Advisory Council

The establishment of a Joint Military Advisory Council (JMAC) would substantially reduce the conflict of interest of officers serving on this senior advisory body. This council of military advisors would have the responsibility to provide the best possible joint military advice, uninhibited by Service responsibilities and pressures. Moreover, these senior advisors would be able to dedicate their full time and attention to these important duties.

Each member of the JMAC would have substantial expertise on the capabilities of his parent Service. While he would not be as knowledgeable as the Service Chief, his understanding of Service capabilities and programs would be nearly as good, particularly if the Service Chief ensured that he were fully informed on developments. Moreover, JMAC members would have a significant advantage over many Service Chiefs: they would have had substantial joint experience.

Another advantage of separating joint advisory and Service administration functions is that it would result in two positions that require very different abilities. This would facilitate the assignment of senior military officers who have the specific talents required by each position. The current "dual-hatted" position requires a combination of administrator, leader, strategist, and operational planner. Officers who are well-qualified in all of these areas are rare.

The ability of the Service Chiefs to devote their full time to Service administration and of JMAC members to devote their full time to the joint advisory role is an important feature of this option. Both of these roles require full attention; as a result, both suffer under the current arrangement. Because a Service Chief gives his greatest attention to the Service leader role, the joint advisory role is particularly shortchanged.

There are many JCS duties that are now poorly performed as discussed in detail in Section D. The ability of JMAC members to spend full time on these neglected duties could be a substantial benefit of this arrangement. In particular, JMAC members could establish close and continuous contact with the operational commanders and carefully monitor their requirements.

In sum, establishment of a JMAC would provide a powerful joint perspective to serve as a counterweight to the Service perspectives that currently dominate the joint arena.

There are numerous arguments against this option. Principal among these is the view that removing the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides joint military advice would separate responsibility and authority. Those that hold this view argue that because the Service Chiefs are responsible for organizing, equipping, manning, and training Services forces, they must be involved in the authority for the employment of those forces. As Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Retired) has argued on this issue:

> The Congress has long recognized that to separate responsibility and authority leads to an impossible system of accountability. It would result in a military establishment totally out of control. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 37)

This argument appears to have little merit. The terms "responsibility" and "authority" are used in an imprecise and confusing manner. The Service Chiefs do have responsibility and authority for organizing, equipping, manning, and training their Service forces. They are to be held fully accountable for executing these logistics responsibilities efficiently and effectively. However, the Service Chiefs, even when wearing their JCS hats, have no responsibility or authority for the employment of U.S. military forces. That responsibility and authority are assigned to the Secretary of Defense and the operational commanders. Accountability for force employment is also clearly placed with the Secretary and the combatant commanders.

In his paper, "The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) presents another dimension of the argument that it is unwise to separate responsibility and authority. In recommending that the Service Chiefs remain JCS members, General Smith argues:

> ...But many of the positions taken by the Joint Chiefs are matters of judgment involving decisions the Services must in part or in full carry out, and here broad military agreement can be most beneficial. Successful implementation is more likely if the recipients of the instructions [the Service Chiefs] have been a part of the decision process (even though their views have not completely prevailed) and are fully aware of what they are told to do. (page 14)

In essence, General Smith believes that the Service Chiefs may not understand what needs to be done or appreciate the need for fully complying with the decisions of higher authority if they are not part of the joint decision-making process.

This argument has merit to the extent that it reflects a natural bureaucratic desire to be involved in decisions by higher authority and a tendency to resist decisions in which an organization believes that it was not a full participant. By itself, this argument does not appear to have sufficient merit to justify the retention of an ineffective joint advisory body. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Service Chiefs would continue to be active participants in the Defense Resources Board where the primary issues of interest to the Services —programs and budgets —are decided.

There is great concern about one particular separation of responsibility and authority and about the lack of involvement of certain recipients of instructions. It arises, however, in connection with the unified commanders. As Chapter 5 notes, the unified commanders will be held responsible and accountable for force employment, but they have extremely limited authority to shape the capabilities of the forces under their command or ability to be heard in senior decision councils. Given that the current JCS arrangement has exacerbated these problems, the option of creating a Joint Military Advisory Council may help alleviate a critical imbalance in responsibility and authority and provide a greater level of involvement by the operational commanders.

The second major argument in opposition to this option is that a body of senior military advisors divorced from executive authority would become a "council of eunuchs" with little impact on actual decisions. General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) presents this argument as follows:

> ...Experience has shown, however, an advisory council within the joint system that does not do more than advise sees its influence diminish over time. In the early years of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Chiefs created a Joint Strategic Survey Committee, charged with advising the Chiefs on broad strategy matters, to be manned by the best and the brightest young flag and general rank officers. The Committee, with no control over resources, had substantial influence for a time; then its impact eroded and it was disbanded. There is no reason to believe that the fate of a modern-day similar advisory board would fare any better. ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", page 39)

While General Smith's description of the fate of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) is accurate, it is not clear that it is an appropriate analogy for the JMAC. The JCS may not have wanted the JSSC to provide crisp advice on matters of broad strategy for fear that it would have limited Service independence. The advice of the JMAC may, however, be highly desired by the Secretary of Defense and others. The validity of this criticism of a JMAC centers on the influence that this advisory body would have with the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. If its advice were valued by these officials, it would play a powerful role. If not, the JMAC would play only a minor role in important issues. The ultimate determinant is likely to be the quality of the advice offered.

The third negative argument is that JMAC members would quickly lose their currency on Service and other operational issues. An extension of this argument is that the separation of JMAC members from day-to-day Service activities might produce an "ivory tower" mentality. A troubling possibility is that Service officials, both military and civilian, might attempt to isolate a JMAC member from his parent Service. Obviously, JMAC members would have to devote sufficient attention to Service developments to ensure an accurate knowledge of their current status. This clearly appears to be possible. However, the Secretary of Defense would also have to play a forceful role in ensuring that JMAC members have unrestricted access to necessary Service information.

It is recognized that Service-unique inputs are required in many areas of joint planning, strategy formulation, and other advisory tasks. The vast majority of these efforts are undertaken in a deliberate manner which permits adequate time for the Joint Staff to obtain the necessary Service inputs and for the JMAC members to consult, as necessary, with the Service Chiefs.

A fourth negative argument is that the establishment of the JMAC would diffuse military influence by creating two sources of military advice: the JMAC and the Service Chiefs. According to this argument, neither source would be as powerful as the present "dual-hatted" Service Chiefs. Less powerful military advisors would have diminished influence with the President, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. As a result, the military point of view will not be adequately represented before decision-making bodies. Speaking with one voice on joint issues has always been an objective of U.S. military officials although its utility to civilian decision-makers is questionable.

There is a powerful counter-argument to this view. At present, the military voice in DoD decision-making plays a limited role because of the poor quality of advice that results from the institutional deficiencies of the present JCS system. The JMAC —capable of objective analyses of issues —could provide better advice and present a better articulation of professional military views. Such inputs are likely to carry much more weight with the Secretary of Defense and other decision-makers.

Moreover, with the current organizational arrangements, civilian decision-makers normally receive from the JCS only one recommendation for consideration. It would appear useful to have more than one recommendation offered by several sources of senior military advice.

Clearly, establishing the JMAC would create additional power centers and make some aspects of internal DoD organization more difficult. External presentation of DoD positions may also be less consistent. However, these would appear to be acceptable costs for the benefits that would result from having an objective body of senior military advisors capable of approaching issues from a national perspective.

Another negative argument is that the separation of the Service Chiefs from the joint advisory body could intensify interservice competition. The Service Chiefs would remain powerful officials even if a JMAC were created. When freed of responsibility for joint cooperation and capabilities, the Service Chiefs may pursue narrow Service interests with greater vigor. The present degree of Service cooperation might be lost. This is clearly a possibility. On the other hand, the degree of Service cooperation is currently limited by the careful protection of Service interests in the JCS system. The advice offered by the JCS is the lowest common level of assent among the four Services. The JMAC may be able to highlight opportunities for vastly improved interservice cooperation and coordination. To the extent that these opportunities affect Service interests, they will be strongly resisted. It would be the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to decide these issues and to ensure that his decisions are fully implemented.

A sixth negative argument —not related to disestablishment of the JCS but to other options for a joint advisory institution —is that the JMAC would continue to perpetuate a committee system. Those who raise this argument believe that a committee system — whatever its composition —would lead to extensive negotiations and compromises that would lessen the likelihood of crisp, clear advice for civilian decision-makers. The alternative is to place the responsibility for joint military advice in the hands of one or two officers, such as the JCS Chairman and a Deputy. This alternative would lead to a narrower set of inputs and experiences in the formulation of joint military advice. This may not be desirable.

The last major argument against this option is the dramatic nature of the changes that it proposes. Many of the effects of this option will be difficult to foresee. Opponents of this concept may argue that a more incremental approach should be pursued.

○ Option 1B —establish a Chief of the Joint Staff

Under this option, the JCS would be disestablished and the Chief of the Joint Staff, assisted by a Deputy, would become the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. This option would have many of the same advantages as Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council): (1) would reduce the conflict of interest for those responsible for joint military advice; (2) would provide the opportunity for better joint military advice, uninhibited by Service responsibilities and pressures; (3) would enable Service Chiefs to devote their full time to Service administration; and (4) would provide an opportunity for a greater role for joint military advice in decision-making through a better articulation of professional military views.

Similarly, this option has many of the disadvantages of Option 1A: (1) the Chief of the Joint Staff and his Deputy would not be as knowledgeable as the Service Chiefs on Service capabilities and programs; (2) these two officials could be isolated from the Services; (3) some aspects of DoD internal management would be more difficult; (4) external presentation of DoD positions would be less consistent; (5) interservice competition might be intensified; and (6) the full effect of this dramatic change would be difficult to foresee.

Aside from these pros and cons, the principal advantage of this option is that it would end the committee system in the formulation of joint military advice. By creating a single Chief of the Joint Staff, the principle of unity of command would be applied at the level of the senior military advisory institution. The most senior U.S. military officer would be able to make clear recommendations to civilian authorities after gathering and considering all relevant information and inputs.

On the other hand, assigning responsibility for joint advice to only two military officers —the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff —would limit the range of senior Service expertise and experience that would be brought to bear in the formulation of joint advice. There may be some tasks —primarily advice on operational matters during crises —in which the committee system should be avoided. However, for other tasks in which a more deliberate process is possible, it would appear useful to have a wide range of inputs.

As an additional consideration, only two of four Services would be represented by the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff. The two Services not represented may believe that their Service-unique inputs have not been adequately addressed. As a consequence, their resistance to proposed alternatives may be formidable.

- ○ Option 1C —designate the JCS Chairman as a statutory member of the National Security Council

This option has two objectives: (1) to enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman; and (2) to ensure that military advice is directly provided to the NSC. The first objective is likely to be obtained if this option were implemented. As a statutory member of the NSC, the JCS Chairman would be viewed as a more powerful and influential official. He may be able to use this enhanced stature to take positions and provide advice independent from the views of the corporate JCS. Alternatively, if he continues to be constrained by the requirement to speak only for the corporate JCS, the advice that he offers is likely to continue to be ineffective. If there is a clear desire to have a more independent JCS Chairman capable of forceful articulation and representation of the joint perspective, it appears that more powerful actions will be necessary.

This option is likely to fail to meet its second objective: ensuring that military advice is directly provided to the NSC. The Congress cannot through legislation instruct the President from whom he must receive advice. If the President believes that the professional military should have a voice at particular NSC meetings, he will invite appropriate officers, including the JCS Chairman. If the President does not want advice from the professional military, for whatever reason, it cannot be forced upon him by law.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Retired), former Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, support these views. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Dr. Brzezinski stated:

> Insofar as the deliberations of the NSC itself are concerned, it is immaterial whether the Chairman of the JCS is made a statutory member....In practice, attendance at the formal NSC meetings is at the President's discretion, and discussion is equally open to the statutory and nonstatutory members. The President calls upon those whose views he wants to hear.
>
> There is no vote and no de facto distinction between participants. Thus the views of the Chairman of the JCS are heard as much as the President wishes to hear them. (Part 11, page 488)

During the same hearing, General Scowcroft presented a similar view:

> I think the present system where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an adviser to the NSC is perfectly adequate. He does and should attend most of the meetings and he will respond in whatever manner the President wishes to use him. (Part 11, page 495)

While there are convincing arguments that professional military advice should be directly presented to the NSC when national defense or security issues are being addressed, there is no way of ensuring this through legislation. The National Security Council is an advisory body to the President. He is and should be free to use and organize it as he sees fit. Congressional efforts to instruct him on the appropriate use and composition of this body are likely to be futile in addition to being undesirable.

In addition to these considerations, this option has a major disadvantage in that it would make the Secretary of Defense and one of his subordinates, the JCS Chairman, equals on the NSC. This would be highly undesirable. It would undermine the Secretary's authority and lead to confusion in the formulation of defense policy and the management of the Department of Defense. Dr. Brzezinski shares this concern:

> The issue [statutory membership on the NSC for the JCS Chairman], therefore, should be judged not in terms of the JCS contribution to the NSC deliberations as such, but rather in terms of the relationship between the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.
>
> While I strongly favor the reforms proposed by Gen. David Jones for the enhancement of the role and status of the Chairman of the JCS, I would be concerned over changes which dilute the authority of the Secretary of Defense as the President's principal officer on defense matters. (SASC Hearings, Part 11, page 489)

General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) sees another disadvantage in making the JCS Chairman a statutory member of the NSC: the senior military position could become politicized. In his paper, "The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future," General Smith argues:

> ...As a member of the NSC the Chairman would tend to be perceived as a member of the Administration's political team because he would be sitting with the other statutory members: the Vice President and the presidentially appointed Secretaries of State and Defense. It is inadvisable for him to be so perceived either at home or abroad. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that the selection of a Chairman under these conditions could become politicized as each Administration would want to make certain it had a Chairman compatible with its outlook and objectives. This would gravely endanger our apolitical military tradition. (page 44)

○ Option 1D —authorize the JCS Chairman to provide the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense with military advice in his own right

As the only member of the JCS without responsibility to represent Service interests, the JCS Chairman is uniquely qualified to champion joint military interests. However, his ability to effectively do so is tremendously limited by his lack of authority to present his own views.

It is absolutely clear that the joint perspective is now under-represented in the Department of Defense. In the absence of more dramatic reforms of the JCS, the only possible way to provide more effective representation of this critical point of view is to authorize the JCS Chairman to forcefully present his own views independent of the corporate JCS position or that of individual Service Chiefs. While there are other options to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman, this is obviously the most important. The other options would serve to complement this one. By themselves, the other options would have a limited effect.

Critics of this option question whether a JCS Chairman —whose background, experiences, and biases are derived largely from duty in one Service —should be considered as being any more objective or expert than other JCS members. In this context, the argument is put forward that the overriding advantage of the current JCS system (with all its faults) is that it ensures that the collective experiences and professional judgments of JCS members are included in the process through which advice is formulated. While the corporate JCS and individual Service Chiefs would still have the opportunity to present their views, they could be overshadowed by a powerful JCS Chairman whose influence would be out of proportion to his expertise and experience.

There is some validity to this argument. However, so long as the members of the JCS, with the exception of the Chairman, retain their Service leadership roles and thus function as a committee of the lowest common denominator, there would seem to be only one way to strengthen the representation of joint interests: enable the JCS Chairman to present his own independent views.

- ○ Option 1E —authorize the JCS Chairman to independently manage the Joint Staff

At present, the JCS Chairman has only a small, immediate staff that reports to him. The Joint Staff works for the corporate JCS body. If the JCS Chairman is to be able to forcefully represent the joint perspective, he must be able to direct the Joint Staff to conduct its work in support of this unified outlook.

The principle advantage of this option is that it may substantially alleviate the tendency of the Joint Staff to propose consensus recommendations representing the lowest common denominator of possible Service agreement. The JCS Chairman could ensure a more objective approach to issues by the Joint Staff. He could also ensure that critical issues receive the attention that they deserve regardless of their level of controversy from the Service perspective. The JCS Chairman could ensure that the Secretary of Defense would receive a greater diversity of viewpoints, more rapidly generated, and more sharply defined than at present. The JCS Chairman could also be authorized, as is proposed by Option 1K in this section, to alter the cumbersome staffing procedures of the Joint Staff which are primarily designed to achieve consensus.

Under this option, work on the Joint Staff would probably become more interesting and offer a greater opportunity for meaningful contributions on important issues. These possibilities might attract higher caliber officers to Joint Staff assignments. It should be noted, however, that this option would not fully ensure the independence of the Joint Staff since each officer would still be dependent on his Service for future promotions and assignments.

Critics of this proposal argue that the JCS Chairman would become too powerful if he solely managed the Joint Staff. He would have full authority to set the work agenda of the Joint Staff. His biases would be forced on the Joint Staff which would be required to accommodate and support his views. With this substantial staff support, the JCS Chairman would be able to completely dominate the other JCS members. There is a possibility that the Service Chiefs might seek to increase the size and quality of their Service staffs to more effectively argue their disparate views.

On the other hand, it can be convincingly argued that the reverse is now the case. By requiring that the Joint Staff work for the corporate JCS, the Service Chiefs have denied the JCS Chairman access to sufficient staff support. At the same time, the Service Chiefs have large Service staffs to support them in their joint work. The Chairman's Special Study Group noted the reliance of the Chiefs on the Service staffs and their limited interaction with the Joint Staff:

> ...by tradition, the Chiefs prefer to depend on their Service staffs rather than on the Joint Staff to analyze Joint issues and to assist them in preparing for JCS meetings. For this reason, there are collectively about as many officers in the Service staffs generally dedicated to Joint activities as there are on the Joint Staff. More important, the Service Chief is not given the benefit of regular Joint Staff advice to balance against the Service views he receives from his own Service staff. The Chief obviously has access to Joint Staff papers, but he does not normally interact with the Joint Staff on a regular basis, nor is he routinely briefed by the Joint Staff. (page 10)

In essence, authorizing the JCS Chairman to independently manage the Joint Staff would correct a current imbalance in staff support and would not, as some have claimed, create an imbalance. As John Kester has concluded:

> ...Unless the [JCS] chairman can call on the joint staff for meaningful help, his position resembles that of the first secretary of defense, who was limited by law to no more than four civilian assistants. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", page 14)

○ Option 1F —establish the position of Deputy JCS Chairman

A Deputy JCS Chairman would be authorized to assume the authority of the Chairman whenever he was traveling away from Washington, D.C. (which is quite often). This would provide for improved continuity and control in the exercise of the Chairman's responsibilities. In a position as critical as JCS Chairman, continuity and control are important and desirable. In supporting the proposal to create a Deputy JCS Chairman, General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), stressed the need to ensure the presence in Washington of a cross-service spokesman at all times:

> ...The Chairman is a cross-service spokesman, not the service chief. When the Chairman is not there, we need, I think, a

> Deputy to the Chairman who is a cross-service spokesman. (SASC Hearings, Part 7, page 279)

An additional advantage of a Deputy Chairman is that it would give the JCS Chairman an ally within the JCS who was independent of any Service and capable of objective consideration of the joint perspective. General W. Y. Smith questions, however, whether a Deputy or Vice Chairman would be an ally of the JCS Chairman:

> ...it has been stipulated that the Vice Chairman would come from a Service other than that of the Chairman. The Chairman presumably would have a say in his selection, but the extent to which the Vice Chairman would have any personal loyalty to the Chairman or necessarily share his point of view is at least questionable. ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future," page 39)

Moreover, critics of this option have suggested that the Deputy Chairman would have little to do whenever the Chairman was in town. If the Chairman were given greater authority, however, he would probably have more than enough work to delegate. It might be desirable to task the Deputy Chairman to focus on resource issues in the same manner that the Deputy Secretary of Defense serves the Secretary. It would also be possible to specify that the Deputy Chairman would also serve as the Director of the Joint Staff, thus making him the Chairman's key ally in managing the staff. This would only make sense if the preceding option of authorizing the Chairman to manage the Joint Staff were implemented. Alternatively, the Deputy Chairman could assume the responsibilities currently performed by the Assistant to the Chairman (i.e., coordinating JCS relations with outside agencies like the Department of State and the National Security Council). If the Deputy Chairman took up duties now performed by another flag or general officer, an additional flag or general officer billet would not have to be created.

Critics of this option believe that a Deputy JCS Chairman is not needed. General Vessey has stated:

> ...a four-star deputy chairman is not required and one would, in fact, not improve the operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

Moreover, critics argue that the creation of a Deputy Chairman would end the system of rotating the position of Acting Chairman among the Service Chiefs. Many observers believe that this rotating system has had the positive benefit of broadening the perspective of individual Service Chiefs. General Vessey has commented that giving the Deputy Chairman the Chairman's duties in his absence.

> ...takes away an important integrating tool that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been using for the past three years; that is, we have rotated the duties of Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman for periods of three months. We have found that this procedure makes all of us better members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from time to time brings each of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into direct contact with

the Secretary of Defense and the President. Modern day communications permit the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and, through the National Military Command System, all of the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands no matter where he is in the world. We have found over the past few years that the combination of modern communications and using Service Chiefs for long and planned tours as Acting Chairman in Washington has worked well for consistency of advice and in unifying the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

General Paul F. Gorman, USA, then the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command and former Assistant to the JCS Chairman, presented similar arguments in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> I believe that that system which General Vessey and his colleagues adopted has had the great benefit of educating members of the JCS in the intricacies of the operations of the National Command Authority in the way that they would not otherwise have gotten, had they been left out of the net as it were in the former fashion.
>
> It has made a very serious proposition of their getting themselves briefed and remaining briefed on world events day by day. They have to curtail their travel as members of the service chiefs. In brief, they have to really put their minds to the kinds of consideration that the Chairman has to bring on issues day to day.
>
> I think that has made for a better set of chiefs. (Part 7, page 303)

The new procedure of a 3-month rotation among the Service Chiefs of the responsibility for serving as Acting Chairman is clearly preferable to the previous approach. Prior to institution of the current system, the most senior Service Chief or, if necessary, Vice Chief available became Acting Chairman when the JCS Chairman was absent. As might be expected, the position of Acting Chairman changed hands much more frequently and continuity was diminished. As the Chairman's Special Study Group noted about this earlier period:

> ...During one recent three-day period when the Chairman was out of town the responsibility for Acting Chairman changed hands seven times. (page 38)

Despite the improvements offered by the new procedure, there are a number of disadvantages to the system of rotating Acting Chairmen. First, the Service Chiefs cannot keep themselves informed on the Chairman's work. When they begin their tour as Acting Chairman, they make an effort to become as knowledgeable as possible on this work. This becomes an additional burden on Service Chiefs who already lack sufficient time to cover their normal responsibilities. Moreover, this system of rapid education poses risks, particularly at the beginning of a tour of an Acting Chairman. The Chairman's Special Study Group highlighted these risks in discussing the need for continuity in the Chairman's position:

> ...This is important in many areas, but surely the most critical involves the role of the Chairman as an advisor to the Secretary and the President in the emergency use of strategic nuclear forces, now a highly technical subject. (page 22)

Second, an Acting Chairman may not be able to divorce himself from his Service interests. There have been instances where Acting Chairmen have sought to promote the interests of their Services. This would clearly be a misuse of this position. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, USCINCEUR, noted one instance in which this occurred:

> I well remember an NSC meeting in which a Chief was representing the Chairman and it was directed that he, the Chief, never again attend an NSC meeting because he used that opportunity to inject into the system some matters which should not have been raised. (Part 7, page 306)

Third, an Acting Chairman may continue to rely primarily on his Service staff during his tour. Again, Service perspectives would play an undesirable role in the conduct of the duties of the joint spokesman. Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger noted this problem in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> ...If the Chairman happens to be out of town during a crisis, as was the case in the Mayaguez incident, the acting Chairman, quite naturally, tends to lean on his own service staff. That causes a fair amount of turmoil in the system. (Part 5, page 188)

○ Option 1G —authorize a 5-star grade for the position of JCS Chairman

General Omar N. Bradley, USA, is the only JCS Chairman to have held a 5-star rank. General Bradley, the first JCS Chairman, was promoted to the rank of General of the Army after serving in this position for more than 1 year.

The objective of this option would be to enhance the stature of the JCS Chairman and, thereby, increase his power and influence. While these goals are laudable, this option by itself is likely to have little impact. By statute and by practice, the JCS Chairman is seen as the most senior U.S. military officer. Promoting the JCS Chairman to 5-star rank would not, therefore, change his relative stature.

○ Option 1H —lessen the pressures for unanimity in JCS advice

Clearly, the JCS would better serve the interests of senior civilian decision-makers if it developed, evaluated, and presented the full range of valid alternative courses of action. When the JCS offers only one recommendation for consideration by higher authority, it ceases to be an advisory body and essentially becomes a decision-making body. When presented with only one proposal — without an appreciation of other possible courses of action —civilian officials can either endorse this alternative or develop additional options using other staff, usually civilian, resources. This is not a preferable system for receiving joint advice. The Chairman's Special Study Group comments as follows on this situation:

> ...there are few defense issues with only one possible resolution, and any Secretary of Defense will be quite aware that alternatives do exist. If he does not find them in JCS papers, he will turn to his civilian staff to find them and to determine whether they are preferable to the one recommended by the JCS. But, no matter how useful this civilian advice, it cannot substitute for a competent military evaluation of the alternatives. (page 47)

Another advantage of this option is that it would help curtail collusion by the JCS. This collusion has been described by various observers as negotiated treaties, truces, log-rolling, back-scratching, and marriage agreements. All of these terms characterize a process in which the needs of the Secretary of Defense and others for clear, usable advice are given low priority and the protection of Service interests is emphasized. It can be convincingly argued that collusion by the JCS members to protect Service interests does not serve the overall interests of national defense.

On the other hand, the professional military has long held the view that its influence is maximized if it speaks with one voice in favor of one course of action. If the senior military advisors openly showed divided views on an issue, the influence of the professional military on the eventual decision would be diminished. In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond articulates this point of view:

> ...Were the comity of JCS relations to be abandoned, far more would be lost than gained. To be sure, comity has not meant an unwillingness to disagree. It has meant, nonetheless, delay, equivocation, and compromise in order to minimize the costs of open disagreement to the status of the Chiefs and their services, together and individually. For open division would likely mean the end of the professional status which the military enjoy through the JCS in the making of national policy. Its professional character would be tainted by the arguments and assumptions which open discussion would reveal. What might be worse for American military interests, and quite likely for the nation, would be reduced influence of badly divided military councils in the making of national policy. The JCS, that is to say, represents an interest, and quite a legitimate one, which can only be maintained by its cohesion... (page 350)

This argument is based, however, upon misplaced emphasis: the degree of military influence has become the focus rather than the quality of advice offered. Again, the tendency of the JCS to serve their interests rather than those of the Secretary of Defense appears to be the case.

The success of this approach is also open to question. While a united front of JCS members poses a formidable force with which to reckon, there is substantial evidence that JCS advice has played a limited role in many important decisions. Secretaries of Defense have often recognized "watered down" and ineffective advice and have sought counsel elsewhere.

- ◦ Option 1I —remove barriers to effective interactions with the JCS system, especially for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Related to its desire for unanimity, the JCS have created effective barriers that limited interactions with non-Service organizations, especially OSD. A more open system would reveal the existence of disagreements within the JCS system. In line with the quote in the discussion of the preceding option, Hammond argues that JCS cohesion "is achieved by its closed military staff characteristics." (*Organizing for Defense*, page 350)

While arguing that the Joint Staff "does deal openly" with OSD and others, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, the current JCS Chairman, offers another reason for carefully controlling such interactions:

> ...it is the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are charged with being advisors to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council. Because of the importance of the issues with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff deal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff guard that duty very carefully. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want JCS advice to be just exactly that and not to be Joint Staff advice. The Joint Staff duty is to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist them in carrying out their duties. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions)

While DoD directives clearly call for substantial cooperation between OJCS and OSD, this has not been the result. If both OSD and OJCS, including the JCS themselves, are to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary cannot be well served by either organization if their advice arrives from two separate channels with limited interaction and coordination. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb does not believe that effective OJCS —OSD interactions are possible. In his book, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, he writes:

> ...directing the Joint Staff to cooperate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to act as one staff for the secretary is totally unrealistic. The members of the Joint Staff from one service do not even cooperate fully with joint staffers from the other services. While on the Joint Staff, they are responsive primarily to the interests of their own service. To expect them to operate in unison with a civilian staff is asking too much. (page 19)

While numerous alternatives for improving OJCS —OSD interactions were presented in Section E, the vast majority of these should not be considered for congressional action. Only two proposals are worthy of consideration in the context of this study: (1) specifying in statute the desired relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and between OJCS and OSD; and (2) making OJCS part of OSD.

Sections 141, 142, and 143 of title 10, United States Code, are silent on relationships between the Secretary of Defense and his civilian assistants and the JCS, the JCS Chairman, and the OJCS staff. DoD Directive 5100.1 does specify the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS/OJCS. The relationship between OSD and OJCS is specified in DoD Directive 5158.1. Given the conflict in the specified and actual relationships, it might be useful to include statutory language that presents the desired relationships. By itself, such additions to title 10 are not likely to have a substantial impact. Despite this realization, no disadvantages of more clearly establishing in statute these important relationships have been identified.

Incorporating OJCS into OSD also has appeal. The existence of OJCS as a wholly separate institution has fostered efforts by the JCS to secure greater autonomy and independence from the Secretary of Defense. The success of these efforts has undermined the authority of and the support for the Secretary. Making OJCS part of OSD would clarify this issue. The JCS is not to be independent of the Secretary of Defense; it is to serve him and be responsive to his needs.

On the other hand, reduced independence for the JCS could create an environment in which it would be easier to "muzzle" the military voice in national security decision-making. While this possibility cannot be absolutely discounted, the system of checks and balances in the Federal Government offer many opportunities to frustrate such an undesirable effort.

- Option 1J —strengthen the requirement for joint experience for promotion to Service Chief of Staff

Given the relatively limited joint experience that Service Chiefs bring to their JCS duties, it would clearly be desirable to set some joint duty standard for promotion to such an important position.

On the other hand, the screening process for Service Chief is extensive. Some observers do not believe that there is a need to establish another yardstick for evaluating the qualifications of candidates for Service Chief positions.

- Option 1K —authorize the JCS Chairman to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff

If the JCS Chairman were authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff, as is proposed by Option 1E, it would be logical to also authorize the Chairman to establish the staffing procedures. If, however, the Joint Staff continued to work for the corporate JCS, the arguments are more divided.

It is clear that the current staffing procedures undermine the quality of joint papers. The process magnifies Service interests and obscures joint considerations. The JCS Chairman would be the most logical person to establish procedures that would strike an appropriate balance between Service and joint perspectives.

On the other hand, if the Joint Staff is to serve the corporate JCS, giving the JCS Chairman the authority to specify staffing procedures might permit him to effectively control the Joint Staff. He might establish a process that would serve his needs and neglect the requirements of the Service Chiefs. This might be of particular concern if the following option, which would substantially reduce the Service staffs which work on joint matters, were implemented.

- Option 1L —substantially reduce the Service staffs which work on joint matters

Many observers of the DoD organization have criticized the overly large bureaucracies, excessive layers, and unnecessary duplication of effort. The large number of military officers on Service staffs who are dedicated to joint matters appears to fit into this category of criticism. Moreover, the existence of these Service staff elements has shifted the focus to Service interests and away from the joint perspective. The Service Chiefs have also come to rely on their Service staffs for inputs that they should be receiving from the OJCS staff.

Substantially reducing the Service staffs which work on joint matters could have numerous benefits: (1) the OJCS staff may be able to address joint issues from a more independent and objective position; (2) the Service Chiefs would be forced to rely on the OJCS staff on joint matters; and (3) the duplication of effort between the OJCS and Service staffs could be substantially lessened.

On the other hand, the Services have important inputs to make on joint issues. It may be necessary to have large Service staffs dedicated to joint matters to consistently ensure that such inputs are made on a timely basis. The absence of effective Service inputs may preclude careful and comprehensive evaluations of joint issues within the JCS system.

This option needs to be addressed in the context of other proposed solutions to OJCS problem areas. If Option 1A (Joint Military Advisory Council) or Option 1B (Chief of the Joint Staff) were implemented, substantially reducing the Service staffs which work on joint matters would clearly be possible and desirable. The loss of responsibility for providing joint advice would greatly lessen the needs of the Service Chiefs for Service staff support on joint matters. The 25-man staff that would remain available to the Service Chief under this option could serve to keep the Chief informed on joint issues and provide necessary information to the OJCS.

If the JCS Chairman were authorized to independently manage the Joint Staff (Option 1E) and/or to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff (Option 1K), there may be a requirement to ensure that the Service Chiefs retained sufficient staff support on joint matters. Such a requirement would arise only if there were concerns that the JCS Chairman would use these new authorities so aggressively that the position of the Service Chiefs would be severely weakened.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE INADEQUATE QUALITY OF THE OJCS STAFF

- ○ Option 2A —give the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotion and assignment of officers who are serving or have served in OJCS

The power that the Services retain over OJCS staff officers (and other joint duty officers) through their control of promotions and assignments is enormous. The current system results in incentives to protect Service interests rather than to think in joint terms. Joint thinkers are likely to be punished, and Service promoters are likely to be rewarded. This system of punishments and rewards must be changed if the quality of the OJCS staff is to be improved and if the objectivity of its work is to be increased.

Giving the JCS Chairman some influence in the promotions and assignments of past and current OJCS officers appears to be the best possible method of changing the currently unfavorable incentives. As the senior military officer representing the joint perspective, the JCS Chairman is best qualified and positioned to ensure that OJCS officers receive fair treatment.

On the other hand, this option may be viewed as an outright challenge to an important Service prerogative: unrestricted management of its professional corps of officers. It would put Service officers under the effective control or potential influence of a military officer outside of their Service.

Despite strong Service objections, it will be impossible to obtain quality work from the OJCS staff unless those officers can be protected from Service retribution for objectively performing their joint duty assignments.

- Option 2B —strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank

The current requirement for joint duty prior to promotion to flag or general rank has been circumvented to the extent that it is meaningless. Obviously, a strengthened requirement for joint duty would greatly increase the interest in OJCS assignments. This should improve the quality of the OJCS staff.

On the other hand, this option could be viewed as an undesirable pressure tactic. As the Chairman's Special Study Group noted:

> ...To increase interest in Joint duty, one could return to a strict interpretation of that prerequisite [joint duty prior to promotion to flag or general rank] or, indeed, institute other forms of pressure on officers to seek Joint assignments. However, such coercive policies are not the best approach, nor are they likely to be effective in the long run. (Appendix E, page E-1)

In addition, the Services claim that there are insufficient joint duty assignments (under a strict interpretation) to permit the qualification of sufficient candidates for flag or general rank. If this were the case, this option would produce difficulties in personnel management and lead to an undesirable practice of quick, ticket-punching rotations of officers through joint duty assignments.

- Option 2C —require the JCS Chairman to evaluate all nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions on the basis of their performance in joint duty assignments

This option has two objectives: (1) to ensure that nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions have strong joint duty backgrounds; and (2) to provide an additional incentive for highly qualified officers to seek joint assignments and to perform their duties in these positions with objectivity.

As to the first objective, this option appears to be too broad. Many nominees for 3-star or 4-star positions will be serving only in Service assignments. Authorizing the JCS Chairman to evaluate their qualifications for a Service position does not appear appropriate. However, the JCS Chairman should be forcefully involved in evaluating nominees for 3-star and 4-star positions that are joint duty assignments.

As to the second objective, this option might provide an additional incentive for joint duty. However, it has, in the view of some observers, the same coercive nature as Option 2B. On the other hand, this option can be viewed as providing a desirable and appropriate incentive. For example, in recommending that the JCS Chairman evaluate all 3-star and 4-star "operational" promotions as well as selected key assignments below those grades, General W. Y. Smith states:

> ...This would formalize the informal voice the Chairman now has in senior promotions, and it is an important change. It would send the proper signal concerning the importance of joint duty. ("The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future", page 43)

- ○ Option 2D —increase the number of cross-Service assignments of military officers

In addition to joint duty, cross-Service assignments provide an improved understanding for a military officer of the capabilities, doctrine, and tactics of a sister Service. The individual Services are the only ones, however, that can judge to what extent such assignments can be made without undue disruption of the Service experience and training of an individual officer and without creating shortfalls in officers available for Service duty.

This does not appear to be an area where congressional action can or should be taken. At most, the Congress could merely encourage the Services to expand as appropriate their cross-Service assignments of military officers.

- ○ Option 2E —establish a personnel management system to ensure that joint college graduates actually serve in joint duty assignments

This option appears to be highly desirable. A substantial portion of the graduates of the three colleges of the National Defense University (NDU) should receive joint duty assignments. This is not to say that NDU graduates do not make better contributions to their work if assigned to a position within their Service. However, only a small percentage of NDU graduates actually are now being assigned to joint duty.

No disadvantages of this option have been identified as long as the Services are given some flexibility in assignments of NDU graduates.

- ○ Option 2F —authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation

The Joint Staff currently suffers from a lack of experience, continuity, and corporate memory. This option would seek to lessen these deficiencies. By authorizing the Secretary of Defense to extend Joint Staff tours for military officers, it would be possible to retain key personnel to provide the JCS with quality staff work.

Opponents of this option may see extended tours on the Joint Staff as the first step to the creation of a General Staff. The argument may be made that officers who serve for more than 4 years on the Joint Staff would lose currency on Service doctrine, operations, and capabilities and, thereby, be susceptible to an "ivory tower" approach.

There may be some merit to these negative arguments. However, careful control of such extensions by the Secretary of Defense could lessen these possibilities while providing the necessary experience and continuity in key Joint Staff positions.

- Option 2G —establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty

The Chairman's Special Study Group made the following observations about the preparation and tenure of joint duty officers:

> ...All professional military assignments have special requirements for prior training and experience. Submarine skippers, F-15 pilots, and infantry battalion commanders all require—and are given—careful preparation.
>
> The same should be true for officers serving in Joint assignments, such as the Joint Staff or the Unified Command headquarters. Aside from understanding how such staffs function, they face the immense problem of learning how the DoD and their sister Services function. Few officers are expert in the several branches of their own Service, let alone the other Services. But officers serving on Joint staffs should at least have a broad working knowledge of all the Armed Forces. Few do. Most assigned to Joint duties have little formal preparation, and few stay long enough to acquire expertise on the job... (page 41)

Given the demanding nature of joint duty assignments, it would appear appropriate to establish a joint duty career specialty. This would provide an opportunity to develop a small cadre of military officers who have demonstrated abilities for and an interest in joint duty. This cadre would provide for better continuity, more objectivity, and greater experience in the handling of joint matters.

To ensure that joint staffs served by joint duty career specialists would not become isolated, this option has two important features. First, joint duty specialists would return periodically to their parent Services for field assignments to maintain currency. Second, only half of the positions on joint staffs would be filled by joint duty specialists, thereby retaining a mix of varied backgrounds and ensuring that joint staffs would not become isolated.

The Services have opposed the creation of a joint duty career specialty for two basic reasons. First, the Services believe that implementation of a joint duty specialty would require the establishment of a joint-duty subspecialty in each functional area. This increase in the number of subspecialties, according to the Services, wouid disrupt current Service personnel systems and detailed officer distribution plans.

Second, the Services argue that a succession of joint duty assignments may result in a loss of currency with respect to Service doctrine, operations, and capabilities. Accordingly, an officer's ability to contribute to the work of a joint staff would be diminished.

In a memorandum for Secretary Weinberger dated December 24, 1984, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, presented the following conclusion on a joint duty career specialty:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified commands consider Service functional expertise the most im-

portant prerequisite in selecting officers to fill joint-duty positions, and they consider a separate career specialty unnecessary to ensure that qualified, experienced personnel are selected for joint-duty assignments.

- ○ Option 2H —establish a General Staff in place of the current Joint Staff

Before evaluating this proposal to establish a General Staff, it should be noted that the U.S. military establishment has not rigorously analyzed the General Staff concept. As Colonel T. N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) notes:

> ...the United States has generally ignored (rather than rejected) the example of the German General Staff... (*A Genius for War*, page 312)

While there was some interest in a U.S. General Staff by those who were studying alternative organizational arrangements during World War II and the immediate post-war period, there has been little attention on the subject since then. This is particularly troublesome because objective evaluations of the concept would only seem possible after the strong emotions associated with World War II began to subside. It may be that the General Staff is an outmoded organizational concept and does not fit the American approach to providing for national defense. Unfortunately, the U.S. military establishment is unable to say whether this is the case or not.

The establishment of a General Staff is a far-reaching option that might substantially contribute toward resolving the existing inadequacies of the Joint Staff. The fundamental characteristic of a General Staff is that its officers, once selected, remain General Staff officers throughout the remainder of their careers, regardless of their assignments. Their promotions are determined by their superiors on the General Staff, not by their original Service.

On the plus side, the very nature of a General Staff would give top-quality officers an incentive for entering this career path, knowing that it offered a promotion track wholly separate from any Service. The type of officer attracted would probably be particularly interested in and suited for staff work. The independence and objectivity of a General Staff, as well as the high-quality officers that it would likely attract, would make it a powerful instrument in planning for war, developing military strategy, and promoting inter-Service cooperation and coordination. In particular, a General Staff would be able to cut across the biases of the individual Services in determining innovative and effective ways for employing their combined combat capabilities.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown presents the following arguments in favor of a General Staff in his book, *Thinking About National Security*:

> Such an approach would be an attempt to introduce a clearer and less parochial military view on issues of military strategy and capabilities, and the relationship between the two. It would provide a means to clarify roles and missions and to improve the procedure for establishing the requirements for oper-

> ational capabilities. A General Staff would be able to review, compare, and suggest changes in the plans of commanders with different geographical or functional responsibilities and to decide among their competing demands for limited combat resources. Decisions would be less likely to be influenced by (or go unmade because of) questions of whether individual unified and specified commanders are from one service or another, whether the functions are oriented toward one service or another, or how the decisions would affect service roles, missions, opportunities, futures, and personalities. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress would be able to get much clearer and more accountable military advice than they get now —if they want it. U.S. military planning and strategy would become more responsive to the changed needs of military operations and to complex political-military situations. (page 210)

Numerous arguments have been raised against the General Staff concept. These criticisms have focused upon the Prussian-German General Staffs of the period of 1807-1945. Missing from this debate is the recognition that a number of other nations, including the United States, France, and Soviet Union have employed the General Staff concept. Another critical point relating to the German General Staff of World War II was that it was not an Armed Forces General Staff, but only served as the central staff for the German Army. This is an important distinction, as subsequent discussion will reveal. Despite these critical omissions, this evaluation will focus on the criticisms of the German General Staff. As a starting point, the concerns expressed by the Congress are presented and are followed by other criticisms.

Congressional hostility to a General Staff is a principal reason why this concept has not been seriously considered for application in the U.S. military establishment. Given the central role of congressional opposition, Appendix A of this chapter presents a paper (specifically prepared for this study) on "The Evolution of Congressional Attitudes Toward a General Staff in the 20th Century" by Robert L. Goldich, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service. Goldich determined that World War II and Service unification were watershed events influencing congressional attitudes toward the General Staff concept. Prior to World War II, congressional discussions of a General Staff "reflected more positive than negative views of the institution."

In the immediate postwar period, the experiences of the war against Germany and its famous Army General Staff and the disputes over Service unification proposals combined to radically alter congressional attitudes. Goldich summarizes this finding:

> After World War II, congressional discussion of general staffs arose in the context of proposals to provide stronger organizational coordination and management of the four military services through creation of a central Department of Defense and a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. Opponents of unification of the Armed Forces under a central Department of Defense, or equivalent organization, argued that a joint, or interservice staff structure in a more unified military establishment

> would represent an undesirable step toward the German General Staff system. These opponents of service unification were principally partisans of the Navy and Marine Corps, who felt that naval and amphibious interests and identities would be dominated by the Army and Air Force in a unified Department of Defense.
>
> Great confusion about the nature of the German General Staff was generated by the resulting debate. There was vehement discussion and uncertainty about the extent to which the German General Staff created, as opposed to reflected, militarism and authoritarianism in pre-1945 Germany. Modern scholarship inclines to the latter view. There was also a blurring in the minds of many congressional commentators between a general staff as (1) an organization charged with assisting a nation's military high command in the planning and execution of military operations (which is found in the military services of all nations) and (2) an elite branch of the career officer corps whose members monopolized high-level positions in the national military headquarters and in field commands (which was unique to pre-1945 Germany).
>
> Those Members of Congress, and others who were opposed to service unification thus may have reflected a distaste for German military institutions, opposition to service unification, and/or unclear comprehension of the varying ways in which a general staff could be defined. The result was an equation of increased centralized control of the separate military services with German General Staff methods and organization, hence with pre-1945 German militarism, and an extension of opposition to the German General Staff to opposition to *any* General Staff. The wars and upheavals which led to the crystallization of these beliefs in the minds of Members of Congress 40 years ago were cataclysmic in nature. Given the evidence of the persistence of these attitudes until well after the end of World War II, it is likely that they linger yet.

Congress' deep concern over the nature of a General Staff was reflected in the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act which expressly prohibited the Joint Staff from operating or being organized "as an overall Armed Forces General Staff..." In its report accompanying the 1958 Act, the House Committee on Armed Services emphasized its reasons for finding a General Staff "dangerous":

> Such an organization [a General Staff] is clearly desirable in battle, where time is everything. At the top levels of government, where planning precedes, or should precede, action by a considerable period of time, a deliberate decision is infinitely preferable to a bad decision. Likewise, the weighing of legitimately opposed alternative courses of action is one of the main processes of free government. Thus a general staff organization —which is unswervingly oriented to quick decision and obliteration of alternative courses —is a fundamentally fallible, and thus dangerous, instrument for determination of national policy.
>
> As a corollary, it is the nature of a general staff at national level to plan along rigid lines for the future. This creates rigid-

ity of military operations and organization and historically has led general staffs to attempt to control all national policies involved in war —notably foreign and economic policy, both of which lie far beyond the proper sphere of military planners.

Moreover, when structurally placed over all the armed services and military departments, an overall Armed Forces general staff serves to isolate the politically responsible civilian official from all points of view but its own, so that, while he, in theory at least, retains all power, this power becomes increasingly captive to the recommendations of the general staff.

It has, parenthetically, been a concern of the committee, in considering the proposed legislation, lest a defense organization be ultimately created in which power is totally concentrated in the Secretary of Defense only so that it may be wielded and controlled more effectively by a military tier (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff) immediately below him.

For these and for other reasons, Congress has historically rejected an Armed Forces general staff and single Chief of Staff. This rejection was exhaustively debated in 1947 when Congress shaped the top organization of the services along representative lines (Joint Chiefs of Staff supported by service committees) and rejected the authoritarian concept advanced in the so-called Collins plan for a single Chief of Staff and a national general staff.

The opposition to the General Staff concept articulated by the House Committee on Armed Services in 1958 can be summarized as follows. It found that the General Staff concept had the following deficiencies: (1) a failure to systematically consider the full range of alternatives; (2) rigidity of thought; (3) an attempt to control national policies that are beyond military affairs; (4) isolation of civilian officials from other points of view; and (5) erosion of civilian control of the military by concentrating too much power in the hands of the military officers immediately below the senior civilian official.

These congressional criticisms are highly inaccurate and cannot be supported by historical analysis of the work of General Staffs, particularly those of Prussia and Germany. In fact, these criticisms more accurately reflect the actual deficiencies of the current Joint Staff than they do the imagined shortcomings of the General Staff concept. Each of these criticisms is evaluated below.

a. Failure to consider alternatives

First, General Staffs have traditionally provided objective consideration of all valid alternatives, to a much greater extent than is now done by the Joint Staff. In *A Genius for War*, Colonel T. N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) discusses the objectivity of German General Staff work:

> Anyone who has reviewed German staff documents cannot fail to marvel at the objectivity of their staff analyses and estimates. This was true not only when they attempted to analyze the causes of defeat or failure, but also in their evaluation of technical or tactical performance of other nationalities, in

peace and war. There was no NIH —"not invented here" — syndrome in the German General Staff. (pages 304 and 305)

b. Rigidity of thought

Second, rigidity of thought or inflexibility have never been identified as deficiencies of General Staffs. Such staffs have been highly innovative and have quickly and objectively recognized previous failures. Dupuy discusses the encouragement of initiative and imagination in German General Staffs:

> There is no direct evidence that German military emphasis on imagination and initiative has been due to a conscious effort to offset any traditional German cultural trait of regimentation. If not conscious, however, this may well have been an unconscious motivation of German General Staff theorists. That these efforts to encourage initiative and imagination were successful is evident from the fact that it was in this area, probably more than any other, that the German, at all levels, excelled in both world wars. (page 304)

Dupuy also comments favorably on the German General Staff's attitude toward intellectual individuality:

> In most armies, intellectual individuality is viewed with some suspicion and even hostility; it is an automatic challenge to authority and the Party Line. In the German Army this natural human reaction also existed —but was offset by the General Staff's deliberate efforts to encourage and reward intellectual individualists. (page 306)

Max Hastings also discounts the argument of rigidity of thought:

> ...One of the more absurd propaganda cliches of the war was the image of the Nazi soldier as an inflexible squarehead. In reality, the German soldier almost invariably showed far greater flexibility on the battlefield than his Allied counterpart. ("Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army", *The Washington Post*, May 5, 1985, page C4)

c. Attempt to control national policies

As to attempts to control national policies, there appears to be some evidence to support this assertion in the actions of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff of the German General Staff during World War I. Dupuy comments as follows:

> ...By this time [July 1917] the real leaders of Germany, with power unchallenged, were Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Field Marshall and the General had not seized power; Germany's political leaders, pale imitations of Bismarck, had abdicated power to them. (page 167)

However, these events occurred in a government where the Army was under the effective control of only the monarch —Kaiser William II —and not the parliament —the Reichstag. Despite this occurrence, it has little to do with the system of government in the United States in which civilian control of the military by the President and the Congress is well established.

In World War II, the German General Staff did not attempt to control national policies. The General Staff was absolutely controlled by Adolf Hitler and its influence even over military matters began to decline in 1938 and continued to erode during the war. As Colonel Dupuy notes:

> The decline of the General Staff as the key military institution in Germany had begun when Hitler assumed the position of Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in early 1938. (page 276)

d. Isolation of civilian officials and erosion of civilian control

As to its relations with civilian officials, there is nothing inherent in the General Staff concept that would either isolate civilian officials from other sources of advice and influence or dominate them and, thereby, erode civilian control of the military. In an editorial page article in *The Washington Post* on June 9, 1984, Colonel Dupuy emphasizes this point:

> ...there is absolutely no evidence that general staffs have in any way eroded civilian control of the armed forces in any nation. They have been subservient to autocrats when they have been created in autocratic societies; they have ably defended liberty when they have been implanted in democracies. The general staff most noted of all, that of Germany, twice attempted to substitute democracy for autocracy in an autocratic society, but failed on both occasions because the autocracy was too entrenched. ("Military Reform: The Case for a Centralized Command", page 19)

Similarly, Captain John M. Nolen, USA, in his article, "JCS Reform and the Lessons of German History," writes:

> Those who claim that JCS reform might threaten civilian control cannot make their case using Hitler's Germany as an example. Granted, the German generals are not guiltless figures in the rise of Hitler and subsequent Nazi aggression. But one of the clear lessons of the Hitler era is that civilian control was never jeopardized. Hitler, the Nazi politician, insured his lasting control over the generals. (*Parameters*, Volume XIV, No. 3, page 19)

In addition to these weak and inaccurate congressional criticisms, there are other arguments in opposition to the General Staff concept which merit consideration. These include: (1) the loss of World Wars I and II is itself an indictment against the General Staff concept; (2) a General Staff would become a dangerous elite; (3) a General Staff would promote militarism; (4) a General Staff is alien to democratic societies; (5) the very nature of General Staff would result in officers too far removed from the field to be realistic planners; and (6) the German General Staff was incompetent in formulating strategy.

e. Loss of World Wars I and II

In *A Genius for War*, Colonel Dupuy summarizes (but does not endorse) the first negative argument as follows:

> The Germans lost World War I, and they also lost World War II. These simple truths would seem to provide prima-facie evidence that German military "genius" —whether personalized or institutionalized —was not performing very well during those wars. (page 290)

The historical record does not support this argument. In both World Wars, the German Army under direction of the General Staff outperformed its opponents. Even Gary W. Anderson, a strong critic of the General Staff concept, admits this fact:

> ...The German army consistently performed better than any of its single opponents from 1866 until 1945. ("The Military Reformers' Prussian Model", *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1984, page 19)

Max Hastings reaches a similar conclusion about German military forces during World War II:

> The inescapable truth is that Hitler's Wehrmacht was the outstanding fighting force of World War II, one of the greatest in history. For many years after 1945, this seemed painful to concede publicly, partly for nationalistic reasons, partly also because the Nazi legions were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time. ("Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army," *The Washington Post*, May 5, 1985, page C4)

Colonel Dupuy agrees:

> ...Germany's involvement in, and loss of, the World Wars was in no way connected with the professional organization, indoctrination, or performance of the German General Staff. (*A Genius for War*, page 302)

f. Elitism

The second negative argument is the dangers associated with creating an elite military organization such as a General Staff. If the General Staff effectively performed the important role envisioned for it, it will almost certainly become an elite organization and attract many of the best military officers. This is not a reason, however, for precluding the search for a more effective central staff organization. In his paper, "Designing a U.S. Defense General Staff", John Kester counters the argument of elitism:

> ...The armed forces are supposed to reflect merit and achievement, not to be egalitarian. They do not exist to make people happy; they exist to do a job. It is not self-evident that feelings of jealousy or awe that might develop among some officers [if a General Staff were created] would be so debilitating as to offset the gains in influence and efficiency that could be expected to flow from a better staff organization. (*Strategic Review*, Summer 1981, page 43)

Kester adds to this:

> Moreover, the services already have elites. The question is simply where the chosen shall serve. (page 43)

g. Militarism

Some of the past aversion to the creation of a General Staff has arisen from the concept's historical roots in Prussia and hence, its identification with "German militarism". While the association of the General Staff concept with militarism persists, there is no historical evidence to support it. The adoption of the General Staff concept by numerous democratic nations with no sign of militaristic tendencies may serve to place this argument in its proper context.

h. Alien to democratic societies

The fourth criticism of the General Staff is that it is alien to democratic societies. In 1956, Hubert Humphrey presented this view. In defending the JCS system, he criticized

> ...the form of highly centralized supreme general staff system which is anathema to every concept of democracy.

Gary W. Anderson presents this argument as follows:

> Strong general staffs, as they evolved in Russia and Germany, are manifestations of autocratic political systems that are essentially alien to the way we do things in our democratic republic. The American military machine is a servant of the state, not a partner in dictating political policy.
>
> General staffs...have traditionally extracted a price for their services...an erosion of civilian control of the armed forces... ("The Military Reformers' Prussian Model", *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1984, page 19)

Dupuy counters the assertions in Anderson's article as follows:

> Nothing that Anderson writes, nothing in the historical record, will support any one of those three sentences. France had a strong General Staff in 1914, and this is why fiercely democratic France was able to survive the Marne Campaign and—eventually, with its allies—win World War I. The U.S. Army has had two strong general staffs in its history: 1917-1918, and 1942-1945. The performance of the U.S. Army during those two periods was up to the finest military traditions of our nation. Civilian control was exercised firmly and wisely by Woodrow Wilson, through Newton D. Baker, and by Franklin Roosevelt, through Henry L. Stimson.
>
> There is no reason for the American military machine to change from being a servant of the state to being its master just because it achieves the efficiency that has been eluding it for centuries (with the brief exceptions for the Army noted above). In fact, the servant will be a useful one, instead of one (as it is now) of dubious utility. ("Military Reform: The Case for a Centralized Command", *The Washington Post*, June 9, 1984, page 19)

i. Removed from reality

One of the reasons for the rejection of a General Staff in the past has been that its officers might be too far removed from the field to be realistic planners. This argument is presented along the following lines. Although regular field assignments would alleviate the problem of unrealistic planning to a degree, the natural bent of

General Staff officers would be toward the theoretical. This inclination could lead to less than the most desirable staff advice, particularly in wartime. No matter how careful the selection process or how thorough the education system, the General Staff could become one step removed from reality and, hence, subject to serious blunders in both operational and resource allocation matters.

The performance of the German General Staff does not support this point of view. The General Staff quickly analyzed technical developments in military equipment and prepared appropriate changes in doctrine and battle plans. The most prominent example of this capability was the development of the "blitzkrieg" doctrine. Dupuy describes the General Staff process that produced these results:

> ...Like qualified observers and critics of the Allies, the Germans observed the obvious "lessons" of World War I. Unlike the others, however, they had an institution [the General Staff] available to make the much more difficult analyses of these observations, to include assessments of the characteristics, limitations, and capabilities of weapons, and the implications of trends in weapons and technology. Following analytical concepts initiated by Scharnhorst and continued by his successors, that institution almost automatically made the even more difficult translation of the analytical results into doctrine, organization, the establishment of requirements for new or modified weapons and equipment, and development of new and revised operational and administrative techniques. (*A Genius for War*, page 255)

This process does not appear to fit an organizational concept that is criticized as removing itself from reality. Moreover, the German General Staff ensured that its officers continued to receive regular field assignments to maintain currency.

j. Incompetent in formulating strategy

The last argument against the German General Staff—that it failed to formulate grand strategy—appears to have more merit than any other. Captain Nolen comments:

> ...Hitler's emasculation of the German General Staff system prevented any systematic assessment of Germany's strategic options. For all of its tactical brilliance, the German officer corps was strategically barren. Strategic decisions were made without the benefit of interservice consultation and coordination, and without considering the relations among the several decisions. (*Parameters*, Volume XIV, No. 3, page 18)

Dupuy reaches a similar conclusion:

> Thus, in essence, Prusso-German military successes were based upon a transitory technical mastery of war. The ultimate failure in both conflicts came because the German military system—unlike those of the Allies—was too narrowly specialized. (*A Genius for War*, page 292)

While the inability of the German General Staff to formulate strategy was a critical deficiency, the criticism for the World War II period must be tempered by the fact that the German General

Staff was only an Army organization and was, therefore, unable to formulate grand strategy involving all three Services. As Nolen notes: "No headquarters was in charge of overall strategy." (page 17)

During World War II, Germany's military effort suffered from four interrelated, organizational shortcomings: (1) the inability to create an effective Armed Forces General Staff and to bring the three Services under unified command; (2) the Services' desire to remain independent of centralized planning and control; (3) the inability to effectively coordinate the operations of the three Services; and (4) a failure to formulate military grand strategy. Nolen discusses these shortcomings as follows:

> Those who see the German General Staff as a model of military efficiency should reconsider the evidence. The German General Staff never solved the problem of centralized command; it remained an army organization. Though amazingly efficient at managing army affairs, it never achieved the status of an armed forces staff with the more complex mission of managing all three armed services. The OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht], which might have performed such a role, was denied by Hitler the size, leadership, or authority to do so. However, Germany's failure to organize a strong armed forces staff was not the fault of Adolf Hitler alone. The armed forces must also bear part of the responsibility. The three services never willingly accepted subordination to a higher headquarters —either to Blomberg's *Wehrmachtamt* or, after 1938, to Keitel's OKW. The services certainly had grounds to question the competence of these higher organizations. Yet one wonders how much of their resistance was for professional reasons and how much was due to organizational rivalries. (page 17)

To this, he adds:

> ...Clearly the absence of an armed forces staff compounded Germany's military deficiencies. Only such an organization could have provided a balanced view of military strategy and properly divided resources among the three services. (page 18)

While the lessons of history concerning the General Staff concept remain debatable, the broader deficiencies in German military organization during World War II have been well and unambiguously documented. These lessons are relevant to the United States because the U.S. military establishment suffers at present from the four organizational deficiencies that plagued Germany during World War II.

- Option 2I —remove the distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS military officers and eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff

The distinction between the Joint Staff and other military officers in OJCS serves no useful purpose. In addition, the 400 officer limitation on the size of the Joint Staff has been circumvented by the flexibility offered to assign officers to OJCS rather than the Joint Staff.

It would be much more useful to manage all military officers in OJCS under one system. Not only would this provide for improved personnel management practices, but it would also highlight the total number of personnel in the JCS system.

The argument raised against this option is that it would permit unconstrained growth in the size of the Joint Staff. To the contrary, this option would provide an opportunity to measure the growth in OJCS personnel resources without the artificial and confusing distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS staff.

- Option 2J—authorize the JCS Chairman to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty

Given that problems in joint duty assignments are broader than just those in the Joint Staff or even the OJCS staff, it would be appropriate to implement management arrangements that would solve the larger concerns. Many of the options proposed in this subsection envision a more forceful role for the JCS Chairman in correcting joint duty problems. Some of these options address only the OJCS staff; others involve all joint duty assignments, but only address narrow solutions to one of many problem areas.

This option would authorize the JCS Chairman to address all personnel problem areas encountered in the joint duty community. The JCS Chairman would be responsible for ensuring that (1) highly qualified officers were selected; (2) they had the appropriate promotion and assignment incentives; (3) they had relevant education and experience; (4) they served sufficiently long tours to be effective; and (5) they could be reassigned to joint duty as necessary.

This option could be implemented in conjunction with Option 2G (Joint Duty Career Specialty) or Option 2H (General Staff). Even if options to establish a joint duty career path were not implemented, the JCS Chairman could—with the authority proposed in this option—have a major impact on the quality and effectiveness of joint staffs.

Objections to this proposal are likely to center on the view that it would infringe upon Service prerogatives for management of their professional corps of officers. The JCS Chairman would have personnel management responsibility for 5 percent of military officers in grades of 0-3 (Captain or Navy Lieutenant) and higher. The Services may be especially troubled by the fact that the JCS Chairman would manage nearly 20 percent of all flag and general officers.

Despite possible Service objections, it does not appear possible to obtain the necessary performance in joint duty assignments without substantial revision of current personnel management practices. Only the JCS Chairman can ensure that joint duty has the stature that it deserves, broaden the preparation of officers for joint duty, and reward them for effective work.

3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT OJCS REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Option 3A —require that the Secretary of Defense annually promulgate a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning

This option would clearly be desirable. The absence of civilian guidance for contingency planning has been a major shortcoming. While it might be possible to provide such guidance without a formal document, it would appear to be more useful to transmit this important information in writing. Moreover, many of the users of this guidance would be located in operational command headquarters which are far removed from Washington.

In concluding that policy guidance for military crisis planning is needed, the *National Security Policy Integration* study states:

> Effective military crisis planning requires higher government levels to select situations to be planned for, to provide the planners with realistic assumptions and objectives, and to conduct a critical review of the resulting plans. (page 36)

The Chairman's Special Study Group also supports this concept:

> ...The important iterative process by which the civilian and military leadership settle on military objectives and on the political assumptions important to contingency planning should be enhanced. The JCS must be furnished clearly defined objectives by the civilian leadership. (page 61)

Besides providing a framework for contingency planning, promulgation of a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have numerous benefits: (1) result in increased attention to contingency planning; (2) lead to a useful questioning of assumptions; (3) help sharpen perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives; (4) ensure that political assumptions are consistent with national security policy; (5) highlight planning guidance issues that need attention; and (6) help connect the PPBS process and contingency planning.

There are two possible problems with this option. First, the guidance may be overly specific and unnecessarily constrain or complicate the work of contingency planners. Second, this guidance document would contain extremely sensitive information which, if leaked, might cause serious political problems or embarrassment. These concerns relate to implementation of this option and not to the concept itself. Clearly, a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning would have to be carefully prepared and protected.

- Option 3B —develop a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans

While increased attention by civilians and the JCS system to the review of contingency plans would be beneficial, it cannot substitute for the actual exercising of plans. Only through such tests can the quality of the plans be assessed and important lessons learned. The *National Security Policy Integration* study supports this view:

> ...military plans should be exercised periodically. Nifty Nugget underscored the need for such exercises, with high-level government participation, both to discover shortcomings in planning and to test the capabilities and resources needed to execute existing plans. (pages 36 and 37)

The disadvantage of this option is the cost of these exercises and the commitment of substantial time by senior civilian and military officials that is required to make the exercises effective. These financial and manpower costs are modest when compared to the substantial benefits of such tests. While planning and preparing for the future are important, senior officials must not neglect preparation for today's and tomorrow's crises. As the Chairman's Special Study Group has stated:

> . . . One cannot overdramatize the fact that while the peacetime management of military activities is an important matter, preparedness for war management is the overriding imperative. That type of preparedness is the best possible deterrent to actual conflict, and provides the best assurance of success if deterrence fails. (page 65)

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. The JCS is unable to adequately fulfill its responsibility to provide useful and timely unified military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.	
2. Deficiencies in JCS advice have encouraged senior civilian officials to rely on civilian staffs for counsel that should be provided by professional military officers.	
3. The conflict of interest inherent in the dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs is the primary cause of deficiencies in JCS performance; furthermore, Service Chiefs do not have sufficient time to perform both roles.	3A. Disestablish the JCS and, thereby, permit the Service Chiefs to dedicate all their time to Service duties. 3B. Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a 4-star military officer from each Service on his last tour of duty. 3C. Reduce the Service staffs that work on joint matters to no more than 25 military officers for each Service.

Conclusions	Recommendations
4. Removing the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice increases the importance of the Defense Resources Board as a forum for the formal presentation of Service views.	4A. Establish the Defense Resources Board in statute with appropriate Service representation.
5. The JCS Chairman's potential effectiveness as the principal spokesman for the joint perspective is curtailed by his limited independent authority.	5A. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own right.
	5B. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to independently manage the Joint Staff.
6. There is an important need for continuity in the position of the senior spokesman on joint matters.	6A. Designate one of the members of the Joint Military Advisory Council, from a different Service pair than the Chairman, as Deputy Chairman.
7. The desire for unanimity has not only forced JCS advice to the lowest common level of assent, but also has greatly limited the range of alternatives offered to the Secretary of Defense.	7A. Specify that one of the responsibilities of the Joint Military Advisory Council is to inform higher authority of all legitimate alternatives.
8. The closed staff characteristics of the OJCS have inhibited important interactions between the OJCS and OSD.	8A. Specify in statute the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Military Advisor Council and between the Joint Staff and OSD.
	8B. Make the Joint Military Advisory Council and the Joint Staff part of OSD.
9. JCS members have traditionally not had a strong background of joint service.	9A. Require that members of the Joint Military Advisory Council have substantial joint experience.

Conclusions	Recommendations
10. The cumbersome staffing procedures of the OJCS have greatly reduced the quality of JCS advice.	10A. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to specify the staffing procedures of the Joint Staff.
11. The quality of the OJCS staff and other joint staffs is inadequate.	
12. For the most part, military officers do not want to be assigned to joint duty; are pressured or monitored for loyalty by their Services while serving on joint assignments; are not prepared by either education or experience to perform their joint duties; and serve for only a relatively short period once they have learned their jobs.	12A. Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to develop and administer a personnel management system for all military officers assigned to joint duty. Establish procedures, as part of this system, to ensure that joint college graduates actually serve in joint duty assignments. 12B. Establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty. 12C. Strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank. 12D. Authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve the extension of tours on the Joint Staff beyond the current 4-year limitation. 12E. Remove the distinction beween the Joint Staff and other OJCS military officers, eliminate the statutory limitation on the size of the Joint Staff, and redesignate the OJCS staff as the Joint Staff.
13. DoD has not rigorously evaluated the General Staff concept.	13A. Require the Secretary of Defense to undertake a comprehensive study of the General Staff concept.
14. The OJCS does not sufficiently review and oversee contingency plans.	

Conclusions	Recommendations
15. There is no civilian guidance being used in developing contingency plans.	15A. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a Planning Guidance for Contingency Planning be annually promulgated, and a continuing exercise program to test the adequacy of major contingency plans be developed.

APPENDIX A

THE EVOLUTION OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD A GENERAL STAFF IN THE 20TH CENTURY

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I. Introduction and Summary of Analytical Findings

PURPOSE, BACKGROUND, AND SCOPE

The purpose of this report is to describe and analyze the evolution of congressional attitudes toward the concepts of military general staffs during the 20th Century, and assess them in the light of current leadership on the subject of general staffs. The nature of German military institutions and the German General Staff, American civil-military relations, and the roles and missions of the four U.S. military services, are involved in, reflect, and are crucial to an understanding of congressional attitudes toward a general staff. The report identifies trends and themes in these attitudes, and delineates factors which appear to have influenced the Congress and its members in arriving at the attitudes they have held.

This report was prepared at the request of the Senate Armed Services Committee to supplement the Committee's ongoing staff study of the organization and management of the Department of Defense (DoD). The Committee staff was interested in the development of and rationales for what it believed had been continuing congressional antipathy toward the term "general staff" and the concepts and structures it connotes.

The report begins with this brief statement of its purpose, background, and scope; a description of research methodology; and a summary of the major analytical findings of the report, centering on the crucial distinction between pre- and post-World War II congressional attitudes toward a general staff. The study then traces the historical development of the general staff concept, with particular attention to modern definitions and the German example. It then identifies and analyzes major themes in the evolution of congressional attitudes toward a general staff during the 20th Century, using the legislative histories—hearings, reports, and floor debates—of the six major legislative acts of the 20th Century related to Army and defense organization as primary sources. Emphasis is placed on issues of bureaucratic politics, executive-legislative relations, structural change in the military establishment, and reaction to external developments such as the Nazi era and World War II. Brief concluding observations end the study.

MAJOR ANALYTICAL FINDINGS: WORLD WAR II AND SERVICE UNIFICATION AS WATERSHED EVENTS

World War II saw a fundamental change in the depth and intensity of congressional attitudes toward a general staff. Before World War II, discussions were in the context of the need to provide coherent staff support to overall national and senior field commanders in the conduct of military operations, and revolved around issues of bureaucratic politics and executive-legislative relations. On balance, these reflected more positive than negative views of the institution.

After World War II, congressional discussion of general staffs arose in the context of proposals to provide stronger organizational coordination and management of the four military services through creation of a central Department of Defense and a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. Opponents of unification of the Armed Forces under a central Department of Defense, or equivalent organization, argued that a joint, or interservice staff structure in a more unified military establishment would represent an undesirable step toward the German General Staff system. These opponents of service unification were principally partisans of the Navy and Marine Corps, who felt that naval and amphibious interests and identities would be dominated by the Army and Air Force in a unified Department of Defense.

Great confusion about the nature of the German General Staff was generated by the resulting debate. There was vehement discussion and uncertainty about the extent to which the German General Staff created, as opposed to reflected, militarism and authoritarianism in pre-1945 Germany. Modern scholarship inclines to the latter view. There was also a blurring in the minds of many congressional commentators between a general staff as (1) an organization charged with assisting a nation's military high command in the planning and execution of military operations (which is found in the military services of all nations) and (2) an elite branch of the career officer corps whose members monopolized high-level positions in the national military headquarters and in field commands (which was unique to pre-1945 Germany).

Those Members of Congress, and others who were opposed to service unification thus may have reflected a distaste for German military institutions, opposition to service unification, and/or unclear comprehension of the varying ways in which a general staff could be defined. The result was an equation of increased centralized control of the separate military services with German General Staff methods and organization, hence with pre-1945 German militarism, and an extension of opposition to the German General Staff to opposition to any General Staff. The wars and upheavals which led to the crystallization of these beliefs in the minds of Members of Congress 40 years ago were cataclysmic in nature. Given the evidence of the persistence of these attitudes until well after the end of World War II, it is likely that they linger yet.

II. The Changing Nature of General Staffs

The term "general staff" has been applied to numerous different features of military organization since the term first appeared in military literature in the 18th Century. By the last third of the 19th Century, the type of structure that had obtained before no longer applied anywhere in the industrialized world. It was replaced by two new and different types of organizational structures, which have been the subject of much analytical and polemical confusion—down to the present.

It is important to understand how general staff structures evolved, and what the nature of the pre-1945 German General Staff system was in order to understand why the Congress became interested in general staffs at different times. The first part of this chapter describes the difference between preindustrial and modern general staffs. This distinction is important to an understanding of why Congress was interested in and concerned about the creation of a modern U.S. Army General Staff in 1903 and in subsequent reforms of that structure. The second part describes the characteristics of the pre-1945 German General Staff and its relation to German militarism of the mid-19th through the mid-20th Centuries. This is essential for comprehension of how congressional attitudes toward the general staff were shaped by understanding—or lack of it—of the German General Staff.

FROM THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL TO THE MODERN GENERAL STAFF [1]

Originally, the term "general staff" was applied, beginning in the middle of the 18th Century, to the collected central administrative officials, and commanders of specialized combat troops, of an army at its national headquarters or of the headquarters of an army in the field. These groups of individuals were almost exclusively concerned with *maintaining* and *supporting* forces in the field, rather than actually *employing* and *operating them.*[2] Well into the 19th Century, not all of them were professional soldiers; those with logistical and medical responsibilities were often civilians under contract.

The "general staff" of a field army, for instance, might consist of those persons responsible for supply, transport, finance (both paying the soldiers and disbursing money for provisions and equipment purchased on the march), military justice, and military discipline (policing the army, preventing desertion, and insuring that any pillaging or foraging was done on orders, or did not unduly interfere with the army's march). Also part of the general staff were commanders of what, in the preindustrial era, were the arcane, specialized, and "high-tech" artillery and engineer branches (even these leaders could be contract civilians). "Such lesser figures as surgeons, soothsayers, and executioners completed the colorful picture."[3]

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[1] This section is based largely on van Creveld, Martin. *Command in War.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1985: 27–40, which is in turn the most recent and comprehensive synthesis of scattered older works. Of the latter, see especially Irvine, Dallas D. "The Origins of Capital Staffs." *Journal of Modern History,* June 1938: 161–179.

[2] This distinction is appropriated from Barrett, Archie D. *Reappraising Defense Organization.* Washington, National Defense University Press, 1983.

The term "general staff" was first used to describe this type of staff in American military history during the War of 1812. One historian described the U.S. Army General Staff of that era in the following terms:[4]

> It was not a general staff in the present sense. Rather, Congress established the War Department administrative offices which in modern terminology would become the special staff . . . . The Secretary [of War] could henceforth call upon an adjutant and inspector general with two assistants, the inspector general and the assistant adjutant general; a quartermaster general; a commissary general of ordnance together with two deputies and an assistant; a paymaster; and an assistant topographical engineer. These officials, unlike previous holders of some of the same titles, were expected to settle in Washington an act as the permanent management staff of the War Department.

The "Army General Staff" came to denote this collection of War Department administrative and logistical bureau chiefs until the establishment of the modern U.S. Army General Staff in 1903.

What this traditional "general staff" did *not* do was provide a staff to assist the commander—whether of a national army or an army in the field—in planning and conducting actual military operations. To the extent that he had any such support, he obtained it from a very few individuals whose duties varied according to the situation—the quartermaster general, whose duties encompassed logistical and supply supervision; a personal secretary; and the senior commanders of military units.[5] Frequently, however, "An aggressive, fast-acting command . . . might well try to concentrate everything—intelligence, planning, operations, staff work—in his own hands, relying on his secretariat simply as a technical organ responsible for taking down his orders and allowing nobody to share his thoughts."[6]

The general staff of pre-industrial war was concerned with administration and logistics rather than operations because of the nature of pre-industrial war and the tasks and demands placed on field commanders in pre-industrial battles. Winston Churchill described the wholly personal nature of a general's actual command responsibilities in a pre-industrial battle in his biography of the Duke of Marlborough (1650–1722). The Churchillian language is no less accurate for being flamboyant:[7]

> The task of the commander in Marlborough's wars was direct. There were no higher formations like divisions and

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[3] van Creveld, *Command in War*. 35. See also David G. Chandler, "Armies and Navies: 1. The Art of War on Land." in J.S. Bromley, Editor. *The New Cambridge Modern History. Vol. VI., The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25.* Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 1970. pp. 761-762.

[4] Weigley, Russell F. *History of the United States Army.* New York, Macmillan Co., 1967. p. 123.

[5] van Creveld, *Command in War.* pp. 37-38; Chandler, "Armies and Navies." p. 761.

[6] van Creveld, *Command in War.* p. 38.

[7] Churchill, Winston S. *Marlborough: His Life and Times.* Abridged and with an introduction by Henry Steele Commager. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968, pp. 281-283.

> corps . . . The control of the battle was maintained on each side by eight or ten superior officers who had no permanent commands of their own, and were virtually the general staff officers of modern times, working in a faithful subordination.
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> In the midst of the scene of carnage, with its drifting smoke-clouds, scurrying fugitives, and brightly coloured lines, squares, and oblongs of men, [the commander] sat on his horse, often in the hottest fire, holding in his mind the positions and fortunes of every unit in his army from minute to minute and giving his orders aloud. We must picture him in those days when the Signal Corps was nonexistent, attended not only by three or four generals of high rank, but by at least twenty young officers specially trained and specially mounted, men who were capable of following the event with intelligent eyes, who watched the field incessantly, and who knew where to find the subordinate commanders, their brigades and regiments.
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> In the times of which we tell the great commander proved in the day of battle that he possessed a combination of mental, moral, and physical qualities adapted to action which were so lifted above the common run as to seem almost godlike. His appearance, his serenity, his piercing eye, his gestures, the tones of his voice—nay, the beat of his heart—diffused a harmony upon all around him. Every word he spoke was decisive. Victory often depended on whether he rode half a mile this way or that. At any moment a cannon-shot or a cavalry inrush might lay him with thousands of his soldiers a mangled bundle on the sod. That age has vanished forever . . .

This language, written of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702-1713, was almost as applicable to the Napoleonic Wars a century later, and almost all other wars waged until the middle of the 19th Century. Administration was considered to be susceptible to systematic control; combat operations were not. Furthermore, battlefield command, while perhaps requiring men with an extraordinary high degree of both moral strength and intellectual ability, was not yet exercised over forces and areas so large and/or complex as to be beyond the ability of any one man to control, regardless of his innate abilities.

Martin van Creveld has summarized why the duties of pre-industrial military staffs—including those, after the mid-18th Century, called "general staffs"—remained confined to administration: [8]

> . . . the much greater uncertainty associated with operations, and the difficulty of reducing it to a set of rules, help explain why the modern general staff was so slow to develop; as late as the middle of the eighteenth century it

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[8] van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 90.

> was an open question as to whether its functions should be carried out by the traditional council of war, by the commander's secretary, by the quartermaster general, or simply in the commander's head . . . The growing use of written letters of instruction between courts and their commanders in the field enabled governments to impose strict controls on strategy, but only at the price of reducing it essentially to trivia. On the tactical level, moreover, communications had not improved a bit since Roman times. As a result, the main action was still almost invariably confined to the commander's own place . . .

The pre-industrial general staff, therefore, was a small administrative staff with only a rare and tangential, and never systematic, responsibility to support a commander in the planning and conduct of actual combat operations. One of its major features was that it was geared for administration and logistics, tasks that must be performed in peacetime as well as during a war. As a result, it tended to develop distinctive and semi-autonomous units that had little to do with actual combat operations. In the United States, these units—the administrative bureaus of the War Department—were closely overseen by, and linked to, the Congress.

Warfare became much more complex during the 19th Century. One major aspect of this increased complexity was armies of a much greater size than had ever been fielded, requiring more and more machine-based logistical and administrative support, and representing a much greater proportion of total national resources—both human and material.[9]

Armies such as these could no longer be commanded, either in the field or from a national capital, by mostly idiosyncratic and improvisational methods of a single commander, no matter what his intrinsic capabilities. High-level commanders needed staffs that could assist them in the planning and conduct of actual combat operations, as well as in providing administrative, clerical, and logistical support for their forces.[10] By the last third of the 19th Century, the amount of intelligence to be assimilated, the range of potential alternative actions, and the plethora of detailed instructions required to implement general high-level orders had all become too large to be managed on the almost purely intuitive basis that had characterized pre-industrial armies.

A dramatic transformation of general staffs took place during the second half of the 19th Century. By 1900, virtually all armies of industrialized nations had institutionalized a general staff organization designed to assist military commanders in the conduct of actual military operations. Such institutions remain standard features of modern armed forces. General staffs are charged with collecting intelligence, preparing and analyzing alternative operational plans, translating the general directives of senior line commanders into the specific and detailed instructions required by subordinates, and monitoring and insuring the implementation of command decisions after they are made.

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[9] The literature on these developments is exhaustive. A recent survey is Hew Strachan. *European Armies and the Conduct of War.* London, George Allen and Unwin; 1983. See also Larry H. Addington. *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century.* Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1984. A standard older work is Theodore Ropp. *War in the Modern World.* Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1962.

[10] Irvine, "The Origins of Capital Staffs," p. 162, has the most concise delineation of the distinction.

Modern general staffs of this type are organized by broad operational function rather than by the specific commodity or service provided by their members. For instance, modern American general staff organization, basically unchanged since World War I and applicable to any command with a general officer in charge, has had four main divisions: personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply.[11] Another category—civil affairs (dealings with local civilian populations and institutions, including, but not limited to, military government of formally occupied territories)—has been added when appropriate.[12]

The modern general staff is as concerned with support and logistics issues as the pre-industrial "general staff," but the modern functional general staff system makes clear that the ultimate purpose of armies is preparation for and the conduct of war, and that its support and logistical activities are directed to those ends rather than to maintenance of peacetime routine.

A national army's general staff, defined in these functional terms, performs for a country's highest politico-military leadership the same function that the general staff of a separate military unit performs for that unit's commander. This highest level of national leadership, with ultimate command of the armed forces, can be civilian or military (if military, it could conceivably derive from the national general staff itself, but need not automatically do so), democratic or authoritarian. Regardless of the nature of the "national command authority"—to use a modern term—whose decision-making processes a national, functionally-organized general staff supports, it is still a general staff—the term applies because of the technical military responsibilities it has, and is not related to the philosophical or ideological orientation of the political leadership it serves.

THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF [13]

The German General Staff was not a functional general staff as described above, but a separate branch of the German Army career officer corps. It was the military-intellectual elite of the German Army from the mid-19th Century through 1945. Its members constituted a cadre of specially selected and trained officers deemed capable of meeting the demanding management and leadership tasks of modern warfare. Its members were recruited and retained through extremely selective and rigorous recruiting and retention policies, which were based on a comprehensive mixture of military-academic studies and field experience. They filled not only staff billets at the German Army's national headquarters, but also command and staff positions in major subordinate field units.

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[11] See Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. pp. 314-320, 322-323, 379-80, 405, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Pub. 1., Washington, April 1, 1984. p. 158.

[12] Ibid.

[13] The Prussian and German General Staff has generated much less historical literature than might be expected, and much of what exists is either polemical or hagiographical. Also, there is a tendency for histories of the German General Staff to become heavily involved in German civil-military relations, which is understandable but not helpful to the analyst trying to find out just how the institutions themselves worked. A brief historical survey is in John M. Collins. *U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique*. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1982. pp. 54-56. See also Walter Goerlitz. *History of the German General Staff, 1607-1945*. Translated by Brian Battershaw. New York, Praeger, 1953; and Trevor N. Dupuy. *A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Those members of the General Staff who were assigned to billets in the "Great General Staff" at the German Army's national headquarters in Berlin (which continued to function under another name after the victorious Allies banned it after World War I), therefore, performed the same duties as the functional general staffs of other nations described in the preceding section of this chapter. Those members of the General Staff branch assigned to "General Staff with Troops" duty performed not only general staff functions in German Army field units, but also served as commanding officers of those units.

The German General Staff was distinguished from all other general staffs by the extraordinarily competitive nature of professional selection to its officer corps. Junior officers (lieutenants and captains) were selected for admission to General Staff officer candidacy. Two or three years of military-academic instruction, marked by constant competition and elimination of unsatisfactory performers, was followed by one or two years of equally selective practical apprenticeship in both staff and line positions. Of 150 junior officers admitted to the *Kriegsakademie* (War College) for the beginning stage to General Staff officer candidate instruction at the end of the 19th century, perhaps four would eventually become full members of the General Staff branch four or five years later.[14] The same degree of selectivity and rigorously meritocratic selection prevailed in the late 1920's and early 1930's. In 1927, 270 candidates took the examination for admission to General Staff training; 37 were actually selected, and only 13 remained at the completion of the training program in mid-1930.[15] Officers in the pre-1945 German General Staff branch had a "lock" on key German Army positions, policies, practices, and institutional characteristics. This domination derived from three factors: the high caliber of individual General Staff officers produced by the General Staff selection and training process; the natural success of such a system in providing its products with a common outlook and attitude toward military problems and their solutions; and the role of the General Staff branch in providing both senior staff officers for the Great General Staff in Berlin and commanders and staff officers for the German Army's major field units.

This "lock" did not, however, create German militarism of the 1871–1945 era. Modern scholarship has stressed that modern German militarism resulted from the interaction of long-standing German attitudes and beliefs with new pressures and social myths arising from circumstances peculiar to the late 19th Century:[16]

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[14] Collins, *U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique.* p. 55.

[15] Spires, David N. *Image and Reality: The Making of the German Officer, 1921–1933.* Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1984. pp. 33–34, 46, 181. Spires' work is one of the few which actually dissects in detail how, during one period of time, the German General Staff recruitment and selection process actually worked.

[16] Bond, Brian. *War and Society in Europe, 1870–1970.* United Kingdom, Fontana Paperbacks, 1984. p. 63.

> First, the German army enjoyed unique prestige for, as Ritter concisely put it, "in western Europe the military were considered a necessary evil, whereas in Germany they were the nation's pride." He also stresses that this was a new strain not derived from the aristocratic Prussia of Frederick the Great; rather it was the bourgeoisie who were not perverted by patriotic pride and free citizens who were captivated by a sense of power. In other domestic issues they might be quite critical of government policy. Indeed, it was the educated middle classes, considerably influenced by academics, who were particularly prone to swing full circle from antimilitarism to idolatry after 1870 because they were most keenly aware of Prussia's historical achievement. For a generation after 1870, German patriotism was strongly nostalgic. Middle-class society . . . generally continued to show tremendous respect for the officer's uniform . . . The reserve officers, who excluded a wide range of "undesirables" such as socialists, peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, and Jews, became more militaristic than the regulars, aping and exaggerating their manners and vices such as gambling, drinking, and brawling. Hence a sort of "pecking order" arose even in civil life and the very status of civilian came to be widely despised by these prigs in uniform.

In such an atmosphere, it was not surprising that German military institutions generally, and the German General Staff in particular as the dominant agency within the German Army, came to possess great prestige. The German General Staff, therefore, rarely had to truly threaten civilian control of the military to get what it wanted—the civilians were in general only too glad to give it to them, often through what observers from nations with a stronger liberal-democratic tradition would call the voluntary abrogation of civilian responsibilities.[17] In Imperial Germany, it is true that "between the 1860's and 1900 the Reichstag [the national legislature] lost the right even to discuss the military budget for as long as five or seven years; that the war minister became a figurehead with no real authority over the army; and that actual authority steadily accrued to the kaiser [emperor] who looked for advice mainly to his own military cabinet and to a lesser extent to the general staff."[18] These things could not have happened, however, without the assent of the civilian institutions involved, including the ultimate civilian, the kaiser.

The same pattern of deference to the Army, which by definition entailed deference to the Army's controlling organ, the General Staff, took place during the Weimar Republic (1918–1933). Even liberal or socialist governmental leaders may have disliked the Army and the General Staff, but it appears that in practice they did little to control what the Army actually *did,* to the extent that was normal for parliamentary bodies in countries such as France, Great Britain, or the United States. German Army evasions of Treaty of Versailles disarmament provisions, secret military cooperation with the Soviet Union, and mobilization planning took place with either the tacit or explicit acquiescence of the Weimar Republic civilian leadership, or else civilian oversight of the Army was so intentionally superficial as not to reveal their existence.[19]

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[17] There is a plethora of literature on German civil-military relations, and the role of the German Armed Forces in German society, from 1871 to 1945. These include Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff;* Gordon A. Craig. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945.* Oxford, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 1955, and Karl Demeter. *The German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650–1945.* New York, Praeger, 1965. See also John Gooch. *Armies in Europe.* Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. pp. 114–117, 136–138, 147, 154–155, 162–163, 165–166, 170–172, 177–178, 195–200, 205–210.

[18] Bond, *War and Society in Europe,* 1870–1970. p. 58.

Finally, under the Nazi regime (1933-1945), Adolf Hitler may indeed have had an intense "populist" disdain for the old-line aristocratic members and characteristics of the traditional German General Staff, but he shared its generally authoritarian outlook, belief in the efficacy of force in international relations, social-Darwinist concepts about war determining the "survival of the fittest" among nations, and character-building aspects of compulsory military service. Hitler—a civilian, a former wartime corporal in the Imperial German Army during World War I—reduced the General Staff as an institution to absolute impotence in terms of major strategic decisions. These he reserved for himself, as absolute dictator.[20] But although the *power* for ultimate military decisions remained in civilian, if authoritarian, hands under the Third Reich, the attitudes and beliefs of both the popular civilian dictator and the professional General Staff toward "the military virtues" of discipline, authority, and obedience were quite similar, and *both* were only reflecting underlying values of German society of the time:[21]

> The majority of senior officers readily accepted [Hitler's] policies—though some failed to grasp their dangerous implications—and many of those who did protest or drag their feet were only really alarmed at the tempo of the build-up for war, not at the prospect of war itself.

SINGLE-SERVICE AND JOINT GENERAL STAFFS

Neither type of general staff—the functional type found in all modern armed forces or the military-elite type unique to pre-1945 Germany—has been anything but a single-service institution *at the national level.* Because the army is the dominant military service in most countries, a national army general staff has frequently dominated national strategy as a whole, but there has never been a truly joint, fully-integrated interservice national general staff.[22] In the German case, because Germany had been overwhelmingly a land power, the Army had always been the dominant service, and therefore the German Army's General Staff, which provided that Army's elite leadership, ended up dominating German military institutions. Germany, however, never institutionalized a joint general staff, and therefore by definition never had a single chief of staff for all three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force).

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[19] As well as the general discussions cited above in note 17, for civil-military relations in Germany during the Weimar era see John W. Wheeler-Bennett. *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945.* London, Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1954, and F. L. Carsten. *The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933.* Oxford, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 1966.

[20] See the sources cited in notes 17 and 19, as well as R. J. O'Neill. *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939.* London, Cassell, 1966; and Albert Seaton, *The German Army, 1933-1945.* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982.

[21] Bond, *War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970.* p. 158. For a discussion of German Army—as distinct from Gestapo or SS—involvement in Nazi wartime atrocities, see Daniel Goldhagen. "A Bitburg Footnote: The German Army and the Holocaust." *The New Republic,* May 13, 1985. pp. 16-17.

[22] The Soviet General Staff may be the closest approximation. See William Scott and Harriet Fast Scott. *The Armed Forces of the USSR.* Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1979. pp. 108-113.

Some major *subordinate* military commands of the *only* two powers—the United States and Great Britain—in which the army, for geostrategic reasons, is *not* the overwhelmingly dominant service, *have* had truly joint general staffs. Examples include the major Allied theater commands in World War II (European, Mediterranean, Central Pacific, and Southwest Pacific theaters), the United Nations Command/U.S. Far Eastern Command during the Korean War, and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during the Vietnam War. Current United States geographically-based unified commands (European, Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, and Central Commands) have interservice joint general staffs along functional lines described above.

III. THEMES IN CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD A GENERAL STAFF, 1903-1985 [23]

The legislative histories of the six most important Army and defense organization-related statutes of the 20th Century were reviewed to determine congressional attitudes toward a general staff. These statutes are:

—*Act of February 14, 1903* (39 Stat. 830, ch. 553; Public Law 88, 57th Congress). This Act established the modern U.S. Army General Staff.

—*National Defense Act of 1916* (39 Stat. 166; Act of June 3, 1916; Public Law 85, 64th Congress). The National Defense Act of 1916 created the basic tripartite structure of the Army that still exists in 1985—the active Army, the National Guard with a continuing State role but trained and equipped to Federal standards and with Federal service obligations; and a purely Federal Army Reserve.

—*National Defense Act of 1920* (41 Stat. 759, Act of June 4, 1920; Public Law 242, 66th Congress). The National Defense Act of 1920 strengthened and reaffirmed the basic structure provisions of the 1916 Act in the context of World War I experience.

—*National Security Act of 1947* (61 Stat. 495, Act of July 26, 1947; Public Law 253, 80th Congress). This Act establishes a separate U.S. Air Force; unified the Armed Forces under a National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense; and provided a statutory basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

—*National Security Act Amendments of 1949* (63 Stat. 578; Act of August 10, 1949; Public Law 216, 81st Congress). The 1949

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[23] For a listing of *all* congressional documents consulted in which relevant material was found, see the Appendix. Footnotes in this chapter cite direct quotations from congressional primary sources only.

Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 changed the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense; strengthened authority of the DoD over the individual military services; and established the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

—*Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958* (72 Stat. 514; Act of August 6, 1958; Public Law 85-599). The 1958 DoD Reorganization Act strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense; clarified the role of the unified and specified commands in the national military chain of command, and clarified the duties and organization of the Joint Staff.

In addition, legislative activity which led up to the comparatively minor Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization enacted in 1984 was revised (98 Stat. 2611; Sec. 1301, P.L. 98-525; Act of October 19, 1984; Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985), as well as some floor debates running into 1985. (The legislative history of the Act of October 21, 1977; P.L. 95-140; Stat. 1172, which changed the number of Deputy and Under Secretaries of Defense and made some other modifications in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, contained no references to the general staff concept.)

All available hearings, reports, and floor debates on the above statutes were surveyed for any references to the term "general staff." Such references were scattered, frequently made only in passing, and often made in a context other than actual legislative consideration of matters affecting the U.S. Army General Staff. Taken as a whole, however, they enable an analyst to acquire a reasonable understanding of how congressional attitudes toward a general staff have evolved since the U.S. Army General Staff was established in 1903.

The survey which follows is thematic and topical within broad chronological lines. Sections on pre- and post-World War II congressional attitudes toward the general staff concept are followed by sections on the reasons for the change in these attitudes after World War II.

PRE-WORLD WAR II CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

Congressional attitudes toward a general staff before World War I, as exemplified in action on the Acts of 1903, 1916, and 1920, revolved around two basic themes. First, it was acknowledged by almost all members of Congress that the United States Army should have a general staff, but a functional one only—not an elite branch of officer corps along German lines. Second, there was ongoing debate over the nature of the relationship between the traditional adminstrative and support bureaus of the Army and the modern Army General Staff established by the Act of 1903.

The Army General Staff was, for example, subjected to explicit congressional revilement during debate over the National Defense Act of 1920 for allegedly trampling over traditional Army administrative practices during World War I. In a comment echoed by many other members of Congress during debate over the National

Defense act of 1920, Representative Dent stated on the floor of the House that: [24]

> . . . the General Staff in Washington is too large and the powers of the General Staff should be curbed and restored to the duties of its original creation. The original General Staff was provided for the purpose of studying plans of the Army, studying ideas as to how the Army should be organized and equipped. But the General Staff has gone beyond its function and has reached out into the various bureaus and different departments of the Army and taken charge of the administrative functions of the Army which heretofore have been operated by the different bureaus charged specifically with that purpose.

Indeed, after World War I there was so much congressional concern that the Army General Staff had, during the war, trespassed on the prerogatives of the Army's administrative bureaus—Adjutant General's, Medical, Supply, Ordnance, and similar departments—that the National Defense Act of 1920 specifically stated that after the Act's enactment Army General Staff officers: [25]

> . . . shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus of offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.

Ironically, modern scholarship agrees that the Army General Staff did indeed involve itself in detailed administrative work during World War I, rather than confine itself to broad planning and operational supervision. It did so, however, because the traditional administrative bureaus charged with support and logistics functions had, over the course of the preceding century, become so ossified and bogged down in petty peacetime routine that they could not function adequately in a modern industrial war.[26]

The Army General Staff was also implicitly criticized by some Members of Congress for "interfering" with hitherto sacrosanct congressional prerogatives in what today would be termed Army tactical organization and force structure. Representative Dent further asserted on the floor of the House that under the National Defense Act of 1920: [27]

> . . . Congress surrenders the right that it has always retained heretofore of fixing the size of the Army and the units of its organization. This principle is surrendered in this bill, and if the very first section of this bill is adopted, then the Congress of the United States leaves it to the

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[24] Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 9, 1920: 4072.

[25] Sec. 5, Act of June 4, 1920; 41 Stat. 764.

[26] See Weigley, *History of the United States Army*. pp. 364–370, 377–380.

[27] Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 9, 1920. p. 4071.

> General Staff to say how many regiments of Infantry you shall have, how many regiments of Cavalry, and how many regiments of Field Artillery.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> Whenever you give the General Staff the power to organize the Army into units of organization as it sees fit, it inevitably follows that you must give to the War Department lump-sum appropriations.

Although not, for obvious reasons, alluded to directly on the floor of either the House or Senate, it appears that Members of Congress opposed to the Army General Staff were concerned that by its very competence, even in the fields of planning and coordination (rather than detailed administration) it was supposed to be confined to, it would interfere with direct, informal ties between influential Members of Congress and Army administrative bureaus. Such ties had developed throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and had often frustrated the Army commanding general and the Secretary of War in exerting centralized control over Army policies and procedures.[28]

The Army General Staff was *not,* however regarded by the Congress as contributing to militarism of fundamentally erroneous concepts of defense strategy and organization. General staffs were usually regarded as necessary organizational components of a nation's military command structure, required by any modern armed force for overall planning and coordination of military policy. During the 1903 debates on the bill which established the modern U.S. Army General Staff, Representative Parker expressed this view: [29]

> Thus there are these two great duties of the General Staff. First, to acquire the information and arrange it so that an order can be intelligently made; and, second, when it has been made, not to command, but to exercise supervision, inform and advise all the different persons in command and all the members of the various departments, so that they shall work together in doing that work, reporting meanwhile to headquarters, so that the Government can find what has been done.
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> * * * * * * *
>
> The whole civilized world has found out that a general staff is an absolute necessity.

In a similar vein, Representative McClellan asserted that: [30]

> . . . the only civilized armies of the world which are not provided with general staffs are those of England and the United States. England's need for a general staff was emphasized in the South African War [the Boer War, 1899-1902].

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[28] Weigley, *History of the United States Army.* pp. 284-290, 326-333, has some examples of this tendency. Robert M. Utley. *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891.* New York, MacMillan, 1973. pp. 57-65, has some oblique mention of the issue.

[29] To Increase the Efficiency of the Army. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 36, January 6, 1903. p. 537.

[30] Ibid., p. 536.

In floor debate over the National Defense Act of 1916, Senator Cummins was highly supportive of the Army General Staff: [31]

> Neither the [General Staff] nor any of its members as such staff officers have any authority whatsoever. It is a board created in order to exchange views, to discuss military affairs, to look into the future, to apprehend military needs, to provide in a broad way for the national defense. It is, I think, an invaluable arm of the service. I think its existence has vindicated the wisdom of the men who not long ago organized it, and I have no criticism upon it or quarrel with what it is appointed to do.

Although the Army General Staff was criticized vehemently for intrusion into routine administrative work during World War I, after that war there remained a great deal of support for an Army General Staff confined to broad policy-related planning and coordinating duties. Representative Miller, endorsing the General Staff concept in 1920: [32]

> The bill provides for an effective General Staff Corps. I am a strong believer in a strong, effective, vigorous General Staff. Without it no Army, however well organized and equipped, can effectively operate. The staff is the planning section of the Army, as well as the coordinating. To give it administrative authority only as a "lastditch" expedient would tend to throw every other administrative branch to the wind. Our experience in the late war has demonstrated beyond all possible doubt the advantages of the staff principle. When we look about to locate the force, the organization that brought about the expansion of our establishment to meet the emergency of war, the eye, as well as the hand, rests upon the General Staff Corps. It must be retained to have an effective Army.

Representative McKenzie expressed similar views: [33]

> . . . I appreciate the prejudice in the mind of the average man against what is known as the General Staff of the Army. It is a regrettable fact, and perhaps much of that prejudice is due to mistakes made by officers heretofore appointed to the General Staff. I say, and I speak to you in all sincerity, do not make a mistake. A general staff, and a general staff with troops, is the very foundation and bulwark of our Military Establishment. Do not fall into the error of believing that the functions of a general staff are not necessary. It was due to the fact that we did not have a large, able, efficient general staff when we got into this war that many mistakes were made, and another reason was due to the fact that civilians, dollar-a-day men, came into the city of Washington and pushed the General Staff of the Army off the map to a great extent.

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[31] To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 53, March 31, 1916. p. 5219.

[32] Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 8, 1920. p. 4040.

[33] Ibid., March 11, 1920. p. 4134.

Before World War II, the Prussian-German General Staff was cited as an example of technical military excellence. In debate over the 1903 Act, for instance, Representative Slayden suggested that: [34]

> . . . the advantages of having a military staff, such as is proposed by this bill, were exemplified in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. One of the countries engaged in that war went into the conduct of a campaign upon a specially devised plan made by a general staff which sat in the city of Berlin; the other went into that war without the preparation which it might have had had it had the privilege of enjoying the benefit of a similar staff sitting in the city of Paris.

Representative Kahn, Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, had similar words of praise for the German General Staff system during debate over the 1920 Act: [35]

> The Germans . . . detailed men permanently in the general staff. The planning for the German Army became the life work of men who were found adaptable for general staff duties. In this country, we have had practically no law which enabled men to be prepared for general staff work. One of the important features of this legislation now under consideration is a general staff school, so that men may be trained for general staff work.
>
> This is an entirely new feature of our military law, and in any opinion it is an excellent feature.

Later that day, Representative McKenzie added that: [36]

> Old Frederick the Great, of Germany . . . was the first man to lay the foundation for a general staff. No man will say that Germany did not have a powerful military machine; but Germany laid the foundation first for a real general staff . . .

The German General Staff was also occasionally mentioned, in a value-free fashion, as one model of organizing a national general staff. Even in 1903, the fundamental distinction between a general staff as a functional organization on the one hand, and as an elite career branch of the officer corps on the other—the latter peculiar to Germany—was apparent to some congressional analysts of the issue such as Representative McClellan: [37]

> There are two general staff systems in existence: First, the Prussian, by which an officer once a member of the general staff always remains so; second, the French, by which the staff is made up of graduates of the Superior

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[34] To Increase the Efficiency of the Army. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 36, January 6, 1903. p. 534.

[35] Army Reorganization. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 59, March 11, 1920. p. 4182.

[36] Ibid., p. 4184.

[37] To Increase the Efficiency of the Army. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 36, January 6, 1903. p. 533.

> War School, detailed for a term of years, by competitive examination.

The German General Staff was *never* criticized for either leading to or representing militarism, dictatorship, or faulty strategic planning. No antipathy to German military institutions *per se* was found in detailed reading of the debates and hearings on the 1903, 1916, and 1920 Acts. There was an occasional use of the term "Prussian" in a derogatory context, denoting authoritarian tendencies, but *never* in relation to the German General Staff—or indeed any other general staff, including that of the United States.

POST-WORLD WAR II CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

After World War II, congressional discussion of the general staff concept revolved around fundamental issues of civil-military relations and service roles and missions. The extent and vehemence of negative attitudes toward a general staff increased immeasurably over pre-1945 levels. Members of Congress were no longer concerned with the issues of organizational "turf" and executive-legislative relations which had dominated pre-World War II debates over the general staff concept and the Army General Staff.

Congressional opponents of a general staff, for example, regarded one of its consequence as militarism and subordination of civil authority to the military. During floor debate on the National Security Act of 1947, Representative Hoffman states this opinion when discussing the Joint Staff that the proposed Act would establish in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: [38]

> The argument may come up that this Joint Staff is not a National General Staff. The fact is that it can be a National General Staff in all but name, and the Director can become a National Chief of Staff.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> It is the imperceptible, gradual, and constant accumulation of authority in carrying out the policy of their so-called superior authorities that national general staffs became a dominant force in their government.

Senator Robertson, 12 days before, had voiced a similar view: [39]

> It is almost axiomatic that militarism in any country increases proportionately to the power of the Nation's general staff.

Representative Ford was just as vehement in his equation of a general staff with militarism during debate on the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, arguing that there was: [40]

> . . . a deep-seated conflict between those, both in the military and in civilian life, who favor a republican form of government and those who apparently believe an extreme

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[38] Unification of the Armed Services. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 93, July 19, 1947. pp. 9436–9437.

[39] Ibid., Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 93, July 7, 1947. p. 8316.

[40] National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 95, August 2, 1949. pp. 1949–1950.

> concentration of authority and power of decision is a very small and carefully selected cadre of officers known as the general staff.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> The General Staff of the United States Army [was] neither American nor democratic in its scope or intent . . . However, with the perfection attained by years of operation and by the distortion and perversion of opportunists it now assumes a role approaching that of military autocracy.

During debate on the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, *supporters* of strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were at pains to disassociate themselves from the "general staff concept," which they implied constituted a threat to civilian control of the military. Senator Saltonstall: [41]

> I should like to emphasize that this bill in no sense destroys the identity of our separate military services nor does it propose the creation of a Supreme General Staff. Rather, it emphasizes civilian control of our Military Establishment.

Senator Thurmond: [42]

> In recommending these changes to the Senate, the committee has wisely preserved in full force and effect the civilian control of the military which is essential in a democratic form of government, especially this of ours. Some persons have been greatly alarmed for fear that the reorganization bill would bring into existence a so-called general staff setup. Certainly, under this bill there is no room for justifiable alarm.

A general staff was also regarded by Members of Congress *opposed* to service unification as both the cause and result of the "autocratic" subordination of the individual military services, each rigidly structured so as to control all national military assets on the ground, at sea, and in the air (i.e., the Army controlling all land forces, including the Marine Corps; and the Air Force controlling all aircraft, including naval aviation), to an overall joint command authority. During the 1947 debate, for instance, Senator Robertson contrasted the "authoritarian" military "philosophy" exemplified by Nazi Germany (and, by implication, by its General Staff), Napoleonic France, Fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union with the "democratic [military] philosophy" of "the democratic nations of the world," in which each service is provided with all forces required to accomplish its broad mission (i.e., in which the Navy is provided with a Marine Corps to accomplish land-warfare missions, and naval aviation to accomplish air-warfare missions, incidental to prosecution of naval campaigns). [43]

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[41] Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 104, July 18, 1958. p. 14254.

[42] Ibid., p. 14267.

[43] Unification of the Armed Services. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 93, July 9, 1947. pp. 8490-8491. For a recent analysis by a naval officer which asserts the same point of

Continued

Finally, after World War II Congress always viewed the overall concept of a general staff in the context of the German General Staff. The German General Staff was regarded as an autocratic institution, responsible in large part for German militarism and aggression in both World Wars. Representative Martin, in debate over the 1947 Act:[44]

> Between 1857 and 1906, the period in which Germany forged the iron spells which ripped our world apart, there were but three directors of the Prussian general staff: Generals von Moltke, von Waldersee, and von Schlieffen. Of these three, von Waldersee was unimportant, holding office but 3 years. Two ruthless, brilliant, and aggressive military intellectuals, Moltke and Schlieffen, actually affected the transition of Prussia into the aggressive, warmongering state which we have unhappily learned to know well, and it was their descendants in office who made World War II a reality.

Critics of the U.S. Joint Staff asserted that it would constitute a general staff that resembled the German General Staff. Senators Mike Mansfield and Paul H. Douglas, in a letter to Senator Stuart Symington written in 1958, regarding the proposed DoD Reorganization Act of that year, expressed fears along these lines:[45]

> While ostensibly rejecting a single Chief of Staff and a General Staff setup, [the proposed legislation] in effect accomplishes that purpose. The language refers to the Chairman of the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as separate entities, gives the Chairman—not the Joint Chiefs of Staff—control over the management of the Joint Staff as well as authority to select its members. This in effect creates the factual single Chief of Staff system which the bill and its report endeavor to deny *and which the unhappy experience of other nations warns us not to adopt.* [CRS]

Supporters of the DoD reorganization measures argued that anything resembling the German General Staff should and would be avoided in the United States—even if these supporters did not always agree with all of the criticisms leveled at the German General Staff. Representative Charles Gubser, during hearings on the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, represented this point of view, asking rhetorically:[46]

> Where in a Prussian general staff system . . . was there any individual who exercised within the framework of a democracy the degree of power or control that would be

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view, albeit in nonpejorative language, see Commander T. R. Fedyszyn, U.S. Navy. JCS Reorganization: A Maritime Perspective. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1985. pp. 80–87.

[44] Unification of the Armed Services. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 93, July 1947. p. 9454.

[45] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Hearings, 85th Congress, 2nd session. June 17–July 8, 1958. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. p. 209.

[46] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization of the Department of Defense. Hearings, 85th Congress, 2nd session. April 22–May 21, 1958. H.A.S.C. No. 83. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. p. 6268.

> exercised under this administration proposal by a civilian Secretary of Defense or the President?

Mr. Gubser went on:[47]

> . . . it seems to me that when we compare this legislation with the Prussian general staff system, we are just comparing horses with cabbages or something equally as ridiculous.
>
> In the first place, the Prussian general staff system . . . evolved out of a dictatorship. We have a democracy. Now some people will say, "Well, the Weimar Republic was not," because of the fact that it operated under the dictates of the allies of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles.
>
> Another thing: The Prussian general staff was in existence before the Weimar Republic and it never surrendered all of its power to civilians under that Republic.
>
> Now, it seems to me that this, again, is a red herring that is being dragged around here and I, for one, am willing to be convinced, but need to be convinced, that this legislation will ever or could ever result in bringing about a Prussian general staff system.

In 1985, speaking on his proposals for Joint Chiefs of Staff reform, Representative Ike Skelton stated that:[48]

> Many of these same critics express the fear that proposals such as the one I am advocating today would lead to the creation of an elite, German-style general staff. This fear deserves to be addressed. The larger answer to their concerns is that the United States has no tradition of military dominance and is not remotely in danger of any such development today. France, Britain, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany have unified service staffs. No one has argued that those democracies have been undermined by such efforts.

Clearly, Representatives Gubser and Skelton, and others who held the same point of view, apparently rejected the German General Staff concept just as much as those persons opposed to further unification of the Armed Forces. Where they seemingly differed was on the relationship between unification on the one hand and both (1) a German General Staff system and (2) military superiority over civil authority on the other.

A very few Members of Congress drew the distinction between the general staff concept and the German General Staff branch. In 1958, Senator Stuart Symington spoke on the distinction between a general staff as a functional organization and as an elite branch of the officer corps:[49]

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[47] Ibid., p. 6269.

[48] Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Extensions of Remarks. Congressional Record [daily ed.], June 13, 1985. p. E2770.

[49] Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 104, July 18, 1958. p. 14259. Senator Symington's lengthy address, covering pp. 14256–14260, is probably the most analytically complete congressional discussion of the general staff concept and the German General Staff discovered in the course of researching this study.

> . . . I think I am right in saying that no proposal for a more unified Military Establishment has ever been made in this century, from Elihu Root's general staff bill [the Act of 1903] down to the present, without dire predictions that a man on a white horse would take over; and that we would find ourselves saddled with a military dictatorship on the German, Japanese, or Latin American model . . .
>
> The Prussian general staff is designated as the threat to our liberties, apparently without realization that both our Army and our Navy adopted a general staff organization based on the Prussian model in the early years of this century—the Army in 1903, the Navy in 1915.
>
> I emphasize the word "organization" in that last sentence.
>
> The thing we did not adopt from the Prussian system was the practice of building up a continuing military elite—called in Germany the general staff corps and distinguished by a red stripe on the uniform trousers. This corps held a special status, permitting them to entrench themselves on a permanent basis in the highest staff and command positions; and thus to acquire great practical power through influential contacts in political and financial circles.

Another was Senator Barry Goldwater, who in 1958 felt that a general staff could be accompanied by constitutional safeguards in the context of American democracy: [50]

> I state again, as I have stated before in discussions on this subject, that I believe the ultimate organization of the armed services must be one military, one uniform, a General Staff, and a Chief of Staff, surrounded by proper civilian protection and surrounded by Congress and the President, so as to eliminate any chances that there might occur what some people seem to think could possibly occur under such a system.

Senators Symington and Goldwater, however, were virtually the only Members of either House of Congress in the post-World War II era who precisely delineated the nature of general staffs in general or the German general staff in particular, or were willing to suggest that the general staff as a term and concept might be applicable to American military institutions.

Nothing better demonstrates the degree of congressional opposition to a general staff than the identically-worded provision found in both the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 and the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 that the intent of the legislation was "not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff," [51] and the provision of the 1958 Act which stated that "The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces general staff and shall have no executive authority." [52]

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[50] Ibid., p. 14266.

[51] Sec. 2 of both Acts.

[52] Subsection 5(a) of the 1958 Act.

REASONS FOR CHANGED CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES AFTER WORLD WAR II: THE GERMAN QUESTION

Two major factors seem to have combined in the post-World War II era to bring about this fundamental change in congressional attitudes toward a general staff. The first involved Germany and the distinctive character of its general staff.

The defeat of Nazi Germany was viewed as the culmination of roughly a century of German history in which the German General Staff had played a unique role in shaping German military institutions. The German General Staff, unlike all other national general staffs, constituted an elite career branch of the officer corps, selected, promoted, and trained accordingly to rigorous and highly selective criteria. It furnished both the leadership of the national high command *and* the commanders and senior staff officers of major commands in the field. It thus wielded correspondingly more influence than other national general staffs which were functional organizations, and whose members returned to their regular branch upon completion of a tour of general staff duty.

By the time congressional debate on the National Security Act of 1947 began, therefore, the German model of a general staff was inextricably linked with the larger course of German history from the 1860s through 1945—the rise of an authoritarian and military-oriented culture and society; disastrous defeat in two world wars, for which the first Germany was substantially and the second Germany almost completely responsible; and the commission of mass murders and atrocities then regarded as unparalleled in human history.

Given the temper of the times, it is therefore not surprising that a more analytical interpretation of the role of the German General Staff in shaping German history did not dominate congressional opinion in the post-World War II era. As noted previously in this study, the German General Staff existed and became powerful in the militaristic *environment* of Prussia and Germany from the mid-19th Century through 1945, but rarely threatened civilian authority *per se,* precisely because "civilian authority"—whether that of Imperial Germany (1871-1918), the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), or Adolf Hitler's Third Reich (1933-1945)—was itself so military-oriented and authoritarian, as was German society and culture. There was thus substantial congruence between German military institutions and ideals—including the prestige of the general staff—and German society as a whole.

REASONS FOR CHANGED CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES AFTER WORLD WAR II: SERVICE UNIFICATION

The second major reason for the change in congressional attitudes toward a general staff after World War II involved the coincidental unification of the Armed Forces that was taking place at the time, and the concurrent creation of an independent Air Force out of the Army Air Forces. Prospective service unification created a great deal of uncertainty and fear among traditional senior officers of the Armed Forces and their congressional supporters. In particular, Members of Congress who were strong partisans of the Navy and Marine Corps were concerned that in a unified national defense organization, the allegedly continental viewpoints of the Army and newly-created Air Force would dominate the naval and amphibious concerns, concepts, and forces of the two sea services. Even more specifically, they were concerned that a dominant Army would attempt to drastically constrain the size, roles, and missions of the Marine Corps, and that a dominant land-based Air Force would attempt to curtail both carrier-based and shore-based naval aviation. The Members of Congress holding these views, of course, reflected similar views on the part of many senior Navy and Marine officers.

Accordingly, Members of Congress opposed to the principle, or the anticipated degree, of service unification searched for arguments with which to oppose it. One was that unification would result in a "general staff" system similar to that of the Germans—in particular, that unification would inevitably require a joint general staff to administer and control the central national defense organization or depatment. Senator Robertson, in arguing against service unification in 1947, expounded on this point:[53]

> Nominally, the Joint Staff is to provide assistance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a function performed satisfactorily heretofore by a secretariat . . . By virtue of its permanence, its availability, and its invitation to the Secretary of National Security to bypass the Joint Chiefs of Staff and place reliance upon it for the administration of the military services, the Joint Staff will inevitably expand, accumulate executive authority, and become the fountainhead of policy and direction for the Military Establishment. Its members will become a permanent national general staff corps, an inner circle of professional military men of the Nation, just as the Army General Staff Corps did within the War Department. It will be a short step indeed from such a position of actual power to a position of titular power and a position of dominance in the affairs of the Nation.

This joint staff was held to be analogous to the pre-1945 German General Staff. The German General Staff, both congressional and executive branch opponents of unification argued, had been a numerically large joint staff with command over all German services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), with a single military Chief of Staff for all three services, and with responsibilities for manning both major field command and staff positions and those in the central headquarters of the German Army. Representative Hoffman, speaking in debate on the 1949 National Security Act Amendments:[54]

> The Congress of the United States has gone on record repeatedly ever since 1903 against the Prussian-type national general staff and against an all-powerful Chief of Staff

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[53] Unification of the Armed Services. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 93, July 7, 1947. p. 8318.

[54] National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Remarks in the House. Congressional Record, v. 95, August 2, 1949. p. 10604.

> of our armed forces, and the Congress went on record in 1947 against absolute "merger" of our armed forces.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> As much as we respect the purely "military" ability of men like General Bradley and General Vandenberg, I am shocked to hear them say before a congressional committee that they believe in a single Chief of Staff of all the armed forces. General Gruenther, director of the Joint Staff, has given his opinion before the House Armed Services Committee that we would have a single Chief of Staff in 5 years.
>
> Forewarned should be forearmed.
>
> What good are pious sentiments if the opening wedges for a Nazi-Prussian consolidation of military power are already hidden in the law?

Senator Robertson, in 1947, was even more explicit:[55]

> The development of the German General Staff has been characterized by continued efforts to bring all elements of the armed forces under control of a single agency controlled directly or indirectly by the general staff. Without going into the separate problem of what form the so-called merger of our armed forces should take, we should remember that any plan that would place all armed forces directly or indirectly under the War Department General Staff or any agency indirectly controlled by it would conform to a method by which the German General Staff militarized Germany.
>
> The arguments voiced by our War Department for its plan for unification of the armed forces and creation of a high command seems inspired by the philosophy of those who militarized Germany.

Congressional critics of unification—which they identified with the German General Staff—further noted not only the supposed moral deficiencies of the pre-1945 German General Staff, but also noted that despite that staff's alleged technical excellence, Germany had been defeated in both world wars. Unification, therefore, would lead to a German-type general staff, which would lead to military defeat, rather than the traditional American system of comparatively independent services, which had twice in the 20th century led to military victory.[56]

Congressional *supporters* of unification challenged—and modern historiography on the subject supports them—the assertions that the German General Staff was a joint staff with direct command over all services. Representative St. George noted in 1958 that:[57]

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[55] Unification of the Armed Services. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 93, July 7, 1947. p. 8317.

[56] For example, see Ibid., July 9, 1947. p. 8490.

[57] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization of the Department of Defense Hearings, 85th Congress, 2nd session. April 22-May 21, 1958, H.A.S.C. No. 83, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. p. 6263.

> . . . the German General Staff was strictly under the Army . . . the Luftwaffe was never included, nor was the Navy.

Members of Congress seeking to refute those critics of unification who were attacking it through attacks on the general staff also noted that while powerful, it had usually been subordinated to civil authority—even if the latter was itself authoritarian, as was the case in Germany, and asserted that the entire panoply of American democratic institutions, concepts, and attitudes—not specific structural characteristics of the military—were what guaranteed that unified U.S. Armed Forces, with or without a joint general staff, would not challenge civilian control of the military. Senator Symington, in debate over the 1958 Act, observed that: [58]

> Hitler's Germany was a party dictatorship, not a military dictatorship.
>
> Beginning in 1938, Hitler had a high command of the armed forces, called the OKW; but this was an instrument for Hitler to impose his will on the army, not the reverse.
>
> We deplore Hitler as a civilian authority, but that's what he was.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> These latter [military] dictatorships do not stem from any particular form of military organization, but from the political immaturity and the habit of authoritarian government, which are the outgrowth of a low level of education of the people.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> The liberties of this country hang on no such slender thread as what this Congress may legislate as to the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the structure of the Joint Staff.
>
> Under our proposal civilian control is still assured by three levels of civilians in the executive establishment—the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, and the President—in addition to the concurrent authority exercised by the two Houses of Congress.

Congressional critics of unification and, *inter alia,* the general staff concept were *correct* in describing the German General Staff as a German Army elite whose members occupied both national headquarters command and staff positions and senior field commands. In asserting that service unification in the United States would inevitably lead to creation of a joint general staff elite with a similar "lock" on both headquarters and field commands, however, these critics were confusing the *functional* and *organizational* characteristics of whatever joint staff organization might exist in the unified Armed Forces with the *military elite* characteristics of the German General Staff. The actual Joint Staff which was established to provide staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, had and has none of the highly selective and meritocratic assignment, educational, and separate career branch characteristics of the pre-1945 German General Staff.[59]

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[58] Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Remarks in the Senate. Congressional Record, v. 104, July 18, 1958. p. 14258.

IV. Concluding Observations

At first glance, congressional attitudes toward a general staff during the 20th Century appear to vary greatly, depending on whether they were stated before or after World War II. Yet a common thread can be discerned throughout the 80-odd years of intellectual history examined in this study—one entirely consistent with basic strains of American thought and belief. A persistent suspicion of hierarchy and authority, however meritocratically chosen or subordinate to democratic institutions, and an equally persistent egalitarianism, however administratively untidy or counter to "effective" government, pervaded congressional discussion of the general staff concept during 1903–1985.

Thus, before World War II, Members of Congress opposed the U.S. Army General Staff—a small, unelected body of professional soldiers—becoming involved in detailed aspects of Army administration, because to do so would decrease the direct influence of the national legislature on the Army. The Army General Staff could plan strategy all it wanted—the Congress was little interested in strategy anyway. Let the general staff influence resource allocation, however, or personnel decisions, and it constituted the injection of technocratic specialists into areas where democratic generalists—i.e., Members of Congress—should have the final say.

After World War II the distinction became even greater. Support for egalitarian institutions was extended by many into the area of interservice relations, where equality of bureaucratic and political power among the three major military services was held to be the logical outcome of democracy, and the subordination of the services to a central authority, however constitutional, was equated with autocracy. Even supporters of service unification who rejected this latter point of view were at pains to declare their opposition to a general staff which was an elite branch of the officer crops, on the German model, although in their next breath they would carefully delineate why American conditions would prevent the rise of militarism like that of Germany regardless of the type of general staff we had—if any.

In retrospect, the vehemence of objections to an elite general staff based on the assumption that such an organization would threaten American *political* democracy seems misplaced. Modern scholarship suggests that the power and prestige of the German General Staff was more a product of Prussian or German militarism than a creator of it. Yet the congressional opponents of "the general staff" may very well have been correct in sensing something "un-American" about it—even the restricted U.S. Army General Staff. The missions of a general staff—to prepare for war, based on the assumption that *there will be a "next war"*; to conduct systematic *long-range* planning; to do all this in an atmosphere of at least relative secrecy—all fly in the face of the traditional American qualities of optimism (there need not be a next war), ad hoc pragmatism (long-range planning is an undemocratic narrowing of options by technocrats), and openness (the public's "right to know").

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[59] Collins, *U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique.* p. 58–60.

Congressional attitudes toward a general staff in the 20th Century, therefore, many indicate the persistence of American social myths (a "myth," in this sense, need not be false—or even susceptible to evaluation as to its truth or falsehood), and the truly representative nature of the Congress in reflecting popular attitudes and beliefs, however, inchoate, formless, or subliminal. If the Congress changes its attitudes about a general staff (either the term itself or the concepts it embodies) it may indicate a strong confidence in the ability of American political institutions to control the military, regardless of how the Nation's highest military command is structured. It might also reflect a changed, deeper, and more substantial acceptance and understanding of the nature of wars and military institutions themselves among not only Members of Congress, but the people they represent.

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CHAPTER 5

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the unified and specified commands which were established to control operations whenever military forces are employed. Commanders of the unified and specified commands report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. These commands and their Service components represent one of the two distinct organizational levels of the Department of Defense: the operational level. The other is the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations.

Unified and specified commands are, by definition, those with a broad and continuing mission. Unified commands have forces assigned from two or more Services; specified commands consist of forces from a single Service. Today, there are six unified commands and three specified commands in existence:

Unified Commands:
U.S. Atlantic Command (Norfolk, Virginia)
U.S. Central Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida)
U.S. European Command (Stuttgart, Germany)
U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii)
U.S. Readiness Command (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida)
U.S. Southern Command (Quarry Heights, Panama)
Specified Commands:
Aerospace Defense Command (Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado)
Military Airlift Command (Scott Air Force Base, Illinois)
Strategic Air Command (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska)

In addition, on November 20, 1984, President Reagan approved the establishment of a seventh unified command: the U.S. Space Command. This new command is to be formally established on September 23, 1985.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the unified and specified command system as it has evolved since World War II and to see, in the context of the overall DoD organization, if this system best serves U.S. national security interests. For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this chapter the unified and specified commands will be referred to as "operational commands". Likewise, the unified and specified commanders will be referred to as "operational commanders." In certain quotes, however, the operational commanders will be referred to as "CINC's", an abbreviation for Commanders in Chief.

B. EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

1. Prior to World War II

Prior to World War II, the War Department and the Navy Department existed as essentially independent entities and rarely did Army and Navy units operate together. When they did so, command arrangements were *ad hoc*. Concerns about the lack of interservice relations first arose during the Spanish-American War when the Army and Navy failed to cooperate fully during the Cuban campaign. In fact, the interservice disputes were so great that the Army Commander refused to allow the Navy representative to sign the formal surrender document. As a result of these problems, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed a common order which created the Joint Army and Navy Board, whose charge was to address "all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services." The Joint Army and Navy Board continued to handle interservice matters until the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created in 1942.

In due time, one product of the work of the Joint Army and Navy Board became the agreements documented in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" (JAAN). The version of JAAN in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 described "mutual cooperation," not unified command, as the favored method in joint operations.

2. World War II

World War II, with its numerous theaters, multiple-Service operations, and increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, proved that "mutual cooperation" between the Services was no longer adequate. General George C. Marshall, USA realized early in World War II that the complexity of modern warfare demanded unified command:

> I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater —air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this. (Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, 1948, page 455)

The disastrous failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941 dictated that in each theater the operational forces of two or more Services be placed under the command of a single individual. Thus, during World War II, the first continuing multiservice commands were created. The newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff designated from among their members an "executive agent" for each of these operational commands.

3. The National Security Act of 1947

While the JCS had decided during World War II that unified command would continue to be employed in peacetime, public and congressional opinion, influenced by the findings of the Pearl Harbor investigation that laid blame for that disaster in large part on divided command, would accept no other arrangement. The

Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, released in 1946, stated:

> It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster that the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed. (page 245)

By World War II's end, the concept of unified command was accepted as sound in theory and practice. As a result, the National Security Act of 1947 provided for unified command and assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, for establishing "unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security."

There was, however, no change in the executive agent arrangement in 1947. Thus, in the years after World War II, the pre-World War II idea that the Military Department that raised and supported the forces also employed the forces was perpetuated. This is an important aspect of the organizational history of the operational commands, because this approach still finds expression in the attitudes and actions of many Service personnel.

4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

In 1953, President Eisenhower by Executive Order revised the executive agent concept to provide that the Military Department rather than a Service Chief would serve as executive agent for each unified command. In his April 30, 1953 message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, President Eisenhower explained and justified this change as follows:

> . . . Under this new arrangement the channel of responsibility and authority to a commander of a unified command will unmistakably be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the designated civilian Secretary of a military department. This arrangement will fix responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials as intended by the National Security Act. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 152)

5. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act

In 1958, as part of the Reorganization Act, a fundamental change in the operational commands took place. President Eisenhower, in proposing the legislative revisions to the National Security Act of 1947, stated:

> . . . separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief. (Message to the Con-

gress, April 3, 1958, *The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 175)

To implement this thesis, President Eisenhower proposed that the operational commanders report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Military Departments and the Service Chiefs were eliminated from the chain of command, and the executive agent arrangement was ended. This was accomplished in the 1958 Reorganization Act and remains in force today.

Specifically, Section 2 of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 declared that it was national policy "...to provide for the establishment of unified and specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands..." Later in the same Act (Section 202(j)), the authority for the President to establish operational commands is set forth with some specificity:

> (j) With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions. Such combat commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President. Forces assigned to such unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands shall be under the full operational command of the commander of the unified combatant command or the commander of the specified combatant command. All forces not so assigned remain for all purposes in their respective departments. Under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense each military department shall be responsible for the administration of the forces assigned from its department to such combatant commands. The responsibility for the support of forces assigned to combatant commands shall be vested in one or more of the military departments as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense. Forces assigned to such unified or specified combatant commands shall be transferred therefrom only by authority of and under procedures established by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President.

Essentially, this same provision has been codified as section 124 of title 10, United States Code, and remains the basis for the current operational command structure.

C. KEY TRENDS

1. Changes in the Operational Command Structure

a. Original Operational Commands

The original operational commands were essentially those in place at the end of World War II. The first peacetime "unified command" to be established, U.S. Forces, European Theater was created when General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was dissolved on July 14, 1945. The basic charter of the original seven unified commands and two specified commands was the Unified Command Plan prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President Truman on December 14, 1946.

Under this plan, the following commands were to be established; the date that each command was actually established is shown.

Unified Commands

- Far East Command (U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas Islands, and the Bonins) —January 1, 1947
- Pacific Command —January 1, 1947
- Alaskan Command —January 1, 1947
- European Command (In effect, the European Command (EUCOM) was only a new title for U.S. Forces, European Theater which had existed since July 1945. While nominally a unified command, EUCOM was almost wholly of Army composition.) —March 15, 1947
- Atlantic Fleet (The Atlantic Fleet was made a command on November 1, 1947, but one month later the Atlantic Command was established.)
- Caribbean Command —November 1, 1947
- Northeast Command (forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland) —October 1, 1950

Specified Commands

- Strategic Air Command —December 14, 1946
- U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) —November 1, 1947

The Strategic Air Command became the first example of what was later designated a specified command, though the term did not come into use until 1951.

b. Changes in the 1950's and 1960's

There was relatively little change in the operational command structure in the two decades following the creation of the original peacetime commands. There were only two major changes: establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command and U.S. Strike Command as unified commands. The changes during this 20-year period were:

- in 1951, U.S. Air Forces, Europe was established as a specified command;
- in 1952, the U.S. European Command became a full-fledged unified command;
- in 1954, the Continental Air Defense Command was established as a joint command and made a unified command in 1958;
- in 1956, U.S. Air Forces, Europe was disestablished as a specified command;
- in 1956, the Northeast Command was disestablished;

- in 1957, the Far East Command was disestablished and its forces were placed under the Pacific Command;
- in 1961, the U.S. Strike Command was established as a unified command;
- in 1963, the Caribbean Command was redesignated the U.S. Southern Command; and
- in 1963, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean was disestablished as a specified command and served only as U.S. Naval Forces, Europe under the European Command.

c. Changes in the 1970' and 1980's

There have been only six changes to the operational commands since 1970:

- in 1971, the U.S. Strike Command was renamed the U.S. Readiness Command;
- in 1975, the Alaskan Command was disestablished;
- in 1975, the U.S. Continental Air Defense Command was designated a specified command and renamed the Aerospace Defense Command;
- in 1977, the Military Airlift Command was given the status of a specified command;
- in 1983, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was designated a unified command and renamed the U.S. Central Command; and
- in 1984, President Reagan approved the establishment of the U.S. Space Command.

d. Summary

Since 1945, there have been 11 different unified commands (including the U.S. Space Command) and five different specified commands. Between 1947 and 1950, the original seven unified commands were created. Four of these —European Command, Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and the Caribbean Command now entitled the Southern Command —remain in existence today. The other three initial commands (Far East Command, Northeast Command, and Alaskan Command) were incorporated respectively into the Pacific, Atlantic, and Readiness Commands. (The Alaskan Air Command also reports to the Aerospace Defense Command in connection with its air defense mission.) The Continental Air Defense Command was a unified command for 17 years beginning in 1958. Two new unified commands have been created and remain in existence today: the Readiness Command/Strike Command in 1961 and the Central Command in 1983. Presidential approval of the U.S. Space Command was given in 1984 and that command was formally established in September 1985.

Of the two initial specified commands, only the Strategic Air Command remains. The other, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was incorporated into the European Command as was U.S. Air Forces, Europe which was a specified command for 5 years. Two new specified commands have been created and remain in existence today: the Aerospace Defense Command in 1975 (after its predecessor organization, Continental Air Defense Command, served as a unified command for 17 years) and the Military Airlift Command in 1977.

In general, the current operational command structure remains basically the one that emerged from World War II with some consolidation taking place and with new commands added to meet emerging requirements. Chart 5-1 shows the history of these changes.

Chart 5-1

CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE



2. Broadening of the Missions of the Operational Commands

The operational commands were formed at a time when security threats to the United States were clear and few in number. The international security environment has become much more complex since 1947 due to the buildup and growing reach of Soviet military power, a proliferation of threats to Western interests, and a diffusion of power and influence in the world. These trends have made today's task of protecting U.S. worldwide interests —which in themselves have grown considerably —exceedingly more complex and demanding than in the immediate postwar period. As a result, the operational commands have experienced a substantial broadening of their missions. Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier summarize this trend in their paper, "Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System":

> Today, however, neither the objectives nor the threat can be so clear and so direct; therefore, a unified commander must maintain both the flexibility and the capability to orchestrate warfare throughout the conflict spectrum. (page 5)

In today's world, the missions of the operational command encompass a wide spectrum, from emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals to the launching of nuclear weapons. This broadening of missions is a trend of considerable significance in the examination of (1) the adequacy of the operational command structure and (2) the organization and command arrangements of the operational commands. Changes in the international security environment that have led to a broadening of operational command missions are briefly described below.

a. Widening Geographic Extent of the U.S.-Soviet Military Competition

The growth of Soviet military power is the most ominous trend in the international security environment that faces the United States. During the past two decades, the military dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet balance of power have shifted adversely for the United States.

The geographic scope of challenges to U.S. and Western security interests has expanded substantially over the past decade, due in part to the growing reach of Soviet military power. The competition for power and influence between the United States and the Soviet Union has become truly global in nature. A new boldness and adventurism in Soviet policy toward the Third World has resulted in the proliferation of threats to U.S. interests in distant world areas which are outside the traditional system of Western alliances. In addition, while the improved ability of Soviet forces to operate in non-contiguous areas heightens the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations, more immediate threats to U.S. interests have risen from the aggressive behavior of Soviet clients such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya.

b. Proliferation of Threats to Western Interests

The proliferation of relatively inexpensive, highly destructive, and effective weapons to Third World countries has increased the likelihood and intensity of regional conflicts. Given modern technologies, states involved in regional rivalries and terrorist groups may find it easier to use force. Such relatively low intensity conflicts as the war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war may be the most likely future challenge to U.S. military forces.

For a variety of reasons, the Third World is increasing its purchases of sophisticated military equipment and, in the process, is becoming more heavily and lethally armed. This spread of military technology means that the United States may face increasingly effective military threats from a variety of Third World sources.

Economic issues have always played an important role in a nation's security policy. The trend over the past decade toward increased economic interdependence leaves national economies more vulnerable to the workings of the international economy. Short of costly neo-mercantilist strategies, this increasing economic interdependence will continue to make the free flow of raw materials and trade of significant importance to the Western World.

c. Diffusion of Power and Influence in the World

Against a backdrop of rising militarism, increasing instability, and economic interdependence, the past 20 years have witnessed a significant diffusion of political, military, and economic power and influence in the world. This diffusion has contributed to an overall weakening of the international order.

The gradual weakening of the political cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance is one example of this process; another very different example is the growing signs of serious political strains and popular discontent in the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In the past 20 years, the world's economic order has also changed. Most notable in this regard has been the new economic strength of oil-rich nations and the influence that they have over the world's economy.

Adding to the diffusion of power has been the rise in the political influence and military strength of a growing number of regional powers including India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa. Within their immediate areas, these regional powers can exert considerable influence on regional policies and actions at the expense of the superpowers and other leading nations.

An increase in nationalism in Third World countries has also served to lessen traditional influences. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, which tragically found expression in the revolution in Iran, has produced another force which often conflicts with Western interests.

In general terms, given this diffusion of power and influence, the traditional instruments of power, force, and economic inducements have become more costly and difficult for great powers, particularly democratic ones, to apply. The increased complexity of world politics has reduced the potential of any one country to exercise control over the whole system.

3. Effect of Improved Communications Capabilities on Command and Control Centralization

The original postwar concept for the unified commands envisioned decentralized execution of joint military operations. However, improvements in communications capabilities have, in recent years, enabled the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense) to effectively control forward deployed military forces.

Improved communications have led to operational centralization that was not anticipated at the time that the unified command concept was developed. Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier comment on this trend:

> . . . the unified command has become the conduit for centralized ad hoc control from Washington over even the most minute aspect of tactical execution. ("Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System", page 6)

They cite the experience of various crises in the mid-1970's — Arab-Israeli War (1973), Mayaguez incident (1975), Korean tree cutting incident (1976), Lebanon evacuation (1977), and the Ethiopian evacuation (1977) —as corroboration of this conclusion. The most well-known instance of centralized control from Washington occurred after Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier had written their paper: the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980. The disastrous failure of this operation focused attention on the proper role of the National Command Authority in controlling tactical operations.

Another aspect of centralized control has been the occasional circumvention of portions of the military chain of command in the field. In certain crises, the National Command Authority has not made use of the intermediate echelons which are part of institutional command arrangements. The Steadman Report noted this occurrence:

> . . . communications capabilities have improved to a point where it now is possible for a remote decisionmaker to talk directly to an on-scene commander. Thus, it is relatively easy to by-pass the military chain of command. (page 28)

Judgments on the proper role of the National Command Authority in controlling tactical operations and on the circumvention of portions of the military chain of command will not be made here. It is sufficient to note that improved communications capabilities have shifted much of the initiative from the operational commands to Washington and has, therefore, often altered the role of the most senior elements of the operational commands.

4. Crisis Management Requirements

Of the key trends affecting the operational commands, perhaps the most significant is the emergence of a genuine requirement for increased presidential control in efforts to manage certain crises, primarily those with the potential for superpower confrontation. In today's international security environment, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union possess substantial nuclear arsenals and in which the two superpowers are locked in competition either directly or indirectly in numerous world areas, the need to manage and terminate confrontations before they escalate to war has become increasingly important. As a result, the tension between competing military and political—diplomatic considerations during crises has been considerably heightened in the last 30 years.

In his paper, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations," Alexander L. George discusses the requirement for presidential control during crises:

> That an in-built tension exists between political—diplomatic and military considerations in efforts to manage crises and, similarly, in efforts to keep limited conflicts from escalating has long been recognized. This problem was forced upon the consciousness of American leaders and strategic analysts during the course of the Korean War and quickly led to recognition of the necessity for maintaining presidential control and asserting political constraints on both the strategy and, often, the tactical operations of a theatre commander. The Korean War taught not only President Truman but all succeeding administrations as well that the president's responsibility does not stop with establishing the political objectives to be pursued in a conflict; he must also maintain firm control over the level of costs and risks that are acceptable in pursuing those objectives. To this end the president must be willing to intervene on a timely basis in the determination of operational military plans and in aspects of their implementation. This, in turn, raises the danger of 'micro-management' of crises and adds to the dilemmas of crisis management. (*Survival*, Volume 26, September/October 1984, page 224)

George also argues that one of the major lessons of the Cuban missile crisis was that

> . . . the requirements for prudent crisis management may indeed seriously conflict with and, in the interest of avoiding war, may have to be given priority over some of the standard requirements of conventional military strategy. (page 223)

Essentially, the United States must seek to manage certain crises with a political-military strategy which differs in important respects from conventional military strategy.

Conventional military strategy focuses upon making the most efficient use of available military forces to achieve assigned military objectives. In contrast, a political-military, or coercive diplomatic, strategy seeks to achieve political objectives and uses some mix and sequencing of persuasion, coercive threats or actions, accommodative offers, and concessions. In his paper, George describes a coercive diplomatic strategy as follows:

> . . . Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the opponent to do something instead of bludgeoning him into doing so. Coercive diplomatic strategy focuses upon the task of affecting the opponent's *will* and his *utility calculations* rather than negating his military capabilities....Relying upon a combination of persuasion, accommodation, and coercion, diplomatic strategy offers the possibility of achieving one's objectives economically, with little bloodshed, fewer psychological and political costs, and often with much less risk of escalation. (page 225)

While the need for a coercive diplomatic strategy and presidential control of its formulation and implementation is undeniable especially in crises involving, either directly or indirectly, the United

States and the Soviet Union, this requirement is little understood and often criticized when employed by the President. The criticisms focus upon the constraints that a coercive diplomatic strategy places upon execution of a conventional military strategy. In addition, there is also criticism —which is sometimes valid —of micro-management of tactical operations by the National Command Authority. While these criticisms may have some validity, the overwhelming evidence supports the need for increased presidential control in managing crises that involve the superpowers.

Criticisms of increased presidential control during the nuclear era —whether associated with conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere need to be placed in a historical context. Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, first published in 1832, clearly indicates that "harmful political influence on the management of war" has been a contentious issue throughout modern history. Clausewitz found little logic in these criticisms of political influence.

Clausewitz's view of war as an instrument of policy are reflected in the following:

> ...war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.
>
> ...war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.
>
> ...The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. (*On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, page 605)
>
> ...If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. (page 606)

Complementing these fundamental concepts, Clausewitz presents his views on political considerations in the conduct of war:

> Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle. (page 606)
>
> ...We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for *purely military* opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for *purely military advice*. But it makes even less sense for theoreticians to assert that all available military resources should be put at the disposal of the commander so that on their basis he can draw up purely military plans for a war or a campaign. It is in any case a matter of common experience that despite the great variety and development of modern war its major lines are still laid down by governments; in other words, if we are to be technical about it, by a purely political and not a military body.
>
> This is as it should be. No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence

> on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right—that is, successful—any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong. (pages 607–608)

Clausewitz's views —written more than 150 years ago —appear to be focused on refuting criticisms of political influences on war that have been frequently and strongly voiced in the last 30 years. *On War* gives an important historical context to the current debate.

Although many of the issues associated with the effective exercise of this control by the President are beyond the scope of this study, the extent to which the unified commands are structured and prepared to effectively respond to current crisis management requirements is not. The major question which emerges is: has the unified command system, developed primarily in the late 1940's, adapted effectively to meet today's crisis management requirements? Subsequent portions of this chapter attempt to answer this question.

D. THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

As mentioned previously, there are ten U.S.-only operational commands in existence today. Due to its brief existence, the U.S. Space Command is not included in this discussion. Figure 5-1 is an unclassified representation of the current geographic boundaries of the nine U.S. commands. (The precise geographic boundaries found in the Unified Command Plan are classified.) In addition, the United States participates in four multinational operational commands.

1. Unified Commands

a. U.S. European Command

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is commanded by General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (USCINCEUR). General Rogers also commands the multinational command, Allied Command, Europe, with headquarters in Mons, Belgium. If a war were fought in Europe, the forces of all allied nations would be commanded by General Rogers as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); the U.S. force contribution would come from USEUCOM. As USCINCEUR, General Rogers has three Service component commands that report to him: U.S. Naval Forces, Europe; U.S. Army, Europe; and U.S. Air Forces, Europe. Chart 5-2 shows the command relationships for the U.S. European Command and the NATO responsibilities of these commands.

FIGURE 5-1

THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP)


USPACOM
Arctic Ocean
USLANTCOM
Arctic Ocean
USPACOM
ADC
SAC
USREDCOM
MAC
Pacific Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
USLANTCOM
USEUCOM
USCENTCOM
Pacific Ocean
USPACOM
USSOUTHCOM
Indian Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
USPACOM
USLANTCOM
USPACOM

Chart 5-2

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US EUROPEAN COMMAND


NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC)
DEFENSE PLANNING COUNCIL (DPC)
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MILITARY COMMITTEE (NATO)
★★★★ USA
CINCEUR (UNIFIED COMMAND)
SACEUR (MAJOR NATO COMMAND)
★★★★ (USAF)
DCINCEUR
★★★★ USN
CINCUSNAVEUR (SERVICE COMPONENT)
CINCSOUTH (MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND - NATO)
★★★★ (FRG)
CINCCENT (MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND - NATO)
★★★★ USA
CINCUSAREUR (SERVICE COMPONENT)
COMCENTAG (PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATE COMMAND - NATO)
★★★★ USAF
CINCUSAFE (SERVICE COMPONENT)
COMAAFCE (PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATE COMMAND - NATO)

• USCINCEUR MAY BE FROM ARMY OR AIR FORCE

Chart 5-3

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US SOUTHERN COMMAND


UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
★★★★ (USA)
USCINCSOUTH
(UNIFIED COMMAND)
★ (USA)
COMUSARSO
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
★★ (USAF)
COMUSAFSO
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
(USN)
COMUSNAVSO
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
074

Chart 5-4


COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US READINESS COMMAND
UNITED STATES READINESS COMMAND
NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
★★★★ USA
USCINCRED
(UNIFIED COMMAND)
DIRECTOR JDA
★★★★ (USA)
CINCARRED
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
★★★★ (USAF)
CINCAFRED
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
• USCINCRED MAY BE FROM ARMY OR AIR FORCE

b. U.S. Southern Command

General John R. Galvin, USA (USCINCSOUTH) commands the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) which is responsible for all of Central and South America except for Mexico which is not assigned to any of the operational commands. Responsibility for the water areas adjacent to USSOUTHCOM is assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Command. Among USSOUTHCOM's missions is defense of the Panama Canal. USSOUTHCOM, headquartered at Quarry Heights, Republic of Panama, has three subordinate Service component commands as shown in Chart 5-3.

c. U.S. Readiness Command

The U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) has no specific area of the world as its responsibility. USREDCOM today is responsible for managing mobilization and deployment of reinforcements to overseas commands, developing joint doctrine, and conducting joint exercises. USCINCRED, General Fred K. Mahaffey, USA, is "double hatted" as the Director of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). USREDCOM and JDA are headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. USREDCOM has Army and Air Force component commands as shown in Chart 5-4.

d. U.S. Central Command

The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was formally established in January 1983. This command is a direct response to President Carter's Southwest Asia doctrine, enunciated in his State of the Union Address in January 1980:

> Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

With headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, USCENTCOM, commanded by General Robert C. Kingston, USA (USCINCCENT), has responsibility for Southwest Asia and those African nations bordering on the Red Sea and comprising generally the Horn of Africa. USCENTCOM grew out of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) established by President Carter in reaction to the policy put forth in his State of the Union address. The RDJTF was originally subordinate to USREDCOM. The former USCINCRED, General Volney Warner, USA, took exception to the decision to establish the new Central Command arguing that if USCENTCOM were established, USREDCOM should be disestablished. General Warner elected to retire to express his disagreement with the decision.

The command relationships of USCINCCENT and his three Service component commands are shown in Chart 5-5.

Chart 5-5


COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US CENTRAL COMMAND

UNITED STATES
CENTRAL COMMAND
NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
★★★ (USA)
USCINCCENT
★★★ (USA)
COMUSARCENT
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
★★★ (USAF)
COMUSCENTAF
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
★ (USN)
COMUSNAVCENT
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
074

- USCINCCENT MAY BE FROM ANY SERVICE

Chart 5-6

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US ATLANTIC COMMAND


ATLANTIC
COMMAND
NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
DEFENSE PLANNING COUNCIL
NATO
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MILITARY COMMITTEE
NATO
★★★★ USN
USCINCLANT
UNIFIED COMMAND
SACLANT
★★★★ USA
USCINCARLANT
SERVICE COMPONENT
★★★★ USAF
USCINCAFLANT
SERVICE COMPONENT
USCINCLANTFLT
SERVICE COMPONENT
CINCWESTLANT
NATO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND
COMOCEANLANT
NATO PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATE COMMAND
★★★ USN
COMMANDER JTF 120
JOINT TASK FORCE
★★ USA
COMMANDER SOCLANT
JOINT TASK FORCE
★ USAF
COMMANDER USFORAZORES
SUB UNIFIED COMMAND
★★ USN
COMMANDER JTF 140
JOINT TASK FORCE
COMMANDER USFORCARIB
SUB UNIFIED COMMAND
★★ USN
COMMANDER ICEDEFOR
SUB UNIFIED COMMAND

e. U.S. Atlantic Command

The U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) is predominately a naval command that exercises operational command of the Atlantic Ocean and contiguous land areas. Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN (USCINCLANT) has three sub-unified commands reporting to him: U.S. Forces, Caribbean; Icelandic Defense Forces; and U.S. Forces, Azores. In addition to serving as USCINCLANT, Admiral McDonald also serves as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a major NATO command. Previously, USCINCLANT had also occupied a third position: commander of his Navy component command. However, during October 1985, another 4-star admiral will be assigned to perform the duties of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT).

In addition to his Navy component command, USCINCLANT has Army and Air Force component commands. The current command relationships of the U.S. Atlantic Command are shown in Chart 5-6.

The U.S. military action in Grenada in October 1983 was undertaken through the unified command structure with USCINCLANT exercising control of the operation.

f. U.S. Pacific Command

Similar to the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is predominately a naval command that exercises operational command of the Pacific Ocean and contiguous land areas. Admiral Ronald J. Hays, USN (USCINCPAC) has two sub-unified commands: U.S. Forces, Japan and U.S. Forces, Korea. During the Vietnam War, USPACOM had a third sub-unified command: the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

In addition to his sub-unified commands, USCINCPAC has three Service component commands reporting to him. These command relationships are shown in Chart 5-7.

Chart 5-7

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: US PACIFIC COMMAND


NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
STRATEGIC DIRECTION
ROK/US MILITARY COMMITTEE
ROK PRESIDENT
ROK MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
STRATEGIC DIRECTION
★★★★ (USN)
USCINCPAC
(UNIFIED COMMAND)
★★★★
USA
★★★★ (USN)
CINCPACFLT
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
COMUSKOREA
(SUB UNIFIED COMMAND)
CINCUNC
(COMBINED COMMAND)
CINCCFC
(COMBINED COMMAND)
★★★★ (USAF)
CINCPACAF
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
★★★ (USAF)
COMUSJAPAN
(SUB UNIFIED COMMAND)
★★★ (USA)
CDRWESTCOM
(SERVICE COMPONENT)
USCINCPAC REPS

Chart 5-8

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND


NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
★★★★ (USAF)
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE
★★★★
USAF
DIRECTOR JSTPS
CINCSAC
(SPECIFIED COMMAND)
COMMANDER SAC
(USAF MAJCOM)
★★★ (USAF)
COMMANDER FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE
★★ (USAF)
COMMANDER 1STRAD
★★★ (USAF)
COMMANDER EIGHTH AIR FORCE

D74

Chart 5-9

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND


NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER
DEFENSE MINISTER
CHIEF DEFENSE STAFF
SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
★★★★ (USAF)
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE
★★★★
USAF
CINCNORAD
(COMBINED COMMAND)
CINCADCOM
(SPECIFIED COMMAND)
COMMANDER SPACECOM
(USAF MAJCOM)

074

Chart 5-10

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND


MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND
NCA
PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
★★★★ (USAF)
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE
★★★★ (USAF)
CINCMAC
(SPECIFIED COMMAND)
COMMANDER MAC
(USAF MAJCOM)
★★★ (USAF)
COMMANDER 21 AF
(AIRLIFT)
★★★ (USAF)
COMMANDER 22 AF
(AIRLIFT)
★★ (USAF)
COMMANDER 23 AF
(SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR RESCUE)
★ (USAF)
COMMANDER AIR WEATHER SERVICE
(USAF)
COMMANDER AEROSPACE AUDIO VISUAL SERVICE
074

2. Specified Commands

a. Strategic Air Command

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is the oldest specified command. General Larry D. Welch, USAF (CINCSAC) commands the Air Force's strategic missile and bomber forces and exercises control over the targeting of the Navy's strategic submarine forces from his headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. As Chart 5-8 shows, SAC has three major subordinate Air Force organizations.

b. Aerospace Defense Command

The Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), established as the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954, is responsible for air defense of the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico. Headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado with sensitive command and control equipment housed in nearby Cheyenne Mountain, ADCOM is commanded by General Robert T. Herres, USAF (CINCADCOM). CONAD was a joint command from 1954 until 1958 and a true unified command from 1958 until 1975 with Army and Navy components contributing to the air defense mission. CINCADCOM also doubles as CINCNORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), an allied air defense command which combines the air defense capabilities of the United States and Canada.

The command relationships of ADCOM are shown in Chart 5-9.

c. Military Airlift Command

The remaining specified command is the Military Airlift Command (MAC) with headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and commanded by General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (CINCMAC). This command has operational control of all of the Air Force's airlift aircraft. As Chart 5-10 shows, MAC has five subordinate Air Force organizations.

3. Multinational Commands

The United States also participates in four multinational operational commands. Each of these four commands is commanded by a U.S. officer. In two cases, the U.S. officer also commands a U.S. unified command. In another, the U.S. officer also commands a U.S. specified command. In the last case, the U.S. officer also commands a sub-unified command. Each of these multinational operational commands has their own multinational chain of command as shown on Charts 5-2, 5-6, 5-7, and 5-9.

a. Allied Command, Europe

Allied Command, Europe (ACE) is commanded by General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, whose title is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). General Rogers also commands the U.S. European Command.

b. Allied Command, Atlantic

Allied Command, Atlantic is commanded by Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN, whose title is Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). Admiral McDonald also commands the U.S. Atlantic Command.

c. North American Aerospace Defense Command

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) consists of U.S. and Canadian air forces. It is commanded by General Robert T. Herres, USAF, whose title is Commander in Chief, NORAD (CINCNORAD). General Herres also commands the U.S. Aerospace Defense Command, a U.S. specified command.

d. ROK/US Combined Forces Command

The ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Korea is commanded by General William J. Livsey, USA, whose title is Commander in Chief, CFC (CINC, CFC). General Livsey is also Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, a sub-unified command of the U.S. Pacific Command. He also commands the United Nations Command and the U.S. Army component, Eighth U.S. Army, of his sub-unified command.

E. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

This examination of the unified and specified commands identified six broad problem areas, all of which apply to the unified commands, but only two of which apply to the specified commands. First, the chain of command from the Commander in Chief to the operational commanders is confused, which is a deficiency of major proportions. Second, the authority of the unified commanders over their Service components is weak. Third, there is an imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their ability to obtain the mix of resources that they need to fulfill their missions. The fourth problem area is the absence of unification below the level of the unified commander and his staff. Fifth, the Unified Command Plan does not receive an objective review. Last, there has been unnecessary micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the National Command Authority (President and Secretary of Defense) during crises.

When the second, third, and fourth problem areas listed above are considered in combination, the authority of the unified commanders can be seen to be extremely limited. They have weak authority over their components, limited influence over resources, and an inability to promote greater unification within their commands. These deficiencies are inherent in the organizational arrangements, established in 1948, for the unified commands. President Eisenhower noted these deficiencies in his message to the Congress on the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. He stated:

> Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each Unified Commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command....Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency....I recommend, therefore, that present law, including certain restrictions relating to combatant functions, be so amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full unity of our commands and the full command over them by unified

commanders. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, pages 179-180)

The arrangements that President Eisenhower sought have never been implemented and the deficiencies persist. As the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* notes:

> Despite the establishment of the unified command concept in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as requested by President Eisenhower, the relationship and relative authority between the Unified Commander and the component commander, and between the component commander and his Military Department, remain substantially unchanged.
>
> The net result is an organizational structure in which "unification" of either command or of the forces is more cosmetic than substantive. (page 50)

1. CONFUSED CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS

There is considerable confusion over the roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational chain of command. As a result, the appropriate relationships between the operational commanders and those above them in the chain of command are very uncertain. There are two basic causes of this confusion: unclear statutes relating to the role of the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command and an ambiguous DoD directive relating to the role of the JCS. The chain of command is further confused by the *de facto* influence that individual Service Chiefs retain over the operational commands. This influence is not the result of formal responsibilities assigned by statute or DoD directive, but is derived from the substantial dependence of the operational commanders on the Service Chiefs for resources and for subsequent career assignments. In many aspects, because of the continuing influence of the Service Chiefs, the executive agent arrangement for operational commands persists despite its termination in 1958. This *de facto* influence of the Service Chiefs has been identified as a third cause of the confused chain of command.

a. Lack of Statutory Clarity on the Role of the Secretary of Defense.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the operational military chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands who are "responsible to the President and the Secretary [of Defense] for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary [of Defense] with the approval of the President." (Section 124(c)(1) of title 10)

While the statutes have been consistently interpreted as placing the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command, the statutes are not clear. For example, nowhere in the statutes is the Secretary of Defense given the authority "to command". In addition, the statutes are silent on the question of who actually commands the operational commanders.

In his study on *Military Command Authority: Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory Bases*, Peter P. Wallace discusses the statutory ambiguity of the Secretary of Defense's command authority:

> One could construct several reasonable arguments that the Secretary has this authority by implication. For example one might argue that the command authority is included within the "authority, direction and control" of the Defense Department. Or that since all residuary powers were vested in the Secretary by the 1949 amendments, and the 1958 amendments specifically took the service secretaries out of the operational chain, the command authority now resides in the Secretary of Defense. Or lastly one might rely on the legislative history of the 1958 amendments which rather clearly indicates that the Congressional intent was to give the Secretary of Defense all the power to run that department that statute could confer, and hence an element so important as command must have been included therein. Yet, it is this very point that makes any attempt to derive command authority by implication so unpersuasive. Command is so critically important that one really has difficulty believing that Congress or the nation could rest very comfortably leaving the command authority open to argument. But this seems to be precisely what has happened. (Pages 27-28)

b. Ambiguity of DoD Directive 5100.1

On December 31, 1958, Secretary of Defense McElroy created the greatest ambiguity in the chain of command by amending Department of Defense Directive 5100.1. This directive, entitled "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," was changed to provide: "The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and *through the Joint Chiefs of Staff* to the commanders of unified and specified commands." (emphasis added) This provision departed significantly from the precise statutory scheme concerning the combatant commands which did not include the JCS. The only elaboration that this ambiguous formula receives is in the directive's description of one of the functions of the JCS:

> 1. To serve as advisers and as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to unified and specified commands, to provide a channel of communications from the President and Secretary of Defense to unified and specified commands, and to coordinate all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the commanders of the unified or specified commands by other authority. (page 4)

The language of the directive could imply any of three roles for the JCS. First, they could merely be the instrumentality through which command is exercised, making no input of their own. This role, implied by the "channel of communications" language, would portray the JCS as merely the command voice of higher authority.

A second possibility is that the JCS would function more as a traditional military staff with the Secretary of Defense as the commander. This interpretation finds some support in the "advisers and military staff" language of the directive. This interpretation would seem to imply that the JCS would generate options and oversee implementation of the Secretary's decisions, but the business of command would be conducted primarily between the Secretary and the operational commanders.

The third possibility is that the JCS would function as a full-fledged link in the chain of command. This role finds explicit support in the description of the chain of command. Under this interpretation, the JCS would not only generate but also choose and implement options; be the principal, if not exclusive, contact at the DoD policymaking level for the operational commanders; and only involve the Secretary with problems that were beyond their capability to solve. The closed staff nature of the JCS system offers evidence that supports this third interpretation. If either the first or second interpretations reflected reality, it would be necessary for extensive interaction between the JCS system and the Secretary of Defense and his staff. This interaction is not possible due to the obstacles to communication resulting from the closed staff characteristics of the JCS system.

While all three possibilities seem plausible under the directive, the third interpretation seems to most closely describe reality. For example, Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN, then Chief of Naval Operations and later Chairman of the JCS, described the chain of command of the *Pueblo* during her seizure by North Korea on January 23, 1968 as follows:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which the Chief of Naval Operations is the Navy member, *exercise command of all operating forces*. Thus in the case of *Pueblo*, the command chain ran up from CTF 96; to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific; to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who in turn report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces through the Secretary of Defense. (emphasis added)

Despite the tenuous basis for command authority provided by DoD Directive 5100.1, the JCS certainly seem to exercise it, at least on occasion.

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Retired), shares Admiral Moorer's view of the chain of command. In his book, *Strategy for Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect*, Admiral Sharp refers to the JCS as "military commanders" (page 33); indicates that while serving as CINCPAC, he was "under the direct authority of the JCS" (page 35); and presents a chart showing the JCS in the chain of command (page 38).

Further evidence of command authority being exercised by JCS members is presented in Graham T. Allison's book, *Essence of Decision —Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, concerning the naval blockade of Cuba:

> Nevertheless, the President expressed concern that the Navy —already frustrated because of the leashing of its designed blockade —might blunder into an incident. Sensing the President's fears, McNamara decided to explore the organization's procedures and routines for making the first interception. Calling on the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy's inner sanctum, the Navy Flag Plot, McNamara put his questions

harshly. Precisely what would the Navy do when the first interception occurred? Anderson replied that he had outlined the procedures in the National Security Council meeting and that there was no need to discuss it further. Angered but still calm, McNamara began to lecture the admiral. According to Elie Abel's reconstruction of that lecture, McNamara firmly explained that:

> The object of the operation was not to shoot Russians but to communicate a political message from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev. The President wanted to avoid pushing Khrushchev to extremes. The blockade must be so conducted as to avoid humiliating the Russians; otherwise Khrushchev might react in a nuclear spasm. By the conventional rules, blockade was an act of war and the first Soviet ship that refused to submit to boarding and search risked being sent to the bottom. But this was a military action with a political objective. Khrushchev must somehow be persuaded to pull back, rather than be goaded into retaliation.
>
> Sensing that Anderson was not moved by this logic, McNamara returned to the line of detailed questioning. Who would make the first interception? Were Russian-speaking officers on board? How would submarines be dealt with? At one point McNamara asked Anderson what he would do if a Soviet ship's captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. At that point the Navy man picked up the Manual of Naval Regulations and, waving it in McNamara's face, shouted, "It's all in there." To which McNamara replied, "I don't give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done. I want to know what you are going to do now." The encounter ended on Anderson's remark: "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade." (pages 131-132)

A footnote to this portion of the book also proves interesting:

> According to Abel, some witnesses say that Anderson "accused McNamara of 'undue interference in naval matters.'" The Admiral, thereafter Ambassador to Portugal, said that this was not his recollection, adding that he was brought up never to say such a thing even if he felt it. (page 309)

Not only does the confused chain of command hamper the ability of the Department of Defense to manage crises, it also poses a dilemma for the operational commanders in peacetime. The operational commanders may believe that the only forum available to them to raise joint Service issues is the JCS, which is often not a hospitable forum for doing so as noted in Chapter 4. Should they choose to exercise their statutory right to go to the Secretary of Defense, thus circumventing the JCS, they may feel that they would be undermining their own positions and jeopardizing their careers.

c. De Facto Influence of the Service Chiefs

Clearly, by law and regulation, the Service Chiefs are in the chain of command only as members of the JCS. As individual Service Chiefs, they are accorded no role in the chain of command. In reality, however, they have substantial influence over the operational commanders. The forces of each operational command are dominated, or nearly so, by units of one of the Services. In each case, the operational commander is normally appointed from the Service with the dominant forces. The only exception to this rule is the U.S. Central Command where command alternates between the Army and Marine Corps. Given his substantial dependence on one Service for resources necessary to execute his missions, an operational commander can be greatly influenced by the Chief of Staff of that Service.

For example, it is highly unlikely that the Commanders of the U.S. Atlantic Command or the U.S. Pacific Command would take a potentially controversial action in peacetime without conferring with the Chief of Naval Operations. Likewise, the Commander of the U.S. European Command would probably seek, at least, the Army Chief of Staff's informal approval before taking any action affecting Army divisions forward deployed in Europe. Therefore, while the Chiefs of the respective Services are not formally in the chain of command as individuals, by virtue of the fact that they control the resources, they certainly are key participants in operational command matters.

2. Weak Authority of Unified Commanders Over Service Component Commands

Within the unified commands, the chains of command vary. In four of the six commands, the unified commander deals only with Service component commands. In USLANTCOM and USPACOM, however, the unified commander deals not only with Service component commanders, but also with commanders of subordinate unified (sub-unified) commands. However, for the most part, all units below the unified commanders, including the sub-unified commands, are essentially single Service commands.

The authority of unified commanders over their Service component commands is weak. There are two basic causes of this problem: (1) restrictions placed upon the authority of unified commanders in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) and (2) dependence of the Service component commands on their Services for resources.

a. Restrictions of UNAAF

The origins of today's UNAAF lie in the Key West Agreement of 1948. At that time, the abiding interest of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was to protect the integrity of their Service operations in the multi-Service operational commands. The particular device adopted to protect Service integrity was the "Service component command." The authorities of the Service component commander versus those of the unified commander, as spelled out in 1948, have survived essentially unchanged in today's UNAAF.

The language of limitation on the authority of the unified commander is pervasive in UNAAF. Key among examples of limitation is the following:

> ...Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the Service component commanders...or through the commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the Service components or other subordinate commands. In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service component commanders....Commanders of Service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of Service on matters which are the responsibilities of the Military Department and Services. (page 46)

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Retired) in his book, *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, comments on the impact of the UNAAF's limitations on the unified commanders:

> Service component commanders, supported by the Service staffs who largely retain the abiding concerns of the 1940s for protecting their Service's integrity and, supported by UNAAF, become powers with whom the multiservice commander conducts negotiations as equals more than as subordinates. (page 3-58)

The Conference Committee Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1985 (Report No. 98-1080) posed a number of questions to be answered by the six unified commanders. Answers were forwarded to the Senate Committee on Armed Services by Secretary Weinberger on March 5, 1985. Given the substantial evidence of UNAAF restrictions on the authority of the unified commands, one of the questions was:

> Does UNAAF overly-restrict your authority over your Service component commanders?

Four of the unified commanders (Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), and Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH)) answered this question in the negative. In contrast, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) responded as follows:

> JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), establishes the organization for unified commands. Although this organization is intended to optimize wartime employment of combat forces furnished by the Services, it does go to some length to protect the integrity of individual Service operations within multi-Service operational commands. In doing so, it places certain limits on the authority of the unified commander that could affect efficient operations (combat or otherwise).

Similarly, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCRED) stated:

UNAAF philosophically emphasizes Service vice joint matters and therefore, results in optimization of Service roles and missions. The results of Service organization, training, and equipping of their forces may not meet operational requirements of the CINC, a situation which is exacerbated by our strategic planning arrangements.

b. Dependence of the Service Component Commanders on Their Services for Resources

Concerning the logistical chain of command, UNAAF provides as follows:

> The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of unified and specified commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. This chain embraces the preparation of military forces and their administration and support. (page 7)

The fact that the logistical chain of command runs around the unified commander greatly weakens his authority over his Service component commands. More specifically, Service component commanders have divided loyalties: while they must fight the battle for the unified commander, they must work through their Services to provide, train, and equip the forces in their component commands. Dependence of a component commander on resource allocations from his Service produces close ties to that Service and strong loyalties to the Service and its Chief of Staff. In addition, future promotions and assignments of component commanders are determined by the Service Chiefs and not by the unified commanders. Therefore, a unified commander must depend on subordinate commanders who in reality have more than one superior.

Moreover, Service component commanders have one great advantage over their unified commander, who is nominally their superior: they control Service resources in personnel and money. By comparison, the unified commander's resources are few. This makes it difficult for the unified commander to influence the development of the capabilities of the forces of his command.

Thus, while the unified commanders are the only military commanders who devote full time to "joint" command, they are sandwiched between powerful structures above and below that encourage single-Service perspectives over a multi-Service approach. As a result, unified commanders have no authority to override any strongly held, single-Service positions even if such is necessary in the interests of the multi-Service, unified command mission.

3. Imbalance Between the Responsibilities and Accountability of the Unified Commanders and Their Influence Over Resource Decisions

The unified commanders have limited ability to influence the allocation of resources either to their commands or within their commands. From the perspective of the unified commanders, the resource allocation process is essentially executed by the Services. The unified commander must plan to accomplish his mission with resources provided by the Services through a process defended and executed by the Services. In *Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy*, General Cushman succinctly states this problem:

> Responsible senior officers who are in the operational chain of command below the President and the Secretary of Defense, and who will be held accountable in the event of command and control failure, have not been given the means necessary to meet their responsibility and accountability. (page 1-21)

While General Cushman refers only to resources for the command and control function, the absence of influence by the unified commanders applies to all resources allocated to their commands.

The Chairman's Special Study Group in 1982 noted the limited influence of the unified commanders in the resource allocation process:

> Today, the CINCs are at best only superficially involved in many things critical to their commands. They play almost no role in the programming and budgeting process (though they recently were invited by the Secretary to participate occasionally in meetings of the Defense Resources Board) and have little influence in the JCS force allocation process. In addition, they are not strongly supported by either the Services or the Joint Staff. (page 32)

The limited input of unified commanders in policy and resource allocation decisions is also addressed in the chapter dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In that context, this limited input from the mission-oriented unified commanders reduces the integrating staff support readily available to the Secretary of Defense.

In the answers submitted to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, the majority of the unified commanders held that there was an imbalance between their responsibilities and accountability and their influence over resource decisions. Only the Commander of the Central Command stated that such an imbalance did not exist while the Commnders of the Atlantic and Southern Commands state that Secretary Taft's new initiatives in the Defense Resources Board program review and Program Objective Memoranda (POM) development process should help redress previous imbalances. These initiatives are discussed in a subsequent portion of this section.

The three other unified commanders state:

> *Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command:* Yes, there is an imbalance between my responsibilities and accountability as a unified operational commander and my influence on resource decisions....The degree of effectiveness we have in readiness, sustainability, and transition to war is in substantial part, a matter of resources.
>
> *Commander in Chief of the European Command:* On occasion the results of major Service decisions, not previously coordinated with me, have affected my ability to execute USPACOM strategy. In some instances I have learned about Service initiatives, which ultimately impacted on PACOM's war fighting capabilities, after the fact during POM deliberations....In essence, some Service POM decisions altered or affected my strategy without adequate concern for PACOM's overall theater requirements.

> *Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command:* There is an imbalance between my operational responsibilities and influence over resource decision. . . . USCINRED has limited influence on resource allocations and limited control over operations funds, particularly crucial in the area of training.

Influence over resource decisions is not a problem for the specified commanders because their requirements are directly incorporated into the Air Force POM where they have direct influence. This fact was confirmed by the answers provided by the Commanders in Chief of the Aerospace Defense Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the Strategic Air Command to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985.

There are essentially four causes of the problem of the imbalance between the responsibilities and influence of the unified commanders.

a. Difficulty of the Unified Commanders to Influence the Policymaking Level of DoD

In order to influence the allocation of resources to his command and policies affecting his command, a unified commander must work through the Military Departments, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The geographic separation of the unified commanders from the policymaking level of DoD makes them dependent upon other officials to represent their views. They have had little success in obtaining adequate representation. As General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, USCINCEUR, expressed in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on November 3, 1983:

> The cross-service or joint views have a smaller constituency and limited formality of expression in the current system. (Part 7, page 278)

The current Administration, recognizing the inadequacy of unified command representation in the Pentagon, has improved the situation by giving the operational commanders a direct voice in the policy and resource allocation processes. The operational commanders now formally participate in the PPBS process by appearing twice a year before the Defense Resources Board. While this biannual input from the operational commanders is a new dimension in the policy and resource allocation processes, it falls far short of providing the unified commanders with a substantial and continuing influence in the allocation of resources to their commands.

Recognizing this fact, Secretary Taft issued on November 14, 1984 a memorandum on "Enhancement of the CINCs' Role in the PPBS". Secretary Taft's memorandum directs the following actions:

- ○ preparation by the operational commanders of their high priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints;
- ○ direct communications between the operational commanders and the Military Departments to resolve problems and concerns during the development of Program Objective Memoranda (POM's);

- ○ preparation of a separate annex for each POM which clearly identifies the requirements of the operational commanders as submitted, whether they were met in the POM with supporting rationale where such needs were not met; and
- ○ permission for the operational commanders to independently raise issues during the Program Review Process of the Defense Resources Board.

These new procedures appear to be a promising step in providing the unified commanders with increased influence on resource decisions.

b. Inability of the JCS to Make Meaningful Programmatic Inputs

The unified commanders view the JCS as their principal contact in the policymaking level of DoD. However, at present, the JCS is an ineffective vehicle for representing the resource allocation needs of the unified commanders. The inability of the JCS to make meaningful programmatic inputs is discussed at length in Chapters 3 (OSD), 4 (OJCS), and 7 (PPBS) of this report.

c. Functional Organization of OSD

Circumventing the JCS through direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense poses substantial risks to unified commanders who are so dependent upon the Services for resources. Moreover, OSD, because of its functional organization, does not have an office that would be a natural ally of a unified commander on the full spectrum of his resource needs. Unified commanders would have to work closely with many functional offices in OSD to gain support for necessary resource allocations. In addition, OSD functional offices may not be attuned to the mission-oriented needs of the unified commanders.

d. Inability of Unified Commanders to Reallocate Resources

It is just as difficult for a unified commander to reallocate resources within his command. He cannot "trade off" between Services without going back through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. While a unified commander might prefer to acquire more ammunition for naval aviation forces and less for his ground forces because of a change in the tactical situation, he is not free to institute such an action within his command. So, most unified commands simply "make do" with the resources provided to them by the Services and plan to fight the next war with the resources that they have been given.

4. ABSENCE OF UNIFICATION BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

In 1958, President Eisenhower stated the following rationale for unification in the operational commands:

> If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. *Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.* (emphasis added)

Despite this rationale, peacetime preparatory activity and organizational arrangements within the unified commands have failed to conform to this fact.

Appendix A to this chapter presents six historical examples of organizational problems affecting U.S. military operations. The appendix presents two examples —the Spanish-American War and Pearl Harbor —from the period before the application of the concept of unified command. Four examples from the post-unified command period are presented: the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the capture of the *Pueblo*, the Iran hostage rescue mission, and the Grenada operation. Across this 85-year period, the deficiencies have remained remarkably consistent: inadequate inter-Service cooperation, lack of unity of command, and lack of unification at levels subordinate to the unified commander. Various points from the historical analyses of Appendix A are referred to in the main text of this chapter. The reader should refer to the appendix for a fuller presentation.

Unification in the unified commands stops at a very high level. Nearly all units below the unified commander are single Service because units of one Service are seldom subordinated to commanders of another Service. Accordingly, when forces from two Services are required to respond to an unanticipated situation, command by mutual cooperation —the basic U.S. military doctrine prior to World War II —remains the order of the day. It can be convincingly argued that the concept of unified command, as formulated in the immediate post-war period and as articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been implemented.

It should be noted that the degree of unification varies among the six unified commands. The existence of sub-unified commands within two of the unified commands has an impact on the relative degree of unification as do certain multinational command arrangements. The Commander in Chief of the European Command noted this fact in his answers to the questions in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985:

> In my view there is sufficient unification of command in USEUCOM, especially as a result of the US/NATO dual command relations necessitated by the CINCEUR relationship to Allied Command Europe.

The absence of unification at levels below the unified commander and his staff is a problem because it substantially impedes efforts to prepare for and conduct effective, joint military operations in times of war. In other words, the absence of unification has resulted in limited mission integration at the operational level of DoD. More specifically, the single-Service status of organizations subordinate to the unified commanders results in the following deficiencies: it does not (1) provide for unity of command during crises; (2) promote joint thinking, planning, and coordination; and (3) facilitate efforts to improve the interoperability of forces from different Services.

Within the operational commands, there have been efforts, in the absence of greater unification, to improve the ability to take unified action during crises. Numerous mechanisms have been created for improving cooperation between forces of different Services. Moreover, there is a greater appreciation of the need for improved interservice cooperation.

The various operating mechanisms work well in exercises which are planned many months in advance and in resolving issues in which time permits a deliberate decision pattern. These operating mechanisms may even permit the effective execution of major operational plans that have been approved in advance by higher authority. However, these operating mechanisms have failed to be effective in unforeseen crises.

Local forces assigned to a unified commander have never been unified to the extent that they could effectively respond on a joint basis to an unexpected threat. The uncoordinated and slow reactions of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific during the seizure of the *Pueblo* may be the best example of this organizational failure. The poorly executed, although successful, incursion into Grenada is another example. Even more troubling is the inability of forces from separate Services to take effective unified action even when time permits joint planning and coordination. The disastrous Iranian hostage rescue mission is a key example of such inability.

In sum, the United States does not have major combatant commands that can provide effective unified action across the spectrum of military missions. The absence of unification at subordinate levels of the unified commands is a much more troubling problem now than in the immediate postwar period for two basic reasons.

First, during World War II, the military objectives were clear, and the unified commands were oriented to offensive, theater-wide warfighting. Since that time, the strategic environment has become increasingly more complex, as discussed in Section C of this chapter, which has greatly broadened the military missions assigned to unified commanders. Moreover, today, U.S. commanders are defending the *status quo*. While unified commands may be organized to conduct theater campaigns similar to those of World War II, it is evident that they are not organized to respond to lesser threats like the *Pueblo* seizure or the *Mayaguez* incident.

Second, two trends discussed in Section C—effect of improved communications capabilities on command and control centralization and crisis management requirements—have made unification at the subordinate levels of the unified commands of increased importance. The original rationale for unification at lower levels was to enable "a single commander to react tactically to a threat without awaiting guidance or decisions from Washington." (*Report of the Secretary of Defense*, 1948) The need for and desirability of such a capability have diminished since this rationale was stated in 1948. However, the current arrangement of having effective unification only at the level of the unified commander and his staff poses another serious problem: in today's environment, the unified commander and his staff are often not key players in military operations within their command. Improved communications have permitted and crisis management requirements have often caused the unified commander and his staff to be circumvented in crises. The chain of command has been shortened by having the National Command Authority deal directly with lower level commanders. In these instances, the absence of unification at lower levels can be a major shortcoming. In discussing crisis management requirements in Section C of this chapter, the following major question was posed: has the unified command system, developed primarily in the late 1940's, adapted effectively to meet today's crisis management requirements? The answer appears to be no.

Despite substantial contrary evidence, many unified commanders believe that there is sufficient unification within their commands. In their answers to the questions posed in the Conference Committee Report on the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, three of the unified commanders (USCINCLANT, USCINCCENT, and USCINCEUR) clearly state that their commands are sufficiently unified. USCINCSOUTH's views on this issue are not precisely stated in his response. While noting some problems with the degree of unification, USCINCPAC states:

> From my perspective the crucial question is not whether there is sufficient unification down to subordinate levels, but whether the unified commander has the requisite authority to ensure the readiness of his forces and, in times of crisis (or hostilities), to bring his subordinate commands together without undue disruption to conduct timely, imaginative and efficient operations.

Only USCINCRED fully agreed that there was a problem of insufficient unification:

> Routinely, there is no unification below the unified command echelon. USREDCOM's components in "peacetime" are, in effect, independent entities in regard to unified action.... In this circumstance, the degree of operational unification in USREDCOM and between its components is decidedly insufficient.

There are two basic causes of the problem of insufficient unification within the unified commands: (1) the refusal of the Services to accept substantial unification within the unified commands, and (2) absence of agreement on appropriate command relationships, especially concerning the principle of unity of command.

a. Refusal of Services to Accept Substantial Unification within the Unified Commands

Despite the fact that the concept of placing the operational forces of two or more Services under a single commander was dictated by the disastrous failure of interservice coordination at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. military establishment has seldom implemented that concept, even during wartime.

While the unified command concept worked well in the European theater during World War II, the Pacific theater was never unified under a single commander. Even the planned amphibious invasion of Japan could not bring the Army or Navy to accept a unified command arrangement: General MacArthur was to lead the land campaign, Admiral Nimitz was to be responsible for the sea battle, and General Arnold was to be responsible for the 20th Air Force with its very long-range B–29 bombers. In his recent book on the war in the Pacific, *Eagle Against the Sun*, Ronald H. Spector comments on the failure to unify the theater under a single commander:

> Against all common sense, against the dictates of military doctrine, against the essence of Roosevelt's message to Churchill, the Pacific was divided into two theaters. (page 144)

Even when unified command was established, interservice cooperation was lacking. For example, in 1945, with World War II not yet ended, a JCS Special Committee observed that:

> ...even in areas where unity of command has been established, complete integration of effort has not yet been achieved because we are still struggling with inconsistencies, lack of understanding, jealousies and duplications which exist in all theaters of operations.

Similarly, in Vietnam, a complex and fragmented structure was created to control U.S. forces in and around Vietnam. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was a sub-unified commander who commanded forces within South Vietnam, but his authority ended at the borders of South Vietnam. Other forces participating in the conflict reported to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), or to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC). This arrangement hardly provided for unified direction of the conflict. Again, Service considerations played the major role in the formulation of this ineffective command arrangement.

In his book, *The 25-Year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) is highly critical of U.S. command arrangements in Vietnam:

> The final major principle I will mention is *unity of command* (vesting a single commander with the requisite authority to obtain unity of effort toward a common goal). It did not exist with respect to U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. (page 193)

Calling Vietnam perhaps the worst example of unclear responsibilities, General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired) stated in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself. For example, each fought its own air war, agreeing only to limited measures for a coordinated effort. "Body count" and "tons dropped" became the measures of merit. Lack of integration persisted right through the 1975 evacuation of Saigon —when responsibility was split between two separate commands, one on land and one at sea; each of these set a different "H-hour," which caused confusion and delays. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 19)

JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is a major obstacle to greater unification of the unified commands. UNAAF places great emphasis on maintaining uni-Service integrity:

> *Maintenance of Uni-Service Integrity.* The command organization should integrate components of two or more Services into efficient teams while, at the same time, preserving to each Service its uni-Service responsibilities. The commander of any force must give due consideration to these responsibilities. *Furthermore, organizational integrity of Service components should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit fully their inherent capabilities.* (emphasis added) (page 43)

UNAAF's requirement that "within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through Service component commanders" (page 37) with certain exceptions is another inhibition on unification. By insisting on single-Service operational chains of command within the unified commands, UNAAF ensures that the unified commands will remain a loose confederation of single-Service forces.

In the questions in the DoD Authorization Act, 1985, the unified commanders were asked:

> Does UNAAF create obstacles to greater and necessary unification in your command?

Despite substantial evidence that UNAAF is an obstacle to unification, four of the unified commanders answered no. In contrast, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command stated:

> In essence, UNAAF provisions for single-Service operational chains of command within the unified commands require the unified command to remain a rather loose confederation of single-Service forces.

Similarly, the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command argues:

> As derived from the law and presently constituted, UNAAF inhibits the unification of command demanded by modern ways and means of warfighting....UNAAF today is less relevant in that it contemplates:
>
> > a. A clear "peace/war" distinction (with limited CINC authority in "peacetime");
> >
> > b. Conventional war only (the least prevalent form of conflict since World War II); and.
> >
> > c. The Service structures fighting the war with unification only at the top.

While the Services have agreed to the concept of unified command, they have placed strict limits on how much unification could be achieved. Command by mutual cooperation among the Services continues to be the dominant arrangement in U.S. operational commands, just as it was prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

b. Absence of Agreement on Appropriate Command Relationships, Especially Concerning the Principle of Unity of Command

In his *Maxims of War*, Napoleon in 1831 stated: "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command". The literature of warfare is filled with similar references to the importance of unity of command. Despite substantial historical evidence, the Department of Defense has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command.

The lack of unity of command was a fundamental ingredient of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In response, the *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* listed as its *first* recommendation:

> That immediate action be taken to ensure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts. (page 252)

The word "outposts" conveys the sense that the Congress meant unity at the level where an attack is possible. The Congress did not seem to mean unity only at some distant unified command headquarters.

Unity of command has been a principle of war in the U.S. Army since the early 1920's. While unity of command has often been identified as a fundamental principle for the joint employment of U.S. military forces, it remains a vague concept. For example, JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, does not define the term "unity of command." The JCS do, along with the Air Force, employ the term "unity of effort" while the Navy and Marine Corps do not refer to the concepts of unity of command or unity of effort in their doctrinal writings. Referring to the absence of explicit discussion of the concept of unity of command in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, JCS Chairman, has stated:

> ...Whereas unity of command is not explicitly treated in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, it is an underlying foundation. (Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, June 4, 1985)

Given the importance of the concept of unity of command, explicit and continuous reference to it in all doctrinal writings would appear to be highly desirable. The limited attention that unity of command receives in JCS and Service writings suggests that (1) it is not a fundamental principle for joint employment of U.S. forces or (2) there is disagreement on the meaning of this concept.

The Army defines unity of command as follows:

> For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander....This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the strategic level, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow there from. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.
>
> In the tactical dimension, it is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal. (Field Manual 100-1, August 1981, page 16)

In their paper, *Unity of Command—Does It Exist in the Field?*, Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff examine the extent to which the concept of unity of command is being implemented in the field. Based upon inputs from 112 military officers within all six unified commands, the paper, published in April 1983, concluded that "unity of command does not exist in the field today." (page IV-2)

This conclusion was supported by two findings: (1) unity of command is still seen as an essential concept in the field; and (2) despite its importance, most professionals feel that unity of command (UOC) is not widespread in their organizations. Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff add the following comments to these findings:

> At least four major studies since 1974 have lamented the lack of UOC. Despite attention, the problem persists. During the field interviews, we heard considerable concern expressed about complicated command relationships, especially those deriving from "dual-hatted" sub-unified commands, and a lack of control over "in-support-of" forces. Recently, one CINC bluntly asserted UOC does not exist. "Without it," he continued, "the probability of effective wartime action is diminished." (page III-7)

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger reached a similar conclusion:

> ...In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of "unity of command" is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the Service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command. (page 187)

The concept of "in-support-of" forces deserves special attention because it appears to undermine the concept of unity of command. JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines "in support of" as follows:

> Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control. (page 176)

While "in-support-of" forces could be those of any Service, only U.S. naval forces have traditionally used this concept. Naval forces have not been placed under the operational control of the commander of the joint operation, but rather have been "in-support-of" the joint operation. This concept essentially means divided command.

In sum, the doctrinal writings of the U.S. military do not clarify or emphasize the concept of unity of command. Furthermore, by embracing the concept of "in-support-of" forces, doctrinal writings undermine unity of command. Reflecting these conceptual disagreements, there is evidence that unity of command does not exist within the six unified commands. In this regard, it is absolutely clear that the congressional recommendation "that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts" has not been implemented.

5. ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The fifth problem area is the current operational command configuration. As mentioned previously, the President has the statutory authority to establish unified and specified commands—"combatant" commands in the words of the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act. The current operational command arrangement is essentially an evolutionary one, building on the base that existed at the end of World War II. As U.S. worldwide national security interests have waxed and waned, old commands have been eliminated and new commands created. If one were to ignore the current Unified Command Plan and start from scratch to design a new plan, it might well differ significantly from the one that exists today. Clearly, today's worldwide strategic environment is drastically different from the one that existed at the end of World War II.

Many factors must be taken into consideration when contemplating what the operational command structure might look like. Management principles such as a clear chain of command, span of control, organizational layering, grade structure, and combat to support ratio must be considered. The political dimension—international treaty arrangements, the perceptions of foreign governments, world opinion, and the inevitable interservice rivalries—must inevitably receive great weight.

Many issues have been raised throughout the literature as various authors have analyzed the current Unified Command Plan:

- Should USEUCOM's responsibilities in the Middle East and Africa be assigned to other commands?
- Does USREDCOM have a valid mission?
- Should USREDCOM be assigned responsibility for large land areas (e.g., Africa and South America)?
- Should USLANTCOM and USPACOM be eliminated?
- Should Alaska be assigned to USPACOM?
- Should the geographical boundaries between USPACOM and USCENTCOM be adjusted to give USCENTCOM responsibility for the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean?
- Should the geographical boundaries between USLANTCOM and USSOUTHCOM be adjusted to give USSOUTHCOM responsibility for the Caribbean?
- Should the Navy's strategic submarine forces and the Army's ballistic missile defense effort be combined with SAC to create a unified Strategic Command?
- Should a Military Transportation Command be created as a unified command?

While these issues may be important, it is not the intent of this study to analyze or reach any conclusions on them. There are more appropriate fora in the Executive Branch for such efforts.

The problem with the Unified Command Plan (UCP) arises because UCP issues are not receiving an objective review in the Executive Branch. There are two causes of this problem: institutional deficiencies of the JCS system and limited review of the UCP by OSD and the National Security Council (NSC).

a. Institutional Deficiencies of the JCS System

The only forum which actively reviews the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the JCS. As in other areas with important multi-Service considerations, the JCS are incapable of non-parochial evaluation of the UCP. The inability of the JCS to objectively review command arrangements for the Southwest Asia region is a recent example of their failure to adequately address difficult unified command issues. In this instance, the members of the JCS were apparently more interested in protecting parochial Service interests than in devising the most effective command arrangements for defense of Southwest Asia. The Army and Air Force wanted the new command to be a sub-unified command under USEUCOM. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps wanted the new command to be a sub-unified command under USPACOM. The Secretary of Defense rejected these parochial positions and created a new, separate unified command, the U.S. Central Command.

Bryant, Trinnaman, and Staudenmaier have commented on the negative effect of the institutional deficiencies of the JCS on the review of the UCP:

> Historically, within the military bureaucracy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has usually been reluctant to open the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to change because of the concern that it could result in dysfunctional battles between the Services as they attempt to stake out positions. Only role and mission battles have proven to be more divisive. Thus, it can be anticipated that suggestions for bold innovative changes will not only encounter the normal bureaucratic resistance, but will also be subject to highly emotional, however well-meaning, attacks by the military hierarchy. Of perhaps even more concern is the fact that it will be difficult to differentiate between valid criticism and criticism based on a desire to protect parochial or bureaucratic interests. (page 12)

b. Limited Review of the UCP by OSD and NSC

As the UCP is a formal document prepared by the JCS, OSD and NSC have played only a limited role in reviewing the work of the JCS. Given the inability of the JCS system to objectively review the UCP, the passive role of OSD and NSC precludes a more useful and comprehensive consideration of UCP issues.

6. UNNECESSARY MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING CRISES

The convergence of two trends addressed in Section C of this chapter has contributed to this problem area. Specifically, improvements in communications capabilities and the requirement for increased presidential control during certain crises have created an environment that promotes micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the National Command Authority (NCA). There has also been an occasional problem within the NCA when the Secretary of Defense has been circumvented, usually by presidential advisors, on operational command matters. For simplicity, micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command by the NCA will often be termed "overinvolvement" in the remainder of this subsection.

As Commander in Chief, the President has authority to become involved in tactical operations and to specify an *ad hoc* chain of command. In certain situations, presidential needs for effective control of crises may absolutely require such arrangements. In such situations, the benefits of effective presidential control outweigh the risks of by-passing key elements of the chain of command and of being overly specific in operational direction. These situations are not the focus of this discussion; rather this problem area addresses those instances when the NCA has become unnecessarily overinvolved in a crisis.

The Steadman Report discusses the factors that lead to NCA overinvolvement:

> Some believe that the very existence of this [improved communications] capability impels decisionmakers to become overly involved in the details of crisis management. Crises are important events and the speed and extent of the flow of information to the public makes every crisis an event with political implications. Thus, key decisionmakers get involved in what may seem to some to be minute details because they want personally to insure a successful outcome. In addition, there is a natural tendency for a key decisionmaker to want to speak with someone at the scene of the crisis —to add a flavor that is unobtainable in Washington or to verify a key piece of information upon which to base a subsequent decision. (page 28)

Much could be written about NCA overinvolvement; however, for the most part, this topic is beyond the scope of this study. Accordingly, only brief evidence will be presented to give some appreciation of the problem. For example, NCA conduct during the Vietnam war has often been characterized as overinvolvement. The Steadman Report stated:

> ...Washington certainly was too deeply involved in the details of actually running the war, particularly the air war in the north. (page 25)

In *Strategy for Defeat, Vietnam in Retrospect*, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, USN (Retired) presented his criticism more strongly:

> ...civilian politico decision makers have no business ignoring or overriding the counsel of experienced military professionals in presuming to direct the day-to-day conduct of military strategy and tactics from their desks in Washington, D.C. (page 270)

General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) discusses circumvention of the Secretary of Defense in his book, *The 25-year War, America's Military Role in Vietnam*:

> Under the present law, the JCS can be subjected to conflicting orders and guidance. This happened both to General Wheeler while he was CJCS, and to his successor, Admiral Moorer. Both men, Wheeler in 1970 and Moorer in 1972, received orders personally from President Nixon with instructions that Secretary of Defense Laird was not to be informed. Military men obviously must not be placed in such an untenable position. Under the circumstances these incidents did not matter very much because the Vietnam War did not put our

> survival at risk, nor was Vietnam vital to U.S. interests. In future situations in which national survival might indeed be at stake, I do not believe the nation can accept this state of affairs. (page 202)

The Steadman Report also notes the dangers of by-passing the Secretary of Defense:

> ...Although in a crisis the President has a number of advisers in addition to the Secretary of Defense, orders to the field commands should be clearly identified as emanating from the Secretary as well as from the President —and not be transmitted separately by Presidential advisers acting in his name. By-passing the Secretary undermines his authority over the combatant forces. (page 29)

There are three major shortcomings of NCA overinvolvement during a crisis. First, the expertise of key elements of the military chain of command may not be effectively applied. The operational commanders, their staffs, and their immediate subordinates have valuable insights into the situation, the threat, and U.S. force capabilities. As the Steadman Report notes, by-passing these levels of command "increases the risk of failure and the risk to the forces involved" (page 28).

The second shortcoming involves the loss of initiative by tactical commanders. When the NCA immediately scrutinizes every tactical movement, on-scene commanders may be reluctant to take decisive action. In today's fast-paced combat environment, such a loss of initiative may preclude effective military action.

The third shortcoming arises from the confusion that results from employing *ad hoc* command arrangements. The benefits of a structured command chain are lost when certain echelons are bypassed.

There are many possible causes of NCA overinvolvement including:

- ○ a lack of discipline in the staff advising the NCA;
- ○ inadequate expertise on operational matters at the NCA level;
- ○ the desire for a military success by a politically troubled administration; and
- ○ a lack of confidence in the judgment of the military chain of command.

It is not possible within the scope of this study to assess whether these possible causes actually played a factor in instances of NCA overinvolvement.

The problem of NCA overinvolvement in crisis is a management one and not a structural or procedural one. The problem can only be solved by presidential leadership in disciplining the system. In this regard, the current Administration has demonstrated much more discipline. While this problem area cannot be specifically identified with the current Administration, it has appeared with sufficient frequency within the last 20 years to be of continuing concern. This is especially so because the underlying trends that promote it will continue.

Given the management nature of this problem and the absence of useful congressional remedies, this study will not seek to propose possible solutions. This is in no way, however, a lessening of congressional concern about the overinvolvement of the NCA in crises that do not justify high-level intervention.

F. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

In this section, possible solutions to the problem areas of the unified and specified commands are described. It should be noted that the options presented in this section to solve a problem area may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. Problem Area #1—Confused Chain of Command From the Commander in Chief to the Operational Commanders

The principal guideline for solving this problem area is to clarify the statutes and DoD directive dealing with the operational chain of command. The seven options for solving this problem differ as to what specific responsibilities in any clarification should be assigned to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS Chairman, and the JCS.

- ○ Option 1A—remove the Secretary of Defense from the chain of command

Some observers argue that the Secretary of Defense has never acted as a full-fledged member of the chain of command. Moreover, since 1958, Secretaries of Defense have had little military experience and seem to have conducted themselves more as managers and policymakers than as military commanders. In his book, *Organization for National Security, A Study,* Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired) argues: "...the law still holds a civilian executive [the Secretary of Defense] legally responsible for professional military matters which, for the most part, are beyond his competence." (page 115) Removing the Secretary of Defense from the chain of command would merely be a formal recognition that Secretaries of Defense, for a variety of reasons including inexperience, have not usually been heavily involved in the command function.

Under this option, the chain of command would run directly from the Commander in Chief to either the JCS Chairman or the JCS. The Secretary of Defense would be involved only if the Commander in Chief requested his participation.

- ○ Option 1B—clearly assign to the Secretary of Defense the role of commander of the operational commanders

This option would clarify the current ambiguous chain of command by specifying that the Secretary of Defense is the sole commander of the operational commanders. The Secretary's authority "to command" would be specifically included in the statutes. It may be even desirable to designate the Secretary of Defense as the Deputy Commander in Chief. Moreover, it would be absolutely clear that the Secretary of Defense was the principal contact in the DoD policymaking level for the operational commanders.

- ○ Option 1C—establish a position for a second Deputy Secretary of Defense who would be responsible for assisting the Secretary of Defense on military operational matters

The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* concluded:

> For all its size, the OSD has no staff element with significant purview of the area of military operations, despite the fact that the Secretary of Defense, since the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act, is the crucial link in the chain of command between the Commander-in-Chief and the Unified Commanders.
>
> If the Secretary of Defense is to discharge effectively his responsibilities as a key element of the National Command Authority—and the alternative of removing him from the chain of command would, in practice, reduce "civilian control" to a fiction—it is clear that he must have an adequate staff for the purpose.
>
> The present arrangement for providing staff support to the Secretary of Defense for military operations is awkward and unresponsive; it provides a forum for inter-Service conflicts to be injected into the decision-making process for military operations; and it inhibits the flow of information to and from the combatant commands and the President and Secretary of Defense, often even in crisis situations.
>
> ...This lack within OSD of expertise in military operations critically impairs civilian control of the military establishment.
>
> ...The absence of a staff element for military operations directly responsive to the Secretary of Defense constitutes a deficiency which can be tolerated only at high risk. (pages 27-28)

In light of these conclusions, the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* recommended establishment of the position of a Deputy Secretary of Defense who would have responsibility for military operations, unified commands, operational requirements, intelligence, telecommunications, international security affairs, the Defense Communications Agency, and civil defense.

The situation that existed at the time the Blue Ribbon Report was written does not appear to have changed. The Secretary of Defense does not have assistants in OSD to help him on operational matters; he is totally dependent on the JCS and the Joint Staff. The disadvantages of this arrangement are compounded by (1) the relative inexperience of the Secretary on operational matters; (2) the limited amount of time that the Secretary can devote to his chain of command responsibilities; and (3) the closed staff nature of the JCS system.

This option would be similar to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendation. It would differ in that the responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary would be limited to operational matters but would not involve such areas as intelligence and telecommunications.

- Option 1D —place the JCS Chairman in the chain of command

If one believed that the military should be formally represented in the portion of the chain of command found at the policymaking level of DoD, this option would place the JCS Chairman, but not the entire JCS, in the chain of command to provide this representation. DoD has recommended this option in its legislative proposal dated April 18, 1983. The House of Representatives included this option in legislation that it passed in 1983 (H.R. 3718) and 1984 (H.R. 5167) to reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the term "chain of command" as follows:

> The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. (page 62)

As to the term "command", JCS Publication 1 presents the following definition:

> The authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (page 74)

Placing the JCS Chairman in the chain of command would make him a "commanding officer" and authorize him to "command". Such action would clearly contradict section 142(c) of title 10, United States Code, which provides in part that the JCS Chairman "may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces."

Under this option, the JCS Chairman would have a much more forceful role in choosing and implementing military operational actions. He could be authorized to handle routine operational matters by issuing commands and only involve the Secretary of Defense on critical issues. Moreover, it would be logical under this option to make the JCS Chairman the exclusive contact at the DoD policymaking level for the operational commanders, at least on operational matters.

○ Option 1E —place the JCS in the chain of command

This option differs from Option 1D by placing the entire JCS in the chain of command as the military representatives at the policymaking level of DoD. In essence, this option would be a formal recognition of the current operation of the chain of command.

○ Option 1F —remove the JCS, including the Chairman, from the chain of command

This option would alter DoD Directive 5100.1 by precluding in statute any role for the JCS or its Chairman in the chain of command. Under this option, the JCS would serve as the military staff supporting the Secretary of Defense, but they would not be astride the chain of command running from the Secretary of Defense to the operational commanders.

○ Option 1G —make the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system

This option could be adopted along with Option 1B (which would assign to the Secretary of Defense the role of commander of the operational commanders) and Option 1F (which would remove the JCS, including the Chairman, from the chain of command).

While Options 1B and 1F would solve the problem of the confused chain of command, they would not clarify how the Secretary of Defense would exercise his command authority. This option proposes that the Secretary would use the JCS Chairman as his principal military advisor on operational matters. Furthermore, the JCS Chairman would solely be responsible for transmitting the orders of the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense to the operational commanders. Despite these responsibilities, it would be absolutely clear that the JCS Chairman would not be part of the operational chain of command. He would provide advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, but the command line would run directly from the Secretary to the operational commanders.

In prescribing the duties of his principal military advisor on operational matters, the Secretary of Defense may or may not want to designate the JCS Chairman as the focal point in the Washington headquarters of DoD for the operational commanders on operational matters.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—WEAK AUTHORITY OF UNIFIED COMMANDERS OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

Five options have been developed to strengthen the authority of the unified commanders over their Service component commands. The first would revise JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), to lessen the restrictions placed upon the authority of the unified commanders. The second option would authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders. The third option would place the unified commander in the logistical chain of command. The fourth option would be to eliminate the Service component commands and to make them part of the joint staff serving the unified commander. The last option is to colocate the unified commander and his Service component commands.

◦ Option 2A —revise UNAAF to lessen the restrictions on the authority of the unified commanders

This option would require an extensive revision of UNAAF to give the unified commanders authority over their Service component commands that is consistent with their mission responsibilities and with the concept of unified command.

◦ Option 2B —authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders

Currently, the unified commanders have minimal, if any, input into the assignment of their Service component commanders. These assignments are made by the Services. Under this option, the unified commanders would be given the authority to select their Service component commanders and to replace them should the need arise.

◦ Option 2C —require the Service component commands to communicate with their Service headquarters on critical resource issues through their unified commander

Under this option, the unified commander would be placed in the logistical chain of command on critical issues. The link between the Washington headquarters of the Military Departments and Service component commands would be weakened, and the unified commander would have greater control and influence over his subordinate commands.

- Option 2D —eliminate the Service component commands and make them part of the joint staff serving the unified commander

If less drastic changes would not provide the unified commander with sufficient authority over his Service component commands, it may be necessary to consolidate these commands with the joint staff of the unified commander.

The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* made this exact recommendation:

> The Unified Commanders should be given unfragmented command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders of component commands should be redesignated Deputies to the commander of the appropriate Unified Command, in order to make it unmistakably clear that the combatant forces are in the chain of command which runs exclusively through the Unified Commander. (page 57)

The Final Report of the Defense Organization Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), entitled *Toward a More Effective Defense*, made the same recommendation:

> The component commanders should not be service representatives with independent authority. Instead, the relationship between a unified commander and his service component commanders should be that of a commander and his deputies for air, land, and sea operations. (page 21)

- Option 2E —colocate the unified commander and his Service component commands

The geographic separation of the unified commander and his Service component commands serves to lessen his authority and control over them. Colocation could be an effective means of strengthening the authority of the unified commander.

3. PROBLEM AREA #3—IMBALANCE BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER RESOURCE DECISIONS

The principal thrust of efforts to correct this problem is to strengthen the role of the unified commanders in policymaking and resource allocation. This idea has been presented in a number of studies. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended that:

> The Unified Commanders should be given express responsibility and capability for making recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations, for operational capabilities objectives and for allocations of force structures needed for the effective accomplishment of the missions assigned to their Commands. (page 5)

Similarly, the National Military Command Structure Study recommended:

> That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include a participating voice in determining requirements of forces under his command. (page 38)

While there is general agreement on the need to strengthen the link between the unified commanders and the DoD policymaking level, how such a proposal could be implemented has not been discussed in previous studies.

The eight options developed to lessen this problem area can be grouped into four categories: (1) increase the stature of the unified commanders; (2) strengthen the ability of the JCS system to represent the unified commanders; (3) strengthen the ability of OSD to represent the unified commanders; and (4) develop new procedural mechanisms to augment the influence of the unified commanders over resource allocations or to increase the level of resources directly under the control of the unified commanders.

- Option 3A —increase the stature of the unified commanders by making them more senior in order of rank than the Service Chiefs

The U.S. military establishment has often had difficulty, especially in wartime, in determining the relative power and influence that should be assigned to Service Chiefs and to field commanders. At present, the Service Chiefs are more senior than the unified commanders. This relative order of rank may lessen the authority of the unified commanders and contribute to the problem of insufficient authority over resource decisions.

This option would alter the relative order of rank. The JCS Chairman would continue to be the most senior U.S. military official. The unified commanders would be next in terms of order of rank. The Service Chiefs would follow the unified commanders in seniority. The status of the specified commanders in order of rank would not change under this option.

- Option 3B —strengthen the capabilities of the Joint Staff to do resource analysis

Part of the inability of the JCS to make meaningful programmatic inputs results from a lack of Joint Staff capabilities for independent resource analysis. Strengthened Joint Staff capabilities in this area may permit a more persuasive input from the JCS system in support of the unified command perspective. An initiative to provide for improved resource analysis capabilities has already been taken in the Joint Staff through establishment of the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency.

- Option 3C —enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman

The thrust of this option is to enable the JCS Chairman to be better able to represent cross-Service issues that are of great importance to the operational commands, especially the unified commands. Specific actions to enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman are presented in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- Option 3D —more clearly link the JCS Chairman with the operational commanders

This could be done by clarifying the operational or administrative chain of command and associated responsibilities. The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 amended section 124 of title 10, United States Code, to strengthen the role of the JCS Chairman as the spokesman for the operational commanders. The specific language was:

> Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Chairman acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements. (page 126)

- Option 3E —create OJCS offices to represent the unified commanders on a day-to-day basis on policy and resource allocation issues

If the OJCS were organized on a mission basis (Option 1K of Chapter 4), the mission-oriented offices could perform this task. If not, new offices, similar to the now abolished Washington Liaison Office of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, would have to be created within OJCS. To be able to effectively represent the unified commanders, these offices would require unimpeded access to the JCS Chairman.

- Option 3F —have OSD mission-oriented offices represent the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues

If new OSD mission-oriented offices headed by under or assistant secretaries were created, the unified commands would have a single point of contact within OSD on policy and resource allocation issues. Under this option, the policy and resource allocation inputs of the unified commands would be directed to principal OSD advisors of the Secretary of Defense who would share a mission and multi-Service perspective with the unified commands.

- Option 3G —have the operational commanders submit operational Program Objective Memoranda

Currently, the resource allocation process is centered around Program Objective Memoranda (POM's) submitted by the Military Departments. This option proposes the submission of POM's by the operational commanders identifying primarily the readiness and sustainability resource needs of their entire commands. These POM's could also focus on procurement requirements that cross Service lines, such as communications programs. These POM's would represent a formal input by the operational commanders and would highlight cross-Service considerations to counterbalance the single-Service perspective of the Military Department POM's.

The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, includes this option in its recommendations:

> The military division of labor between force-maintaining and force-operating structures should be reflected in the programming and budgeting processes. Specifically, we propose that a separate program and budget be established for the operational forces that would be prepared and executed by the unified and specified commanders under the supervision of the chairman of the JCS. Under this proposal, each service would continue to produce its program and budget for procurement, re-

search and development, training, and associated operational and personnel costs. But, many of the in-theater operating costs of the service components of the unified and specified commands would be shifted to a new joint account. This separate "readiness" program and budget would include such items as operating and maintenance expenses, in-theater training and exercise costs, certain military construction costs (ammunition storage, for example), and some family housing costs. The specific items that would be included in the new account would be determined on the basis of a line-by-line review of current department accounts. (page 19)

- Option 3H —approve the use of the CINC Readiness Fund

In both fiscal years 1983 and 1984, the Department of Defense requested, but the Congress denied, funding of $100 million for the CINC Readiness Fund. The CINC Readiness Fund was intended to provide unified commanders with a source of funds to meet unanticipated, unprogrammed, urgent, near-term readiness and warfighting requirements. DoD's rationale for such a fund was based upon the financial dependence of the unified commands on Service components to meet their unprogrammed requirements and upon the difficulties associated with the reprogramming and supplemental processes.

In fiscal year 1985, a similar funding request for $50 million was made by DoD under a program entitled JCS Special Fund. This funding request was also denied by the Congress. However, the Congress did provide authority for the Secretary of Defense to make available from Operation and Maintenance authorization funds sums necessary to meet the contingency requirements of the unified and specified commands. Specifically, Section 304 of the DoD Authorization Act, 1985 provides:

> CONTINGENCY FUNDS FOR THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
>
> Sec. 304. The Secretary of Defense may make available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, out of any funds appropriated pursuant to the authorizations contained in section 301 for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, such sums as may be necessary to meet unforeseen and contingent requirements of the unified and specified commands of the Armed Forces.

While this provision is a recognition that the unified commands are too dependent on the independent programmatic and financial decisions of their Service components, it also represents an indication that the Congress is not convinced of the need for separate and distinct appropriations to meet the unprogrammed requirements of the operational commanders.

This option would endorse the concept of the CINC Readiness Fund/JCS Special Fund as a means of providing the operational commanders with greater influence over resources.

4. Problem Area #4—Absence of Unification Below the Level of the Unified Commander and His Staff

Four options have been developed to lessen this problem area.

- Option 4A —clarify appropriate command relationships within the unified commands, especially concerning the principle of unity of command

The Department of Defense has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command. This is reflected both in doctrinal writings as well as command relationships within the unified commands. In particular, the concept of "in-support-of" forces appears to directly contradict the principle of unity of command because it permits divided command.

This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense clarify the currently ambiguous concepts concerning appropriate command relationships.

- Option 4B —revise UNAAF to remove obstacles to the creation of additional sub-unified commands and other necessary subordinate joint organizations

If the unified commanders are to be able to orchestrate warfare throughout the conflict spectrum, subordinate organizations must be unified as far as possible down the command chain. The only constraints to the application of this principle would be when logistical, administrative, and training inefficiencies would be created that outweigh the benefits of enhanced unification or when necessary flexibility in force deployment or employment would be lost. UNAAF is a major obstacle to obtaining desired unification at subordinate levels because it places great emphasis on maintaining uni-Service integrity. This option would require revisions to the UNAAF designed to promote appropriate unification in subordinate levels of the unified command.

- Option 4C —remove the Service component commanders from the operational chain of command

The requirement that operational command be normally exercised through the Service component commanders is a major impediment to unification. This option would solve this problem by removing the Service component commanders from the operational chain of command. The Service component commands would then be limited at the operational level to logistical responsibilities comparable to the responsibilities of the Military Departments within the policymaking level of DoD.

The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, recommended that the unified commander be authorized to establish his chain of command:

> Although the National Security Act grants the unified and specified commanders "full operational command" of the forces assigned to the combatant commands, it leaves the definition of that phrase to the JCS. In our view, the JCS have defined "full operational command" too narrowly. Specifically, the JCS guidelines that require a CINC to exercise operational command only through the component commands and those that allow the component commander to select subordinate units to perform tasks assigned by the unified commander should be relaxed. Subject to approval by the secretary of defense, the CINC should have the authority to establish the operational

chain of command in his theater and to select the units he believes necessary for a given military operation. (page 21)

- Option 4D —place greater emphasis on joint training within the unified commands

If subordinate forces in the unified commands cannot be organized on a more unified basis, the ability of forces to take unified action could be improved by more joint training. This option would provide for expanded joint training programs within each unified command.

General W.Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) comments on inadequate joint training:

> ...for a variety of reasons, the CINC historically has not achieved what he believes is a satisfactory level of joint training. He has had to rely heavily on Service training for the readiness of his units, but, as noted, he has little or no influence or control over that training. (*The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future*, page 6)

To correct this problem, General Smith recommends:

> ...since the JCS exercise program is central to the CINC's ability to train his forces, JCS exercises should receive a higher priority in the available funding. A balance between Service-oriented exercises and joint exercises is justified; however, the balance is not yet correct. (page 32)

5. PROBLEM AREA #5 —ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The first two options to lessen this problem area focus on improving the work of the JCS system on the Unified Command Plan and on increasing the attention that OSD and NSC place on the UCP. The third option offers one way of enhancing the prospects that the goal of the second option would be achieved.

- Option 5A —correct the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system

Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents various options for correcting the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system. This option merely acknowledges that one of the benefits of such actions would be an enhancement of the prospects for an objective review of the UCP.

- Option 5B —seek increased attention to the UCP by OSD and NSC

If the objectivity of the JCS review of the UCP is less than desired, the only possible solution is to shift the burdens of objective UCP review to OSD and NSC. This option would call for a more active role by these two organizations in reviewing the UCP.

- Option 5C —require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on the UCP

This option would seek to give the UCP high-level attention in the Executive Branch by requiring the President to submit a one-time report to the Congress.

G. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the unified and specified commands that were set forth in Section F. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

1. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE CONFUSED CHAIN OF COMMAND

Before options to correct the problem of the confused chain of command can be usefully evaluated, a fundamental issue on the power of Congress to specify the operational chain of command needs to be examined. This issue is addressed as an introduction to the evaluation of options which follows.

a. Is the Congress empowered to specify the operational chain of command?

There are differences of opinion on the powers granted by the Constitution to the Congress and the President, as the Commander in Chief, to specify the operational military chain of command.

John Kester in his article, "Thoughtless JCS Change Is Worse Than None," argues that the President solely has the authority to adjust the chain of command:

> ...it is Presidents, not Congresses, who adjust the military chain of command. The Congress, of course, is empowered in Article I of the Constitution to raise and support armies (including those that fly), to provide and maintain a navy, and to pass laws regulating the armed forces. Much is granted there that Congress can do. But there also are some things that Congress may not do. The exact borderlines are hazy. It is clear enough, however, that Congress does not have any Constitutional authority to direct in detail through what chain of command the President exercises his power as Commander-in-Chief.
>
> The President's power as a commander comes from an independent grant in Article II of the Constitution, and not from the Congress. At the very least this allows him to pick the command channel he prefers—as Presidents have done, sometimes using one and sometimes another. Congress can do much to set the size, shape, content, and capabilities of the armed forces. But most Constitutional scholars agree that it cannot intrude upon the essence of the command function. (*Armed Forces Journal International*, November 1984, page 115)

Despite Mr. Kester's assertions, there are persuasive arguments that the Constitution does empower the Congress to specify the chain of command. A legal opinion prepared by Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist in American Public Law of the Congressional Research Service, reaches this conclusion. This legal opinion, prepared in support of this study, is presented as Appendix B of this chapter.

The three basic arguments in this legal opinion can be summarized as follows:

- Through the creation of positions in the U.S. military establishment and the fixing of appropriate grades with respect to such positions which essentially establish the hierarchy of responsible parties, the authority of the Congress to fix the chain of command is significant.
- The congressional power to make rules for regulation of the armed forces adds additional support to a role for the Congress in specifying the chain of command.
- Congress by law (the National Security Act of 1947) has effectively established the chain of command and by law has changed it (1953 and 1958 amendments) or authorized the President, subject to congressional scrutiny, to change it.

The recommendations of this chapter are based upon the premise that the Congress is empowered to specify the chain of command. In the exercise of this power, the Congress must, however, ensure that the President has sufficient flexibility to adjust command relationships to provide for effective command in unforeseen situations.

- Option 1A —remove the Secretary of Defense from the chain of command

This option would return to the chain of command arrangements employed during World War II. At that time, the JCS reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, and through the executive agent arrangement, a JCS member supervised each of the operational commands. Other than the Commander-in-Chief, there were no civilians in the operational chain of command.

In his book, *The 25-Year War —America's Military Role in Vietnam*, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA (Retired) appears to argue for this option:

> In our system of government, the president, with his dual role as civilian chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is the indispensable key to national security. For the president to control the nation's armed forces, he must command them; he cannot delegate this to his secretary of defense or to the military chiefs. He must have direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, collectively and individually, and must regularly see them. If he shunts them off or allows his secretary of defense to isolate the chiefs, he does so at the nation's peril. The president *is* the commander-in-chief and there is no substitute for his forceful and visible leadership in discharging this supreme command function over the Department of Defense and the armed forces. (page 201)

If the President were to dedicate, as Roosevelt did during World War II, nearly his full attention to the conduct of military operations, such an arrangement might make sense and ensure effective civilian control of the military. In today's world, however, the Commander-in-Chief will be able to spend only a small portion of his time on military operational matters. Without the full-time assistance of the Secretary of Defense, the President would be unable to effectively supervise and control military operations.

Moreover, there is evidence that there was an absence of effective civilian control during World War II. In his book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel P. Huntington discusses the extent of civilian control during World War II:

> The military attitude toward civilian control changed completely during the war. The plans for postwar organization of the armed services, developed by the military in 1944 and 1945, reflected a new conception of their role in government. One would hardly recognize the cowed and submissive men of the 1930's in the proud and powerful commanders of the victorious American forces. Civilian control was a relic of the past which had little place in the future. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the present time," Admiral Leahy said quite frankly and truthfully in 1945, "are under no civilian control whatever." (pages 335 and 336)

Apparently, a persuasive case can be made for a continuing role for the Secretary of Defense in the operational chain of command. However, three problems remain: (1) the relative inexperience of the Secretary for this role; (2) the limited time that the Secretary can devote to this responsibility; and (3) the absence of adequate and independent staff support on operational matters for the Secretary.

○ Option 1B —clearly assign to the Secretary of Defense the role of commander of the operational commanders

If one were convinced that the Secretary of Defense should remain in the operational chain of command, there is a need to clarify his role. The current uncertainty as to the Secretary's responsibilities has resulted in confusion within the chain of command and a weakening of civilian control. It can be convincingly argued that the Secretary of Defense has lost much of his authority in the chain of command because of a lack of an understanding of his precise role.

In addition, the absence of statutory emphasis on the "command" role of the Secretary of Defense may have led to insufficient attention to necessary qualifications for this role in selecting Secretaries of Defense. Undue emphasis may have been placed upon the Secretary's political and managerial roles and not enough on his civilian "military commander" role. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Retired) refers to the Secretary of Defense as the:

> ...defacto Deputy Commander in Chief just below the President in the chain of command. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 31)

There may be merit to specifying through amendment of the statutes that the Secretary of Defense is the *de jure* Deputy Commander in Chief.

If the Secretary of Defense is to remain an integral part of the chain of command and become an effective participant, no negative consequences of clarifying his role have been identified. However, Secretary Weinberger has stated that there is no need for clarification of the role of the Secretary of Defense:

> The chain of command is clear....the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands are fully and directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for carrying out their assigned responsibilities. This role is well understood and does not require statutory clarification. (Answers to Defense Authorization Report Questions).

- ○ Option 1C —establish a position for a second Deputy Secretary of Defense who would be responsible for assisting the Secretary of Defense on military operational matters

Traditionally, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have divided their responsibilities so that the Secretary focused on external (White House, Congress, alliances, etc.) matters and on operational matters while the Deputy Secretary focused on internal DoD management. A second Deputy Secretary focusing on operational matters would, therefore, assume responsibilities currently borne by the Secretary.

On the positive side, a second Deputy Secretary would ensure more attention by a senior civilian official to operational matters. He may be able to lessen the three problems associated with a continuing role for the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command: (1) relative inexperience; (2) limited time; and (3) inadequate staff support. A second Deputy Secretary could become a specialist on operational matters and devote his full attention to these issues. He may also be able to ensure that the Secretary receives a broader and more balanced set of inputs than currently available from the JCS system. He might also become the focal point for OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans.

On the negative side, a second Deputy Secretary would add an additional layer through which the advice of the JCS would be filtered. This might be seen as a further erosion of military representation in DoD decision-making. In addition, the creation of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense and a staff to support him would add to a bureaucracy which may already be too large and cumbersome.

A fundamental issue regarding this option is whether the JCS system as currently formulated has served the Secretary of Defense as an effective military staff on operational matters or, if not, whether alternative arrangements for the JCS system could result in more effective staff support for the Secretary. While the evidence clearly suggests that the Secretary has been poorly served by the JCS system on operational matters, the preferable approach would be to correct deficiencies in the JCS system rather than to add a new senior civilian official in an attempt to overcome these shortcomings. A second Deputy Secretary of Defense would perpetuate the long history of creating civilian offices to do the work that joint military offices have failed to effectively perform.

Regarding the relative inexperience and limited time of the Secretary of Defense, the most useful approach may be to lessen other demands on the Secretary's attention to enable him to devote more time to his important chain of command duties. This could be done by (1) reducing his span of control; (2) providing more effective staff support for his mission integration responsibilities which could permit more effective delegation of decision-making authority; and (3) lessening congressional demands on the Secretary's time.

◦ Option 1D —place the JCS Chairman in the chain of command

Proposals to place the JCS Chairman in the chain of command are based upon (1) concerns about the relative inexperience and limited time of the Secretary of Defense; (2) the utility of having a single military point of contact and a single command voice of higher authority within the Washington headquarters of DoD on operational matters; (3) the need for formal military representation in the Washington headquarters portion of the chain of command; and (4) concerns that command by a committee (the JCS) violates the principal of unity of command.

In a letter dated April 18, 1983 accompanying a legislative proposal, DoD justifies its recommendation that the JCS Chairman be placed in the chain of command in order "to make explicit his functions as a link between the Secretary of Defense and the unified and specified commands." Expanding on this point, the letter adds: "The practice has been for the Secretary of Defense to communicate with the combatant commands through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the proposed legislation would formalize this arrangement..." This is a rather modest rationale for making such a significant change in the chain of command. DoD's rationale encompasses only the second of the four reasons, presented in the preceding paragraph, for placing the JCS Chairman in the chain of command.

There is substantial evidence that command by committee has resulted in inappropriate emphasis on Service interests in the formulation of operational plans. The current limits on the authority of the JCS Chairman preclude him from developing recommendations on operational matters that set aside undue Service parochialism in the search for effective courses of action. Placing the JCS Chairman alone in the chain of command may give him the stature and independent authority necessary to rise above Service parochialism. It may be possible for the Chairman to make objective recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, as a member of the chain of command, the JCS Chairman would clearly become the focal point within the Washington headquarters of DoD for the operational commanders on operational matters. He could also become their advocate on policy and resource allocation issues although that possibility is separate from consideration of the operational chain of command.

Arguments against this option also have merit. Key among these is the view that putting the JCS Chairman in the chain of command would weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense. This option could lead to circumvention of the Secretary and to insulation and isolation of the Secretary from the operational commanders. Should these negative predictions occur, the Secretary's ability to effectively manage DoD would be impaired and civilian control of the military would be weakened.

A second negative argument is that the Secretary of Defense would receive advice only from one uniformed official rather than the multi-Service input from the entire JCS. Given the complexity of the many facets of modern warfare, it would be detrimental to unnecessarily limit the range of opinions that the Secretary would receive. General W. Y. Smith, USAF (Retired) also argues: "it would be relatively easier to overrule a single military voice than to deal with the concerns of the different Services." (*The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future*, page 47). Furthermore, a JCS Chairman would come to his position with all of the biases that would result from a lengthy career in one of the four Services. The validity of this argument is somewhat weakened by the fact that the Joint Staff with officers from all Services would continue to raise and address issues from a multi-Service perspective.

A third negative argument is that the Service Chiefs are the most knowledgeable officials on the full spectrum of the capabilities of the forces of their Services. This knowledge can be an important input in the formulation of recommendations on military operational matters. This input would be diminished if only the JCS Chairman were placed in the chain of command even if the JCS Chairman consulted the Service Chiefs before making his recommendations.

A fourth major negative argument is the risks to civilian control that arise from placing one uniformed officer in command of the vast majority of U.S. operational military forces. General Smith sees a greater risk:

> The greatest drawback to a single military chief is not, however, that without countervailing forces a "man on horseback" would arise. Rather it is the danger of the politization of the office of the Chairman....The temptation would be for him to be seen too much the spokesman of an Administration in power rather than of the professional military. (*The U.S. Military Chain of Command, Present and Future*, page 47).

○ Option 1E —place the JCS in the chain of command

This option would formally recognize the actual implementation of the ambiguous situation created by DoD Directive 5100.1. The JCS, as a corporate body, do now, in the view of many observers, act as a full-fledged member of the operational chain of command. This option would merely legitimize the current situation.

In general, the pros and cons of this option are the exact opposite of those for Option 1D. Arguments in favor of this option include (1) the need to have a multi-Service input on operational matters; (2) the value of involving the most knowledgeable officials on Service capabilities in decisions on operational matters; and (3) the maintenance of a system of checks on the authority of any single military official which would help ensure civilian control.

The negative arguments include (1) violation of the principle of unity of command; (2) the failure of the JCS committee to provide objective advice on military operations; and (3) inappropriate emphasis on Service interests in the formulation of operational plans.

There is one negative argument against this option which also applies against Option 1D: putting the JCS in the chain of command would weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense. This is clearly evident at present. The Secretary of Defense is now often insulated and isolated from the operational commanders.

Furthermore, the JCS system has failed to sufficiently interact with the Secretary and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on operational matters. This has ensued from the closed staff nature of the JCS system which results in part from the dual responsibilities of the Service members of the JCS.

- Option 1F —remove the JCS, including the Chairman, from the chain of command

This option would return to the statutory scheme for the chain of command. The operational commanders would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

The arguments in support of this option include (1) strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense which has been diminished by the current role of the JCS in the chain of command; (2) strengthening of civilian control of the military; and (3) improving the link between the Secretary of Defense and the operational commanders.

The negative arguments include: (1) the inexperience of the Secretary of Defense in the command role; (2) limits of the time that the Secretary can devote to this responsibility; and (3) the removal of all formal military representation from the chain of command at the DoD policymaking level.

- Option 1G —make the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system

This option would be based upon the following arguments:

- the Secretary of Defense should remain in the chain of command and his role therein should be clarified;
- the JCS, including the Chairman, should be removed from the chain of command because a formal role for the corporate body or the Chairman would weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense;
- it would be useful to have a single military point of contact and a single command voice of higher authority within the Washington headquarters of DoD on operational matters;
- there currently is inappropriate emphasis on Service interests in the formulation of operational plans;
- designation of the JCS Chairman as the Secretary of Defense's principal military advisor on operational matters will increase his stature and independent authority and enable him to rise above Service parochialism in rendering advice on operational matters;
- the increased authority of the JCS Chairman will come at the expense of the Service Chiefs and not at the expense of the Secretary of Defense; and
- given the predominance of the JCS system on operational matters, appropriate military representation on operational matters at the policymaking level of DoD is assured even without formal representation in that portion of the chain of command.

The Steadman Report made a recommendation similar to this option in support of which it argued:

> ...a committee structure is not effective for the exercise of military command or management authority. Such authority could be more effectively exercised by the Chairman, who in being so empowered, should also be directed to act in consultation with the other JCS members when time permits. (page 35)

There are several arguments in opposition to this option. First, with his increased authority, the JCS Chairman may be able to more effectively compete with the Secretary of Defense for power and influence. The concentration of power in the hands of one senior military official, according to this argument, would curtail the system of checks inherent in the JCS.

This argument seems to have little merit. It appears to say in analogy: don't create a Deputy Secretary of Defense because he would become a competing force to the Secretary of Defense. Obviously, the personal relationship established between the Secretary and the JCS Chairman would be the key ingredient in determining the utility of this organizational approach.

Other negative arguments are that (1) the Secretary of Defense may not consistently receive a multi-Service input from the entire JCS; (2) the Service Chiefs, who are the most knowledgeable officials on the full spectrum of the capabilities of the forces of their Services, would have a diminished input on operational matters; and (3) the position of JCS Chairman could become politicized.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE WEAK AUTHORITY OF UNIFIED COMMANDERS OVER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

- ○ Option 2A —revise UNAAF to lessen the restrictions on the authority of the unified commanders.

While there are disagreements as to whether JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), overly restricts the authority of the unified commanders, the more convincing arguments are that it does. As UNAAF delineates the purpose and basis on which unified commands are formed, it is the starting point for improved command relationships within the unified commands.

The basic relationships in UNAAF have not been altered since the Key West Agreement of 1948. Given the experience with unified command since that time, a careful examination of UNAAF seems appropriate.

- ○ Option 2B —authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders

The advantage of this option is that it is more likely to ensure subordinate commanders who are fully supportive and capable of successfully interacting with the unified commander. Given the importance of these relationships, the unified commander should be given wide discretion in selecting his immediate subordinate commanders.

On the negative side, the Services may lose the influence associated with independent appointments of Service component commanders. Moreover, the unified commander may select subordinates who share his biases and thus may be offered less than the full range of opinions on issues affecting the unified command.

- Option 2C —require the Service component commands to communicate with their Service headquarters on critical resource issues through their unified commander

Currently, Service component commands serve as middle men between two masters: the unified commander and the Service Chief. On critical issues, it would seem appropriate for the discussions to occur between the two principal officials. Routine matters could continue to be addressed directly between the Service component commands and the Service headquarters.

On the negative side, such direct communications with Service Chiefs would add to the workload of the unified commander. Obviously, he would want to limit his involvement to only those issues which are critical to his command.

Another negative aspect is that the Service component commands will lose influence and control on key issues. This, however, is the desired result of this option.

- Option 2D —eliminate the Service component commands and make them part of the joint staff serving the unified commander

It is difficult to foresee how this drastic change to the unified commands would be implemented. There will continue to be a requirement to conduct Service-unique administrative work associated with organizing, training, and equipping forces. Some organizational entity will be required for these purposes.

While it can be argued that the Service component commands retain too much power and influence, abolishing these commands does not appear necessary, at least at this time, to correct these problems.

- Option 2E —colocate the unified commander and his Service component commands

Costs would appear to preclude further consideration of this option. However, as base realignments and closures are considered, this possibility should be kept in mind. For example, there has been speculation that Camp H. M. Smith, the headquarters of USPACOM, might be closed. Should this be the case, USPACOM should be colocated with one of its Service component commands.

3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER RESOURCE DECISIONS

- Option 3A —increase the stature of the unified commanders by making them more senior in order of rank than the Service Chiefs

There are historical examples of the dispute over whether field commanders or Service Chiefs should be more senior in rank. In *Organizing For Defense*, Paul Hammond discusses the dispute during World War I between General John J. Pershing, USA, then Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and Major General Peyton C. March, USA, the Army's Chief of Staff.

Referring to former Secretary of War Elihu Root's reforms of Army organization, Hammond states:

> Root's principles certainly offered no guidance for determining how to cut the strategic pie between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General, AEF. As might have been expected, the issue ultimately resolved itself into one of rank and command. The dispute between Pershing and the Chief of Staff, Major General Peyton C. March, over which was of superior rank, was settled in March's favor by a general order in August, 1918, five months after he had become Chief of Staff. In that office he was to take "rank and precedence" over all other officers of the Army. (page 41)

One could quickly conclude that the relative rank of the Service Chiefs and the unified commanders would be guided by the same principles that settled the Army dispute during World War I. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that the relationships of the commanders of multi-Service commands with the Service Chiefs are much different than the relationship between Generals Pershing and March.

In creating a more appropriate analogy for today's unified organization, General March's equivalent is the JCS Chairman. The Service Chiefs would be equivalent to Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff during World War I. While the Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff during World War I contributed to the strategic direction of the field commands, just as the corporate JCS do today, there was no consideration of making them more senior than General Pershing.

Setting aside their responsibilities as members of the JCS, the Service Chiefs are primarily logisticians. As individual Chiefs of Staff, their primary duties are to organize, train, and equip the forces of their Services. It is only as JCS members that the Service Chiefs assume broader duties for the strategic direction of operational forces.

The focus in this problem area, however, is the logistics role of the Service Chiefs. At issue is whether it is logical to continue to assign the Service Chiefs —who have only logistics-related responsibilities —a more senior position than combatant commanders — who are responsible for executing the major military missions of DoD. The current arrangement has contributed to Service Chief dominance of the resource allocation process at the expense of the unified commanders and to the *de facto* influence that the individual Service Chiefs retain over operational matters within the unified commands.

If the unified commanders were made more senior than the Service Chiefs, their influence over resource decisions could increase. The Service Chiefs would continue to play an important role in rationalizing the demands from the various unified commanders, but the focus would likely shift from Service priorities to the warfighting needs of the combatant commands. Such a shift seems desirable.

On the negative side, increasing the stature of the unified commanders could lead to six independent "warlords". It would be difficult to rationalize the distinct demands of powerful combatant commanders. Johnson, Sedgewick, and Ortloff comment on this possibility in their study, *Unity of Command —Does It Exist in the Field*?

> If the distribution of influence is considered to be a zero-sum game, giving CINCs more influence in the PPBS process would infringe on the Service Chiefs' prerogatives to some extent. Bringing the CINCs into the resource arena would not add competition for the same resources, however. It would add, rather, a new point of view: that of the consumer. We believe the balance point between the power of the CINCs and Service Chiefs needs to be realigned, but how far? A system of independent "warlords" commanding forces heavily specialized on regional lines would not be economical or prudent. While it can be argued that the Services are in the best position to make economical decisions about weapon systems, it can also be argued that inappropriate systems ultimately have the highest costs. (page IV-5)

- Option 3B —strengthen the capabilities of the Joint Staff to do resource analysis

Given the weaknesses of the JCS system in making meaningful programmatic inputs, this clearly appears to be a desirable option. As General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, USCINCEUR, has stated:

> ...there remains in Washington a preeminence of Service goals in the program and budget process. The newly created 40-man office in OJCS, the Strategic Planning and Resources Analysis Agency (SPRAA) may help to alleviate this situation. We are working with this office in an effort to insure that it can prepare adequately the CJCS [JCS Chairman] to serve as spokesman for CINC warfighting needs. (Answers to Authorization Report Questions).

The usefulness of this option should not be overemphasized. Despite increased emphasis on resource analysis, the basic institutional deficiencies of the JCS system, if unaltered, could severely restrict the output of SPRAA.

The only negative argument identified with this option is that it could divert attention of the JCS system away from strategy formulation and operational matters. Evaluation of this criticism would require an explicit determination of the work priorities of the JCS system and whether strengthening resource analysis capabilities would contribute to or impede achievement of these work priorities.

- Option 3C —enhance the independent authority of the JCS Chairman

While enhancing the independent authority of the JCS Chairman could improve his ability to represent the unified commanders, there are more significant issues associated with such a change. Accordingly, this option will be addressed in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- Option 3D —more clearly link the JCS Chairman with the operational commanders

To a certain extent, at least, this option was implemented in the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 which provided that the Chairman would act "as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirement."

This approach would make sense if the operational requirements of the operational commanders never conflicted. In such an unlikely situation, the JCS Chairman could argue for the requirements of each command in evaluating the programs formulated by the Military Departments.

This is not likely to be the case. The operational commands are likely to have different needs, all of which cannot be accommodated within fiscal constraints. The JCS Chairman would need to determine which operational requirements he will support in decision councils. As such, he could have the final say on operational requirements, resources, and priorities. The JCS Chairman would become the sole referee of the competing resource demands of the operational commanders. The inputs of the operational commanders would be filtered by the JCS Chairman before presentation to decision-making bodies, such as the Defense Resources Board. Alternative arrangements might provide better representation of the operational commanders in DoD decision—making bodies.

There is also the question of how much time the JCS Chairman should devote to resource allocation issues. As subsequent portions of this study conclude, programming and budgeting already dominate DoD organizational activity. As a result, operational matters —strategy, contingency plans, joint doctrine, joint training, and coalition issues —receive inadequate attention. This is an area where the JCS Chairman can make a major contribution and should focus his attention. Overinvolvement of the JCS Chairman in resource issues would further compound the problem of the predominance of programming and budget.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Retired) supports this view:

> What worries me when I read the Steadman report is the possibility that the [JCS] Chairman will get deeply involved in the budget process.
>
> ...The advantage of the chairman is that he is not responsible for the detailed activities of a service. He can sit back and reflect on the world and its contents.
>
> ...We will ruin the utility of this fellow if we ask too much of him. When I see him getting into the budgetary numbers game, I worry about it. (*The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy*, American Enterprise Institute, 1978, page 11)

John Kester shares this point of view:

> ...It might be urged that he [JCS Chairman] and the JCS should spend much of their time on purely military plans — movements and mobilizations —since no one else does, and there are plenty of other players in the budget fights. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, Volume Two, Number One, February 1980, page 15)

This is not to say that the JCS Chairman should not play an advisory role in resource allocations. However, he could limit this role to advising on critical resource issues and joint programs. John Kester supports this view:

> ...If the [JCS] chairman cannot advise on program and allocation issues, the uniformed military will abdicate influence on issues of trade-offs that transcend service lines. Surely some of the chairman's time can be allocated profitably to issues of such importance. ("The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", page 15)

If the position of Deputy JCS Chairman were created, it might be desirable to assign participation in the resource allocation process to this officer. Under such an arrangement, the JCS Chairman and Deputy Chairman would divide their work similarly to the way the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense now do.

- Option 3E —create OJCS offices to represent the unified commanders on a day-to-day basis on policy and resource allocation issues

If the OJCS were organized on a mission basis, the mission-oriented offices could perform this task. If OSD also had mission-oriented offices, a decision on which organization should have the primary responsibility for representing the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues would be more difficult.

Section 141(d) of title 10, United States Code, specifies the following among the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

> (1) prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces;
>
> (2) prepare joint logistics plans and assign logistics responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those plans;
>
> (3) review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistics plans;

To fulfill these duties, it can be argued that the OJCS should be the primary point of contact in the policymaking level of DoD for the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues. Such an argument would require a broad interpretation of JCS duties.

Such a broad interpretation would imply that the OJCS should also have the primary responsibility for representing the Military Departments on policy and resource allocation issues. This is not the case; the Military Departments make their inputs directly to the Secretary of Defense. Such an arrangement for the unified commanders would appear to be equally appropriate.

The unified commanders are immediate subordinates of the Secretary of Defense. It appears that they should be directly represented in OSD which has responsibility for policy and resource allocation decisions.

If the OJCS remains organized on a functional basis, new offices would have to be created to represent the unified commanders on the full range of policy and resource allocation issues. Adding to the large OJCS bureaucracy, however, has little appeal.

- Option 3F —have OSD mission-oriented offices represent the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues

While the unified commanders report to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS, the primary point of contact for the commands has traditionally been OJCS. This approach appears to be most appropriate on operational matters. It is uncertain, however, as to whether this is the most desirable arrangement on policy and resource allocation issues. In these instances, the inputs from the unified commands could be directed to the Secretary's principal advisors in OSD.

Under the current OSD organization, this would be difficult. The commands would have to contact a substantial number of functional offices to make their views known. However, if OSD mission-oriented offices were created, the commands would have a single focal point for their inputs. Given the proposed functional subunits or resource cells within each mission-oriented office, the majority of the inputs of the unified commands could be addressed by the mission-oriented offices. However, should the unified commands have inputs in other functional areas, the mission-oriented offices could represent the unified commands with other OSD offices. Unlike operational issues, most policy and resource allocation issues are not time urgent. Hence, the use of a single OSD focal point to represent the full-range of unified command requirements and positions should not result in costly time delays.

- Option 3G —have the operational commanders submit operational Program Objective Memoranda

The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, evaluates this option as follows:

> We recognize that establishing a separate readiness program and budget would cause, at least initially, some dislocations in the department as the new procedures were established. It is likely that it would also require some shifts in staff from the military departments to the Joint Staff and from the component commands to the unified commands. Nevertheless, we believe that these short-term costs would be substantially outweighed by two long-term benefits.
>
> First, a readiness program and budget would enfranchise in the planning and allocation processes the major institutional constituency for readiness and sustainability —the unified and specified commanders. This fundamental change would add needed balance to the flow of military recommendations to the civilian leadership. Instead of having all such recommendations manifested in the programs and budgets of the military departments, there would be recommendations on two sets of issues: one grounded in concerns about readiness and sustainability, the other in concerns about force structure modernization and expansion. In each case, the recommendations would reflect the responsibilities and perspectives of the officers involved. In this way, civilian leaders would be able to make better informed judgments regarding the proper balance in the defense budget between short-term considerations of readiness and sustainability and long-term considerations of force structure modernization and expansion.

> Second, by assigning the CINCs a greater role in determining the readiness and sustainability of their forces, the operations program and budget would help smooth the transition between the current peacetime dominance of the individual services and the expected wartime dominance of the operational commanders. Specifically, the readiness program and budget would allow resources to flow down the same channels as operational authority and responsibility without depriving the services of their primary role as the maintaining arm of the forces. (page 20)

Despite these arguments, it appears that the enhancement role for the operational commanders in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, as provided for in Secretary Taft's memorandum of November 14, 1984, offers great potential for increasing the visibility of the requirements of the operational commanders without the disruptions of this option.

Both this option and the newly established procedures have the same objective: to provide a better appreciation of the readiness and sustainability needs of the operational commanders. It appears desirable to evaluate the adequacy of the newly established procedures before implementing more drastic proposals.

- ○ Option 3H —approve the use of the CINC Readiness Fund

The fundamental issue regarding the CINC Readiness Fund is whether Washington organizations (Congress, OSD, Military Departments) are prepared to relax their absolute control over resources and permit operational commanders some flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements. At present, resource allocations for very specific purposes are approved in advance. In addition, changing approved allocations involves a cumbersome set of procedures, both within DoD and between DoD and the Congress.

It is not possible to exactly forecast the funding requirements of the operational commands well in advance of the actual operating period as the current budget process requires. There appears to be a strong case to provide a CINC Readiness Fund to meet unforeseen requirements.

On the other hand, given the substantial demands for relatively scarce defense resources, there is a requirement to ensure that expenditures are made only for priority needs. Should the concept of the CINC Readiness Fund be approved, the Secretary of Defense will need to ensure that he develops procedures that provide sufficient oversight of expenditures while still being responsive to the urgent needs of the operational commanders.

4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSENCE OF UNIFICATION BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF

- ○ Option 4A —clarify appropriate command relationships within the unified commands, especially concerning the principle of unity of command

Clarification of appropriate command relationships would obviously be beneficial. If unity of command is to be the basic principle for command relationships, this should be clearly communicated and implemented.

No valid disadvantages of this option have been identified.

- ○ Option 4B —revise UNAAF to remove obstacles to the creation of additional sub-unified commands and other necessary subordinate joint organizations

The relative emphasis to be placed on joint organizations versus single-Service organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands involves the following considerations:

- ○ wartime effectiveness versus peacetime efficiency;
- ○ joint requirements versus Service prerogatives; and
- ○ likelihood of theater-wide campaigns versus lesser crises.

UNAAF's emphasis on a single-Service operational chain of command within the unified commands appears inappropriate in the current environment. As the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command has stated:

> UNAAF's organizational approach, which preserves division by Service and Service components, plus the stated requirement to preserve uni-Service integrity in the organizational structure, needs to be reviewed in terms of today's required levels of integration and employment of modern weapons systems. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.)

The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command has offered a similar recommendation:

> We have now had considerable experience with the unified command system and from my parochial perspective I am not convinced that a federated system is as necessary as it once appeared....I would suggest that we should look closely at this arrangement to ensure that it reflects today's environment in terms of the required integration needed to conduct modern warfare and in terms of current political imperatives. (Answers to DoD Authorization Report Questions.)

Key among the advantages of this option is that it will enable the unified command system to more effectively meet today's crisis management requirements. In those crises in which the President must retain effective control, there may be a requirement to circumvent portions of the military chain of command. The creation of additional joint organizations at subordinate levels of the unified commands may permit more effective military action under the direction of the National Command Authority.

- ○ Option 4C —remove the Service component commanders from the operational chain of command

If the single-Service operational chains of command are an impediment to unification, the Service component commanders should be removed from the chain of command. Such an organizational change would have Service organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels of DoD responsible solely for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Operational matters would be handled solely by joint organizations at both the operational and policymaking levels.

There may, however, be instances in which the unified commander may want to place one or more of his Service component commanders in the chain of command. The CSIS recommendation offers greater flexibility in this regard; it would authorize the unified commander to specify his chain of command depending on the situation. This approach may suffer from its *ad hoc* nature. While the chain of command could be structured to best meet the situation at hand, there may be drawbacks to having different reporting relationships during crises.

- ○ Option 4D —place greater emphasis on joint training within the unified commands

This option, by itself, is likely to accomplish little. Increased joint training is likely to result only through changes that augment the influence of the unified commanders on resource allocations.

5. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSENCE OF AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

- ○ Option 5A —correct the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system

This option is the principal focus of Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, therefore, will not be evaluated here.

- ○ Option 5B —seek increased attention to the UCP by OSD and NSC

This is essentially a management issue. If the senior leadership of OSD and NSC do not see the need for or validity of civilian oversight of the Unified Command Plan, there is little that can be done.

- ○ Option 5C —require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on the UCP

A one-time Presidential report on the UCP may or may not prove useful. If the civilian officials responsible for preparing or, more likely, reviewing this report devoted sufficient time and critical attention to the relevant issues, the UCP might receive an objective review. If, however, they merely saw this as another congressional reporting requirement to be met with as little energy as possible, nothing would be gained.

This option also poses the potential for undesirable congressional meddling on UCP issues.

H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the unified and specified commands. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section E (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section G (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. The Congress is empowered by the Constitution to specify the chain of command.	
2. The chain of command from the Commander in Chief to the operational commanders is confused, primarily due to uncertainty about the roles of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chain of command is further confused by the *de facto* influence that individual Service Chiefs retain over the operational commands.	2A. Clearly assign to the Secretary of Defense the role of commander of the operational commanders.
	2B. Specify in statute the Secretary of Defense's authority "to command".
	2C. Specify that the Secretary of Defense is the principal contact in the DoD policymaking level for the operational commanders.
	2D. Remove the JCS, including the Chairman, from the chain of command.
	2E. Make the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational matters and the sole command voice of higher authority within the JCS system while ensuring absolute clarity that the JCS Chairman is not part of the chain of command.
3. The concept of unified command, as formulated in the immediate post-World War II period and as articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, has not been implemented.	
4. Provisions of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), are inconsistent with the concept of unified command.	4A. Revise UNAAF to make it consistent with the concept of unified command.

Conclusions	Recommendations
5. The authority of the unified commanders over their Service component commands is weak.	5A. Revise UNAAF to lessen the restrictions on the authority of the unified commanders.
	5B. Authorize the unified commanders to select and replace their Service component commanders.
	5C. Require the Service component commands to communicate with their Service headquarters on critical resource issues through their unified commander.
6. There is an imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their influence over resource decisions.	6A. Increase the stature of the unified commanders by making them more senior in order of rank than the Service Chiefs.
	6B. Strengthen the capabilities of the Joint Staff to do resource analysis.
	6C. Have OSD mission-oriented offices represent the unified commanders on policy and resource allocation issues.
	6D. Approve the use of the CINC Readiness Fund.
7. The Department of Defense has taken an ambivalent approach to the concept of unity of command; the congressional recommendation "that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts" has not been implemented.	

Conclusions	Recommendations
8. There is an absence of unification below the level of the unified commander and his staff; as a result, command by mutual cooperation—the basic U.S. military doctrine prior to World War II—remains the order of the day at subordinate levels of the unified commands.	8A. Clarify appropriate command relationships within the unified commands, especially concerning the principle of unity of command.
	8B. Revise UNAAF to remove obstacles to the creation of additional sub-unified commands and other necessary subordinate joint organizations.
	8C. Remove the Service component commanders from the operational chain of command.
9. There is no objective review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP).	9A. Seek increased attention to the UCP by OSD and NSC.
	9B. Require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on the UCP.

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF DOD ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

This appendix presents six brief historical examples of organizational problems that have plagued U.S. military operations. The appendix includes two examples—the Spanish-American War and Pearl Harbor—from the period before the application of the concept of unified command. The other four examples are from the post-unified command period of U.S. military history: the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the capture of the *Pueblo*, the Iran hostage rescue mission, and the Grenada operation.

Most of these historical examples have been described and analyzed in much more detail elsewhere; nonetheless, the short papers in this appendix succintly explain the organizational shortcomings that hampered U.S. forces. A final consideration in the preparation of these papers was the necessity to use only unclassified information. This constraint was, of course, most important in preparing the examples on the Iran hostage rescue mission and the Grenada operation.

A. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The Spanish-American War of 1898 provides a classic example of the consequences of lack of unity of command and inadequate inter-Service cooperation on American conduct of a military operation. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. military establishment consisted of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy—both of which operated with little Presidential guidance. The Spanish-American War witnessed not only the failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate on military planning, but also the lack of coordination within the Military Departments themselves. The following examples will serve to illustrate the extent of the problems faced by the operational commanders.

Command of American naval forces in the Caribbean was divided between Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. A sharp personality conflict between Sampson and Schley exacerbated the problems that the lack of unity of command permitted. Since the commanders could not agree on where the Spanish fleet would strike, Sampson blockaded Havana while Schley remained at Key West. Even after the Spanish fleet headed for Cuba, the two commanders further disagreed on where in the Caribbean the Spanish would go for reinforcements—resulting in Sampson heading for Santiago, Cuba while Schley moved his fleet to guard another Cuban port, Cienfuegos. The net result of this internal naval disagreement was that each part of the American fleet was out of reach of the other and, therefore, in danger of being destroyed piecemeal by the Spanish fleet.

The failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate was vividly illustrated by the one substantial joint campaign of the war, that of Santiago. Admiral Sampson had taken control of the fleet once Commodore Schley had reached Santiago. Sampson's Army counterpart was General Shafter. Sampson and Shafter repeatedly disagreed on the best tactic to defeat the Spanish. Shafter insisted that the Navy force the entrance to the harbor of Santiago and aid the Army in the capture of the city. Sampson refused to enter the mine-infested harbor, insisting instead that the Army attack the formidable forts guarding the entrance to the harbor so that his forces could safely remove the mines before entering the harbor.

In the end, Shafter's troops captured Santiago with only minimal naval assistance in the form of a blockade by Sampson's forces from outside the harbor. Army-Navy relations were so strained by the end of the Santiago campaign that General Shafter refused to allow Admiral Sampson's representative to sign the surrender document.

The final conflict between the Army and the Navy occurred after the Spanish capitulation. The Army, believing that it had contributed the most to the victory, took charge of the surrender and claimed all captured weapons—including the remaining Spanish naval forces. The Navy opposed the latter move and the conflict was settled in Washington, allowing the Navy to take charge of the Spanish vessels.

Despite the U.S. victory on the battlefield, the Spanish-American War was a failure for the U.S. military establishment. Public criticism resulting from the realization that there had been no plan, either of mobilization or operations, for the conduct of the war led to the creation of the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.

B. PEARL HARBOR

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was an overwhelming success, taking both policymakers in Washington as well as commanders in Hawaii totally by surprise. Although many factors contributed to this disaster, the structure of the chain of command was a major problem.

There were two chains of command originating from Pearl Harbor—one for the Army, the other for the Navy. The Army chain of command ran from Lt. Gen. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to Secretary of War Stimson and finally to President Roosevelt. The Navy chain of command went from Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to Navy Secretary Knox and ultimately to the President. Therefore, below the Presidential level, no one exercised authority over both commanders at Pearl Harbor.

The problems inherent in this command structure become evident when one analyzes the reasons for the total surprise achieved by the Japanese forces. The absence of adequate intelligence in the weeks leading up to the attack can be at least partially blamed on the lack of unity of command below the level of the President. No one below that level had access to all of the incoming intelligence. It was only at the Presidential level that a comprehensive analysis of all of the available intelligence information could have been made. But no one at that level had the time or the responsibility to do such an analysis. As Peter P. Wallace concludes in "Military Command Authority":

> There was nowhere, short of the President, that intelligence could be joined with the command authority to take action on a joint basis, based on that intelligence. (page 44)

The fragmented command situation in Hawaii also contributed to the lack of warning. With no unified commander, General Short and Admiral Kimmel commanded by cooperation—but neither questioned the plans or operations of the other. General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-range air reconnaissance, while Admiral Kimmel assumed that the Army's radar was fully operational. Both assumptions were incorrect. A Senate investigating committee made the following conclusion regarding the lack of adequate coordination between the Army and Navy commands:

> There was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period November 27-December 7. There was but little coordination and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the responsible commanders knew what the other was doing with respect to essential military activities. (*Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 1946, page 153)

The agreement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel to defend Hawaii through cooperation clearly failed to compensate for the absence of a unified command below the Presidential level.

C. THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF

The Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines was the greatest naval battle in history and the last major fleet action of World War II. Although this October 1944 battle resulted in an overwhelming victory for the United States, it was, by a very narrow margin, almost the largest American naval defeat since Pearl Harbor. The major problem which the U.S. Navy encountered at Leyte Gulf was a lack of unity of command which very nearly proved decisive.

The catalyst for the Battle of Leyte Gulf was General MacArthur's return to the Philippines on October 20, 1944, during the American landing on the island of Leyte. For the Japanese, the fight for the Philippines was vital. Three Japanese naval forces, which included almost every remaining Japanese ship, were committed to the battle.

The American naval forces were divided into two fleets—the Third Fleet under the command of Admiral Halsey, and the Seventh Fleet commanded by Admiral Kinkaid. While Admiral Halsey was, in turn, commanded by Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii, the Seventh Fleet was "MacArthur's Navy" and Admiral Kinkaid was directly under MacArthur's command. Thus the two fleets that were cooperating in support of the American landing at Leyte had no common superior below the level of the JCS in Washington. This lack of a unified commander in the field led to a series of misunderstandings which resulted in near-disaster.

One of the central misunderstandings of the battle on the American side centered around the existence and mission of Task Force 34. A series of confusing and intercepted transmissions, beginning with Admiral Halsey's plans to form a new unit—Task Force 34—to take on heavy surface forces, led Admiral Kinkaid to assume that Halsey's Task Force 34 would be used to guard San Bernardino Strait, thus leaving his Seventh Fleet free to concentrate on the other major entrance to Leyte Gulf, Surigao Strait. However, Halsey's orders stated that while he was supposed to cover the Leyte beachhead, in the event that he found a major portion of the Japanese fleet, his primary mission would then be to destroy that force. Thus, when Halsey proceeded north out of the Leyte Gulf region to attack the Japanese carrier forces—which actually were a decoy to draw his fleet away from the battle—the vessels that would have formed Task Force 34 went with him. He compounded his error by not informing Kinkaid that Task Force 34 had never been formed. This lack of adequate, direct communication and coordination between Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid left San Bernardino Strait and Kinkaid's northern flank unguarded and open to the Japanese.

Historian Adrian Stewart, in *The Battle of Leyte Gulf*, raises a question of critical importance regarding this misunderstanding:

> Would so immense an oversight have been possible, had there been present a supreme commander who could have viewed the battle as a whole? The lack of such a commander would seem to have been the crucial American error. (page 84)

As a result of the confusion, the remainder of the Japanese fleet sailed unopposed through San Bernardino Strait into Leyte Gulf and were met only by an escort carrier unit which was totally unprepared for such a battle.

By the time Kinkaid discovered the error, the Japanese were coming through the strait and Halsey was 350 miles away. Worse still, Halsey ignored Kinkaid's desperate messages asking him to return: "Situation very serious. Escort-carriers again threatened by enemy surface forces. Your assistance badly needed. Escort-carriers retiring to Leyte Gulf". Only when Nimitz intervened, sending Halsey the famous message—"Where is Task Force 34? Whole world wants to know."—did Halsey turn back. But by the time he arrived, the battle had been won.

Fortunately for the United States, heroic fighting on the part of the escort carrier unit and confusion and bad judgment on the part of the Japanese were enough to overcome the problems created by the lack of unity of command.

D. THE CAPTURE OF THE USS PUEBLO

The USS *Pueblo*, an intelligence-gathering ship, was seized by North Korean naval vessels in the Sea of Japan, approximately 15 miles off the North Korean coast, on January 23, 1968. This incident represented the first capture of a sovereign ship on the high seas in peacetime in over 160 years. Because U.S. military forces failed to assist the *Pueblo* from the beginning of the crisis until its arrival in Wonsan harbor (about 4 hours), sensitive information and equipment were lost and the vessel's crew was imprisoned for 11 months by the North Koreans. This lack of action, in turn, can be traced to problems with the U.S. military command structure in the region—specifically, the lack of unification at levels subordinate to the unified commander.

At the time the *Pueblo* was seized, its intelligence-gathering mission off the coast of North Korea was characterized as a "minimal-risk" operation—that is, no forces were specifically dedicated to support the ship. Therefore, when the crisis developed, no single commander in the vicinity had adequate forces under his authority to deal with the seizure. The efforts of commanders below the level of the unified commander to coordinate their forces to handle the crisis resulted in no action being taken.

At the time she was seized, the *Pueblo* was under the operational control of the Commander, Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN). However, COMNAVFORJAPAN did not command any forces which could be used to assist the *Pueblo*. He had to *request* forces from other commands in the vicinity. Air support forces were requested from the Commander, 5th Air Force, in Japan. However, since the 5th Air Force had not been previously ordered to provide specific forces for the *Pueblo*'s mission, none were readily available. Another possible avenue of assistance was the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, which was on maneuvers approximately 500 miles from the *Pueblo*. The *Enterprise* was under the command of the Commander, 7th Fleet, not COMNAVFORJAPAN. COMNAVFORJAPAN assumed the 7th Fleet would receive notification from Washington to assist the *Pueblo*; therefore, he did not directly request the *Enterprise's* assistance. As a result of this breakdown in communications, it took almost three hours from the beginning of the crisis for the Commander, 7th Fleet, to change the course of the *Enterprise*.

Peter P. Wallace, in "Military Command Authority: Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory Bases," summarizes the chain of command problems encountered during the *Pueblo* crisis:

> If any one of the nearby commanders had sufficient forces to deal with the *Pueblo* seizure, the crisis would have been entirely different. But the precise point is that no one commander had such forces and thus commanders were forced to rely on coordination, requests and assumptions about what others were doing. Two major reasons inherent in the command structure chiefly explain this result. There was no effective unity of command below CINCPAC, and those links in the chain of command, CINCPAC and above, who possessed sufficient authority were too far away to influence the situation. (pages 55–56)

Although the capture of the *Pueblo* painfully demonstrated the dangers of inadequate unification at levels below the unified commander, this problem remains essentially unresolved today, almost 20 years later.

E. THE IRAN HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION

On April 24, 1980, U.S. military forces undertook the rescue of 53 Americans who had been held hostage in Tehran, Iran, since November, 1979. Code-named Operation Eagle Claw, the mission not only failed to free the American prisoners but ended tragically in the deaths of eight U.S. servicemen as well. Although several problems contributed to the failure of this heroic effort, this paper will only seek to identify and describe its organizational deficiencies.

1. Planning

Shortly after the takeover of the American Embassy, President Carter directed the Department of Defepse to plan a rescue operation that could be undertaken if diplomatic efforts to free the prisoners failed. A Concept Plan (CONPLAN) to counter terrorism had already been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and, therefore, was available for use in planning this particular contingency. The CONPLAN offered a framework for organizing, planning, training, and executing military responses to terrorist actions. However, the Joint Task Force (JTF) that was established to carry out the rescue mission adopted very little of the JCS CONPLAN; instead, the JTF improvised and relied upon *ad hoc* arrangements to perform most of its tasks. The report of the Special Operations Review Group that was commissioned by the JCS to examine the rescue operation explained that:

> . . . major areas of endeavor, such as task organization planning, integration of concurrent planning by subordinate units, and determination of support and requirements, were compartmentalized and reliant upon *ad hoc* arrangements. (August 1980, page 15) (This report will subsequently be referred to as the "Holloway Report" after the Review Group's Chairman, Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Retired).)

Much of the planning of the Joint Task Force was focused on the best means to transport the rescue force deep into Iran to Tehran and back again. A "preliminary assessment" prepared under the direction of the JCS soon after the rescue operation explained the Task Force's major planning problem:

> . . . it became clear early in the planning effort that a helicopter-supported operation offered the best prospects for success. Due to the distances involved, a corollary to this realization was that, at some point, a helicopter force would have to be refueled enroute from its launch point to its destination in the vicinity of Tehran. A major portion of the planning effort was focused on finding the best combination of location, tactics, and equipment to make the refueling, as well as the remainder of the mission, militarily feasible. (May 6, 1980, pages 1–2)

The plan that eventually evolved from this planning effort required a complex series of ground and air movements, involving personnel and equipment from all four Services. In his book, *The*

Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed, Paul B. Ryan outlined the plan:

> The rescue plan called for six giant C–130 transport planes to lift the men, equipment, and helicopter fuel from an Egyptian air base to an island airfield off Oman for a refueling stop. The planes would then fly to a secret landing strip in Iran, designated "Desert One", 265 nautical miles from Tehran. There they would be joined by eight Sea Stallion helicopters launched three hours earlier from the aircraft carrier *Nimitz*, on station in the Arabian Sea. The rescue force would then transfer to the helicopters and fly to Desert Two, a remote mountain hideaway 50 miles from Tehran. The helicopters would be concealed at a site about 15 miles away. That evening the raiders would be clandestinely driven in vans and trucks to Tehran. About 11 p.m. that night, they would storm the compound, immobilize the guards, and free the hostages.
>
> While the main group overran the embassy, a smaller band would break into the Foreign Affairs Ministry and rescue the U.S. charge d'affaires, Bruce Laingen, and two other Americans. Some forty minutes after the initial break-in, the raiders and hostages would board waiting helicopters at the embassy compound or, if the compound was not usable, at a nearby soccer stadium. If the Delta team, as the rescue group was called, found its way blocked by Iranian mobs, then two C–130 gunships, circling overhead, would immobilize the crowd with gatling guns, which fire 17,000 rounds per minute. Meanwhile, about eighty Rangers would be airlifted from Qena, Egypt, to an isolated desert airstrip at Manzariyeh, thirty-five miles south of Tehran. They would land, seal off the field, and await the arrival of C–141 Starlifters. Next, the helicopters would arrive and discharge their passengers. The helicopters would then be destroyed by their crews. A C–130 gunship would orbit overhead to cover the evacuation. Finally, the loaded transports would take off, presumably to return to Qena and freedom. (1985, pages 1–2)

2. Training

The Joint Task Force headquarters in Washington supervised the training of the plan's disparate forces. After late November 1979, much of the training took place at a desert training site in the western United States. Although members of the JTF headquarters staff traveled to the training site to supervise specific exercises, the general responsibility for supervising training at the site was carried out, in part, by two officers who were advisors to General Vaught but who, at the same time, still worked in their regular duty assignments outside the JTF. The Holloway Report makes it clear that "neither was responsible for the overall management of joint training activities." (page 25)

Complicating the crucial task of joint training even further was the confusion that existed over who was in charge of the helicopter training. Apparently, during the first two months of training, more than one officer immediately below the Commander of the Task

Force was thought to be responsible for preparing the helicopters and their crews.

3. Organizational Problems

The sad ending to this dangerous mission is well known. Paul Ryan briefly describes it at the outset to his book:

> In the early dawn of 24 April 1980 [actually 25 April 1980], in the Iranian desert, a group of some 130 Army Green Berets, Rangers, drivers, and Iranian translators plus some 50 pilots and air crewmen were forced to abort the rescue of 53 Americans held hostage in Tehran. The commander on the scene made the decision reluctantly after three of his eight helicopters, for various reasons, were not able to complete the mission. Worse yet, as the evacuation got underway, a helicopter, maneuvering close to the ground, sliced into a large transport plane laden with fuel and ammunition. Both aircraft burst into flames, and eight men died. The remainder flew to safety, leaving behind five helicopters, weapons, communication equipment, valuable secret documents, and maps. . . . (*The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed*, page 1)

The most serious criticism of the organization of the rescue operation is the charge that all four Services insisted on participating in the mission even though the participation of all four was unnecessary or even harmful. In other words, each Service demanded "a piece of the action". In his position as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski was deeply involved in reviewing the plans prepared by the Defense Department. He made it clear in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believes that those plans suffered from a JCS agreement to unnecessarily include forces from all four Services:

> One basic lesson [to be learned from the failure of the mission] is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration. (SASC Hearings, Part 11, page 503)

A surprising source of similar criticism was Major General John Singlaub, USA (Retired), who had been relieved of his position as Chief of Staff of the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command by President Carter in 1978:

> In 1982, Singlaub appeared on the same BBC program as Admiral Holloway and Colonel Beckwith [Commander of the JTF ground forces component]. Responding to a question on the role of each service in the assault, Singlaub surprisingly replied: "There were some political considerations. I think that an effort was made to get *all* of the services involved. . . ." He went on to say that an operation in which Marine pilots flew Navy helicopters and carried Army troops supported by the Air Force "had a nice ring to it, in a public-relations sense". But if this arrangement was a factor, and "there were some who thought it was a major factor", then, he said, "it was wrong." (*The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed*, page 132)

Criticism of the Services' interest in getting "a piece of the action" largely results from the controversial selection of Marine pilots to join Navy pilots in flying Navy helicopters from the aircraft carrier USS *Nimitz* into Iran. Apparently, Marine pilots were chosen for their experience in assault missions. However, even the Holloway Report, which criticized the mission in only understated and indirect terms, recognized that Air Force helicopter pilots with experience in long-range flying would have been better suited for the long-range demands of the rescue plan:

> These USAF pilots, more experienced in the mission profiles envisioned for the rescue operation, would have probably progressed more rapidly than pilots proficient in the basic weapons system but trained in a markedly different role. (page 35)

The report went on to explain that Air Force pilots would have far less difficulty in mastering a helicopter only slightly different than the one they normally flew (the Navy RH-53 and the Air Force H-53 are variants of the same helicopter) than Marine pilots would have in mastering a mission *very different* than the kind they normally flew (long-range flight versus assault missions):

> Experience gained in Project "Jungle Jim" (circa 1961) illustrated that learning new and vastly different complex mission skills is far more difficult than transitioning to an aircraft of similar design and performance characteristics. (page 35)

Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger recalled the lessons of the Sontay raid to make the same point about the choice of helicopter pilots:

> Lesson No. 3 [from the rescue mission]: Retention of successful tactics from the past requires an effective institutional memory. Mechanisms to prevent the loss of valuable experience can preclude falling into preventable errors. For example, the raid at Sontay prison in North Vietnam in 1970 was well-planned and brilliantly executed. The distances were substantial. Air Force helicopters used were air-refuelable, and the crews had many hours of night flying and refueling experience. Air Force pilots have had extensive experience working with Army combat units and in delivering them to the combat zone. Experience and trust go together. In a complex operation, the chain is only as strong as the weakest link. Clearly the helicopter link [in the Iran rescue mission] could have been strengthened by drawing on proved equipment and on experience. ("Some Lessons of Iran," *The New York Times*, May 6, 1980, page A27)

The clear implication of this criticism is that Marine pilots were selected not because they could best contribute to the success of the operation but because the Marine Corps lacked any other role in the mission.

Although less important than the choice of helicopter pilots, two other problems illustrate organizational shortcomings of the Iran rescue operation. First, discarding most of the elements of the existing JCS plan for responding to terrorism may have hampered preparation for the mission. The Holloway Report concluded:

> . . . that application of an existing JCS CONPLAN and JCS/Service doctrinal precepts could have improved the organization, planning, and preparation of the force through unity of command and cohesion of effort. That, in turn, would have led to more effective command and control and enhanced overall JTF readiness. (page 18)

The natural temptation in designing a response to a particular crisis is to create an *ad hoc* organization with unique rules for command and control, supply, and training. However, as the Holloway Report points out:

> Prolonged *ad hoc* arrangements often result in tasking from different sources and can cause confusion at the operating level. These situational arrangements may hinder preparation and can impact adversely on overall cohesion of effort. (page 18)

In addition, the Joint Task Force could not be sure that events in Tehran would require it to attempt a rescue mission before it was completely ready; therefore, it could not afford to take the time necessary to improvise a "custom tailored" organization.

Second, the poor coordination of the joint training at the western desert training site illustrates the relative inexperience of the Services in training together instead of separately. Although the separate Service elements of the JTF exercised together, the critiques of those joint exercises were generally conducted at the permanent duty locations of the forces. The Holloway Report explains that:

> There was limited opportunity for face-to-face exchange of views and problem solving that could have enhanced accomplishment of training objectives; e.g., more training on communications equipment and procedures to assure effective force integration. (page 25)

The failure of the Joint Task Force to centralize responsibility for joint training reflects the historical difficulty that the four Services have had in training together, even when such joint training was essential to the success of a specific operation.

Despite the courage of the servicemen involved in Operation Eagle Claw, it failed to achieve its purpose. Although it is difficult to discern how much of its failure can be attributed to the organizational problems highlighted here, there is no doubt that they contributed to its tragic outcome.

F. THE GRENADA OPERATION

On October 25, 1983 elements of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps assaulted the island of Grenada in the Caribbean. The operation, code-named URGENT FURY, must be viewed as a success. The principle missions—the rescue of the American medical students, the restoration of democracy and the expulsion of Cuban forces—were accomplished rapidly and with relatively little loss of life (18 U.S. servicemen killed and 116 wounded).

The operation was planned and conducted with extraordinary speed. On October 14, the National Security Council instructed the Joint Chiefs to begin planning for the evacuation of American citizens from Grenada. Conditions on the island continued to deteriorate and on October 21 the National Security Council modified its guidance to add the "neutralization of Grenadan Armed Forces, stabilization and, as requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean states, restoration of democracy in Grenada." The operation was scheduled to begin before dawn on October 25.

Despite the success of URGENT FURY, after-action reports prepared by the Services and numerous articles in professional journals reveal serious problems in the ability of the Services to operate jointly. These problems have their roots in organizational shortcomings.

This analysis is based upon a review of public sources, interviews with some participants, and after-action reports. As of this writing, the Committee staff has not had access to all of the after-action reports and has not conducted comprehensive interviews of participants.

This analysis is also unclassified. The Committee staff is aware of additional serious problems which cannot be disclosed because they are classified.

1. Concept of the Operation

Grenada is located in the geographical area of responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), Admiral Wesley McDonald, whose headquarters are in Norfolk, Virginia. On October 14, the JCS tasked CINCLANT to begin planning a possible evacuation of U.S. citizens from Grenada. CINCLANT's initial plan called for the operation to be conducted by a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) which was on its way to Lebanon and could be diverted. However, when that proposal was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs, it was determined that the Marines should take the northern half of the island and that U.S. Army forces should take the southern half of the island where the major targets were located, including the capital of St. Georges, the Point Salines Airfield, the medical schools and the major concentration of Cuban and Grenadan forces. Some have speculated that CINCLANT's plans were changed only because the Joint Chiefs insisted that each Service should have a piece of the action. There is no direct proof of that allegation, and the JCS have stated that CINCLANT himself discarded using only Navy and Marine Corps units because "the number, size and location of the various objectives exceeded the capability of a single Marine battalion." (JCS response to the "Lind report", *Armed Forces Journal*, July 1984, page 13)

The forces were organized under a Joint Task Force designated JTF 120 and commanded by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, who was the Commander, Second Fleet. Because Admiral Metcalf had no Army personnel on his Second Fleet staff, one Army general officer and two majors were assigned to his staff on an emergency basis. There was no unified ground commander on the island, a matter which caused some problems. Additionally, some Air Force aircraft remained under the control of the Military Airlift Command.

A number of individuals have criticized the tactics and performance of some of the units involved. This analysis undertakes no such criticism but rather focuses on those problems which may be traced in whole or in part to organizational shortcomings. American forces performed bravely and fought well. Because the operation was so hastily planned and conducted, subordinate and small-unit commanders were forced to make rapid adjustments and to improvise. One of the great strengths of the American Armed Forces has always been the initiative and leadership of small unit commanders. Grenada proved no exception. However, with better organizational arrangements, much of the need for improvisation could have been avoided. In a more serious fight against a stronger and more sophisticated enemy, these organizational failures could prove disastrous.

2. Communications

Probably the largest single problem was the inability of some units to communicate. Many Army and Navy units could not communicate with one another. There were also problems between the Army and Marine units on the ground. The root cause of this inability to communicate is that each Service continues to purchase its own communications equipment which all too frequently isn't compatible with the equipment of the other Services. On March 22, 1985, in response to a question from Senator Nunn as to why there was a lack of communications interoperability between the Services, General Wallace H. Nutting, then the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, stated:

> It is a function of the way we prepare for war and that is the fact that the law charges each military department to organize, train and equip forces to operate in a particular environment for which it is responsible. That is too simple an answer, but that is where it begins with the way we prepare for war.

For example, the Army elements initially on the ground were unable to speak to the Navy ships offshore to request and coordinate naval gunfire. It has been reported that one Army officer was so frustrated in his efforts to communicate with the Navy ships that he used his AT&T calling card to place a call on an ordinary civilian pay telephone to his office at Ft. Bragg in an attempt to coordinate fire support. It has also been reported that some of the early communications were conducted via a ham radio operator.

Officers from the 82nd Airborne Division flew by helicopter several times to the USS *Guam* (Admiral Metcalf's flagship) to coordinate naval gunfire; unfortunately these efforts were still unsuccessful. Another officer from the 82nd even borrowed a UHF radio from the Marine Headquarters on the *Guam* in order to be able to communicate directly with the Navy ships. However, subsequent efforts by that officer to request fire and to reposition the destroyers to more favorable locations failed in part because of the inability to authenticate requests using Navy codes. (For additional problems associated with coordination of Navy gunfire, see below.)

In a further example, certain messages failed to reach the Army on the ground in Grenada. This problem nearly proved disastrous as one of those messages contained information concerning the existence of a second campus where American students were located. The Army forces were unaware of the existence of the second campus until the students at that campus telephoned on the afternoon of the 25th to report they were surrounded and to request urgent rescue. The operation was mounted the next day, October 26, successfully rescuing 224 American students.

The JCS "Joint Overview" of the Grenada operation states that "several observations were made in the US CINCLANT report regarding communications difficulties. The observations centered around equipment and compatibility and procedural differences." (May 1, 1985, page 5)

Communications failures were also acknowledged by Army Major General Jack Farris who was the Commander of U.S. Forces Grenada from October 29 until December 15, 1983. General Farris said that the inability of the Army and the Navy to work together "causes communications problems...components of the Joint Task Force being [not] able to talk to each other....It affects the efficiency of all of your operations—for example, intelligence operations." (*Navy Times*, November 5, 1984, page 12)

3. Fire Support

By all accounts the fire support to the Marines was adequate and presented no problem. However, fire support from the Navy to the Army was a serious problem.

According to after-action reports, the coordination between the Army and the Navy ranged from poor to non-existent. The initial assault on the southern part of the island was made by U.S. Army Ranger elements. The Navy was not present at any of the Ranger planning sessions and when Navy aviators were briefed on their mission to support the ground troops, no Army representatives or Air Force Forward Controllers were present. According to an after-action report, Navy aviators

> ...went into combat the first day with absolutely no knowledge or coordination with the Ranger operation...due to this reason all [USS *Independence*-based] aircraft were initially prohibited from flying south of the northern sector without [special] permission until midday of day one. ("Grenada: Rampant Confusion," Michael Duffy, *Military Logistics Forum*, July/August 1985, page 23)

Likewise, representatives of the 82nd Airborne were not present at CINCLANT's planning sessions on Monday, October 24.

> This conscious oversight proved to have several ill-effects, the most important of which was the failure to obtain critical information on the non-Army fire support assets in the area of operations. Procedures for requesting naval gunfire communications channels to be used, FSE [the 82nd Airborne Division fire support elements] coordination with the Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC), availability and munitions of air and naval assets are examples of the kinds of issues which were not fully resolved before deployment. These problems and others were dealt with on the ground. ("URGENT FURY: Looking Back and Looking Forward," Major Scott R. McMichael, *Field Artillery Journal*, March/April 1985, page 10)

Pursuant to the 82nd Airborne Division Readiness SOP (Standard Operating Procedures), a Navy unit, the 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICLO), and an Air Force unit, the 21st Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS), were notified to send ANGLICLO teams and Technical Air Control parties (TAP) to join the 82nd. However, they did not arrive in time to deploy with the 82nd. Even after they arrived on Grenada, Major McMichael reports that the ANGLICO "did not have the necessary communications information —codes, frequency, call signs, etc.—to communicate with naval elements." ("URGENT FURY: Looking Back and Looking Forward," page 10)

A similar problem plagued the last major assault by Army forces against an enemy compound at Egmont on October 27. The plan called for preparatory fire support to be delivered by two artillery battalions, U.S. Navy aircraft (A-7's from the USS *Independence*), an Air Force AC-130 and a destroyer. Although the preparation and the assault were successful, a number of problems occurred which caused the artillery and naval gunfire portions to be unsatisfactory. The artillery problems resulted from conflicts within the 82nd Airborne Division. However, as Major McMichael observes, the failure of the naval gunfire has "its roots in the unstable soil of joint operations." Major McMichael writes:

> When the preparation was initiated the destroyers did not fire. The ANGLICO was unable to discover why the destroyers were not firing. Apprised of the problem, the division fire support element attempted to assist and was informed by the SACC that the Navy would not fire while friendly aircraft were over the target. The problem was not solved in time to have naval gunfire delivered on the target. Later, it was discovered that the CJTF [Commander, Joint Task Force], who reserved personal approval of all naval gunfire missions, had refused permission to fire because of his lack of confidence in ANGLICO destroyer communications. The question may legitimately be asked why the 82nd Airborne Division and the Rangers were not informed of these decisions prior to the initiation of the preparation. In stark contrast, support provided by the A7s and the AC-130 was uniformly superb. ("URGENT FURY: Looking Back and Forward," page 11)

These failures dramatically illustrate the inadequate attention paid to the conduct of joint operations. The fault rests with both the Army and the Navy. As Major McMichael observes, "No one from any service at the joint level apparently understood fire support doctrine sufficiently to anticipate and resolve the problems which surfaced in Grenada. This problem carried over into the operational phase because the CJTF did not augment his staff...with qualified Army personnel." ("URGENT FURY: Looking Back and Forward," page 12) Surprisingly, there is no fire support manual that covers the particular conditions of URGENT FURY—a combined arms joint attack on an island.

However, all was not bad. There were certainly bright spots. For example, on the afternoon of October 26, Army Rangers, by then attached to the 82nd, conducted an air mobile raid at Grand Anse to rescue American medical students. The Ranger FSO (fire support officer) coordinated fire from Navy A-7s, Army artillery and Marine attack helicopters with no apparent problem.

4. Lack of a Unified Ground Commander

Other problems were apparently caused by the failure to appoint a single ground commander. The Marines on the northern half of the island were designated as the 22nd MAU and the Army forces on the southern half were designated as JTF 123 (Rangers and Air Force gunships) and JTF 121 (82nd Airborne). These units reported directly to Admiral Metcalf, the commander of the Joint Task Force abroad the USS *Guam*.

At one point the boundary between the Marines and the Army was adjusted southward so that the Marines could conduct a helicopter and amphibious assault at Grand Mal near St. Georges. By all available accounts, the operation went well, but the absence of "unity of command" on the ground prompted General Farris to comment:

> We never had a joint land [commander]. We never had a land forces commander in Grenada. Now, it wasn't necessary as long as the Marines were way up there in Pearls and the Army's way down there at Point Salines, but when the forces come in proximity —like they were there after the marines came in north of St. Georges —then you have forces operating in proximity and they must coordinate their efforts. And when you don't have a common commander, then what happens is that people have some disagreements and than they bicker and then they argue. And it takes time to do all that and to debate things and to decide what's going to be done. You don't have time for that in combat. There needs to be a guy there that can say here's the way we're going to do it, here's the resources we are going to use to do it with. (*Navy Times*, November 4, 1984, page 12)

It is reasonable to assume that at least some of the organizational problems, such as the lack of coordination of fire support, could have been solved if a unified ground commander had been established.

5. Logistics

Similar organizational shortcomings caused serious logistics problems. The initial attack elements (the Rangers, the Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division) were deployed so rapidly and with such little planning that they arrived with only what they could ~~load~~ on the initial aircraft.

There was also a decision to exclude the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) which was created in 1979 to coordinate the rapid deployment of forces. According to reports, the JDA was not included because it did not have adequate communications gear to process highly classified messages. The Department of Defense asserts that this problem has now been corrected. It is distressing that a joint organization established to coordinate operations like Grenada was not employed. It is also clear that whatever the JDA had been doing for those four years, it had not solved the fundamental problems of the inability of the Services to work together jointly. Retired Army General Volney Warner, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Readiness Command, said, "The JDA's major purpose in life is planning that kind of situation. To rule them out is unconscionable." ("Grenada: Rampant Confusion," page 22)

There were problems even within the Services. For example, Lt. Col. Keith Nightingale, a battalion commander in the 82nd, said "we deployed with virtually nothing except what was in our rucksacks". The 82nd deployed with no vehicles. There was no room on any of the aircraft for the 150 transporters a battalion would normally take on a mission. Without its trucks, the 82nd has no long range communications gear. "No vehicles meant no radios" said Nightingale's executive officer. The 82nd arrived without any heavy anti-armor weapons. TOW missiles did not arrive until D+3. The 82nd did not have the ability to communicate sophisticated intelligence data because its radio teletype were "delayed because they earned a low ranking on the aircraft priority list." ("Grenada: Rampant Confusion," page 26). As a result, the Rangers and the 82nd had to commandeer local trucks and gasoline.

Once the Port Salines airstrip had been secured, a substantial airlift began but backups occurred almost at once. One principle reason was that the runway would only permit aircraft to land, unload, and take off one at a time. But there were other, more organic problems. Duffy writes:

> Many units deployed from U.S. bases to Grenada actually spent more time circling the Point Salines airfield than in transit. Some aircraft had to return to Puerto Rico and other locations to refuel. "Aircraft were stacked up to the ionosphere," says one commander, who added that lift operations might have been aborted had the enemy had longer range anti-aircraft capability.
>
> The airlift back-up was complicated by a number of factors. All requests for supplies and access to the island were channeled through the Military Airlift Command's liaison working with the task force commander. But many units, both in Grenada and in the United States, tried to obtain direct flights to the island regardless of the pecking order. The conflicting systems kept a lot of people in the air and probably delayed the arrival of needed equipment. ("Grenada: Rampant Confusion," pages 26–27)

In addition there were a number of other problems. Native food had to be bought in great quantities because much of the rations shipped to the island for U.S. soldiers had to be diverted to feed the more than 800 prisoners of war. The Army also had to create a unique supply system because its existing supply channels proved to be too cumbersome. According to reports, the 82nd Airborne Division resorted to using messengers who would return to Ft. Bragg and order supplies directly from various Army depots. The supplies would then be sent by Express Mail to Ft. Bragg where they were loaded on aircraft bound for Grenada. Even with this expedited process, the first delivery took eight days.

URGENT FURY revealed many shortcomings in the logistical support for the rapid deployment of joint forces. Vice Admiral William Cowhill, the Director of Logistics for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the operation, has observed:

> You've got to get the logistics in early. You get different forces from different services and it causes overlaps and shortages. Unless you get the staffs together early, you can't do the

> proper coordinating. ("Grenada: Rampant Confusion," page 22)

As in the other areas examined in this analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude that better organization would have avoided many of these problems.

6. Conclusions

The operation in Grenada was a success, and organizational shortcomings should not detract from that success or from the bravery and ingenuity displayed by American servicemen.

However, serious problems resulted from organizational shortfalls which should be corrected. URGENT FURY demonstrated that there are major deficiencies in the ability of the Services to work jointly when deployed rapidly. The poor communications between the Army and the Navy are unacceptable. The Services are aware of some of these problems and have created a number of units and procedures to coordinate communications, such as the Joint Communications Support Element and the Joint Deployment Agency. However, in Grenada, they either were not used or did not work. More fundamentally, one must ask why such coordinating mechanisms are necessary. Is it not possible to buy equipment that is compatible rather than having to improvise and concoct cumbersome bureaucracies so that the Services can talk to one another? Are the unified commands so lacking in unity that they cannot mount joint operations without elaborate coordinating mechanisms? In a war, these mechanisms would probably be discarded in favor of a much more direct procedure, as happened in several instances in Grenada.

Similar problems arose because of differences in doctrine and training. The lack of understanding on the part of very senior commanders in all Services about the capabilities, assets and tactics of the other Services resulted in serious shortcomings. Far more attention must be paid to joint operations because employment of force by the United States in all but the most unusual circumstances will be joint.

The JCS is not unaware of this problem. In its report of April 1982, the Chairman's Special Study Group on the Organization and Functions of the JCS concluded:

> The military organizations given the responsibility for the planning and execution of Joint activities—notably the JCS, the Joint Staff and its subordinate agencies such as the Joint Deployment Agency, and the various Unified Command headquarters—simply do not have the authority, stature, trained personnel, or support needed to carry out their jobs effectively. (page 54)

This inability to work together has its roots in organizational shortcomings. The Services continue to operate as largely independent agencies, even at the level of the unified commands. The failure of the Joint Task Force Commander in Grenada to be familiar with Army and Air Force tactics and assets, and the failure of the senior Army commanders to be aware of the problems of working with the Navy, clearly demonstrate this problem.

In future conflicts, we may not be so successful.

APPENDIX B

THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

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THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND [1]

The framework of the defense establishment is authorized in a handful of basic statutory authorities and several major reorganizations.[2] Of course, at the top of the pyramid stands the President who, as Commander in Chief, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, has "the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy . . ." [3] "His [the President's] duty and his power are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy." [4]

The Department of Defense, the successor agency to the National Military Establishment authorized by section 201 of the National Security Act of 1947, was made an executive department of the United States by section 4 of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949.[5]

Headed by the Secretary of Defense who "is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense," DOD includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Armed Forces Policy Council, the military departments and the military services within those departments, the unified and specified commands, and such other agencies as the Secretary of Defense establishes to meet specific requirements.[6]

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[1] The phrase "chain of command" as best we can determine, does not appear in the United States Code. Its appearance in decisional authorities is almost as rare. One exception is *Gregory* v. *Laird*, 326 F. Supp. 704, 708 (S.D. Cal. 1971), where it was noted that in the military establishment the phrase is used to describe a "hierarchy of responsible parties." At the same time, the court stated that "there are numerous chains of command organized to serve different functions, and that certain individuals fit into more than one such chain." For present purposes, the phrase is intended to suggest the hierarchy of responsible parties through which orders run for carrying out military missions.

[2] These authorities, as implemented by regulations, see, generally, 32 CFR Chap. 1, parts 40-379, include the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 578, the Act of October 21, 1977, 91 Stat. 1172, the Inspector General Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1101, the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984, 97 Stat. 614, and Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, effective June 30, 1953, 67 Stat. 638 and Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 514.

[3] The Federalist Papers, No. 69 (Hamilton).

[4] *Fleming* v. *Page*, 9 How. (50 U.S.) 603, 614 (1850).

[5] 10 U.S.C. § 131.

Although both provide staff assistance and advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are separately identified and organized.[7]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. The individual service chief is the senior military officer of his service and is responsible for keeping the Secretary or civilian superior of his military department informed of matters considered by the Joint Chief of Staff. While the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the ranking military officer, he may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.[8]

The military departments are separately organized under their respective Secretaries and function under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. Each Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation of his department. Orders to the military departments are issued through the Secretaries of these departments, or their designees, by the Secretary of Defense or under authority delegated by the Secretary or provided by law.

Military missions are performed by unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands which are established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands, which consist of forces assigned to them by the military departments are "under the full operational command" of the commander of the command to which they are assigned. Combatant commanders are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands. Orders to combatant commanders are issued by the President or by the Secretary of Defense, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.[9]

The prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief to specify the chain of command involves the creation of offices and the filling of offices, two separate and distinct powers. The Constitution by the Necessary and Proper Clause assigns the former to Congress,[10] while it deals with the appointing power in Art. II § 2, cl. 2 which provides as follows:

> And he [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,

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[6] 10 U.S.C. §§ 124, 133, 141, 171, 3010, 5011, 8010.

[7] See 10 U.S.C. §§ 133 et seq., 141 et seq.

[8] 10 U.S.C. § 142.

[9] 10 U.S.C. § 124.

[10] *Buckley* v. *Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1978).

> whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

As Commander in Chief, the President sits on a tremendous source of potential power. However, as in most other things affecting the President (except the powers to pardon, to receive ambassadors and to negotiate with foreign nations), he is dependent upon Congress for authority or money, or both, to convert a potential power into an actual one. So much was clearly stated by Justice Jackson, who concurring in the *Steel Seizure Case,*[11] observed that "[w]hile Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, *only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command." (Emphasis added.)*

Professor Edward S. Corwin, a noted constitutional scholar of the recent past and hardly a grudging or reluctant advocate of a strong Chief Executive, noted that insofar as selecting military subordinates is concerned, Congress had kept that power to itself.

> One power of supreme military command the President curiously lacks: that of choosing his subordinates. Not only does Congress determine the grades to which appointments may be made and lay down the qualifications of appointees, but it has always been assumed that the Senate shares the appointing power for military as well as civil officers. Without doubt Congress could transfer the power to "the President alone," but has never done so. Indeed, it has at times attempted to usurp the appointing power itself.[12]

So long as the distinction is maintained between the creation of positions and the fixing of appropriate grades with respect to such positions on the one hand and who the President actually consults in formulating and executing military policy on the other, congressional authority to fix the chain of command is significant. In the exercise of its necessary and proper power Congress both directly and indirectly through the determination of grades and laying down qualifications of appointees effectively establishes the chain of command. The congressional role in the mentioned regards is reinforced by traditional military reliance on rank and adherence to the seniority system, i.e., "time in grade, time in the service." These factors tend to give Congress a large, if not decisive, role in establishing the formal chain of command. Insofar as lawful orders are concerned, the latter operates exclusively on the basis of "trickle down."

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[11] *Youngstown Co.* v. *Sawyer,* 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952).

[12] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957* (New York, 1957), p. 261. In one of two footnotes to this paragraph, Corwin observes: "Polk was bitter because Congress would not create during the Mexican War the grade of Lieutenant General in order that he might appoint somebody over the heads of Scott and Taylor. 'My situation', he lamented, 'is most embarassing. I am held responsible for the War, and I am required to entrust the chief command of the army to a general in whom I have no confidence.' " *Id.* at 465, note 102.

In another of Corwin's well-regarded works, *The Constitution And What It Means Today* 125-126 (1973 rev. ed.), the author describes limits placed on presidential choices by congressional authorization of positions and grades as follows:

> Legally, the President is limited in choosing his principal military subordinates, whose grades and qualifications are determined by Congress and whose appointment is ordinarily made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, though undoubtedly Congress could if it wished vest their appointment in "the President alone." Also, the President's power to dismiss an officer from the service, once unlimited, is today confined by statute to require a trial by court-martial if the officer contends that he "has been wrongfully dismissed" and requests one in writing. But the provision is not regarded by the Court as preventing the President from displacing an officer of the Army or Navy by appointing with the advice and consent of the Senate another person in his place. The President's power of dismissal in time of war Congress has never attempted to limit.

In addition to its power to create offices, art. I. § 8 Cl. 14 empowers Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Judicial decisions applicable to this clause are few and guarded insofar as it relates to the President's power as Commander in Chief. Justice Jackson did not go beyond the observation "that [by] the congressional power 'to make rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,' . . . it [the Congress] may to some unknown extent impinge upon even command function." [13]

The courts have failed to draw the line between his power and those of Congress, except to proclaim such self-evident dogmas as the President cannot by military orders evade legislative regulations and Congress cannot by rules and regulations impair the authority of the President as Commander in Chief.[14]

Although in establishing positions and grades Congress effectively fixes the line followed when the President transmits battle and other orders, legislative efforts to limit absolutely the exercise of command authority to a single mode or channel raises both constitutional and practical problems. Congress undertook to do that on one occasion and a short time later rescinded its efforts when recommended to do so by President Grant.

Section 2 of the Army Appropriation Act of 1867,[15] among other things, provided that all army orders should pass through the General of the Army, who was required to keep his headquarters at Washington and who should not be removed, suspended relieved from his command, or assigned to duty elsewhere, except at his own request or by approval of the Senate.[16]

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[13] *Youngstown Co.* v. *Sawyer*, 343 U.S. at 644.

[14] See, e.g., *Swain* v. *United States*, 28 Ct. Cl. 173 (1893), *aff'd* 165 U.S. 553 (1897).

[15] 14 Stat. 486-487.

[16] 16 This provision was one of several legal restrictions that Congress imposed on the removal of federal officials largely because of its differences over reconstruction with President Johnson. The chief of these was the Tenure of Office Act, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), the violation of which led to President Johnson's impeachment and trial and eventual acquittal. The opinion of the Court in *Myers* v. *United States*, 272 U.S. 52, 164-166 (1926), which gave the President broad powers to remove executive officials, describes these events as follows:

> We come now to a period in the history of the Government when both Houses of Congress attempted to reverse this constitutional construction and to subject the power of removing executive officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to the control of the Senate—indeed, finally, to the assumed power in Congress to place the removal of such officers anywhere in the Government.
>
> This reversal grew out of the serious political difference between the two Houses of Congress and President Johnson. There was a two-thirds majority of the Republican party in control of each House of Congress, which resented what it feared would be Mr. Johnson's obstructive course in the enforcement of the reconstruction measures, in respect of the States whose people had lately been at war against the National Government. This led the two Houses to enact legislation to curtail the then acknowledged powers of the President. It is true that, during the latter part of Mr. Lincoln's term, two important, voluminous acts were passed, each containing a section which seemed inconsistent with the legislative decision of 1789, (Act of February 25, 1863), 12 Stat. 665, c. 58, § 1, Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 489, c. 79, § 12); but they were adopted without discussion of the inconsistency and were not tested by executive or judicial inquiry. The real challenge to the decision of 1789 was begun

Continued

Berdahl, whose studies on the commander-in-chief continue to be a frequently cited source in this area, states that "President Johnson signed this [the Army Appropriation] act under protest, holding that it in effect deprived the President of the command of the Army; and having obviously been passed as a measure designed to control him in particular, its injustice and inexpediency were soon recognized and it was soon repealed."[17] Professor Corwin, previously quoted in support of the view that the President lacks the power of "choosing his subordinates", characterized the provision as follows: ". . . . the remarkable—and unquestionably unconstitutional—'rider' to the Army Appropriation Act of March 3, 1867, by which President Johnson's power as Commander-in-Chief was partially transferred to General Grant. . . ."[18]

The views expressed by Professor Corwin on section 2 of the Army Appropriation Act of 1867 and legislation authorizing and regulating the commander-in-chief's military subordinates are not inconsistent or contradictory. As indicated, the former was undertaken with the purpose and effect of depriving the President of command of the army and as such, was in contravention of one of the unquestioned powers conferred by the Commander in Chiefship Clause, i.e., "general direction of the military and naval operations" and "control of the movements of the army and navy".[19] The 1867 law is a far cry from legislation authorizing officer positions, grades and qualifications pursuant to the congressional necessary and proper powers. The latter, supplemented by the Armed Forces adherence to the seniority system, i.e., "time in grade, time in service", may affect the order of hierarchy which is generally described as the chain of command, but it does not deny or prohibit the President from assuming personal direction of military operations. The latter seems to be the prime reason that led Corwin to

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by the Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 9[illegible], c. 176, forbidding dismissals of Army and Navy officers in time of peace without a sentence by court-martial, which this Court, in *Blake* v. *United States*, 103 U.S. 227, at p. 235, attributed to the growing differences between President Johnson and Congress.

Another measure having the same origin and purpose was a rider on an army appropriation act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 487, c. 170, § 2, which fixed the headquarters of the General of the Army of the United States at Washington, directed that all orders relating to military operations by the President or Secretary of War should be issued through the General of the Army, who should not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate; and that any orders or instructions relating to military operations issued contrary to this should be void; and that any officer of the Army who should issue, knowingly transmit, or obey any orders issued contrary to the provisions of this section, should be liable to imprisonment for years. By the Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44, c. 34, § 2, the next Congress repealed a statutory provision as to appeals in habeas corpus cases, with the design, as was avowed by Mr. Schenck, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, of preventing this Court from passing on the validity of reconstruction legislation. 81 Congressional Globe, pages 1881, 1883, *Ex parte McArdle*, 7 Wall. 506.

But the chief legislation in support of the reconstruction policy of Congress was the Tenure of Office Act, of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 430, c. 154, providing that all officers appointed by and with the consent of the Senate should hold their offices until their successors should have in like manner been appointed and qualified, and that certain heads of departments, including the Secretary of War, should hold their offices during the term of the President by whom appointed and one month thereafter subject to removal by consent of the Senate. The Tenure of Office Act was vetoed, but it was passed over the veto. The House of Representative preferred articles of impeachment against President Johnson for refusal to comply with and for conspiracy to defeat, the legislation above referred to, but he was acquitted for lack of a two-thirds vote for conviction in the Senate.

[17] *War Powers of the Executive in the United States* 128 (1921).

[18] *President: Office and Powers, supra*, at 463, note 89.

[19] *War Power of the Executive in the United States, supra*, note 17, at 117, 121.

conclude that the "rider" to the Army Appropriation Act of 1867 was unquestionably unconstitutional.

Clearly, Congress in authorizing (or refusing to authorize) positions and grades can have a significant bearing on the President as Commander in Chief, but that fact alone does not make congressional action or inaction unconstitutional. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, dissenting, *Myers* v. *United States*,[20] effectively stated that such disharmony is the price exacted by the separation of powers.

> The separation of the powers of government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, dependent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial. Obviously the President cannot secure full execution of the laws, if Congress denies to him adequate means of doing so. Full execution may be defeated because Congress declines to create offices indispensable for that purpose. Or, because Congress, having created the office, declines to make the indispensable appropriation. Or, because Congress, having both created the office and made the appropriation, prevents, by restrictions which it imposes, the appointment of officials who in quality and character are indispensable to the efficient execution of the law. If, in any such way, adequate means are denied to the President, the fault will lie with Congress. The President performs his full constitutional duty, if, with the means and instruments provided by Congress and within the limitations perscribed by it, he uses his best endeavors to secure the faithful execution of the laws enacted. Compare *Kendall* v. *United States*, 12 Pet. 524, 613, 626.

Although Congress in establishing the hierarchy of responsible parties effectively fixes the line followed when the President gives orders, it seems that legislative efforts intended to limit his sources of advice on military matters would be a futile endeavor.

In summary, Congress by law has effectively established the chain of command and by law has changed it or authorized the President, subject to congressional scrutiny, to change it. If Professor Corwin can be relied on, Congress traditionally establishes the President's military subordinates.

To some extent, the congressional power to make rules for regulation of the armed forces seems supportive of this conclusion although case law is silent on the point. In any event, it is striking that the chain of command accords with the scheme set forth in the basic military legislation of the United States.

The position of Chairman at the Joint Chiefs of staff was authorized by the section 211 of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949,[21] which specifically designated the incumbent to preside at meetings of the Joint Chiefs, but he was not to be considered Chief of Staff to either the President or the Secretary of Defense or of the Armed Services. The Act provided that he should have no vote.

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[20] 272 U.S. at 291-292.

[21] 10 U.S.C. § 142.

Briefly, the Chairman, so long as he remains chairman, is prohibited under existing law from exercising military command. Accordingly, placing him in the chain of command for purposes of performing military missions would require two changes in existing law: (1) modification of 10 U.S.C. § 142(c) to permit him to exercise command generally or for particular purposes, and (2) modification of 10 U.S.C. § 124(c) to insert him in the chain of command between the President and Secretary of Defense and combatant command commanders.

CHAPTER 6

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

A. EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

1. Introduction

The origins of the three Military Departments in existence today can be traced in the history of the Federal Government to almost 200 years ago with the creation, as executive departments, of the Department of War in 1789 and the Department of the Navy in 1798. With the exception of uniformed military components under their jurisdiction, the Military Departments are the most abiding components of the present U.S. military establishment.

Although numerous internal changes of an evolutionary nature occurred, the essential organizational structure of the War and Navy Departments as co-equal, executive-level departments remained unchanged through World War II. The experiences of that war led to a recognition of the need for major structural changes in the U.S. national security apparatus, especially within the military establishment.

2. The National Security Act of 1947

In April and May 1944, the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy held hearings on a "Proposal to Establish a Single Department of the Armed Forces." During those hearings, War Department officials urged the establishment of a single Department of Armed Forces while officials of the Navy Department urged further study.

In October 1945, a report from a committee established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and forwarded to the President recommended (with one member dissenting) that a single Department of Armed Forces be established. Both the proposal before the House Select Committee and the JCS committee report recommended the creation of a separate air force component within the single department. Also in October 1945, the Secretary of the Navy transmitted to the Congress a report prepared by Ferdinand Eberstadt at the request of the Secretary of the Navy and upon the suggestion of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. The Eberstadt report advised against the establishment of a single defense department, but did recommend the creation of a new, executive-level air department to be headed by a Secretary who would be an equal of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

In October and December of 1945, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs conducted hearings on two bills proposing the establishment of a single defense department. During those hearings, the War Department favored a single department with three autonomous Services —Army, Navy, and Air. The Department of the

Navy opposed the single department, suggested the organization proposed in the Eberstadt report, and urged further study of organizational problems.

On December 19, 1945, President Truman stated in a Message to the Congress: "...There is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department." (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 11) The message also suggested a broad outline for reorganization. Among other things, it proposed a single "Department of National Defense" consisting of all armed and civilian forces then within the War and Navy Departments and organized into three coordinated branches (land forces, naval forces, and air forces), each under a civilian Assistant Secretary of National Defense. Additionally, the outline suggested that there should be a Chief of Staff of the Department and commanders of the three component branches and that these four military officers should constitute an advisory board to the Secretary of National Defense and the President.

Throughout 1946, President Truman urged War and Navy Department officials to devise a mutually acceptable plan to provide greater unification of the Services. On January 16, 1947, the Secretaries of War and the Navy reported to the President that they had reached agreement on a plan that both Departments would accept. On February 26, 1947, President Truman submitted to the Congress a draft bill for unification that had the approval of the Secretaries of War and the Navy and the JCS. With minor changes, the Senate approved the bill on July 9, and the House of Representatives, with numerous changes, approved a bill on July 19, 1947. After conference action, the President signed the National Security Act of 1947 on July 26, 1947.

The Act provided, among other things, for the creation of a unified National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense and composed of three departments: Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense was given authority to "establish *general* policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all the departments or agencies therein" and to "exercise *general* direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies." (emphasis added).

The three Military Departments in the National Military Establishment were to be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries, and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense were retained by each of the respective Secretaries. Additionally, each Service Secretary was specifically authorized, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to present to the President or the Director of the Budget any report or recommendation relating to his respective department. Finally, the roles and missions assigned to each department were set forth in a very general fashion in the Act.

The resolution of the detailed assignment of roles, missions, and functions was left to the JCS. When they were unable to resolve some basic differences, the Secretary of Defense met with the JCS at the Key West Naval Base in 1948. The agreement, produced by that meeting and ultimately approved by the President, was reflected in a document entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." With only minor changes, the agreement reached in 1948, usually referred to as the Key West Agreement, remains in effect today.

3. The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act

The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, soon discovered that he did not have authority commensurate with his responsibilities. He pointed this out in his first report which covered the first 15 months of operation under the National Security Act of 1947. In that report, he made several suggestions for change, including strengthening the Secretary of Defense's authority over the three Military Departments. He suggested that if the statute were amended to clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense to establish policies and programs for and to exercise direction, authority, and control over the Military Departments (as opposed to establishing "general" policies and programs and exercising "general" direction, authority and control), then there would be no need to change the titles of the Service Secretaries, as they clearly would serve under the Secretary of Defense.

In November 1948, a Committee on National Security Organization (known as the Eberstadt Task Force), of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (usually referred to as the Hoover Commission) submitted a report to the Hoover Commission expressing many of the same concerns as Secretary Forrestal. Included in the recommendations of this report were several specific changes to strengthen the Secretary of Defense's control and direction over the Military Departments. These may be summarized as follows: (1) removing the limiting term "general" from the Secretary of Defense's basic authority statute; (2) giving the Secretary of Defense authority to exercise "direction and control" over the preparation of military budget estimates; (3) giving the Secretary of Defense authority to supervise expenditures of the Military Departments in accordance with appropriations and control and direction over requests for authorization; (4) repealing the Service Secretaries' right to appeal to the President or the Director of the Budget and repealing the reservation to those Secretaries of powers not specifically conferred on the Secretary of Defense; and (5) making the administration of the three departments by the respective Secretaries subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The Hoover Commission itself, in its report of February 1949, agreed with the major recommendations of the Eberstadt Task Force, but also recommended that the Service Secretaries be designated as Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force and that the three military Services be administered by these three under secretaries subject to the full direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense.

In a message to the Congress transmitted on March 7, 1949, President Truman recommended most of the changes previously suggested by Secretary Forrestal, the Eberstadt Task Force, and the Hoover Commission. While recommending that the Secretary of Defense's responsibility for exercising direction, authority, and control over the affairs of the Department of Defense be made clear, the President did not endorse abolition of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and their respective Service Secretaries, as recommended by the Hoover Commission. Rather, he recommended these departments be designated as "military departments" (as opposed to executive departments), that the Secretaries of these departments no longer serve on the National Security Council, and that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force administer their departments under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and without the right to appeal to the President or Director of the Budget. He specifically did not recommend blanket transfer of all statutory authority of the three Military Departments to the Secretary of Defense or any change to the statutory assignment of combat functions to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The recommendations of the President, with two significant changes, were enacted into law on August 10, 1949. The two significant changes were (1) that, while the Secretary of Defense's authority over the Military Departments was made clear, the Secretary was prohibited by law, from transferring, reassigning, abolishing, or consolidating any of the combatant functions assigned to the various Military Departments, and (2) that, while the Secretaries lost their right of direct appeal to the President or the Director of the Budget, they, along with the members of the JCS, were given the right to present recommendations on their own initiative to the Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. (The Senate position on this matter had been to terminate any right of the Service Secretary to direct appeal above the Secretary of Defense. However, the House of Representatives insisted on such a right.)

4. The 1953 Reorganization Plan

In April 1953, President Eisenhower, after having received reports from the Secretary of Defense and from a Committee appointed by the Secretary and headed by Nelson Rockefeller, transmitted Reorganization Plan No. 6 to the Congress. That plan further strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense as the head of the Department of Defense. At the same time, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to revise the Key West Agreement to clarify that the chain of command to the unified commands was from the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of the Military Department designated by the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the unified command concerned. This was designed to ensure clear lines of civilian control over the unified commands.

5. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act

The final major historical step leading to the present organization, structure, and functions of the Military Departments occurred in 1958. This step followed the report of the second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government which, in short, recommended strengthening the role of the Secretary of Defense over the business affairs of the Department, and a Presidential Message to the Congress which, likewise, recommended increased authority for the Secretary of Defense. The resulting legislation, Public Law 85-599 (the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958) was designed to leave little doubt that the management, control, and direction of the Department of Defense were the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. The explicit changes of the 1958 amendment were as follows:

(1) The Secretary of Defense was authorized to assign common supply or service activities to a single department or agency.

(2) The Secretary of Defense was authorized to assign development and operational use of new weapons to any department or service.

(3) Functions assigned by law could be transferred or abolished after 30 days notice to Congress, except major combatant functions could not be transferred or abolished if disapproved by either House of Congress.

(4) Assistant Secretaries of Defense were permitted to issue orders to Secretaries of the Military Departments by written authorization of the Secretary of Defense.

(5) The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs were removed from the chain of command to the unified and specified commands.

(6) The Military Departments were to be separately organized (as opposed to being separately administered) under the Service Secretaries but would function under the direction, control, and authority of the Secretary of Defense, and the number of Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments was reduced from 4 to 3. However, the Service Secretaries retained their right to make recommendations directly to the Congress after first informing the Secretary of Defense. (Once again, as had been the case in 1949, the Senate supported abolition of this Service Secretary authority. However, the House insisted that existing law be continued, and the House position prevailed in conference.)

6. Developments Since 1958

Since 1958, various minor changes have occurred in the organization, structure, and functions of the Military Departments, mostly relating to the number of assistant secretaries and the duties to be assigned to them. For example, Public Law 91-611 added a fifth Assistant Secretary of the Army, mandated that one of those assistant secretaries be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, and prescribed the duties of that position. In March 1978, the Secretary of Defense, exercising the reorganization authority of section 125(a) of title 10, United States Code, reduced the number of assistant secretaries in each of the Military Departments by one. Finally, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-94), enacted on September 24, 1983, restored one assistant secretary to both the Army and Navy.

B. KEY ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS

1. Strengthening of the Authority of the Secretary of Defense at the Expense of the Service Secretaries

As the recent history of the Military Departments shows, the most important organizational trend since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 has been the strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense and his staff, usually to the derogation of the Service Secretaries and the Military Departments. (Because there are four Services, "Secretaries of the Military Departments" would be the proper title for the civilian heads of the three Military Departments. However, the colloquial term "Service Secretaries" is used extensively and is adopted for use in this study.) In his book, *Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretaries*, Colonel Richard J. Daleski, USAF notes this trend:

> Prior to 1947, Service Secretaries were the sole members of the President's Cabinet responsible for military affairs. However, subsequent defense reorganizations have gutted the Service Secretaries' legal prerogatives. Especially between 1949 and 1958, there was a sharp erosion in the Service Secretaries' organizational position and opportunities for influence in defense matters. (page 5)

Evidence of this trend is found in the following:

- the strengthening of the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense by the 1949 and 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 and the 1953 Reorganization Plan;
- the substantial increase in the number of assistants to the Secretary of Defense provided in statute, especially the provisions resulting from the 1953 Reorganization Plan;
- the substantial increase in the number of personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
- the consolidation of supply and service functions common to the Services in Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities under the control of the Secretary of Defense;
- the assignment of nearly all Service combat forces to unified and specified commands which report (through the JCS) to the Secretary of Defense;
- the development of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System which substantially enhanced the control of the Secretary of Defense over the Department's resource allocation process; and
- the establishment of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council which strengthened the Secretary of Defense's review and oversight of major research and development and acquisition programs.

The one change in executive authority that, perhaps, can be viewed as contrary to this trend was the presidentially approved revision in 1953 of the portion of the Key West Agreement dealing with the chain of command. This revision provided that the chain of command above each unified command was from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Military Department designated as executive agent for that unified command, to the Chief of the Service, to the unified commander. However, while the Service Secretary had not been previously included in the chain of command, the 1953 revision was designed to clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense at least as much as it was designed to clarify the authority of the Service Secretaries. Moreover, even if this particular step were viewed as a reversal of the overall trend of increasing authority of the Secretary of Defense, that reversal was short-lived. In his Message to the Congress in 1958, President Eisenhower explained that he was removing both the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs from the operational chain of command.

Overlaying the basic trend of increased authority for the Secretary of Defense has been the management styles of various Secretaries of Defense. Some Secretaries, notably Secretary McNamara, favored a highly centralized decision-making process. Others, especially Secretaries Laird and Weinberger, promoted a greater degree of decentralization. In particular, Secretary Weinberger has sought to shift more authority and accountability to the Service Secretaries than had been the case during the previous Administration. This shift is evidenced visibly by the inclusion of the Service Secretaries as permanent members of the Defense Resources Board. The power and influence of the Service Secretaries and their Departments have been increased or decreased as a result of the management style of the Secretary of Defense. These changes, however, can be viewed as marginal fluctuations when compared with the impact of the basic trend of increased authority for the Secretary of Defense.

In summary, the overall trend for the past 40 or more years in the organization of the U.S. military establishment has been to invest more authority and responsibility in the Secretary of Defense while decreasing the authority and responsibility of the Service Secretaries. Recognition of this trend does not, however, necessarily answer the question of what is the optimal balance (or separation) of powers between the Secretary of Defense and the three Service Secretaries within the single Department of Defense.

2. Weakening of the Ties Between Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs of Staff

The second major organizational trend is the weakening of the ties between Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs of Staff. These ties, especially in the War Department, were weakened by the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942 and the position of Secretary of Defense in 1947. As these two central organs in the unified Department of Defense consolidated their power and influence in the new bureaucracy, the ties between the Service Secretaries and Chiefs were further weakened.

When the War and Navy Departments existed as separate executive-level departments, there were powerful forces that could make the civilian Secretary and his military Chief natural allies. A strong alliance between the Secretary of War and his Chief of Staff began to develop shortly after the Spanish-American War and endured through World War II, although its intensity declined during the war. (Hammond, *Organizing For Defense*, pages 24 and 183). In the Navy Department, this natural alliance never materialized due to the continuing search by senior naval officers "towards a way to minimize the power of the Secretary over naval affairs." (Hammond, page 76)

Both internal and external challenges forced the Secretary-Chief alliance in the War Department. The internal challenges were from the insubordinate, autonomous bureaus. The external challenges were from the Congress. The Chief had to rely on the Secretary to gain and maintain control over the bureaus "for the bureaus were simply not subservient to the Chief." (Hammond, page 25). In addition, the Chief found the Secretary valuable in protecting the Army from involvement in politics and non-military policymaking. (Hammond, page 183). For his part, the Secretary needed the Chief to help provide central direction and control of the Department.

The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greatly affected this Secretary-Chief alliance. Service Chiefs became powerful figures, working directly with the President and having an important role in the direction of the U.S. war effort. Paul Hammond comments on the results of the new stature of the Service Chiefs:

> ...Where before the central authority of the Chief of Staff had never been secure from successful challenge, so that he always required the Secretary's active support, in World War II the risk of challenge all but disappeared. (page 183)

Moreover, the JCS gave the Service Chiefs an avenue independent of the Service Secretary for pursuing the interests of the uniformed Services and for assuming the role of Service spokesmen. In his book, *The Management of Defense*, John C. Ries confirms this outcome:

> ...As individuals, the Joint Chiefs were responsible to their service secretaries. Collectively, the Joint Chiefs constituted the military advisors of the secretary of defense. And since the Joint Chiefs were the only service department representatives with a statutory role in the departmental policy process, they became the *spokesmen* for the services. The service secretaries...were bypassed. (page 148)

In addition, as the Secretary of Defense became a more powerful figure, the Service Chiefs began to use the JCS channel on non-JCS issues in order to circumvent the Service Secretaries and present their views directly to the Secretary of Defense.

In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond discusses the weakening of the ties between Service Secretaries and Chiefs and the resulting erosion in the role of the Secretaries:

> In the 1950's, the Secretary was less necessary to the service, for its Chief was often a more effective champion than he in OSD, the new layer of government where so many of the questions vital to it were settled. And by this time, bureau independence was negligible. As the bonds of the Secretary-Chief alliance were weakened by unification, nothing took their place, for the alternative basis for secretarial control, a civilian staff, had neither the cohesion nor the position in the military establishment necessary to make it a counterweight to the policy planning of the Chief of Staff. In the service departments the civilian Secretaries have therefore been largely advocates and expediters of policies formulated by others. (page 298)

3. Erosion of the Contributions of Service Secretaries to Civilian Control of the Military

The trend discussed in the preceding subsection has been the major factor in the erosion of the Service Secretaries' contributions to civilian control of the military. It was only in an environment in which the Service Chief and his staff had to depend on the Secretary for its own authority that the Secretary was able to exercise responsible control. The Service Secretary has lost the independence from the military headquarters staff that their former dependence on him provided. While there have been exceptions to this general rule—a contemporary example being the forceful management style of the current Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman—the overall trend has been unaltered.

The Service Secretary, as a result, has become heavily dependent on, if not the captive of, the Service Chief and the military headquarters staff. In *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Dr. Lawrence J. Korb comments on this situation:

> Except in rare cases, the service secretaries play a very small part in the major areas of the service policy-making process. The initiatives and positions are developed by the service chief and his military staff, and the secretary usually contents himself with acting as a spokesman for these service positions. For example, the secretary usually has very little say in the preparation of his departmental budget. (page 4)

Noting the strong orientation of Service Secretaries to the role of advocate, the Symington Committee concluded that the Service Secretaries diminished, rather than enhanced, civilian control:

> ...The Committee (including its Chairman) now believes, however, that, by perpetuating separate Service secretariats, it will be more difficult to subordinate service interest to national interest. The Committee therefore considers that it would be wise to discontinue what is now a *dual system* of civilian control as a result of interposing between the Secretary of Defense and the Services themselves a set of Secretaries identified with each service. (page 8)

Identification of this trend does not suggest that the Service Secretaries do not have an important role to play in providing civilian control of the military. The trend merely signifies that, whatever their role, Service Secretaries are having less success in fulfilling it.

4. Trends in the Personnel Strengths of the Top Management Headquarters of the Military Departments

The history of the personnel strengths of the top management headquarters of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are shown in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 respectively. Within the scope of this study, it was not possible to determine the reasons for fluctuations in the number of personnel assigned to these top management headquarters. In many instances, activities and their assigned personnel were transferred from headquarters to field activities. The trends for the Secretariats, military headquarters staffs, and combined staffs are evaluated in the following paragraphs.

TABLE 5-1

ACTUAL END STRENGTHS IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY[a]

Year	Secretariat			Military Headquarters Staff			Combined		
	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total
1934	10	4	14	39	137	176	49	141	190
1941	23	6	29	36	172	208	59	178	237
1945	1613	357	1970	1685	2228	3913	3298	2585	5883
1948	891	114	1005	12266	3849	16115	13157	3963	17120
1950	925	120	1045	9992	2998	12990	10917	3118	14035
1955	786	150	936	13788	3662	17450	14574	3812	18386
1960	717	152	869	11145	3278	14423	11862	3430	15292
1965	799	134	933	6092	2599	8691	6891	2733	9624
1970	653	136	789	4937	3086	8023	5590	3222	8812
1971	654	133	787	4820	2928	7748	5474	3061	8535
1972	374	139	513	4907	2814	7721	5281	2953	8234
1973	314	109	423	2766	1957	4723	3080	2066	5146
1974	274	102	376	2313	1530	3843	2587	1632	4219
1975	251	107	358	2093	1490	3583	2344	1597	3941
1976	250	90	340	2053	1505	3558	2303	1595	3898
1977	259	119	378	1989	1549	3538	2248	1668	3916
1978	220	113	333	1856	1474	3330	2076	1587	3663
1979	222	112	334	1821	1485	3306	2043	1597	3640
1980	242	117	359	1755	1564	3319	1997	1681	3678
1981	234	138	372	1800	1622	3422	2034	1760	3794
1982	295	129	424	1850	1623	3473	2145	1752	3897
1983	283	133	415	1830	1582	3412	2113	1715	3828
1984	278	113	391	1832	1559	3391	2110	1672	3782
1985[b]	251	117	368	1792	1419	3211	2043	1536	3579

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[a] Data for 1934-1970 provided in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services from the Secretary of the Army, dated August 16, 1985; data for 1971-1985 provided in a letter to the Senate Committee on Armed Services from the Chief, Plans and Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, dated July 30, 1985.

[b] Programmed.

TABLE [illegible]

ACTUAL AND [illegible] IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY[a]

Year	Secretariat			Military Headquarters Staff						Combined		
				Navy			Marine Corps					
	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total
1966	1064	481	1545	1036	935	1971	1450	1059	2509	3730	2415	6145
1967	1226	377	1603	1282	1497	2779	1626	1017	2643	4133	2892	7025
1968	1356	383	1739	1115	1243	2358	1238	965	2203	3710	2596	6306
1969	1013	401	1414	721	1208	1929	1170	1135	2305	2918	2730	5648
1970	916	397	1313	1042	1372	2414	1163	1433	2596	3121	3202	6323
1971	742	377	1119	902	1276	2178	1073	1284	2357	2717	2937	5654
1972	674	331	1005	1442	1265	2707	1056	1173	2229	3172	2769	5941
1973	642	309	951	797	1234	2031	1196	1409	2605	2625	2962	5587
1974	650	305	955	793	1065	1858	1149	1728	2877	2592	3099	5691
1975	755	300	1055	787	1085	1872	656	997	1653	2208	2382	4590
1976	793	311	1104	783	1042	1825	566	1032	1598	2242	2385	4627
1977	747	284	1031	693	1054	1747	149	460	609	1589	1798	3387
1978	685	294	979	597	1062	1659	130	395	525	1412	1751	3163
1979	515	275	790	509	1042	1551	126	409	535	1150	1726	2876
1980	575	232	807	551	1178	1729	129	379	508	1255	1789	3044
1981	610	304	914	505	1340	1845	123	413	536	1339	1957	3296
1982	569	283	852	694	1322	2016	133	424	557	1396	2029	3425
1983	569	281	850	688	1333	2021	123	453	576	1375	2072	3447
1984[b]	562	270	832	688	1303	1991	133	420	553	1383	1993	3376
1985[b]	547	259	806	714	1315	2029	133	370	503	1394	1944	3338

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a Data provided in a memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy), dated August 23, 1985.

b Programmed.

TABLE 6-3

ACTUAL END STRENGTHS IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE[a]

Year	Secretariat			Military Headquarters Staff			Combined		
	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total	Civ	Mil	Total
1948	234	148	382	2595	2279	4874	2829	2427	5256
1950	307	145	452	3969	2713	6682	4276	2858	7134
1955	358	200	558	4909	3320	8229	5267	3520	8787
1960	317	219	536	3869	2700	6569	4186	2919	7105
1965	334	197	531	2840	2422	5262	3174	2619	5793
1970	301	133	434	2414	2198	4612	2715	2331	5046
1973	291	201	492	2366	2353	4719	2657	2554	5211
1974	278	199	477	2191	2330	4521	2469	2529	4998
1975	302	193	495	2159	2262	4421	2461	2455	4916
1976	290	187	477	2000	2207	4207	2290	2394	4684
1977	212	135	348	1803	1964	3767	2015	2100	4115
1978	180	145	325	1364	1787	3151	1544	1932	3476
1979	161	138	299	1231	1664	2895	1392	1802	3194
1980	181	139	320	1256	1674	2930	1437	1813	3250
1981	184	136	320	1251	1679	2930	1435	1815	3250
1982	178	142	320	1246	1684	2930	1424	1826	3250
1983	177	143	320	1241	1689	2930	1418	1832	3250
1984	171	134	305	1171	1629	2800	1342	1763	3105
1985[b]	171	133	304	1139	1630	2769	1310	1763	3073

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[a] Data for 1948-1970, 1975, and 1980-1985 provided in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services from the Director, Legislative Liaison, Department of the Air Force, dated August 13, 1985; data for 1973, 1974, and 1976-1979 provided by the Department of the Air Force on August 14, 1985.

[b] Programmed.

a. Secretariats

Since the end of World War II, the overall trend has been a substantial reduction in the number of personnel assigned to the Service Secretariats. The numbers of personnel authorized to be assigned to the three Secretariats in 1985 are at or near their lowest levels in the last 40 years.

The Army Secretariat reached its peak end strength in 1946 (2,156 personnel). While the end strength was reduced substantially in 1947 (531 personnel) with the creation of the Department of the Air Force, by 1948, it had nearly doubled (1,005 personnel). Modest growth continued over the next several years with a spike during the Korean War year of 1951 (1,241 personnel). Since 1951, the trend has been a near continuous decrease in assigned personnel.

Like the Army Secretariat, the end strength of the Navy Secretariat peaked in 1946 (4,331 personnel). From 1948 through 1963, the end strength remained relatively constant. The downward trend in the personnel strength of the Navy Secretariat began in 1964 although reversed briefly in 1967 and 1968.

The Air Force Secretariat has a different history of end strengths. After the Department of the Air Force was created, the personnel strength grew steadily from 382 in 1948 to 541 in 1951. Between 1953 and 1976, the size of the Secretariat staff remained relatively constant, reaching a peak strength of 583 in 1962. The Secretariat was substantially reduced in 1977 and has continued a downward trend in subsequent years:

The overall downward trend in the end strengths is shown in the following summary table:

TRENDS IN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF SERVICE SECRETARIATS

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	1,045	869	789	359	368
Navy	1,665	1,739	1,313	807	806
Air Force	452	536	484	320	304

Regarding the relative number of civilian and military personnel assigned to the Service Secretariats, there is a trend toward greater percentages of military personnel. This trend is pronounced in the Army, modest in the Navy, and small in the Air Force. The following table presents the data reflecting this trend:

MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	11.5	17.4	17.2	32.5	31.8
Navy	25.3	22.0	30.2	34.9	32.1
Air Force	32.1	40.9	37.8	43.4	43.8

b. Military Headquarters Staffs

While the personnel strengths of the military headquarters staffs also have a downward trend, the history of these staff sizes varies from that of the Secretariats. In general, these staffs grew in size and reached their peak strength sometime during the 1950's (except the Marine Corps whose peak was reached in 1969).

The Army Staff grew steadily from 4,996 personnel in 1946 to 19,958 personnel in 1952, nearly four times its strength at the end of World War II. Since 1952, the Army Staff has continued to decline in personnel strength. Its authorized strength in 1985 is its lowest level in the postwar period.

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations also grew in the immediate postwar period, reaching a peak of 2,798 personnel in 1956. As data for this entire staff is not available prior to 1949, this statement is based upon the growth of the staff beginning in 1950 and the growth in the military component of this staff from the 1947 level. After 1956, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations began to decline in personnel, although this reduction was not continuous.

Data for the personnel strengths of Headquarters, Marine Corps are available only for 1950 and subsequent years. After 1951, the number of personnel assigned to this staff continued to decrease until 1961, with an overall reduction of 35 percent. After stabilizing briefly, the personnel strength of Headquarters, Marine Corps grew sharply from 1965 to 1969, reaching a postwar high of 3,490 personnel in 1969. Beginning in 1970, the trend has been downward with a significant reduction in 1977.

The Air Staff also grew in the immediate postwar period: from 4,874 personnel in 1948 to a peak of 8,339 personnel in 1956. Since that time, the size of the Air Staff has continued to decline. The authorized strength in 1985 is a postwar low.

The overall downward trend in the end strengths of the military headquarters staffs is shown in the following summary table:

TRENDS IN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF MILITARY HEADQUARTERS STAFFS

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	12,990	14,423	8,023	3,319	3,211
Navy	1,971	2,364	2,414	1,729	2,029
Marine Corps	2,509	2,203	2,596	508	503
Air Force	6,682	6,569	4,612	2,930	2,769

Regarding the relative number of civilian and military personnel assigned to the military headquarters staffs, there is a significant trend toward greater percentages of military personnel in all four staffs. The data in the following table show this trend:

MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS STAFFS

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	23.1	22.7	38.5	47.1	44.2
Navy	47.4	52.8	56.8	68.1	64.8
Marine Corps	42.2	43.8	55.2	74.6	73.6
Air Force	40.6	41.1	47.7	57.1	58.9

c. Combined Staffs

When the personnel data for the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are combined, the greater extent to which the work of the top management headquarters of the Military Departments is conducted by military personnel is quite clear.

MILITARY PERSONNEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	22.2	22.4	36.6	45.7	44.2
Navy	39.3	41.2	50.6	60.4	58.2
Air Force	40.1	41.1	46.7	55.8	57.3

In the Army and Air Force, the Secretariats have increased as a percentage of the total personnel assigned to the top management headquarters. While the Navy Secretariat represents a substantially greater portion of the total work force of the top management headquarters, its current percentage is lower than in 1950 and 1960.

PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Army	7.4	5.7	9.0	9.8	10.3
Navy	27.1	27.6	20.8	26.5	24.1
Air Force	6.3	7.5	9.5	9.8	9.9

C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The Military Departments are large organizations encompassing both Washington headquarters organizations and substantial field commands, bureaus, and activities. The major organizational elements of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are graphically presented in Charts 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3, respectively. This study will focus on seven organizations that constitute the top management headquarters of the three Military Departments:

Office of the Secretary of the Army
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

While organizations subordinate to these seven headquarters may be in need of structural and management reform, evaluation of such needs are beyond the scope of this study.

CHART 6-1

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
GENERAL COUNSEL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON 1/
CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1/
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (CIVIL WORKS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS & FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF
ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY COMMITTEE
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 2/
THE AUDITOR GENERAL 6/
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS AND PLANS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF LOGISTICS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY 3/
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF AUTOMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS 4/
THE SURGEON GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
CHIEF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
CHIEF ARMY RESERVE
U.S. ARMY EUROPE
U.S. ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
U.S. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND
MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND
U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND 5/
U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND
U.S. ARMY HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND
EIGHTH U.S. ARMY
U.S. ARMY JAPAN
U.S. ARMY WESTERN COMMAND
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

1/ CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON AND THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND ARE RESPONSIVE TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

2/ THE INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVES AS THE CONFIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF, AND REPORTS DIRECTLY TO, THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF UPON THE MORALE, DISCIPLINE, EFFICIENCY, AND ECONOMY OF THE ARMY.

3/ THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY IS UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF, AND IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (IL & FM) WITH CONCURRENT RESPONSIBILITY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

4/ THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS REPORTS THROUGH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS) TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON CIVIL WORKS MATTERS.

5/ COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND REPORTS DIRECTLY AND CONCURRENTLY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION MATTERS.

6/ THE AUDITOR GENERAL REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF WITH CONCURRENT RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

CHART 6-2

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY


NAVY DEPARTMENT
*SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
*OPERATING FORCES
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF PROGRAM APPRAISAL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, ENGINEERING & SYSTEMS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (SHIPBUILDING & LOGISTICS)
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF NAVAL ACQUISITION SUPPORT
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
SPACE & NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND
NAVAL EDUCATION & TRAINING COMMAND
NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHY COMMAND
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND
NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND
NAVAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMAND
NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
NAVAL DATA AUTOMATION COMMAND
NAVAL SPACE COMMAND
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
NAVAL LEGAL SERVICE COMMAND
SUPPORTING ESTABLISHMENT
MARINE CORPS RESERVE
SUPPORT
NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
U. S. NAVAL FORCES EUROPE
ATLANTIC FLEET (INCLUDES FLEET MARINE FORCES)
PACIFIC FLEET (INCLUDES FLEET MARINE FORCES)
OPERATING FORCES OF THE MARINE CORPS
NAVAL FORCES SOUTHERN COMMAND
MINE WARFARE COMMAND
OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION FORCE
NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND

*ALSO INCLUDES OTHER DESIGNATED ACTIVITIES NOT SHOWN ON THE CHART WHICH ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS DEPICTED

Department of the Air Force

CHART 6-3


SECRETARIAT
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
UNDER SECRETARY
AUDITOR GENERAL
SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
GENERAL COUNSEL
LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SPACE SYSTEMS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT & LOGISTICS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY MANPOWER RESERVE AFFAIRS & INSTALLATIONS
AIR STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
CHIEF OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
SURGEON GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE RESERVE
CHIEF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
DIRECTOR AIR NATIONAL GUARD
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF STUDIES & ANALYSES
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INFORMATION SYSTEMS
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF SCIENTIST
1947 HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP
COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MANPOWER & PERSONNEL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PROGRAMS & RESOURCES
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PLANS AND OPERATIONS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF LOGISTICS & ENGINEERING
FIELD
AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND
AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
AIR TRAINING COMMAND
AIR UNIVERSITY
ALASKAN AIR COMMAND
ELECTRONIC SECURITY COMMAND
MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
SPACE COMMAND
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
US AIR FORCES EUROPE

1. Service Secretariats

a. Organization

The current structure of each Military Department is generally similar. Each is headed by a Secretary whose position and general duties are mandated by statute (Sections 3012, 5031, and 8012 of title 10, United States Code). Under these statutes, only the Secretary of the Air Force is required to be "appointed from civilian life by the President, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." (Requirements and procedures for appointment of the Secretaries of the Army and Navy are not prescribed in statute.) However, the Air Force requirement and procedure are followed for all three Service Secretaries.

Additionally, each Military Department is authorized an Under Secretary who is appointed by the President from civilian life, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each Under Secretary succeeds to the duties of the respective Service Secretary if there is a vacancy in that office or during the Secretary's temporary absence. The duties of the Service Under Secretaries are not prescribed by law.

Each Military Department has a number of assistant secretaries. The Department of the Army is authorized five; the Department of the Navy, four; and the Department of the Air Force, three. Under the authorizing statutes, each Military Department must designate one of its assistant secretaries as Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and the duties of that position are prescribed by law. In addition, the Department of the Army also must designate one of its assistant secretaries as Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, and the duties of that position are prescribed by law. The titles and duties of the remaining authorized assistant secretaries (three in the Army, three in the Navy, and two in the Air Force) are not mandated by law. Administratively, the departments have established these positions as follows. Each Military Department has an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management. Likewise, an assistant secretary exists in each Department to handle research and development and related activities. Finally, the Army has an Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics while the Navy has an Assistant Secretary for Shipbuilding and Logistics. In the Air Force, the logistics function is assigned to the assistant secretary who handles research and development.

Additionally, each Military Department is required by law to have a Comptroller and Deputy Comptroller, to be appointed by the Service Secretary. The authorizing statutes specify the duties of these positions and require that at least one of these two positions in each department be occupied by a civilian.

Finally, within each Secretary's Office, there is an Office of General Counsel, an office for public affairs, an office for legislative affairs, and an administrative assistant to the Secretary. (In the Army, the position of Administrative Assistant is authorized by law.)

The organization of the three Service Secretariats is graphically depicted in Charts 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6.

CHART 6 – 4

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY


SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY
NATIONAL BOARD FOR PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
GENERAL COUNSEL
CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
DIRECTOR OF CIVILIAN MARKSMANSHIP
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (OPERATIONS RESEARCH)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (CIVIL WORKS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, & ACQUISITION)

CHART 6 – 5

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY


SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY
DIRECTOR,OFFICE OF PROGRAM APPRAISAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
GENERAL COUNSEL
CHIEF OF INFORMATION
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
AUDITOR GENERAL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (POLICY)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (SHIPBUILDING AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, ENGINEERING, AND SYSTEMS)

CHART 6 - 6

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE


SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY
DIRECTOR OF SPACE SYSTEMS
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
GENERAL COUNSEL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
DIRECTOR OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
AUDITOR GENERAL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (SPACE SYSTEMS)
SPECIAL ASSISTANT (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS, & INSTALLATIONS)

b. Personnel Strengths

The number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be assigned during fiscal year 1985 to the three Service Secretariats are shown in the following table:

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO SERVICE SECRETARIATS

[Fiscal Year 1985]

	Military	Civilian	Total
Army Secretariat	117	251	368
Navy Secretariat	259	547	806
Air Force Secretariat	133	171	304

As these personnel strengths indicate, there is a wide disparity in the size of the three Secretariats. The Navy Secretariat is more than twice as large as the Army office and 2½ times the size of the Air Force office. Section 1303 of the DoD Authorization Act, 1985 requested the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Congress on the reasons for these disparities.

In response to this requirement, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft submitted on January 7, 1985 a report, entitled *Report on the Size of the Service Secretariats in the Department of Defense.* This report concludes that:

> ...the differences among the three organizations are attributable to the fact that each secretariat is tailored to meet the particular needs of the military department which it oversees and the management style of its chief executive, the military department secretary. They do not reflect the existence of more or less "fat" in one secretariat as compared to another, or greater efficiency in the management of one military department as compared to another. Further, the size of the secretariat, alone, does not accurately represent the management overhead of a military department. To get a complete picture, the service secretariat and service staff must be considered together. When this is done, the departmental staffs of the three military departments appear to be sized comparably in relation to the total forces which they are required to manage. (page 14)

In arriving at these conclusions, this report analyzes the number of personnel in each Military Department assigned to perform 19 major functions. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6-4. Based upon this functional comparison, the report placed the reasons for a Secretariat to have a substantially higher staffing level for particular functions into four major categories:

- ○ *Service-unique function* —A function is performed in one Secretariat, but not in others, because it is a unique requirement of that Military Department's mission.
- ○ *organizational placement decision* —A function is performed in a particular Secretariat, but not in others, because of a decision by a Service Secretary.
- ○ *expanded function* —A function exists in all three Secretariats, but it is substantially broader in one Secretariat compared to another.

TABLE 6-4

Functional Comparison of Service Secretariats

	FY 1985 Authorized Strengths	Immediate Office	Public Affairs	Operations Research	Legislative Liaison	General Counsel	Judge Advocate General	Auditor General	Admin Services	Space Policy & Systems	Financial Mgmt.	Comp-troller	Civil Works	Manpower & Reserve Affairs	Install-ations	Logis-tics	Research & Devel-opment	Acquisition & Procurement	Ship-Building	Small Business
ARMY	373	22	50	13	54	22	0	0	54	0	30	0	18	35	16	13	18	21	0	7
NAVY	806	20	67	22	58	73	79	2	115	0	19	184	0	53	12	10	52	13	22	5
AIR FORCE	304	19	65	0	54	35	0	0	10	25	26	0	0	21	14	10	11	14	0	0

- *program/workload emphasis* —A function exists in all three Secretariats, but it is staffed more heavily in one compared to another, because of greater workload or a decision by a Service Secretary to emphasize oversight of that function at the Secretariat level.

The following table shows the disparities between Service Secretariat staffing of functions grouped in the four categories listed above. In parenthesis behind each entry is the number of personnel assigned to that function above the lowest level assigned to either of the other two Secretariats.

DISPARITIES IN SECRETARIAT STAFFING OF VARIOUS FUNCTIONS

	Army Secretariat	Navy Secretariat	Air Force Secretariat
Service Unique Function.	Civil Works (+18).		
		Shipbuilding (+22).	
			Space Policy and Systems (+25)
Organizational Placement Decision.	Operations Research (+13).	Operations Research (+22).	
		Judge Advocate General (+79).	
		Comptroller (+184).	
Expanded Function.	Administrative Services (+44).	Administrative Services (+105).	
		General Counsel (+51).	General Counsel (+13)
Workload/ Program Emphasis.	Manpower and Reserve Affairs (+14).	Manpower and Reserve Affairs (+32).	
	Research and Development (+7).	Research and Development (+41).	
	Acquisition and Procurement (+8).		
		Public Affairs (+17).	Public Affairs (+15)

The following observations can be drawn from this table:

- while each Service has one unique function, they do not have a noticeable impact on the size of the Secretariat because of the relatively similar number of personnel assigned to them;
- the placement of the Judge Advocate General and the Comptroller in the Navy Secretariat is a major cause of its larger staff size;
- the expanded functions for Administrative Services and General Counsel in the Navy Secretariat also are major causes of its larger staff size; and

- while the Navy Secretariat has more personnel assigned to Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Research and Development, these are more modest differences than in other functions.

The *Report on the Size of the Service Secretariats in the Department of Defense* justifies several of these increased staff levels for the Navy Secretariat in light of the dual-Service (Navy and Marine Corps) structure of the Department of the Navy:

- the Office of the Judge Advocate General is located in the Navy Secretariat because, by law, it must provide support to two military Services, the Navy and Marine Corps. (page 12)
- the Comptroller's Office is located in the Navy Secretariat because it must oversee and integrate budget activities for two Services. In addition, a large portion of the Comptroller's organization, the Office of Budgets and Reports, is required, by law, to be located in the Navy Secretariat. (page 12)
- the Manpower and Reserve Affairs staff in the Navy Secretariat must be concerned with two separate personnel systems, each with its own particular occupational specialties, promotion and assignment practices, rank structure, manpower utilization priorities, and training needs. (pages 3 and 4)
- certain other functions demand higher staffing levels due to the increased number of staff actions required to oversee, coordinate, and integrate the activities of two separate Services and to interface with two separate Service headquarters staffs. (page 3)

There are increased staff levels for two functions that do not fit into the category of being caused by the dual-Service nature of the Department of the Navy: Administrative Services and General Counsel. These are justified in the *Report on the Size of the Service Secretariats in the Department of Defense* as follows:

- The Navy Secretariat provides for most of its administrative support on an in-house basis and, in addition, supports other Navy organizations, such as the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in such areas as civilian personnel, mail, and correspondence control. (page 13)
- In addition to supporting its secretariat, the Navy General Counsel provides department-wide legal advice and services and, also, has a large centralized litigation staff which handles all major law suits involving the Navy. (page 12)

2. Service Military Headquarters Staffs

a. Organization

The headquarters staffs of the four Services are organized under the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. These positions are each mandated by statute (sections 3034, 5081, 8034, and 5201 respectively of title 10, United States Code), and the incumbents are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. While each of these officers performs his duties under the direction of his Service Secretary, the statutes clearly provide for such direction only for the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. In statute, the Chief of Naval Operations is given a special status not provided to the other Service Chiefs:

> The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval adviser to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war... (section 5081, title 10, United States Code)

The headquarters staffs that support the four Service Chiefs are addressed differently in the statutes. For the Army and Air Force, these staffs are identified in statute as the Army Staff and the Air Staff (Chapters 305 and 805, respectively, of title 10, United States Code). The composition of these two staffs and a limitation on the number of military officers that may be assigned to them in peacetime are prescribed in the statutes. In the case of the Army Staff, the limit is 3,000 officers. For the Air Staff, no more than 2,800 officers may be so assigned.

The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps are not prescribed in statute. In addition, there are no limitations on the number of officers who may be assigned in peacetime to these headquarters staffs.

Each Service Chief has a Vice Chief, entitled Vice Chief of Staff in the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy, and Assistant Commandant in the Marine Corps. Of these four officers, only the Vice Chief of Naval Operations is required by law to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The statutes also differ in prescribing the positions of less senior military officials in these four headquarters staffs:

> *Army*—the Army Staff may have four Deputy Chiefs of Staff and five Assistant Chiefs of Staff;
>
> *Navy*—the Chief of Naval Operations may have six Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations, and there is no limit on the number of Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations;
>
> *Marine Corps*—there is no limit on the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff serving the Commandant; and
>
> *Air Force*—the Air Staff may have five Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and there is no limit on the number of Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

The senior leadership positions in each of the four military headquarters staffs are compared in Table 6-5. The organization of these staffs is graphically depicted in Charts 6-7 through 6-10.

The statutes also vary widely in terms of military officials who must be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. These differences are shown in Table 6-6.

TABLE 6-5

COMPARISON OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS STAFFS

	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
1. Senior Administrative Officer	Director of the Army Staff	Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Chief of Staff	Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
2. Deputy Chiefs of Staff/Naval Operations				
	Personnel	Manpower, Personnel, and Training	Manpower	Manpower and Personnel
	Operations and Plans	Plans, Policy, and Operations	Plans, Policies, and Operations	Plans and Operations
	Logistics	Logistics	Installations and Logistics	Logistics and Engineering
	Research, Development, and Acquisition		Research, Development, and Studies	Research, Development, and Acquisition
			Requirements and Programs	Programs and Resources
		Submarine Warfare Surface Warfare Air Warfare	Aviation Training Reserve Affairs	
3. Senior Financial Officer	Comptroller of the Army	---	Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps	Comptroller of the Air Force
4. Assistant Chiefs of Staff/ Navy Directors	Intelligence Information Management	Naval Intelligence Command and Control Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program Planning Naval Warfare	---	Intelligence Information Systems Studies and Analyses

CHART 6–7

THE ARMY STAFF


CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF
ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY COUNCIL
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
EXECUTIVE SERVICES OFFICE
THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY
STAFF ACTION CONTROL OFFICE
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM MANAGER
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE
ARMOR COMBAT VEHICLE TECH SYSTEM OFFICE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION DIRECTORATE
ARMY FORCE MODERNIZATION COORDINATION OFFICE
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (OPERATIONS & PLANS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PERSONNEL)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (LOGISTICS)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INFORMATION MANAGEMENT)
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
THE SURGEON GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

CHART 6 – 8

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS


CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
VICE CHIEF
ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF
DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM
MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF INFORMATION
FLEET MASTER CHIEF FOR NAVY SHORE ACTIVITIES
ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL SERVICES
ASSISTANT FOR NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS
CNO SAFETY & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH COORDINATOR
CNO EXECUTIVE BOARD
DEPUTY CNO (MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND TRAINING)
DEPUTY CNO (SUBMARINE WARFARE)
DEPUTY CNO (SURFACE WARFARE)
DEPUTY CNO (LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CNO (AIR WARFARE)
DEPUTY CNO (PLANS, POLICY & OPERATIONS)
DIRECTOR, NAVAL PROGRAM PLANNING
DIRECTOR, NAVAL WARFARE
DIRECTOR, NAVAL MEDICINE
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, SPACE, COMMAND AND CONTROL
DIRECTOR, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL RESERVE

CHART 6 - 9

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS


COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
CHIEF OF STAFF
MARINE CORPS UNIFORM BOARD
DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROJECTS DIRECTORATE
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
COUNSEL FOR THE COMMANDANT
MEDICAL OFFICER, USMC
DENTAL OFFICER, USMC
CHAPLAIN, USMC
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (MANPOWER)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS, POLICIES & OPERATIONS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (AVIATION)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (TRAINING)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND STUDIES)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (REQUIREMENTS & PROGRAMS)
FISCAL DIRECTOR OF THE MARINE CORPS
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
DIRECTOR, COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, & COMPUTER DIVISION
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
INSPECTOR, JUDGE ADVOCATE DIVISION
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT
DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY & MUSEUMS

CHART 6 – 10

THE AIR STAFF


CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF
ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF
CHIEF, OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
CHIEF SCIENTIST
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT OF THE AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION
1947 HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP
COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, & ACQUISITION)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS & OPERATIONS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (MANPOWER & PERSONNEL)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (LOGISTICS & ENGINEERING)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PROGRAMS & RESOURCES)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INFORMATION SYSTEMS)
SURGEON GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE RESERVE
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (STUDIES & ANALYSES)

TABLE 6-6

MILITARY OFFICER POSITIONS REQUIRING APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE

ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
Chief of Staff	Chief of Naval Operations Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Commandant	Chief of Staff
Surgeon General	Surgeon General		Surgeon General
Judge Advocate General	Judge Advocate General		Judge Advocate General
Assistant Judge Advocate General			Deputy Judge Advocate General
General Officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps			
Chief of Chaplains	Chief of Chaplains of the Navy		
Chief of Army Reserve			Chief of Air Force Reserve
Chief of National Guard Bureau			
Chief of Engineers	Chief of Naval Personnel		
	Chief of Naval Research		
	Director of Budgets and Reports		

b. Personnel Strengths

The number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be assigned during fiscal year 1985 to the Service headquarters staffs are shown in the following table. To establish the total size of the top management headquarters of each Military Department, the personnel strengths of the Secretariats are also included in this table.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

[Fiscal Year 1985]

	Service Staffs			Service Secretariats			Combined		
	Mil	Civ	Total	Mil	Civ	Total	Mil	Civ	Total
Army	1,419	1,792	3,211	117	251	368	1,536	2,043	3,579
Navy/Marine Corps	1,685	847	2,532	259	547	806	1,944	1,394	3,338
Air Force	1,630	1,139	2,769	133	171	304	1,763	1,310	3,073

D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

The predominance of the power and influence of the four Services in decision-making is the most critical organizational problem of DoD. As John G. Kester states in his paper, "Do We Need the Service Secretary?":

> ...the greatest organizational shortcoming of the Department of Defense always has been dominance by the services at the expense of truly joint military preparation and planning. That difficulty has been papered over, since McNamara's time, by building a large OSD staff around the secretary of defense to do things that the parochial services cannot be trusted to do. The underlying defect has never been cured. (*The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 166)

Parochial Service positions have dominated for three basic reasons: (1) OSD is not organized to effectively integrate Service capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill the major missions of DoD; (2) the JCS system is dominated by the Services who retain an effective veto over nearly every JCS action; and (3) the unified commands are also dominated by the Services primarily through the strength and independence of the Service component commanders and constraints placed upon the power and influence of the unified commanders. In sum, the problem of undue Service influence arises principally from the weaknesses of organizations that are responsible for "truly joint military preparation and planning."

Noting this critical problem, some have urged that the four separate Services be disestablished and combined into one uniformed Service, as Canada has done. There is little evidence to support the need for such drastic action in the U.S. military establishment. First, there are substantial benefits to having the four separate

Services. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown addresses this issue in his book, *Thinking About National Security*:

> Any organization as large as the Department of Defense must be divided into major operating units, with appropriate authority delegated to them. Historically, having an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines has made considerable sense. Each service has definable functions, and the land, sea, and air environments differ sufficiently to call for differing skills, experience, and sometimes even equipment. The morale and esprit in the military have largely come from service identifications. Recruiting, training, and personnel functions up to a certain level are clearly best carried out in such a structure. Attempts to substitute for service identification some general professional military identification, or a functional identification that would go with the activities of particular unified or specified commands, are unlikely to work as well. (page 207)

Former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert supported this view in his article, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?":

> Looking at the big picture of service roles and missions, no reason for separate services seems more important than the freedom to apply many years of thinking and experience to operational concepts and weapon requirements. In the Army, Navy and Air Force, and in the Marines, too, a sense of professionalism has been distilled to: develop each requirement; design and produce the suitable weapon; devise the doctrine to govern its proper use in battle; then train and supply the troops to operate that weapon effectively in a familiar medium. (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1966, pages 477 and 478)

The second reason for retaining the four-Service structure of DoD is that there are numerous and less drastic actions that can be taken —as presented in this study —to provide for more effective integration of Service capabilities and for more useful joint military preparation and planning. For these reasons, the basic four-Service structure of the Department of Defense remains a viable concept.

While the larger problem of undue Service power and influence can most effectively be corrected by changes outside of the Military Departments, there are deficiencies internal to the Departments that, if corrected, could improve their organizational performance. This section discusses four problem areas that have been identified within the Military Departments and presents analyses of their contributing causes. First, there is substantial confusion about the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the Service Secretaries. Second, there are unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort within the top management headquarters of the Military Departments. The third problem area is that the Military Departments, like OSD, suffer from inexperienced political appointees. The last problem area is the limited utility of the current assignments of Service roles and missions and the absence of effective mechanisms for changing those assignments.

1. CONFUSION CONCERNING THE ROLES OF THE SERVICE SECRETARIES

The confusion concerning the roles of Service Secretaries is most clearly confirmed by the divergent views of those roles by individuals who are or have been a part of the U.S. military establishment. These individuals share some common views. Most believe that the Service Secretary has an important role as an implementor of effective civilian control of the military although those who cited this role did not agree upon the meaning of civilian control. Many others, but not all, believe that it is the Service Secretary's role to be an advocate for his Military Department's point of view. While some common views were found, conflicting views were prevalent.

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the three incumbent Service Secretaries and one former Service Secretary presented divergent views on principal Service Secretary roles. The Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., emphasized the role of Service advocate:

> ...if Service Secretaries and their staffs are eliminated it would deny one element in the present structure which I believe to be a considerable source of strength. That element is the role of the Service Secretary as the advocate for the Service... (Part 6, page 217)

In contrast, the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, stated:

> ...In practice the Service Secretaries should be the senior civilian counselors to the Secretary of Defense on all military matters, operational as well as administrative. (Part 6, page 226)

In line with this, Secretary Lehman stated:

> ...The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries must worry as much about the soundness of military strategy, military operations, military weapons and military leadership as they do about the soundness of contract procedures and spare parts procurement. (Part 6, page 225)

In this same context, he adds:

> The Secretaries of the Military Departments, as the principal civilian advisors to the Secretary of Defense, have a voice in the formulation of military strategy. (Part 6, page 260)

Secretary Lehman's views regarding the similarity of the roles of the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries can be better understood by his statement that

> ...I am sure had I been Secretary of the Navy in the fifties, I would have opposed strongly the deletion of the Service Secretaries from both the chain of command and the Cabinet... (Part 6, page 228)

The Secretary of the Air Force, Verne Orr, emphasized the role of exercising civilian supervision of Military Department programs as well as the following role:

> ...I also perform a coordinating role between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its staff and the Air Force. (Part 6, page 231)

Former Secretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas emphasized a different role:

> ...it seems to me that their [Service Secretaries] principal role is and ought to be a managerial one. (Part 6, page 255)

John G. Kester, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army and a former Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, has written that:

> Today how a service secretary fills his day depends mostly on himself. Although there are few limits on what an active secretary might do, there are few particular things he must do. Staffs above and below would be happy to take over most of his activities. His office, though it has a traditional title, really is defined so broadly as hardly to be described at all. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 154)

From the foregoing, there can be little doubt that there is confusion and lack of understanding about what the Service Secretary should be doing as the "head" of a Military Department. There are three basic causes of confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries: (1) misconceptions about the roles of the Service Secretaries in the unified Department of Defense; (2) efforts to provide independence for the Service Secretaries from the Secretary of Defense; and (3) lack of consistency and specificity in statutory descriptions of Service Secretary positions.

a. Misconceptions about the Roles of Service Secretaries

As in many other areas, there has been a failure to determine what role the Service Secretaries should play in the unified Department of Defense. With the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947, the Service Secretaries remained powerful individuals. Their relationship to the Secretary of Defense, however, was never precisely defined. As the role of the Secretary of Defense was clarified and strengthened in 1949, 1953, and 1958, little attention was given to what roles could usefully be fulfilled by the Service Secretaries. In essence, there has been little, if any, redefining of the Service Secretary's roles during his transition from head of an independent, executive-level department to a subordinate of a powerful Secretary of Defense. As John Kester notes:

> The role secretaries of Defense have allocated for service secretaries never has been fixed. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1981, page 159)

Similarly, the Defense Manpower Commission stated:

> In all of the services there is a distinct lack of definition as to what the duties of this layer (service secretaries) are other than being "responsible" for policy. (Volume I, Working Paper C, page 25)

Similarly, Eugene M. Zuckert discusses the confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries that existed when he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Air Force in 1961 —14 years after the position of Secretary of Defense had been established. In his article, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?", Zuckert confirms that the roles of the Service Secretary had not been redefined:

> Those first six months [of Zuckert's tenure as Secretary of the Air Force] were frankly disappointing because the scope and duties of the job were stripped down from those which had surrounded Symington's stewardship [as Assistant Secretary of War for Air in the immediate post World War II period]. A comprehensive management study was prepared by my staff and the barriers that lay between my office and the job I thought I had been hired to do were laid out in detail. (page 465)

While Zuckert later recognized the emergence of "a new, important job for the Air Force Secretary as a defense manager," (page 465) it is uncertain that such a clarification of the roles of the Service Secretary were understood or accepted by many others, either during the 1960's or now.

The most important change in the position of the Service Secretary is that he no longer is at the top of the organization, but rather in the middle. While he continues to represent his Service —his principal role prior to 1947 —the Service Secretary must now also meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense. John Kester comments on this new role and its demands:

> The secretary inevitably is a man in the middle —in part an advocate for his service to the secretary of defense, in part a firm preceptor who must persuade his service and the Congress that it should accept the secretary of defense's program and the president's budget, even if he personally disagrees with some of the decisions. He has to know what balance to strike, and when to inject some ideas of his own. If his service perceives him as a politically ambitious transient or a supine tool of the Defense staff [OSD], he will be unable to keep them from running around him to the Congress and the press, and will lose their needed help. But if he becomes simply a loudspeaker for service demands, he will not be able to help his service at all. The secretary of defense will pay him no heed (as happened in the 1950s with Army Secretary Wilber Brucker). ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", pages 157 and 158)

Misconceptions about their roles have precluded Service Secretaries from striking the proper balance between their two major responsibilities. They have generally given much more attention to their role as Service advocates. Kester notes the problem of overemphasis of the advocacy role:

> As these three offices are used now, they are misconceived. The service secretaries are not needed in order to bolster the services. The service staffs are too strong already. What the service secretaries ought to be doing is not acting as uncritical service advocates, but rather riding herd on the service staffs

> to make sure that their activities really fit into the overall defense plan and that it is the overall defense needs that dominate. Their preoccupation should be, not service prerogatives, but rather to protect Defense activities from service parochialism. (page 165)
>
> ...This is not to say that a service secretary should never argue for his service's favorite programs. It does not deny that each service has perspectives that ought to be brought to the secretary of defense's attention. It is, though, to suggest that the service secretary ought to use far more selectivity, and support his service staff when he knows that its position really fits into the larger defense needs. "They ought to be filters," one secretary of defense complained. "Instead, they're amplifiers." The service secretary's reason for being is not to provide yet another voice for parochialism in a department that is far less effectively centralized, and far less capable of joint military activities, than many people imagine. (page 166)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* also noted a lack of balance in the roles played by Service Secretaries:

> ...The time has passed when the Service Secretary's role can be confined to advocacy alone. The Department of Defense, after all, is a single department with its component elements constituting a Defense team. As such, the Service Secretary must be both an advocate for his Service as well as a representative at the Service level of the Secretary of Defense. If the job is to be carried out properly, it must be regarded by both the Service Secretary and the Secretary of Defense as consisting of two parts —the proponent head of a major operating element, and an official of the DoD as a whole, subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. (page 42)

Secretaries of Defense apparently are also confused about the roles of the Service Secretaries. Consistently, Secretaries of Defense have failed to understand the important roles that Service Secretaries can play and have increasingly paid less attention to them. Too often the Secretary of Defense and OSD have dealt directly with Service Chiefs on issues that should be taken up with the Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense has also permitted Service Chiefs to end-run their Secretaries by raising issues through the JCS system that should not be addressed in that forum. Both of these actions undercut the Service Secretaries.

Secretaries of Defense have also failed to ensure that highly qualified and skilled personnel are appointed as Service Secretaries. John Kester cites this fact:

> There has always been a temptation, for presidents and secretaries of defense, to assume that the services run themselves well enough, so that the service secretary positions can safely be distributed as political patronage or to satisfy particular constituencies. (page 156)

Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Retired) believes that there may also be a desire by Secretaries of Defense to avoid the appointment of powerful Service Secretaries who could challenge the authority of the Secretary of Defense and be "divisive obstacles to progress."

This could be especially troubling if they were heavily focused on advocating Service interests. Captain Schratz cites this as the initial view of Secretary McNamara (who later changed his position and sought strong Service Secretaries):

> ...McNamara initially saw a strong, analytical type of service secretary as a rallying point for service loyalties and hence a divisive threat to his own full exercise of authority. ("The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, page 23)

As a result of these tendencies by Secretaries of Defense and Presidents, the capabilities of Service Secretaries have varied greatly. Colonel Daleski, USAF comments as follows on the capabilities of Service Secretaries:

> ...it has been argued convincingly that the Service Secretaries' actual contributions...have been minimal because of the personal characteristics of many who have served in those positions. More often than not, secretarial positions have been seen as ways of satisfying political debts with the result that incumbents typically have suffered from little or no relevant experience in defense management. (*Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretaries*, page 12)

b. Efforts to Provide Independence for the Service Secretaries from the Secretary of Defense

Since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, there has been a concerted effort to ensure that the Military Departments and their civilian Secretaries retained sufficient influence to protect Service interests and to voice Service points of view. At issue is whether such efforts have gone too far and have given the Services too much power to pursue their narrow interests. The evidence suggests that the degree of Service independence hinders unified direction and control of the Department of Defense.

Specifically, efforts to provide independence for the Services and their Secretaries have led to a lack of assurance that decisions by higher authority will be faithfully executed by the Military Departments. While seeking to ensure that the Military Departments have the ability to forcefully present divergent views in the DoD decision-making process, the independence provided to them and their Secretaries from various sources has given them the ability to impede the execution of major decisions.

While the Services employ numerous methods for impeding execution of major decisions, a frequent tactic is delay. During a period of delay, a Service will seek to develop new considerations that will force a formal reexamination of the issue. While these new considerations may sometimes lead to a better decision, this period of delay may frequently result in the loss of important opportunities. Given their remoteness from actual implementation, the Secretary of Defense and his staff are not likely to be aware for an extended period that implementation is being delayed. The Secretary of Defense needs the forceful support of the Service Secretaries to protect the integrity of his decisions. The support that the

Secretary of Defense has traditionally received has been inadequate.

There is, however, another point of view on this issue: the capacity of the Military Departments to impede the execution of major decisions is a necessary check upon the centralized power of the Secretary of Defense. That is, the ability of the Military Departments to exercise this type of veto power on some apparently final decisions is really a part of the decision-making process, because it assures the fullest consideration of the military's point of view. This view, however, appears to contradict the underlying principles of a unified Department of Defense and of a Secretary of Defense with "authority, direction, and control of the Department of Defense."

It also is said that leadership, not organization, is at the heart of this problem. Some observers doubt that any organizational change will alter this practice. Rather, they believe this type of practice exists in any large organization and that the leadership qualities of the Secretary of Defense and his relationship to his Service Secretaries are far more important in getting decisions executed than are organizational arrangements. For example, Martin Hoffman, a former Secretary of the Army, former General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and former Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, holds this view. In his opinion, the present organizational structure in the Department of Defense is capable of making optimal decisions and obtaining effective execution if, *but probably only if*, the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries are each good leaders and the Secretary of Defense uses the Service Secretaries as a "kitchen-cabinet." Hoffman believes that this type of organizational relationship was the one intended by the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments.

In line with this view, observers believe that the Secretary of Defense presently has the legal authority to ensure that decisions are properly executed by the Military Departments, and it is only because the Secretary of Defense fails or chooses not to exercise that power that the Military Departments can hinder apparently final DoD decisions. While it is clear that the Secretary of Defense has the necessary legal authority, there are many obstacles to his use of that authority and to his efforts to exert stronger leadership.

Independence for the Service Secretaries and the Military Departments results from: (1) statutory authority for independent recommendations by the Service Secretaries to the Congress; (2) independent political bases of Service Secretaries and other senior civilian officials in the Military Departments; and (3) the sheer size of the top management headquarters of the Military Departments.

(1) Statutory Authority for Independent Recommendations

When the position of Secretary of Defense was created in 1947, opponents of unification and those who desired to check the power of this new official sought to preserve a degree of independence for the three Service Secretaries. One of the means that the Congress chose in 1947 to provide independence was to give statutory authority to each Service Secretary, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to make any recommendation to the President or to the Director of the Budget relating to his department as that Servic

Secretary deemed appropriate. In 1949, the Congress changed this authority to permit the Service Secretaries (and JCS members), after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to make any recommendation to the Congress relating to the Department of Defense. This latter statutory authority —which still exists —contributes to confusion about the authority, responsibility, and role of the Service Secretaries. The history of this authority is traced in more detail in the following paragraphs.

When the National Military Establishment was created in 1947, the three Military Departments were executive level departments and the Service Secretaries were permanent members of the National Security Council along with the Secretary of Defense. During that organizational era, the Congress gave the three Secretaries the right, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to present any report to the President or the Director of the Budget. President Truman, in his Message to Congress on March 7, 1949, recommended that the Secretaries lose that right of appeal as part of the reorganization of the U.S. military establishment and the redesignation of the three executive departments as Military Departments. (*The Department of Defense 1944-1978*, page 79)

In considering the legislation encompassing the President's recommendations, the Senate supported the abolition of the Service Secretaries' right to appeal directly to the President. The Senate Committee on Armed Services said in its report on the bill:

> This proviso as set forth in the 1947 act specifically continued to the Secretaries of the military departments their authority as heads of executive departments to present recommendations and reports directly to the President or the Director of the Budget, after first informing the Secretary of Defense. The elimination of this wording is considered essential by the committee in view of the fact that under the proposed legislation the three military departments no longer have status as executive departments, as they did under the 1947 act. This change reflects the evidence presented to this effect by the overwhelming majority of witnesses which testified before the Committee. It is, of course, quite obvious that nothing in the 1947 act or the amendments proposed herein limits in any way the power or the propriety of the Congress calling upon the Secretaries of the military departments, or anyone else in the Military Establishment, for such reports or recommendations as the Congress may desire. (Senate Report No. 366, 81st Congress, 1st Session, to accompany S. 1843, page 7).

The House of Representatives did not, however, agree with the Senate position. As a result, the conference committee adopted language permitting the Service Secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to the Congress (vice the President or the Director of the Budget) any recommendation on national defense, after first informing the Secretary of Defense.

Despite the objections of President Truman to the statutory independence provided the Service Secretaries, the net effect of congressional action on the 1949 amendment was to strengthen this independence. While the earlier authority of the Service Secretaries permitted them to circumvent the Secretary of Defense, after 1949, they were also authorized to end-run the President. In addition, while the earlier authority was restricted to addressing Executive Branch relations, the 1949 amendment authorized direct appeal outside the Executive Branch. The Congress essentially transformed the Service Secretaries and JCS members into quasi-agents of the Legislative Branch.

In 1958, this issue again arose after President Eisenhower sent a Message to the Congress suggesting certain reorganizations of the Department of Defense. In that message, President Eisenhower had emphasized that, "(We) must remove all doubt as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense," and that "we be done with prescribing controversy by law." He further recommended "eliminating from the National Security Act...the other needless and injurious restraints on the authority of the Secretary of Defense." Shortly thereafter, the President transmitted proposed legislation to the Congress which would have abolished the right of the Service Secretaries and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense. The resulting bill, as reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services and passed by the Senate, would have abolished the Service Secretaries' right to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, but would have permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, either individually or as a group, to make such recommendations to committees of the Congress.

However, the bill reported by the House Committee on Armed Services continued the existing authorities. When the President objected in writing to this provision, which he viewed as an invitation to "legalized insubordination", an amendment in support of the President's objection failed on the House floor by a vote of 192 to 211. In conference, the House position once again prevailed and was explained in the conference report as a "simple repetition" of the "law which has been in existence for the past 9 years."

This right of Service Secretaries to present recommendations to the Congress, still in law 36 years after the Military Departments lost their executive department status and 38 years after the Service Secretaries became subordinates of the Secretary of Defense, continues to contribute to the confusion surrounding the role of the Service Secretaries. By continuing the authority of the Service Secretaries to present independent recommendations to the Congress, the Congress has encouraged Service Secretaries and their staffs to take the case for their point of view outside of DoD.

A contemporary example of this capacity is the Navy's successful blockage of the Secretary of Defense's decision to consolidate the Army's Military Traffic Management Command and the Navy's Military Sealift Command. In that situation, discussed fully in Chapter 9, the Secretary of the Navy directly sought support from Members of the Congress to legislatively block this consolidation even though the Secretary of Defense, supported unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had decided and directed that the consolidation occur. This situation provides clear evidence of the lack of a clearly defined superior-subordinate relationship between a Secretary of Defense and a Secretary of a Military Department. The source of this particular problem again is the historical status of the Military Departments as separate, independent, executive-level entities.

(2) Independent Political Bases

Beyond the independence provided to the Service Secretaries in statute, there have also been concerted efforts to appoint senior civilian officials in the Military Departments who have independent political bases either in the White House or the Congress. Service officials with substantial outside political support can effectively frustrate initiatives of the Secretary of Defense, either by preventing issues from being raised or blocking implementation of decisions. Even when the Secretary of Defense is aware of such activities by the Service Secretaries, he may not have the political muscle to discipline or fire them. As John Kester notes:

> ...the secretary of defense, if he wants to be sure of their loyalty, is better off with service secretaries who do not have powerful independent political bases on Capitol Hill or in the White House, or who for any reason can think of themselves as "fire-proof." ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 158)

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also notes this problem:

> ...In recent years Assistant Secretaries of the Military departments have often been appointed from the ranks of Congressional staffers in an attempt to cement departmental relations with Congress. Unfortunately, this practice has increased the likelihood of Service Secretariats' trying to bypass the Secretary of Defense in dealing with Congress....short circuits result, as the former Congressional staffers revert to their earlier loyalties. (*Thinking About National Security*, page 208)

(3) Size of the Top Management Headquarters of the Military Departments

Statutory and political independence, combined with the sheer size of their top management headquarters, give the Military Departments substantial capacity to block decisions that are not consistent with their point of view from being made or implemented. As Edward N. Luttwak observed about the military headquarters staffs in his book, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*:

> ...At present, they [the military headquarters staffs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force] employ almost 9,000 people in uniform (mostly officers, and many of them of middle rank) —far more than in the Office of the Secretary, the Joint Staff (1,300) and the civilian-run secretariats of the Army, Navy, and Air Force combined (1,600). These numbers reveal the true balance of power: although the official table of organization puts them at the bottom —below the civilian secretariats, who are in turn below the Secretary of Defense and his Office —it is in fact the service headquarters that have the greatest power. Their huge size is only partly explained by their supervisory role over their own services (which is already the second layer of supervision, the first being provided by the management and force commands outside the Pentagon). In

> fact, the size of the Washington headquarters of each service also reflects their undeclared function, which is to manipulate the Joint Staff and even more to outmaneuver the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When a civilian official in that office produces a ten-page paper to argue for some decision or other that is uncongenial to a service, its Washington staff can reply with a one-hundred-page refutation; when three civilian officials probe a questionable service proposal, its staff can assign ten officers to defend the service point of view. By controlling the information on detailed matters within the service domain, and by sheer numbers, the headquarters of each service thus systematically resist central direction. If only because of the lively possibility of a hostile Congressional reaction, stimulated by the friends of each service on Capitol Hill, Secretaries of Defense are usually reluctant to overrule professional military advice —which now comes from the service headquarters alone; and to seek alternative options from the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff is futile. (pages 280 and 281)

Luttwak notes only the power of the military headquarters staffs. However, if the military headquarters staffs have the capability to block decisions by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments —with the resources of both the military headquarters staffs and the Service Secretariats working in concert —have an even greater capacity to ensure that many unfavorable decisions are not made or, being made, are not implemented.

c. Lack of Consistency and Specificity in Statutory Descriptions of Service Secretary Positions

Part of the confusion about the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the Service Secretaries results from the different statutory descriptions of those positions. The position of Service Secretary is mandated by law, and the statutes describe each Service Secretary as the "head" of the respective Military Department. However, those same statutes, in attempting to describe what it is that the three Service Secretaries shall do as the "head" of their Departments, are neither consistent nor specific. Table 6-7 presents the statutory description of the roles of the three Service Secretaries.

TABLE 6-7

STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES
(As Specified in Title 10, United States Code)

§ 3012. Secretary of the Army: powers and duties; delegation by

(a) There is a Secretary of the Army, who is the head of the Department of the Army.

(b) The Secretary is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including—

(1) functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of the Army, including research and development; and

(2) direction of the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities for the Army;

(3) acquisition of all real estate and the issue of licenses in connection with Government reservations;

(4) operation of water, gas, electric, and sewer utilities; and

(5) such other activities as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense as authorized by law.

He shall perform such other duties relating to Army affairs, and conduct the business of the Department in such manner, as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(c) The Secretary may assign such of his duties as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army and to the Assistant Secretaries of the Army. Officers of the Army shall, as directed by the Secretary, report on any matter to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or any Assistant Secretary.

(d) The Secretary or, as he may prescribe, the Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary shall supervise all matters relating to—

(1) the procurement activities of the Department of the Army; and

(2) planning for the mobilization of materials and industrial organizations essential to the wartime needs of the Army.

(e) The Secretary, as he considers appropriate, may assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Army and civilian personnel of the Department of the Army.

(f) The Secretary may change the title of any other officer, or of any activity, of the Department of the Army.

(g) The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

§ 5031. Secretary of the Navy: responsibilities

(a) There is a Secretary of the Navy, who is the head of the Department of the Navy. He shall administer the Department of the Navy under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(b) The Secretary of the Navy shall execute such orders as he receives from the President relative to—

(1) the procurement of naval stores and material;

(2) the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of naval vessels; and

(3) all matters connected with the Department of the Navy.

(c) The Secretary of the Navy has custody and charge of all books, records, and other property of the Department.

(d) The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence is in addition to the authority of the Secretary under section 6011 of this title.

§ 8012. Secretary of the Air Force: powers and duties; delegation by

(a) There is a Secretary of the Air Force appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Air Force.

(b) The Secretary is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including—

(1) functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of the Air Force, including research and development; and

(2) such other activities as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense as authorized by law.

He shall perform such other duties relating to Air Force affairs, and conduct the business of the Department in such manner, as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(c) The Secretary may assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Air Force and to the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. Officers of the Air Force shall, as directed by the Secretary, report on any matter to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or an Assistant Secretary.

(d) The Secretary or, as he may prescribe, the Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary shall supervise all matters relating to—

(1) the procurement activities of the Department of the Air Force;

(2) planning for the mobilization of materials and industrial organizations essential to the wartime needs of the Air Force; and

(3) activities of the reserve components of the Air Force.

(e) The Secretary, as he considers appropriate, may assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of the members of the Air Force and civilian personnel of the Department of the Air Force.

(f) The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

The lack of consistency in these descriptions can be explained, to a limited extent, by the differences in forces, roles, and missions assigned to the three Military Departments. However, these differences do not explain, for example, why the Secretary of the Navy has been given the specific statutory responsibility and authority to "execute such orders as he receives from the President relative to" the procurement of naval stores and materials, the construction, armament, equipment and employment of naval vessels, and all matters connected with the Navy. (Section 5031 of title 10, United States Code) While both the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force have the statutory responsibility and authority to conduct activities prescribed by the President and to conduct departmental affairs directed by either the President or Secretary of Defense, neither of these two Service Secretaries have the special statutory responsibility for Presidential orders as does the Secretary of the Navy.

It appears that this special statutory relationship between the President and the Secretary of the Navy is a holdover from an earlier organizational era when there was no government official other than the President to whom the Secretary of the Navy was subordinate. That is no longer the case and has not been since the creation of the position of Secretary of Defense. The continued existence of this apparently special responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy, without any evidence of need, can cause confusion and misunderstanding when attempting to define the role of the Service Secretaries.

2. UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

A problem area that has frequently been identified is the existence of two separate headquarters staffs (three in the Navy) in the Military Departments: the Secretariat and the military headquarters staff. Critics believe that this arrangement results in an unnecessary layer of supervision and duplication of effort. This criticism must be considered in the context of the numerous staff layers that are involved in virtually every issue having multi-Service considerations: substantial staffs at one or more field commands or activities of each Service, the large military headquarters staffs, the Service Secretariats, the staff of the Secretary of Defense, and often the staffs of one or more unified or specified commands and the Joint Staff.

It is a generally accepted principle of organization that unnecessary layers of supervision result in delays and micro-management and are counterproductive and inefficient. Additionally, while duplication of effort within an organization may be useful at times, if that duplication of effort does not result in some specific benefit to the organization, then the duplication is unnecessary and inefficient.

The problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments is compounded by the excessive spans of control of the Service Chiefs of Staff. (For this discussion of span of control, the Service Chief, Vice Chief, and senior administrative officer (e.g., Director of the Army Staff) are treated as one entity.) The Army Chief of Staff has 42 officials reporting directly to him (25 of whom are on the Army Staff); the Chief of Naval Operations, 48 officials (23 in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations); the Air Force Chief of Staff, 35 officials (21 on the Air Staff); and the Marine Corps Commandant, 41 officials (23 in Headquarters, Marine Corps). The large and cumbersome spans of control make effective supervision and coordination much more difficult.

A number of studies of DoD organization have identified the existence of two separate headquarters staffs in the Military Departments as a problem. In December 1960, the report of the Committee on the Defense Establishment, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, identified this issue as a problem and emphasized the need

> ...to minimize the duplication and delay growing out of the present multiple layers of control...(page 7)

Similarly, the *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* in July 1970 found:

> There also appears to be substantial duplication in all Military Departments between the Secretariat staffs and the military staffs. (page 38)

The April 1976 report of the Defense Manpower Commission cast the issue of duplication of effort in a large context:

> Three layers [OSD, Service Secretariats, and military headquarters staffs] at the Department of Defense (DoD) executive level involved in manpower and personnel policy, planning and programming, and to some extent, operations, appear to be excessive. Given the basic nature of the Department of Defense, two layers —Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services [military headquarters staffs] —should suffice... (*Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security*, page 89)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study*, submitted in June 1978, also focused upon layering in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments and its associated redundancy and duplication. In this regard, the study stated:

> ...we believe that layers should be reduced when their number produces duplication rather than a needed diversity of views. (page 45)

In his book, *Thinking About National Security*, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown argued that within the Military Departments there is a need

> To reduce the number of levels in an overly layered managerial structure...(page 208)

Some integration of the Service Secretariat and the military headquarters staff has been undertaken in each of the Military Departments. In each department, there is only one staff for legislative affairs and only one staff for public affairs. Each of these staffs have civilian and military members, but the staffs in both of these areas provide single-source support for both the Service Secretary and Chief. A number of years ago, the Air Force integrated its two staffs for civilian personnel matters into one staff, and the Army has recently completed an integration of its two staffs in this functional area.

However, not everyone agrees that the existence of two separate Service headquarters staffs results in either an unnecessary layer of supervision or unnecessary duplication of effort. There is a body of opinion that the two staffs serve separate and necessary functions. Some believe, for example, that the advice and recommendations by the military headquarters staff, not only in operational areas but also on resource allocation issues, should be unfettered by political considerations. These individuals argue that it is the responsibility of the Service Secretariats to interpose these considerations and that this responsibility is necessarily separate from the responsibility of the military headquarters staff.

Others urge that the Service Secretariats provide a measure of continuity and "corporate memory" to the Military Departments which is not possible with an essentially "transient" military headquarters staff. Such arguments are based, however, upon the mistaken assumption that the Service Secretariat is composed of permanent civilian, as opposed to transient military, personnel. In fact, between 32 percent and 44 percent of the Service Secretariats are military personnel. In addition, between 26 percent and 56 percent of the military headquarters staffs are composed of permanent civilian employees. Assuming that continuity and corporate memory come from permanent civilian employees as compared to military personnel, it seems those factors are not unique to the Service Secretariats. It should also be noted that in the senior leadership positions, the Secretariats are just as transient as the military headquarters staffs, given the relatively rapid rate of turnover of political appointees.

Finally, others note that the Service Secretaries and their staffs bring a different set of experiences and viewpoints to bear on program management and on many other military departmental matters which are helpful in reaching optimum decisions. That is, the political, budgeting, acquisition management, civic, and academic points of view and skills interposed into the decision-making process by the Service Secretariat can help provide better overall decisions than if only military skills and points of view are present. For example, the opportunity to manage or the experience in overseeing budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars or programs having nationwide political impact does not often arise in the military environment. Yet, a Service Secretary needs people on his staff that have that experience and expertise.

The need of a Service Secretary to have such experience and expertise available to him does not seem, however, to be relative to the issue of whether separate staffs are necessary, but only whether the Service Secretary will be permitted appropriate flexibility to obtain those experts and experienced personnel who are necessary to advise him. That is, it may be sufficient to ensure that such experience and expertise is available to the Service Secretary, without regard to whether it comes from the Secretariat, military headquarters staff, or an integrated staff. In short, this issue seems more related to the Secretary's ability to obtain needed support, not whether unnecessary supervision and duplication exist.

There are two causes of the unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort: (1) the current organizational arrangements are a holdover from an earlier era when the Service Secretaries headed executive-level departments; and (2) inability of the Service Secretaries to effectively control the military headquarters staffs.

a. Holdover from an Earlier Era

The existence of two separate headquarters staffs predates the creation of the Department of Defense. Prior to the National Security Act of 1947, the staff of each Service Secretary as a head of an executive-level department was a very small cadre of advisors. Under the 1947 Act, the departments were continued as executive-level departments and the Service Secretaries retained their own staffs. This organizational scheme continued through the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, even though the departments lost their status as executive departments and even though the Service Secretaries were removed from the National Security Council. Although there have been minor changes in the Service Secretariats in the intervening 30 years, the existence of a Service Secretariat and a military headquarters staff in each of the Military Departments essentially is the result of the structure in effect prior to the creation of the Department of Defense.

b. Failure of the Service Secretaries to Effectively Control the Military Headquarters Staffs

The second cause of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments is the failure of the Service Secretaries to effectively control the military headquarters staffs. Given this failure, the Service Secretaries created or maintained large Secretariats in an attempt to provide this control.

John Kester comments on this issue as follows:

> DoD officials have not been immune to the bureaucratic tendencies to build new staffs rather than try to make the existing ones work, and to assume, contrary to managerial logic, that any new task assigned should mean not reordering of priorities, but addition of more people. For instance, the endemic failures of the JCS to support successive secretaries of defense led not to reform of the JCS, but rather to a mammoth Office of the Secretary of Defense. The failure of service secretaries to get control of the military staffs of their departments led to the expansion of secretariats of their own that they could order around without having to worry about footdragging by a double-hatted chief of staff and his deputies....In spite of ritual complaints, the chiefs of staff have not particularly resisted the trend of service secretariat expansion; for if the civilian secretary has his own secretariat to play with, he may stay more out of the chief's hair and leave the large military staff to him. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", pages 161-162)

In essence, the large Service Secretariats exist because the Secretaries could not make the military headquarters staffs responsive to them. Instead of attacking the basic problem, the solution was to create or maintain a large bureaucracy —the Secretariat —to supposedly provide this control. It is not evident that the desired control has been achieved. It is evident that unnecessary layers and duplication have resulted.

3. INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

In Chapter 3 dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the problem area of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions was identified. The Service Secretariats have the identical problem with many of the same causes. The basic causes identified in Chapter 3 are: (1) appointment of senior civilian executives who lack a substantial background in national security affairs primarily because senior civilian appointments are used as political patronage; (2) a high turnover rate of senior civilians; (3) numerous and lengthy vacancies in these positions; and (4) substantial financial disincentives for individuals appointed to such positions. As these causes are presented in detail in Chapter 3, they will not be repeated here.

The problem of inexperienced political appointees is even more critical in the Service Secretariats than in OSD. This results from the unfavorable perceptions of key offices in the Secretariats, including the position of Service Secretary. John Kester discusses the unfavorable perception of the position of Service Secretary:

> We do not have to search long to find civilians —many close to the secretary of defense —who sneer that the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are today about as obsolete as the rigging on the *Pinafore*. Nor is there a shortage of uniformed officers who maintain that civilian appointees in the Department of Defense in general, and the three service secretaries in particular, too often are naive and transient amateurs who know little about their jobs; who act at the whim of a mysterious and unprincipled force called politics; who if they begin to learn anything about their duties will leave office soon after; and who are best treated like a senile great-uncle — with honor, compassion, comfortable surroundings, and no important responsibilities. By that view, such eminences are to be piped aboard, chauffeured about, and generally kept harmlessly amused while the serious work of the world goes on around them. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 149)

Colonel Daleski also found unfavorable views of the Service Secretaries:

> ...To some, Service Secretaries are anachronisms —without useful function, irrelevant to contemporary defense policy — and indeed major contributors to the "confusion" that surrounds the discussion of important defense issues. (*Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretaries*, page 1)

These attitudes result from misconceptions of the role of the Secretary and his staff and from the failure of the Secretary of Defense to emphasize these important positions. Since there is no clear understanding of what a Service Secretary and his principal assistants should do, there is not clear understanding of the types of experience and qualifications which should be sought for these positions. As to the failure of Secretaries of Defense to emphasize these positions, Kester notes:

> ...secretaries of defense in recent years have acted less and less as if service secretaries mattered; that sends a message, too. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 150)

Given this unfavorable perception, Service positions have limited appeal to talented and experienced candidates.

4. LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

A final problem area relating to the Military Departments is the limited utility of the general statutory and administrative assignment of roles and missions among the Services and the absence of effective mechanisms for changes to these assignments. The assignment of roles and missions was an overriding concern since the earliest proposals for unification. While the Congress prescribed the general functions of each Service in the National Security Act of 1947, the fundamental document that assigns more detailed functions, or roles and missions, to the Services is the Key West Agreement negotiated in March 1948. While some Service witnesses have testified that the assignment of roles and missions is constantly under review, it is difficult to understand how, in light of the tremendous changes in technology, strategy, and tactics over the past 40 years, there has been no major change in the roles and missions of the Services since 1948. As *The Department of the Army Manual* states:

> Service roles and missions require continuing reexamination to keep pace with the changing nature of war and with the accelerating pace of technological change. (page 4-20)

The problem arises because this continuing reexamination has not taken place to the extent necessary to avoid wasteful duplication and to maximize force effectiveness.

a. History of the Assignment of Service Roles and Missions

In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond notes that the principal focus of congressional consideration of unification legislation from early 1946 to July 1947 was on roles and missions issues. According to Hammond, this period

> ...was dominated by the practical and profoundly political questions about the forces, functions, and status of the Navy...proposals for major structural change had originated out of the roles and missions disputes and their acceptance finally turned on some kind of settlement of the latter, largely in the Navy's favor. (page 222)

On January 16, 1947, Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal reported to President Truman their agreement on a plan for unification. As part of this agreement, the two Secretaries had drafted a mutually agreed Executive Order to specify Service functions. In their letter to President Truman, Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal stated:

> We are agreed that the proper method of setting forth the functions (so-called roles and missions) of the armed forces is by the issuance of an Executive Order concurrently with your approval of the appropriate legislation. (*The Department of Defense 1944–1978*, pages 32–33)

This proposed Executive Order was discussed at length during the 1947 hearings on unification legislation.

The Congress, however, was concerned about the sole use of an Executive Order to specify Service roles and missions. The Congress viewed the roles and missions issue as a problem of Executive-Legislative relations. In *The Management of Defense*, John C. Ries stated the dilemma facing the Congress as follows:

> ...If Congress permitted any executive officer to reallocate or restrict service roles and missions, it would be delegating him some of its own prerogatives. But if Congress did not allow an executive officer to consolidate or reassign service functions, its prerogatives would be preserved, but existing duplication would be perpetuated. (page 96)

The Congress attempted to resolve this dilemma in two ways. First, it prescribed minimum functions for each Service in the National Security Act of 1947. These Service functions as embodied in title 10, United States Code, are presented in Table 6–8. These congressional prescriptions have been altered in only one instance since 1947: the Marine Corps Act of 1952 introduced specific language on the composition of the Marine Corps which shall "...include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings..." The second way that the Congress sought to resolve this dilemma was its agreement to the use of an Executive Order, concurred in by the Services, which specified respective functions in greater detail.

TABLE 6-8

FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE

PRESCRIBED IN TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

ARMY (Section 3062(b))

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

NAVY (Section 5012)

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and is generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(d) The Navy is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

MARINE CORPS (Section 5013)

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

AIR FORCE (Section 8062(c))

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

On July 26, 1947 —the same day that he signed the National Security Act of 1947 —President Truman issued Executive Order 9877 setting forth the more detailed assignment of Service roles and missions. However, differences in language between this executive order and the general statements of Service functions that the Congress decided to include in the National Security Act led to efforts to revise the Executive Order. The key language differences were over Navy and Air Force responsibilities for air missions.

On January 20, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal sent a draft revision of the Executive Order to the JCS for comment. The JCS was unable to reach agreement on a revision. As a result, Secretary Forrestal met with the Service Chiefs at the Key West Naval Base in Florida from March 11-14, 1948. At this conference and a subsequent meeting in Washington on March 20, agreement was negotiated on the assignment of Service roles and missions. President Truman approved this agreement on April 21, 1948, and on the same day, Secretary Forrestal released a paper, entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff", that documented the agreement. This paper has been commonly referred to as the "Key West Agreement." This agreement is now embodied in DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," first promulgated on March 16, 1954.

The Key West Agreement assigns primary and collateral functions to each Service. The use of collateral or secondary functions was the most innovative feature of the Key West Agreement. Where it had been impossible to define Service responsibilities, collateral functions were assigned in an effort to foster joint activity. In summary, the Key West Agreement assigns key primary functions as follows:

Army

- sustained combat operations on land
- Army antiaircraft artillery
- primary interest in the development of airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment

Navy and Marine Corps

- sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based naval air components
- naval forces, including naval close air support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations
- seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign

Air Force

- sustained combat operations in the air
- strategic air warfare
- close combat and logistical air support for the Army
- air transport for the Armed Forces

In their paper, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin characterize this agreement as follows:

> The Key West agreement represented a compromise of sorts. The Navy gained many of its goals: retention of the Navy-based Marine Corps; the authority to provide close air support for Marine land operations; and the authority to carry out those air operations, including ground-launched missions, which are required for sea battles. The Army and the Air Force, convinced that the services should avoid excessive duplication, were willing to give the Navy control over almost all sea operations. And the Army and Air Force agreed to cooperate with each other as a team on joint missions. Specifically, this meant that the Air Force pledged to provide the Army with airlift and close air support. (*Foreign Policy*, #53, Winter 1983-84, page 117)

While there have been no major changes to the portions of the Key West Agreement dealing with Service roles and missions, there have been a number of clarifications:

- ○ *Memorandum for the Record of the Newport Conference of August 20-22, 1948* —Two roles and missions clarifications resulted from this conference. The first was a clarification of the term "primary mission" so that "the Air Force could not deny the Navy access to atomic weapons or exclude it from planning for strategic air operations." (Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years*, page 401) The second was the placement of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project—an interservice organization responsible for the handling and assembly of nuclear weapons—under Air Force control on an "interim" basis.
- ○ *Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force., October 2, 1951* — This memorandum, known as the Pace-Finletter agreement (after the two Service Secretaries who negotiated it), sought to delineate the meaning of the phrase in the National Security Act of 1947 that specified that the Army shall include land combat and services forces and "such aviation...as may be organic therein." Army organic aviation was defined to consist of aircraft utilized by the Army within [illegible] Army combat zone which was defined as not normally exceeding 50 to 75 miles in depth. The functions that could be performed by Army aircraft were specified as were functions for which Army aircraft were not to duplicate Air Force functions.
- ○ *Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation, November 4, 1952* —This second Pace-Finletter agreement modified the previous agreement to: (1) redefine the combat zone to normally be 50 to 100 miles in depth; and (2) more importantly, limit Army fixed wing aircraft to an empty weight of not more than 5,000 pounds.
- ○ *Memorandum for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, November 26, 1956* —This clarification addressed five subjects:
  - —*use of aircraft by the Army.* Specific limitations were placed on the use of aircraft by the Army. Key among these was the reaffirmation of the limitation that Army fixed wing aircraft would have an empty weight not to exceed 5.000 pounds.

—adequacy of airlift —Air Force capability to provide airborne lift was viewed as being adequate "in the light of currently approved strategic concepts."

—air defense —The Army was assigned responsibility for land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense (100 nautical miles), and the Air Force was assigned responsibility for such missile systems for area defense.

—Air Force tactical support of the Army —The Army would develop surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. Other tactical air support functions were to remain the responsibility of the Air Force.

—Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) —Operational employment of the land-based IRBM system was assigned as a sole responsibility of the Air Force, thus removing the Army from this function.

- *Department of Defense Directive 5160.22, March 18, 1957* —The Army and Air Force continued to have sharp disagreements over the provision of tactical air support for the Army. This directive, which superceded the Pace-Finletter agreements of 1951 and 1952, sought to clarify these disputes. On March 8, 1971, this directive was cancelled, especially in light of the view that the 5,000-pound limitation on Army fixed-wing aircraft was inappropriate.
- *Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, March 6, 1961* —The advent of military satellite and space vehicle systems in the late 1950's created problems of control and coordination within the Department of Defense. This directive assigned responsibility to the Air Force for research, development, test, and engineering of space development programs or projects. This directive was revised on September 8, 1970 to enable the other Services to pursue space development programs related to the major weapon systems for which they had responsibility.
- *Agreement between Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, April 6, 1966* —This Army-Air Force agreement, known as the Johnson-McConnell agreement (after the two Chiefs of Staff), sought to reach an understanding on the control and employment of certain types of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Disputes in this area had been intensified by increasing levels of warfare in Southeast Asia. For its part, the Army agreed "to relinquish all claims for CV-2 [CARIBOU] and CV-7 [BUFFALO] aircraft and for future fixed wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift." Under this agreement, all CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft in the Army inventory were transferred to the Air Force. The Air Force agreed "to relinquish all claims for helicopters and follow-on rotary wing aircraft which are designed and operated for intra-theater movement, fire support, supply and resupply of Army forces" and for certain Air Force control elements.
- *Navy-Air Force Agreement, May 22, 1974* —This agreement covered the use of B-52 aircraft to provide aerial delivery of Navy sea mines.
- *Navy-Air Force Memorandum of Agreement on the Concept of Operations for USAF Forces Collateral Functions Training,*

September 2, 1975 —This agreement provided a general concept of operations for Air Force resources training to perform collateral functions in sea control operations. It was envisioned that Air Force capabilities might be employed to perform the following tasks as part of sea control operations:

—search and identification;
—electronic warfare;
—tactical deception;
—attack against surface and air units; and
—aerial minelaying.

○ *Memorandum of Agreement on U.S. Army —U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process, May 22, 1984* —In this agreement—signed by the respective Chiefs of Staff, Generals Wickham and Gabriel—the Army and Air Force affirmed that "they must organize, train, and equip a compatible, complementary and affordable Total Force that will maximize our joint combat capability to execute airland combat operations." The initial agreement contained 31 initiatives for action by the Army and Air Force; this list was later expanded to 34 initiatives. These initiatives addressed several areas where the Army and Air Force have traditionally experienced jurisdictional disputes: air defense, close air support, guided missiles, and intratheater airlift. About half of the initiatives directly addressed these areas. However, initiatives were taken in a number of new areas such as air base ground defense, combat search and rescue, Special Operations Forces, and night combat.

Beyond these specific initiatives, the Army-Air Force agreement of May 1984 sought to institutionalize a joint force development process. With this objective in mind, the agreement provided for:

—establishment of a long-term process that would include an annual update and review of the initiatives for action;
—expansion of the agreement to include future initiatives;
—annual exchange between the Army and Air Force of a formal priority list of those sister Service programs essential to the support of their conduct of successful airland combat operations, the purpose of which is to ensure the development of complementary systems without duplication;
—resolution of joint or complementary system differences prior to program development;
—high priority in the Army and Air Force development and acquisition processes for programs supporting joint airland combat operations; and
—dedication to providing the best combat capability to the unified and specified commanders.

b. Evaluation of the Key West Agreement and Subsequent Clarifications

(1) Key West Agreement

The Key West Agreement and subsequent revisions did little to settle roles and missions disputes among the four Services. It did resolve some of the most fundamental issues raised by unification

—in particular, preservation of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Beyond these issues, however, jurisdictional boundaries remained blurred. In essence, the Key West Agreement "called for the Services, under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs, to coordinate their efforts closely, avoid duplication, and work toward 'maximum practicable' integration of policies and procedures." (*The Formative Years*, page 396) Given the environment of extensive suspicion and rivalry among the Services, effective coordination did not result. As Steven L. Rearden noted in *The Formative Years*:

> ...Until the actual cooperation matched the resourcefulness of the semantic compromises [of the Key West Agreement], there could be no genuine harmony or teamwork, and no true resolution of the more troublesome roles and missions questions. (page 397)

In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond also concludes that the Key West Agreement had limited utility in solving the issues of Service jurisdiction:

> ...Its delineation of service functions has endured, though only because there is little of a general character which can be said about service functions, not because it settled anything.
>
> ...[Secretary of Defense] Forrestal found little immediate comfort in the agreement. Before he could publish it, Generals Spaatz and Norstad of the Air Force had qualified their approval by indicating that they accepted it as an interpretation of the National Security Act, but disagreed with it in principle. Since a major purpose of the agreement was to circumscribe the behavior of the Chiefs and their services with the public and Congress, the practical effect of such a qualification was to nullify the agreement, for the major roles and missions dispute in the military establishment, between the Navy and the Air Force over naval aviation, had never turned on the interpretation of the statute, but always on the contended merits of the roles and missions issue. (pages 237 and 238)

John C. Ries in *The Management of Defense* reached similar conclusions:

> ...The product of this meeting, the Key West Agreement, failed completely as a basis for service agreement. In fact, the services disagreed about correct interpretation even before publication.
>
> As in any attempt to state policy separate from the specific means of implementation, the Key West Agreement did not contain clear criteria for choosing one particular set of means over another. The agreement could not substitute for a final choice or negotiation among specific service proposals. And in spite of the agreement, the JCS, a committee of equals, could not do more than endorse the proposals of each individual service. (page 126)

In *The Uncertain Trumpet*, written in 1959, General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Retired) cited the need to rewrite the assignment of Services roles and missions in light of the limited utility of the Key West Agreement:

> This housecleaning should start with a rewriting of the roles and missions of the three services. The present roles and missions were promulgated in 1947 at the time of the famous Key West conference and have not been changed in any significant way since then. In their initial form, their statement was little more than a description of the capabilities of the services at the time of the promulgation of the Key West Agreement. Since that time, weapons systems, tactics, and strategy have changed, and with them the capabilities of the services. (page 165)

(2) Clarifications of the Key West Agreement

There have been ten clarifications (of varying degrees of significance) of the Key West Agreement over a 37-year period. Six of these clarifications involved only the Army and the Air Force and were usually focused on aviation support for Army combat forces. The first clarification, resulting from the Newport Conference, sought to end a dispute between the Navy and Air Force over access to atomic weapons. The eighth clarification was made necessary by military use of space and involved all four Services. The remaining two clarifications, involving the Navy and Air Force, were focused on Air Force collateral functions in sea control operations.

The first seven chronological clarifications sought to resolve specific disputes and did not reflect an approach by the Services in Reardon's words "to coordinate their efforts closely, avoid duplication, and work toward 'maximum practicable' integration of policies and procedures." In his book, *The Department of Defense*, Carl W. Borklund characterized the nature of inter-Service conflict and controversies, of which these seven clarifications were a part, as follows:

> In general terms, during all these squabbles, where separate service functions and combat capabilities supposedly interlocked, the tendency was to neglect those links. Where the weapon system had glamour and could command or attract large amounts of budget appropriations, each service concentrated on it, especially if the weapon function was to deliver an atomic warhead. The emphasis was on competition, rather than on complementary effort toward a common combat capability goal. (page 271)

While a more cooperative approach began to emerge in the minor Navy-Air Force agreements of 1974 and 1975, it was not until the Army-Air Force Memorandum of Agreement in 1984 that this approach was clearly evident. It is particularly notable that the 1984 agreement not only proposed to resolve numerous specific issues, but also sought to institutionalize a process by which Army/Air Force cooperation and coordination could be maximized. In the press conference, General Gabriel noted the significance of the agreement:

> What we have come up with, I think, is a very historic thing. It's kind of a revolutionary approach... Pentagon News Briefing, May 22, 1984, page 2).

c. Reasons for Concern

Underlying concerns about the adequacy of Service roles and missions assignments are three facts: (1) the Key West Agreement of 1948 made only general assignments of areas of jurisdiction; (2) no major changes to the Key West Agreement have been made; and (3) despite the Army —Air Force agreement of 1984, there do not appear to be effective mechanisms for considering necessary revisions to roles and missions assignments. The second and third facts may be more significant. The agreement negotiated in 1948 may have gone as far as the Services could go during the immediate post-war period which was characterized by substantial bureaucratic turmoil. Samuel P. Huntington describes this environment as follows:

> ...In the immediate postwar period, fundamental issues of service existence and strategy were at stake. After a major war, military policy is in a state of flux. The cake of custom, bureaucratic routine, and sustained habits of behavior—executive, congressional, and popular—are broken. Change is not only possible, but expected. In such periods, existing organizational units have the most to fear from major threats to their existence, and new organizational units have the best prospects for an easy birth or growth. ("Inter-Service Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services", *Problems of National Strategy*, page 469)

In such an environment with many important issues of strategy and concepts still evolving, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach wide agreement on the jurisdiction of each Service. Huntington cast Service activity during the immediate, post-war period in the following terms:

> After World War II, each service and hoped-for service was anxious to carve out a role for itself suitable to its ambitions and self-conceptions before a postwar equilibrium was established and the patterns of organization and behavior jelled into enduring form. The unification battle involved the general pattern of postwar organizational relationships for all the services and, specifically, the formal recognition of the separate existence of the Air Force. Closely linked with this were the legitimate fears of the Navy and Marine Corps for their future being. "Why should we have a Navy at all?" asked the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, and answered himself by declaring that, "There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force." Similarly, the then Chief of Staff of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, made it quite clear that the Marines ought to be maintained as only a minor landing force. The uneasiness these views inspired in the sea-going services was not allayed until their functions were carefully defined in the National Security Act and the Key West roles-and-missions paper, the Forrestals [a 4-ship class of aircraft carriers] floated forth on the flood of Korean War appropriations, and the Marine position was sanctified in the Marine Corps Act of 1952. By 1952, the United States had four recognized services instead of the two it had had in 1940.

> After 1952, whatever the vicissitudes of budgets and strategy, the existence of no service was in serious danger from another. An equilibrium had been reached. (pages 469 and 470)

Once this equilibrium had been reached, there was greater potential for more specificity in the assignment of Service roles and missions. This potential has never been realized (for reasons explained later in this subsection).

The failure to more adequately and continuously address Service roles and missions is of concern for three basic reasons: (1) the Key West Agreement permitted duplication of effort among the Services in many areas; (2) the advance of technology posed many new jurisdictional issues not anticipated at the time of the Key West Agreement; and (3) the Key West Agreement may have artificially constrained the development of force capabilities necessary to meet the changing needs of warfare.

(1) duplication of effort

Duplication of effort is a topic that needs to be addressed carefully. Duplication is normally viewed as unnecessary and, therefore, wasteful. However, for the Department of Defense, duplication may provide a degree of insurance against unforeseen changes in the threat or evolution of warfare and against the pursuit of a single solution to a complex military requirement. In *The Management of Defense*, John C. Ries articulates this point:

> ...The greatest threat to adequate defense comes from gaps in defense capabilities, not from duplication. The existence of several agencies [the Military Departments] with overlapping missions encourages competition in determining alternative ways of doing the same job and provides the incentive to find gaps that need filling. Competition, far from being extravagant, is probably the surest and cheapest insurance that can be purchased against a fatal gap in defense capabilities. Even if gaps do not occur, the single way is often the most expensive way. The costs are the undiscovered cheaper ways of developing the same capability. (page 207)

In *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, Edward N. Luttwak discusses the benefits of duplication, or diversity, in conflict. Luttwak argues that efforts to standardize and avoid duplication are focused on business efficiency whereas military effectiveness in combat demands diversity. He argues that

> ...less standardized military forces are more resilient. (page 135)

Luttwak uses the following among many examples to explain this point:

> ...If, for example, our forces use a single, standardized type of antiaircraft missile for the sake of efficiency, enemy pilots will be able to underfly its minimum operating altitude or overfly its maximum ceiling, and the enemy's electronic wizards can devote all their efforts to countering its specific detection and guidance systems. If efficiency is sacrificed and a second, different type of missile is added with higher or lower altitude

> limits, or merely different electronic specifications, the enemy's pilots will find it that much more difficult to avoid both missiles, while the enemy's electronic countermeasures must cope with two different challenges. (page 135)

While the points made by Ries and Luttwak have merit, unconstrained duplicative activities are not the answer. Just as an excessive focus on business efficiency can lead to the pursuit of single, high-risk solutions and vulnerable forces, duplication can be unnecessary and wasteful of scare defense resources. This is of particular concern because the costs of unnecessary duplication in DoD are greater than for other organizations, particularly those in private business. This is so because of the separateness of the Services. Once unnecessary duplication has been determined to exist, it is much more difficult to eliminate. In *The Organizational Politics of Defense*, William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson explain these points:

> If the central management can cut through the debate and make a firm conclusion that an activity is wasteful duplication, that does not mean the activity is necessarily closed down. A weakness of using the budget as an instrument of control is that by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may be too late to do much about it. "Sunk costs" and organizational barriers to transferring activities often make it simpler to accept the duplication.
>
> ...A commercial firm might firmly consolidate activities by transferring personnel, assigning the responsibility to one of the competitors. This step can be difficult for a business firm, but transferring defense activities can be extraordinarily difficult because of the powerful traditions surrounding the military services. Consider the consequences should the Secretary of Defense choose to transfer a group of career Air Force officers doing meterological work to the Navy. While it would be a technically feasible task, although administratively horrendous, such a step is especially difficult because the services are indeed separate. This special uniqueness of the military services is reinforced by the support offered the services by constituencies outside the Department of Defense. Foremost among these is Congress, which includes many partisans of the different services. In addition, for each military uniform, there are reserve organizations, National Guard components, veterans and all of their formidable political allies ready to leap to the defense of the sanctity of service traditions.
>
> If conflict over jurisdiction does develop in the military establishment, it thus has to center around the transfer of jurisdictions alone. But it is difficult to close down an on-going activity in any business, and doubly so in the Defense Department. To establish a program, to buy the material necessary, and to train the personnel is often a major investment. Once in operation, the costs of the activity are relatively small. If faced with the prospect of having to close one program and expand the same activity in another department, the central management of any company or bureaucracy is likely to leave well enough alone. The major investment in expertise from training

> and experience is not transferable when the personnel are not; the costs of moving a jurisdiction from one military service to another, therefore, become virtually prohibitive. Even when an iron-clad case can be made for the transfer and consolidation of an activity, it is often not worth the political costs. The distinctive nature of the military services thus helps to preclude simple reallocation of established jurisdictions. Duplication, once established and allowed to grow to significant proportions, is very hard to eliminate. (pages 45 and 46)

Given the costs associated with unnecessary duplication, DoD must make every effort to ensure that appropriate jurisdictional boundaries are established. It is not clear that the rigorous analysis required to establish these boundaries has been conducted at any time since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.

(2) advance of technology

Technology with application to warfare has advanced at an ever increasing rate. The emergence of new technology has posed new jurisdictional issues. Unfortunately, there has been no effective mechanism for resolving them until the costs of duplicative efforts become substantial. Key examples of DoD jurisdictional disputes arising from new technology include the intermediate-range ballistic missile competition between the Army's Jupiter and Air Force's Thor and the guided missile competition between the Army's Nike Hercules and the Air Force's Bomarc and land-based Talos.

Lucas and Dawson discuss duplication in new fields, which they term "pre-emptive duplication," as follows:

> Duplication in new fields is usually the result of the absence of jurisdictional boundaries, or of boundaries made obsolete or ambiguous by rapid social or technological change. In areas the organization has not previously entered, no "zoning laws" delimit where a department can and cannot probe. The exploration of new fields is thus a tempting opportunity to establish small activities that may prove fruitful, particularly in view of the natural tendency of organizations to allocate an emerging activity to the department that has already developed some familiarity with it. The leadership of departments is only too well aware of the fact that small decisions awarding jurisdiction over marginal functions to a department may be decisive in future organizational bargaining over that function if and when it has taken on importance. There is, then, a powerful incentive to set up shop in a field before jurisdictional boundaries are established. An activity has only to offer faint promise, and departments will tend to establish some proprietary program. As a consequence, management frequently finds that the departments are already engaged in small-scale duplicative activity in a new field.
>
> Once established, these activities may gradually grow or be maintained at a low level until the goals they serve take on new importance. When that occurs, the central management may find several activities, each arguing that it alone should be the recipient of further organizational growth in the same general area. In each case, managers and specialists have de-

> veloped expertise in solving the managerial and technical problems associated with that area. Relevant equipment has often already been obtained. The organization finds it has "sunk costs" in fostering more than one department's ability to cope with the given problem area. (page 45)

Lucas and Dawson draw the following analogy to pre-emptive duplication:

> ...One is reminded of the practice of the explorers of the Age of Discovery, who carried the royal banner onto the beach and claimed all the lands they had discovered in the name of their king. (page 85)

John C. Ries describes the situation:

> ...the first service to develop a suitable weapon would acquire the mission that went with it. (page 130)

The absence of a continuing review of Service roles and missions has precluded the establishment of jurisdictional lines that would bring duplicative conflict among the Services under control.

(3) artificial constraints

The third area of concern is that the Key West Agreement placed artificial constraints on the development of force capabilities to meet the changing needs of warfare. In their article, "The Key West Key", Morton H. Halperin and David Halperin describe the overriding influence of the Key West Agreement on today's military operations, procurement, and thinking. They conclude that the Key West Agreement and subsequent revisions "have contributed to some of the most glaring failures and shortcomings of American military policy in the postwar era." (*Foreign Policy*, #53, Winter 1983-84, page 114)

In support of this conclusion, Morton and David Halperin cite:

- the overreliance of the Army on the helicopter because of limitations on Army aviation;
- the failure of the Air Force to provide adequate close air support for the Army;
- the failures of the Navy to acquire sufficient sealift and the Air Force to acquire sufficient airlift;
- the inability to provide an effective force to conduct the Iranian hostage rescue mission; and
- the inability to consider a sea-based alternative for the MX missile.

The Halperins argue that the constraints of the Key West Agreement have hindered the search for more effective forces and program alternatives. They argue the need for a comprehensive reevaluation of the Key West Agreement in the following terms:

> An examination of the agreements and their sometimes disastrous consequences suggests that the Key West approach was fundamentally flawed. If the United States is to continue to defend its interests effectively without wasting vast sums of money, serious revisions of the responsibilities and missions of the armed forces will be needed. (page 116)

d. nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the three Service Secretaries and four Service Chiefs were questioned on the nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions. Their responses offer supporting evidence of the inadequacy of this review process. Secretary of the Army Marsh stated:

> ...I know of no present effort within DoD to make a fundamental re-examination of the assignment of Service roles and missions....I'm not aware of any deliberate, periodic effort to examine roles and missions on a regular basis; nor do I believe a need exists to do this at the present time. (Part 6, page 264)

Similarly, Secretary of the Air Force Orr stated:

> There are no formal efforts within DoD to re-examine roles and missions. (Part 6, page 264)

Secretary of the Navy Lehman had an apparent, although not necessarily, contrary view if considered in the context of the Service Chief statements which follow:

> ...the assignments of functions, roles, and missions within and among the Services is a subject of almost daily discussion and review. (Part 6, page 264)

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, stated:

> We don't have an annual roles and missions conference...but I have to say in the budget development, the Defense Resources Board procedure, our debate with the Congress and the like, we essentially mold the roles and missions so they do evolve and they do change.
>
> ...This is a roles and missions shift in a sense, but we are doing it not in the context of meeting and discussing it, but getting on with what do we need to fight our forces better and, out of that, roles and missions changes are taking place.
>
> ...I believe that if we try to formalize or institutionalize the process, it could be very unwieldy and debilitating. (Part 8, page 353)

The Army Chief of Staff, General Wickham, added:

> The DRB [Defense Resources Board] process, I believe, forces a good degree of review of roles and missions through the programmatic dimensions. (Part 8, page 353)

General Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, commented:

> In the effort that General Wickham just mentioned—roles and missions are not the driving factor.
>
> It is who can do what, what is the smartest way to do it and the most affordable way to do it. We have really thrown out the roles and missions issues...
>
> It is working well and the more we do this, of course, the more we find out there are other things that we can help each other on without bumping into the parochial problems of the past. (Part 8, page 354)

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley, stated:

> ...I don't think the subject is necessarily a change of roles and missions but rather a continued emphasis on this harmonization of capabilities that exist within the Armed Forces of the United States. (Part 8, page 354)

These seven statements reveal the nature of DoD review of Service roles and missions. First, there is no mechanism for formal review of roles and missions assignments. Formal reviews are being avoided apparently because they are expected to be "debilitating" given the historical record of roles and missions disputes. Second, the budget, through the Defense Resources Board process, is used as the sole source of roles and missions changes. This is of concern because as the previously quoted conclusion from Lucas and Dawson noted:

> ...A weakness of using the budget as an instrument of control is that by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may be too late to do much about it.

Third, the central management of DoD appears to be playing a passive role in reexamining roles and missions issues. The major activity appears to be allowing the Services to cooperate as they see fit.

e. causes of the problem

The causes of the problem of an absence of a comprehensive and objective review of Service roles and missions are clearer than the source of any other problem. There are two causes: (1) statutory restrictions on changes to the combatant functions of each Service which have served to inhibit central management in this area; and (2) the desire of the Services to avoid reconsideration of these controversial issues.

(1) Statutory Restrictions on Changes to the Combatant Functions of the Services

The present statutory language regarding the authority of the Secretary of Defense to make changes to combatant functions, codified in section 125 of title 10, United States Code, was enacted as part of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947. Under present law, the Secretary of Defense must notify the Congress of a proposed transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of a major combatant function, power, or duty assigned by law to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. Congressional power to block such changes was provided for in a one-House veto. While this congressional obstacle has been rendered constitutionally suspect by recent Supreme Court rulings, it is clear that the Secretary of Defense could anticipate substantial congressional scrutiny and opposition to any such attempted changes.

An historical review of the statutory limitations placed on the the authority of the Secretary of Defense in the assignment of Service roles and missions reveals a clear concern on the part of the Congress not to surrender its constitutional authority in this field. Congressman Carl Vinson elaborated on this concern in the House Armed Services Committee report on the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958:

> Congress cannot abdicate the responsibility vested in it by the Constitution. It must continue to reserve to itself decisions as to the basic duties of each of the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) is to perform. This has the great advantage of insuring that matters of such vital import to the defense of the nation are not left to the Executive alone, but are subject to the collective judgment of the Congress. (page 37)

The first explicit statutory limitation on Executive changes to combatant functions was contained in the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. The National Security Act of 1947 had been silent on this issue. Ironically, one of the main purposes of the 1949 amendments was to clarify and strengthen the powers of the Secretary of Defense. While this goal was achieved in many areas, a direct prohibition was placed on the Secretary of Defense's ability to change combatant functions. Interestingly, a version of this prohibition was part of the Administration's legislative proposal. During the Senate hearings on the 1949 amendments, Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Administration recognized congressional authority in this area.

As part of its legislative proposal for the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the Eisenhower Administration called for the repeal of the restrictions on the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change combatant functions. Secretary of Defense McElroy gave the following explanation to the House Armed Services Committee for this proposal:

> The changes in the law which we are proposing do not change the present statement of functions of the armed services. The crux of the discussions, therefore, is the question of the authority of the Secretary of Defense to eliminate overlapping in combat functions as may be required by changing circumstances. This provision is considered necessary because the advent of modern weapons has eliminated the clear distinction which could at one time be made between combat on land, combat at sea, and combat in the air. Thus the advent of modern weapons has led to overlapping which is confusing and wasteful, and has underscored the vital need for unified direction and operational use of combatant forces. (page 6392)

This desire for greater flexibility on the part of the Secretary of Defense in order to avoid duplication and overlapping ran counter to congressional interest in maintaining control over the assignment of Service roles and missions. Congressman Rivers stated the basic issue during the House Armed Services Committee hearings on the 1958 legislation:

> The more executive authority we put in one man, the less constitutional-mandated authority we retain for ourselves. (page 6216)

The result of this debate was the compromise embodied in current law. For the first time, the Secretary of Defense was given explicit authority to change combatant functions, but this new authority was made subject to congressional review and veto.

Despite this congressional obstacle, the Secretary of Defense has substantial discretion, in theory, over the assignment of more detailed roles and missions to the Services as long as he does not violate the general statements of Service roles and missions prescribed in various sections of title 10, United States Code. In practice, Secretaries of Defense have avoided roles and missions controversies because they apparently believe that Service opposition will be translated into congressional opposition. In his book, *On Watch*, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Retired) confirms that this belief has led to inaction by the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Zumwalt had proposed that at least some Air Force aircraft should be required to be capable of operating from aircraft carriers. He relates the outcome of his effort after failing at the Military Department level:

> ...I then went to Melvin Laird and his deputy David Packard and urged that they get it done. Both of them thought it was a good idea, yet both declined to touch it. Their reason was probably a good one, that the Congress and its lobbies would not permit it, and a jurisdictional wrangle would hurt the Defense budget. (page 70)

(2) Desire of the Services to Avoid Reconsideration of Controversial Roles and Missions Issues

In the immediate post-World War II period, the Services were unable to reach agreement on the assignment of roles and missions. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was forced to intercede and forge the necessary (although general) compromises. The intensity of interservice conflict and suspicion during this period was so great that the Services have made every effort to keep roles and missions issues dormant. In *The Common Defense*, Samuel P. Huntington remarked of this period:

> ...The years from the beginning of the struggle over unification in 1944 until the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 stand out in American military history as a high-water mark of interservice competition. The issues at stake were vital to the services; the means employed were varied; the intensity and passion of the debate were unprecedented. (page 369)

The Services have been successful in avoiding roles and missions issues. Unless substantial pressure is exerted on the Services to reexamine these assignments, they will not, as a general rule, volunteer to address them. Admiral Zumwalt found this to be the case. During June 1971, he wrote to Admiral Moorer, then JCS Chairman, proposing reconsideration of roles and missions assignments:

> ...The current fiscal and domestic political climate makes it more and more important that we break away from rigid boundaries established by traditional service roles and missions. To a limited degree, this has already begun. Examples are cooperation in ocean surveillance and the USAF mining role. These represent a beginning—much more can be done; for example, the Air Force can contribute to ASW and to the Navy's sea control requirements (both of which are essential to providing the logistics for deployed tactical AF units). What makes each service avoid this kind of thinking is that if accept-

ed, it may result in de facto alteration of relative funding profiles. (*On Watch*, page 71)

The outcome, in the words of Admiral Zumwalt, was that:

> ...the problem was put in the "too hard to" file. (page 71)

While this study project has not attempted to conduct an indepth analysis of the present assignment of the roles and missions of the Services, it appears that a comprehensive analysis of present day requirements, capabilities, and roles and missions is as necessary to ensuring an optimal national defense structure as is the study of any other set of relationships in the U.S. military establishment.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

Possible solutions to the problem areas of the Military Departments are described in this section. The options presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, the implementation of one option would preclude the implementation of other options; in other cases, several options could be implemented.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1—CONFUSION CONCERNING THE ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES

The Service Secretaries currently play a limited and confusing role in the management of the U.S. defense effort. In response to this unsatisfactory situation, two broad approaches are possible: (1) abolish the three Military Departments and three Service Secretary positions while retaining the four-Service structure of DoD; and (2) clarify the roles of the Service Secretaries and their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Within these two broad categories, a total of ten options have been developed.

a. abolish the three Military Departments and three Service Secretary positions

If one believed that the position of Service Secretary were no longer needed or that its disadvantages were greater than its advantages, two options are possible: (1) make each Service Chief the senior official responsible for organizing, manning, equipping, supplying, and training Service forces and have him report directly to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These options are based on the view that integration of Service capabilities cannot be attained so long as three separate Military Departments—each headed by a relatively independent Secretary—continue to exist, or that integration of Service capabilities can only be attained if senior members of the staff of the Secretary of Defense, having an integration mission and owing no duty to the separate Services, exercise direction and control over them.

- ○ Option 1A —have the four Service Chiefs report directly to the Secretary of Defense

This option was recommended by the Committee on the Defense Establishment, headed by Senator Stuart Symington, whose report was submitted to President-Elect Kennedy on December 5, 1960. The Symington Committee Report recommended:

> ...the elimination of the present departmental structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force, but would preserve the military Services as separate organic units within a single Defense Department. Such a step would do away with the present departmental Service Secretaries and their Under and Assistant Secretaries, fifteen in all. (page 7)

In line with this recommendation, this option envisions the abolition of the three Military Departments, Service Secretaries, and Secretariats. The four Service Chiefs would become the senior officials responsible for organizing, manning, equipping, supplying, and training Service forces. The four Service Chiefs would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

- ○ Option 1B —create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force

This option envisions the abolition of the three Military Departments and the three Service Secretaries. The three Secretariats would be substantially reduced in size and transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Within OSD, these Service-oriented offices would each be headed by an Under Secretary of Defense. This option was studied, although not recommended, by the *Departmental Headquarters Study*. In commenting on this option, the *Departmental Headquarters Study* stated:

> ...Proponents of this concept have more in mind than merely a change in titles; what is intended is a single level of civilian authority with designated civilians in OSD responsible for overseeing the operations of the Military Services. (page 39)

b. clarify the roles of the Service Secretaries and their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense

The options developed within this broad category are based upon the premise that the Service Secretaries can make important contributions to defense management if confusion about their roles can be clarified.

- ○ Option 1C —specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense

The responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense are stated in very general terms in title 10, United States Code. Each Service Secretary's responsibilities are stated in an identical sentence in three separate sections of law:

> ...The Secretary [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force]. (sections 3012, 5031, and 8012)

Given that Service Secretaries have failed to balance their Service advocate roles with their roles as principal assistants to the Secretary of Defense, it appears that it might be useful to more precisely specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense. This option proposes appropriate revisions to title 10, United States Code, based at least upon the following principles:

- beyond their roles of heads of Military Departments, the Service Secretaries are officials of the Department of Defense as a whole;
- as such, Service Secretaries should ensure that the policies and programs of their Departments are consistent with broad national security policy and the resource allocation needs of DoD;
- the Service Secretaries are the principal assistants of the Secretary of Defense in the formulation and execution of the resource allocation process;
- the Service Secretaries are responsible for ensuring that decisions of higher civilian authority are implemented by the Military Departments.

- Option 1D —remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries

This option is based on the belief that the present statutory descriptions of roles and authorities contain unnecessary distinctions among the Service Secretaries and that such inconsistencies promote uncertainty in terms of their authority and responsibility. In particular, the specific responsibilities of the Secretary of the Navy to the President appear to be an anachronism that would be eliminated under this option.

- Option 1E —repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress

The three sections of title 10, United States Code, dealing with the powers and duties of the Service Secretaries contain the following provision:

> ...After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Army, Navy, or Air Force] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate. (sections 3012, 5031, and 8012)

This option would repeal this authority. Such action would be based on the belief that this statutory authority contradicts the role of the Service Secretary as a subordinate of the Secretary of Defense and the President, permits the Military Departments to operate outside of the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and even if not exercised, creates uncertainty about the Secretary of Defense's authority to control the Military Departments.

- Option 1F —give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries

Article II of the Constitution of the United States provides authority for the Congress to vest appointment powers in officials other than the President. The pertinent portion of Article II is:

> He [the President]...by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: *but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-*

> *ferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.* (emphasis added)

This option would exercise congressional authority to vest appointment power in the Head of a Department, in this instance, the Secretary of Defense.

This option is designed to ensure that the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to other Executive Branch power centers, selects his principal executives and advisors in the Military Departments, the Service Secretaries. This option is based upon the premise that the Secretary of Defense is more knowledgeable than anyone else in evaluating the qualifications of prospective candidates and more capable of identifying his management needs. This option also recognizes the importance of the Secretary of Defense having a "team" management approach comprised of individuals who will owe their loyalty to him. Only in this way can the Secretary of Defense be confident that his policies will be faithfully executed, particularly with the diffused authority that exists in the Department of Defense. As a last point, this option would likely give the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in the removal of Service Secretaries who, for whatever reason, were unable to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 1G —strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities

If the Secretary of Defense expects to utilize the three Service Secretaries as principal advisors with perspectives and concerns similar to his, he must seek to broaden their vision from relatively narrow Service interests and issues. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense develop a pattern of involvement of Service Secretaries on broad defense issues. This effort could include (1) participation of the Service Secretaries in the strategic planning process; and (2) occasionally, assignment to the Service Secretaries of DoD-wide issues for study, organization, or resolution.

- Option 1H —strengthen the role of the Military Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination

This option is an extension of the concept presented in Option 1G. Given the needs of DoD for improved mission integration, it might be useful to assign to the second-ranking civilian official in each Military Department formal responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination. Among the specific roles that it recommended for Service Under Secretaries, the *Departmental Headquarters Study* proposed that each Under Secretary serve as "Executive for the Service Secretary for multi-service assignments and initiatives." (page 74)

- Option 1I —prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the Service Secretaries

The Service Chiefs circumvent the Service Secretaries on topics which the civilian heads of the Military Departments should be involved by raising issues directly with OSD or through the JCS system. Without the active support of OSD and the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries do not have an effective means of curtailing this disruptive practice. This option proposes that the Secretary of Defense carefully monitor such efforts and bring them to an end. The Secretary of Defense will need to establish guidelines on actions he finds undesirable. Forceful action against any violations should help end such efforts and restore the authority of Service Secretaries.

- Option 1J —remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

Chapter 4 concerning the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops two options that would remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice. Arguments for such actions are presented in detail in that chapter. This option is presented here in recognition of its contribution to clarifying and strengthening the role of the Service Secretaries. Specifically, as John Kester notes, removing a Service Chief from the JCS system would "make him and the military staff more dependent on, and therefore more responsive to, the service secretary." ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 163) In essence, this option would seek to restore the Secretary-Chief alliance that provided effective civilian control and management in the War Department prior to and during World War II.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

The most forceful options to correct the problem of unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments involve either full or partial integration of the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. There is also the possibility that this problem could be lessened by unilateral reductions in the size of the military headquarters staffs.

- Option 2A —fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy

This option proposes an across-the-board merger of the Army and Air Force Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. The single integrated staffs would serve both the Secretary and Chief of Staff in the Army and Air Force. The dual-Service structure of the Department of the Navy precludes full integration of the Secretariat and the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters staffs. The Navy Secretariat continues to be necessary as a separate organization providing overall management of the department. Despite the continuing requirement for a Navy Secretariat, there appear to be opportunities for partial integration of the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel appeared to be proposing this option when it recommended:

> ...The Secretariats and Service staffs should be integrated to the extent necessary to eliminate duplication...A study of the present staffs indicates that the Secretariats and Service staffs

combined should total no more than 2,000 people for each Department. (page 42)

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* made three recommendations concerning selective integration of the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs. Specifically, it proposed to:

- conduct the manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics functions only in the military headquarters staffs in support of both the Service Secretary and Chief;
- integrate the research and development staffs of the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs under a Service assistant secretary; and
- provide common access for both the Service Secretary and Chief to the systems analysis, inspector general, and audit service capabilities.

While this option includes these three recommendations for the Army and Air Force, it goes beyond the theme of selective integration and proposes fully integrated top management headquarters staffs for these two Military Departments. For the Department of the Navy, only the first of the three recommendations of the *Departmental Headquarters Study* is included in this option.

Under this proposal, each Military Department would be authorized a civilian secretary and under secretary, two civilian assistant secretaries (one for financial management and one for research, development, and acquisition), and a civilian general counsel. All other functional offices would be headed by a military officer. The Service Secretary and Under Secretary would be assisted by an executive office of not more than 25 personnel to be organized as they deem appropriate.

In the following paragraphs, specific proposals to integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are presented. These proposals—despite the detail in which they are portrayed—are provided only for illustrative purposes. They represent only one of many possible schemes of integrating these staffs. Accordingly, they should not be considered recommended courses of action. Their purposes are solely to: (1) demonstrate that the concept of an integrated staff is a valid alternative; (2) serve as a starting point for efforts to design a more logical integrated staff; and (3) identify for the Congress the underlying principles to be addressed in legislation.

a. Department of the Army

At present, 13 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army and 25 senior military officials in the Army Staff report to the Chief of Staff, Vice Chief, and Director of the Army Staff. While integration of the two staffs would eliminate some of these officials, a general streamlining of the integrated staff would be necessary to permit effective management by the Secretary and Chief of Staff.

CHART 6 – 11

TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY COUNCIL
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
SERGEANT MAJOR
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INFORMATION MANAGEMENT)
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
GENERAL COUNSEL
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (OPERATIONS AND PLANS)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PERSONNEL)
THE SURGEON GENERAL
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION)
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

Chart 6-11 presents an illustrative proposal for integrating the Army Secretariat and military headquarters staff. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

—three Assistant Secretary positions would be eliminated: Civil Works, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Installations and Logistics;

—the two Deputy Under Secretary positions would be eliminated;

—the position of Administrative Assistant to the Secretary would be eliminated;

—the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition would be eliminated;

—the Comptroller of the Army and the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Chief of Staff;

—the Assistant Chief of Staff (Information Management) and Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Chief of Staff and Secretary respectively;

—the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Chief of Staff;

—the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) instead of the Chief of Staff;

—the Surgeon General, the Adjutant General, and the Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel) instead of the Chief of Staff;

—the title of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) would be changed to Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations and Logistics) to reflect sole responsibility for the installations function; and

—a new position of Assistant Chief of Staff (Program Analysis and Evaluation) would be created to replace the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate in the Office of the Chief of Staff.

b. Department of the Navy

At present, 12 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat report directly to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy. Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 23 senior military officials report to the Chief, Vice Chief, and Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Within Headquarters, Marine Corps, 23 senior civilian and military officials report to the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and Chief of Staff. Beyond partial integration of the Secretariat and the military headquarters staffs, some streamlining of these organizations will be necessary to permit effective management.

CHART 6 – 12

TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY


SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
COMPTROLLER OF THE NAVY
FISCAL DIRECTOR OF THE MARINE CORPS
THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, ENGINEERING & SYSTEMS)
CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH
GENERAL COUNSEL
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NAVAL PROGRAM INTEGRATION
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
CHIEF OF INFORMATION
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
VICE CHIEF
ASST. VICE CHIEF
DCNO (MANPOWER, PERSONNEL & TRAINING)
DIRECTOR, NAVAL MEDICINE
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
DCNO (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, & EVALUATION)
DIRECTOR, COMMAND & CONTROL
DCNO (PLANS, POLICY & OPERATIONS)
DIRECTOR, NAVAL WARFARE
DIRECTOR, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DCNO (PROGRAM PLANNING)
ACNO (AIR WARFARE)
ACNO (SURFACE WARFARE)
ACNO (SUBMARINE WARFARE)
DCNO (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)
DCNO (SHIPBUILDING)
DIRECTOR, NAVAL RESERVE
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
CHIEF OF STAFF
DEFUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (MANPOWER)
ASST. DCS (TRAINING)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, & STUDIES)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS, POLICIES, & OPERATIONS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (REQUIREMENTS & PROGRAMS)
ASST. DCS (AVIATION)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS & LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (RESERVE AFFAIRS)

Chart 6-12 presents an illustrative proposal for partially integrating the Navy Secretariat, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Headquarters, Marine Corps. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

—the positions of Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Assistant Secretary (Shipbuilding and Logistics) would be eliminated;

—the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Secretary;

—the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Commandant of the Marine Corps;

—the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Secretary;

—the Office of Program Appraisal would be retitled the Office of Naval Program Integration and would assume responsibility for ensuring that Navy and Marine Corps programs are consistent and complementary;

—the Inspector General would report to the Secretary instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;

—the Director of Naval Medicine and the Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, and Training) instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;

—the Director of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation would be retitled the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation);

—the Director of Space, Command and Control would report to the new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation) instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;

—the Director of Naval Warfare and the Director of Naval Intelligence would report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) instead of the Chief of Naval Operations;

—the position of Director of Naval Program Planning would be retitled Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Program Planning);

—the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, and Submarine Warfare would be retitled Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations and report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Program Planning);

—the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) would be retitled to include the installations function;

—the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Shipbuilding) would be established;

—the Deputy Chief of Staff (Training) of the Marine Corps would be retitled Assistant Chief of Staff and would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower) instead of the Commandant; and

—the Deputy Chief of Staff (Aviation) of the Marine Corps would be retitled Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff and would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Requirements and Programs) instead of the Commandant.

c. Department of the Air Force

At the present time, the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Air Force have 12 senior civilian and military officials in the Secretariat who report directly to them. Within the Air Staff, the Chief, Vice Chief, and Assistant Vice Chief of Staff have 21 senior civilian and military officials reporting directly to them. Given the management problems associated with such wide spans of control, the integration of the two staffs should also focus on streamlining the organization.

CHART 6 – 13

TOP MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE


SECRETARY
UNDER SECRETARY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
1947 HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF
ASST. VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE
THE AUDITOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION)
CHIEF SCIENTIST
USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INFORMATION SYSTEMS)
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS UTILIZATION
GENERAL COUNSEL
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PLANS & OPERATIONS)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (INTELLIGENCE)
CHIEF, OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (MANPOWER & PERSONNEL)
THE SURGEON GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS, & ENGINEERING)
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (PROGRAMS & RESOURCES)
ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF (STUDIES & ANALYSES)
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPACE SYSTEMS
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE RESERVE

Chart 6-13 presents an illustrative proposal for integrating the Air Force Secretariat and military headquarters staff. The major changes reflected in this chart are:

- —the position of Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations) would be eliminated;
- —the position of Deputy Chief of Staff (Research, Development, and Acquisition) would be eliminated;
- —the position of Deputy Under Secretary (Space Systems) would be eliminated;
- —the position of Special Assistant (International Affairs) would be eliminated;
- —the position of Administrative Assistant to the Secretary would be eliminated;
- —the Comptroller of the Air Force would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Chief of Staff;
- —the Auditor General would report to the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) instead of the Secretary;
- —the title of the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Logistics) would be changed to Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) to reflect the loss of the logistics function and responsibility for the acquisition function;
- —the Chief Scientist, USAF Scientific Advisory Board, and Assistant Chief of Staff (Information Systems) would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Chief of Staff;
- —the Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization would report to the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition) instead of the Secretary;
- —the Judge Advocate General would report to the General Counsel instead of the Chief of Staff;
- —the Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence) and the Chief of the Office of Air Force History would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Operations) instead of the Chief of Staff;
- —the Surgeon General and Chief of Chaplains would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Personnel) instead of the Chief of Staff; and
- —the title of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics and Engineering) would be changed to Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations, Logistics, and Engineering) to reflect sole responsibility for the installations function.

○ Option 2B —selectively integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs

This option differs from Option 2A in that it would integrate the Secretariats and military staffs in only four functional areas: manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics. Officials and offices in the Secretariats dealing with these four areas would be eliminated, and the Secretary and Chief would depend on the same offices, headed by a military officer, for staff assistance.

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* included this option as one of its recommendations for the Military Departments:

> ...As a start toward reducing staff layers and individual staff components, authorize the Service Secretaries to eliminate their Assistant Secretaries for the Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics functions, placing reliance for conduct of these functions on the respective Service Chiefs and on the OSD staffs in the two functional areas. (pages 74 and 75)

For the Department of the Navy, the organizational changes proposed in this option are identical to those proposed in Option 2A. However, for the Department of the Army and Air Force, the staff integration proposed in this option is considerably less extensive than in Option 2A. The specific changes resulting from this selective staff integration in the Departments of the Army and Air Force are discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. Department of the Army

Under this option, the Army Secretariat would continue to exist. The number of assistant secretaries, however, would be reduced from five to three. The positions and offices of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics) would be eliminated. The Secretary and Chief of Staff would receive their staff support in these functional areas from the same offices, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel) and the retitled Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations and Logistics). While no offices in the Army Staff would be abolished or created under this option, it might be desirable to make a number of the streamlining changes proposed in Option 2A for the Army Staff as well as for the Secretariat.

b. Department of the Air Force

Under this option, the Air Force Secretariat would continue to exist. The number of assistant secretaries, however, would be reduced from three to two. The position and office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations) would be eliminated. In addition, the Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Logistics) would lose responsibility for the logistics function; accordingly, this position would be retitled Assistant Secretary (Research, Development, and Acquisition). The Secretary and Chief of Staff would receive their staff support in the manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics functions from the same offices, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Personnel) and the retitled Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations, Logistics, and Engineering). While no offices in the Air Staff would be abolished or created under this option, it might be desirable to make a number of the streamlining changes proposed in Option 2A for the Air Staff as well as for the Secretariat.

- Option 2C —reduce the size of the Service military headquarters staffs

Options 2A and 2B would have the impact of eliminating or reducing the size of the Service Secretariats. If it is determined that such actions are not desirable, it may be possible as an alternative to reduce the size of the Service military headquarters staffs. This option proposes that additional reductions be made in the personnel strengths of each Service military headquarters staff. The focus would be on those personnel who are unnecessarily duplicating work performed in the Secretariats, elsewhere in the Military Departments, or in other DoD organizations. For example, Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes a reduction of about 200 military officers in each Military Department who are assigned either full—or part-time to work on joint issues. In this regard, if the Service Chiefs are removed from the institution that provides unified military advice, the need for the operations, plans, and policy staffs in the military headquarters staffs should be reevaluated.

The *Departmental Headquarters Study* included a recommendation to reduce the size of the military headquarters staffs:

> ...Encourage a continuation of the effort already underway to reduce headquarters military staffs by greater dependence on subordinate commands, particularly in the materiel area. (pages 78 and 79)

3. PROBLEM AREA #3 —INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

The problem of inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions affects all three Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The options developed in Chapter 3 dealing with this problem area in OSD can also be applied to the Service Secretariats. Three options appear to be most appropriate:

- require that political appointees have strong defense management credentials;
- require a longer commitment of service from political appointees; and
- formulate monetary incentives or lessen the monetary disadvantages for political appointees.

As these options are described and evaluated in sufficient detail in Chapter 3, they will not be addressed here.

There is one area where political appointments in the Service Secretaries differ from those in OSD: their generally unfavorable perception. Many of the options proposed for problem area #1 relating to the confusion over the roles of the Service Secretaries would improve understanding of the importance of Secretariat positions, especially the Service Secretary. However, given the seriousness of this deficiency, a specific option is presented here.

A second option is presented that would give each Service Secretary increased authority in the selection of political appointees in his Secretariat. Such a proposal is designed to ensure that the Secretary would be able to insist upon high quality assistants who would be responsive to his leadership.

- Option 3A —correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the Military Departments

Administrations will continue to have difficulty in recruiting talented and experienced civilian officials for appointments in the

Military Departments if the perception persists that these positions are not important. This option proposes a concerted effort to correct this negative perception. The best possible means of implementing this option is a change in the behavior patterns of the President, Secretary of Defense, and senior OSD officials. As long as these officials act as if Service appointments are not important, others will share this view.

- Option 3B —give the Service Secretaries authority to appoint their under and assistant secretaries

This option is designed to help insulate the selection of political appointees in the Military Departments from excessive political considerations. A Service Secretary could increase the weight given to the qualifications and defense management credentials of various candidates. In addition, the Service Secretary would have a greater capacity to ensure that his principal assistants would be supportive of him and not oriented to a separate agenda. Moreover, the Service Secretary would be more likely to have available the advice and expertise that he believes will be needed in the performance of his duties.

4. PROBLEM AREA #4 —LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

As noted in Section D of this chapter, this study has not attempted to conduct a detailed analysis of the present roles and missions assigned to the four Services. However, there have been suggestions that those assignments should be completely reviewed, that effective mechanisms for changes to roles and missions assignments be developed, and that the statutory impediments to the authority of the Secretary of Defense to change those assignments be repealed. Each of these suggestions has been developed into an option.

- Option 4A —require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions

Given the reluctance of the Services to address roles and missions issues, this option would force a comprehensive review of these assignments. This report would, at a minimum, provide for the updating of the Key West Agreement.

- Option 4B —require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions

This option would seek to institutionalize a continuing review of Service roles and missions that would identify at an early stage needed changes in such assignments. This report may correct the current deficiency of relying solely on the budgetary process as a means of identifying roles and missions changes. In preparing this report, the JCS Chairman should consider the impact of changes in the threat, technology, weapon systems, strategy, and tactics on the assignment of Service roles and missions.

- Option 4C —authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles and missions

This option would revise section 125 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense, following presidential approval, to alter the assignment of roles and missions to the four Services.

F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the Military Departments that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

1. Options for Dealing With the Problem of Confusion Concerning the Roles of Service Secretaries

The fundamental issue in evaluating options to solve this problem area is whether the Service Secretaries can play a useful role in the management of the U.S. defense effort and, therefore, continue to be needed. In other terms, the issue can be stated as whether the Service Secretaries are assets or liabilities to the Secretary of Defense in his efforts to manage DoD. Too frequently, the Secretary of Defense is likely to have viewed the Service Secretaries more as liabilities. The heavy emphasis that Service Secretaries have placed on their roles as advocates has added to the Secretary of Defense's problems. This has been especially true when Service Secretaries have used their independent political standing to vigorously pursue Service interests in external fora. Often the Secretary of Defense has been confronted with Service Secretaries who have sought to advance their personal agenda. Moreover, Service Secretaries have rarely brought substantial expertise to their positions. As a last point, the Secretaries of the Military Departments have been playing a diminished role in providing civilian control of the military.

Despite these shortcomings in past performance, there appears to be substantial potential in the positions of Service Secretary for meaningful contributions to DoD management. As Colonel Daleski has noted:

> Compelling as this case against the Service Secretaries may be, it is not conclusive. Several factors suggest a more positive view of the Secretaries and their potential contribution to defense management. Despite frequent DoD reorganizations, which have indeed diminished the Service Secretary's legal authority, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary's ability to contribute meaningfully to defense management has thereby been irreparably impaired. (*Defense Management in the 1980's*, page 17)

The Service Secretary can play a useful role in five areas: (1) civilian control of the military; (2) essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily management of his Department; (4) political spokesman for the needs of his Department; and (5) salesman within his Department of the decisions of higher civilian authority.

a. civilian control of the military

Efforts to provide for civilian control of the military appear to be most effectively pursued on a decentralized basis. The Service Secretary is uniquely positioned to provide civilian control. Alternative arrangements require a greater degree of centralization which is likely to be less effective. Colonel Daleski supports this view:

> ...Service Secretaries continue to enhance civilian control because they and their staffs are uniquely situated to exercise civilian oversight on military departmental programs. As heads of departments, Secretaries alone can possess the requisite independence, authority, credentials and intimate knowledge of operating programs to assure that departmental activities are conducted in the public interest. (*Defense Management in the 1980s: The Role of the Service Secretary*, page 18)

John Kester agrees:

> ...the service secretary also is a unique engine of civilian control—a slippery term that is invariably saluted but seldom defined. If civilian control refers to civilian appointees making the ultimate program and budget decisions, and being the ultimate command authority, we unquestionably have that now—but it comes from the secretary of defense, and does not require the service secretaries. There is another aspect of civilian control, however, which the secretary of defense, busy and distant as he is, can never hope to provide: it is a qualitative check on the way each service runs itself, and an authority that the service knows will step in if corruption, blundering or excessive zeal start to veer the service off the reasonably wide road that the larger society tolerates. The civilian secretary can provide someone close enough to the service to have some idea what is going on and who in holding the service to external standards can do so with sensitivity to and sympathy for the traditions and values that give the service its identity. It is the service secretaries who help pick up the pieces when the system has gone off the track—cheating at service academies, misconduct in training, corruption in a PX system, mistreatment of recruits, My Lai. At the same time they may be able to hold off short-term press or congressional pressure while the service tries to heal itself. This sort of qualitative control and special monitoring can never adequately come from the Secretary of Defense's office, which is both too distant and too little involved in the unique values and personality of each service itself. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 156)

A report of the House Committee on Government Operations presents a similar view:

> It is not sufficient to say that civilian interests are protected by the Secretary of Defense or the President himself. The interests of the country require civilian leadership, including ci-

> vilian secretaries, at as many key points in the military organization as is possible. (*Access of Service Secretaries*, page 11)

b. essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals

As the "man in the middle", the Service Secretary has a special perspective that may be of great assistance to the Secretary of Defense in the resource allocation process. The Service Secretary can serve as the essential link between detailed Service programs, with which he is more familiar than the Secretary of Defense and his staff, and broader DoD policy and strategy goals. John Kester speaks about the essential link provided by the Service Secretary when he discusses the role of the Service Secretary in

> ...making sure that the service's activities fit into the Department of Defense as a whole and the national strategy. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 155)

and in being

> ...able to fit the positions he advocates into the larger defense programs and policies with which the secretary of defense is concerned. (page 159)

In his article, "The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Retired) comments on a role of the Service Secretary during Secretary McNamara's tenure:

> ...The service secretary emerged not as a special pleader for a service viewpoint, not self-identified with service programs, but with a special perspective in coordinating Defense policy which could not be fulfilled by an Assistant SecDef [Secretary of Defense]. He advises the Secretary of Defense and serves as an intelligent advocate of service interests at the Defense [OSD] level...
>
> ...the service secretary is able to preserve his own unique perspective, serving as an effective check on both the Defense [OSD] and military [Service] views. (*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, page 24)

c. daily departmental management

In addition to enhancing civilian control, the unique position of the Service Secretary enables him to effectively manage the daily activities of his Department. As Eugene M. Zuckert notes:

> ...the Service Secretary...fulfills a managerial responsibility at precisely that middle level which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the Department of Defense as now constituted. ("The Service Secretary: Has He A Useful Role?", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1966, page 458)

The Department of Defense is too large and complex to be managed solely from the top. The details of daily management of the major components are too great to be effectively handled by any central staff. Such management responsibilities must be decentralized. The Service Secretary is the logical official to fulfill this management need.

d. political spokesman

The Service Secretary also has an important role as political spokesman for his Department. The Secretary of a Military Department can insulate the military Service leaders from politics. As John Kester argues:

> ...tasks, that reek of politics, are not appropriately imposed on someone in uniform. The civilian secretary can spare his uniformed officers the indignity of having to mix in them. He protects his service from political pressures that without him it is not equipped to handle...("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 154)

The Service Secretary can represent the programs and policies of his Department with the Congress and the public. Given the economic and political dimensions of defending Service positions in these fora, the Secretary is a more appropriate spokesman than the Service Chief. In addition, by fulfilling this role, the Service Secretary removes an enormous burden from the Secretary of Defense.

As part of this role, the Service Secretary should absorb outside political heat—especially from the Congress—and barbs from the media and thereby deflect these burdens from the Secretary of Defense. The Service Secretary should also be prepared to handle the majority of congressional investigations, only involving the Secretary of Defense when absolutely necessary.

e. salesman within the Military Department of the decisions of higher civilian authority

As a member of the Service "family", the Service Secretary can be effective salesman of decisions by higher authority. As an insider in the Service system, the Secretary's influence in obtaining a favorable Service response—even to decisions that vary from strongly held Service positions—is likely to be greater than that of any other senior civilian official. If he skillfully performs this duty, the Service Secretary will provide valuable assistance to the Secretary of Defense. John Kester comments on this role:

> ...The secretary of defense is too far removed to press the services to overcome reluctance to adopt or implement necessary new policies; the service secretaries can insist that they follow through. ("Do We Need the Service Secretary?", page 154)

He also discusses another dimension of this role:

> ...The service secretary is also needed to soothe inevitable service program and budget disappointments; because the Defense budget each year is the resultant of political bargaining as well as of the external threat, the services never will receive as much as they think they should have. The service secretary should be a political buffer to help them swallow it. (page 160)

In combination, these five roles suggest a range of potentially important contributions by Service Secretaries. Moreover, it is difficult to envision alternative organizational arrangements that would have greater management potential. As Colonel Daleski notes:

> ...these contributions are available *only* through Service Secretaries. There are simply no alternatives to the Service secretarial role in enhancing civilian control and in making defense management more efficient and responsive. (*Defense Management in the 1980s*, page 17)

- ○ Option 1A —have the four Service Chiefs report directly to the Secretary of Defense

This option has the advantage of eliminating one of the two layers—the Secretariat—in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments. It would also enable senior military officials to more directly and forcefully argue the Service point of view with the Secretary of Defense and his key assistants.

This option, however, has a number of critical drawbacks. Key among these is its adverse impact on civilian control of the military. Under this option, the Secretary of Defense would have sole responsibility for providing civilian control. The breadth of this task is too great to be effectively performed by one official.

The second drawback is the absence of a civilian input in the formulation of Service programs and policies. While military perspectives have an important role, the complexity of defense issues requires broad consideration of economic, political, and diplomatic factors. The absence of a Service Secretary and Secretariat diminish the prospects that this broader perspective would receive the attention that it deserves.

- ○ Option 1B —create Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force

The principal advantage of this option is that it would likely provide senior civilian officials responsible for Service matters who are substantially attuned to the perspective, agenda, and needs of the Secretary of Defense. Such officials would appear to be more capable of striking a balance between the roles of Service advocate and principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

This option also has the apparent advantage of eliminating one of the three layers—OSD, Service Secretariat, and Service military headquarters staff—in DoD management. However, it is not clear that this would be the result. While the Service Secretariat would essentially be transferred to OSD, giving the appearance of one management layer, OSD could in practice continue two separate layers of management activity.

This option has a number of serious deficiencies. Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy, and Air Force would not be as capable as Service Secretaries in performing the five key roles discussed earlier in this subsection: (1) civilian control; (2) essential link between detailed Service programs and broader DoD policy and strategy goals; (3) daily departmental management; (4) political spokesman; and (5) salesman within the Military Department of decisions by higher civilian authority. In each instance, Under Secretaries of Defense would suffer from their organizational remoteness from the Services. They would be viewed as outsiders, not as members of the Service family. This status would greatly hinder their effectiveness. As Captain Schratz notes:

> The military chief enjoys a special relationship with the [Service] secretary which would hardly emerge were his immediate civilian superior on the Defense [OSD] staff. "The system" may make the DoD official too often a natural adversary...("The Role of the Service Secretary in the National Security Organization," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, page 24)

Beyond these deficiencies, the transfer of Service Secretaries' responsibilities to Under Secretaries of Defense would be a downgrading of these positions. As a result, it would likely be more difficult to attract highly talented and experienced people to these positions.

- Option 1C —specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense

If the positions of Service Secretary are to be retained, this option appears to be highly desirable. One of the deficiencies that has been perceived in the performance of the Service Secretaries is their failure to recognize and to fulfill their responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Specifying these responsibilities in statute may lessen this problem. In any case, no disadvantages of this option have been identified.

- Option 1D —remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries

At present, there is no clear basis in law for determining the proper roles of Service Secretaries. Moreover, there are conflicting authorities in existing law. The inability to determine what it is that a Service Secretary is to do results partially from the failure of the statutes describing the position to do so clearly. This is compounded further by a failure to update the existing statutes so that the duties and responsibilities of the Service Secretaries are internally consistent. There is no evidence to indicate that the scope of authority of the three Service Secretaries should differ, except as they relate to functions that exist in only one Military Department. This option does not imply the need for a laundry-list of duties. Rather, it recognizes the need for a clear statement of responsibility and for removing inconsistent responsibilities.

The present inconsistencies and unclear descriptions of the duties and authorities of the Service Secretaries, especially as they relate to the roles of other DoD officials, make the fixing of accountability difficult. Merely bringing the authorizing statutes into conformance with each other will not result in immediate changes in the way the position of Service Secretary is viewed. However, it should remove one impediment to a clear understanding of the roles of the Service Secretary.

No disadvantages of this option have been identified.

- Option 1E —repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress

The authority of the Service Secretaries to make recommendations to the Congress on their own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, appears to be wholly inconsistent with the subordinate role of the Service Secretary. This essentially unlimited authority appears to be unlike any other in the Federal Government. The Senate Committee on Armed Services has supported abolition of this authority on two separate occasions, and apparently nothing has changed since either of these attempts. This authority has rarely, if ever, been exercised, and it may not be serving the Congress well. Yet, at the same time, the mere existence of this authority, permitting subordinate officials to bypass the President and the Secretary of Defense, clouds the lines of authority and responsibility.

The time has long passed when the Congress and the public can continue to treat the three parts (the Military Departments) of the whole (the Department of Defense) as independent and non-contiguous institutions, or to permit the senior officials of those parts to operate as plenipotentiaries. It must be recognized that each action by a Military Department or a Service Secretary has some effect on the other Military Departments and the Department of Defense as a whole. It is rarely helpful and virtually never appropriate that subordinate officials be permitted to bypass superiors to go to higher authority when such actions will effect the entire organization for which the superior officer is charged with responsibility.

In short, it appears that this authority could be abolished without the Congress losing its ability to get needed information. Such a change should help clarify the relationships of Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense.

- ○ Option 1F —give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries

The Congress has the authority under the Constitution to vest the Secretary of Defense with appointment power for the positions of Service Secretary. This change in appointment power would strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the President.

Historically, the process by which Service Secretaries are selected has given limited attention to (1) the qualifications of candidates; (2) the management needs of the Secretary of Defense; and (3) the value of forming a management team of Service Secretaries who are compatible with and loyal to the Secretary of Defense. Inattention to these factors has greatly diminished the assistance that Service Secretaries have provided to the Secretary of Defense in managing DoD.

This option clearly offers the potential for correcting shortcomings in the selection of Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense may be able to play a forceful role in the selection of his Service Secretaries.

On the other hand, despite the change in formal authority, there may be no alteration in the location of ultimate decision authority on Service Secretary appointments. Through its personnel office, the White House may continue to dominate the selection process. Given the subordinate position of the Secretary of Defense and his loyalty to the President, it is not likely that the Secretary of Defense could exercise substantial independence in the selection of key political appointees, such as Service Secretaries. Notwithstanding this possibility, this option may increase the influence that the Secretary of Defense could exert in this process.

Presidents are likely to oppose the loss of this appointment power. Their ability to make appointments to serve their interests—whatever they may be—would be constrained. Moreover, Presidents may lose the ability to establish a system of checks and balances within DoD that would prevent any one official—the Secretary of Defense most likely—from gaining too much power. The President would want to avoid a situation in which a Secretary of Defense develops a constituency that makes him unresponsive to presidential leadership.

The most persuasive argument against this option from the congressional perspective is that the requirement of Senate confirmation of Service Secretaries would be foregone if these appointments were vested in the Secretary of Defense. Article II of the Constitution provides for Senate confirmation only for officials appointed by the President and would not apply to non-presidential appointments. In his paper, "Senate Confirmation of Non-Presidential Appointments", Richard C. Ehlke argues:

> The explicit terms of Article II with respect to the appointing power and the separation of powers analysis of the Court in *Buckley v. Valeo* and *INS v. Chadha* would seem to preclude attaching the requirement of Senate confirmation to appointments vested in the heads of agencies. The Court in *Buckley* and *Chadha* strictly interpreted provisions in the Constitution that delineated the respective roles of the Congress and the Executive in important governmental processes —the appointment of officers and the making of law. Deviations from those explicit constitutionally—prescribed procedures have been struck down by the Court in unequivocal terms in both *Buckley* and *Chadha*. (page CRS-6)

Given the importance of the Service Secretary positions, it is highly unlikely that the Senate would view the loss of the confirmation requirement for these positions to be in the public interest. In addition, the prestige of these positions might be diminished if they were no longer presidential appointments.

- Option 1G —strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities

This option would have the objective of eliminating the common notion that Service Secretaries should simply be advocates of their Services' policies and programs. It may help elevate Service Secretaries to a role of being principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of issues, including those that cross Service lines. This may encourage the perception of the Service Secretaries as DoD managers as well as the heads of the component Military Departments.

On the negative side, if the Service Secretaries were given an expanded role in policymaking and other DoD-wide activities and yet retained a strong orientation to the Service advocate role, they would prove to be obstacles in the search for more effective DoD policies and programs. If Service Secretaries cannot develop a balanced approach to Service and broader DoD interests, then it may be disadvantageous to expand their involvement.

- Option 1H —strengthen the role of the Military Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination

Chapter 3 dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense identifies mission integration as the principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense. In that context, mission integration means the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and to conduct effective unified operations in discharging the major U.S. military missions. Currently, the Military Departments have limited involvement in efforts to provide for effective mission integration.

It would seem useful and appropriate to assign to a senior civilian official in each Military Department formal responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination. Such assignments would improve the visibility and continuity of cooperative efforts.

This appears to be an assignment that could be effectively discharged by Service Under Secretaries. The Under Secretaries have the same perspective as the Service Secretary but have fewer burdens.

On the other hand, one could argue that a greater level of involvement by Service Under Secretaries would complicate the work of OSD officials who are the principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense on mission integration efforts. While OSD officials would need to remain informed of cross-Service efforts initiated at the Military Department level, it would seem preferable to have as many of these issues as possible resolved at the Service level without continuously forcing OSD into a referee role.

- Option 1I —prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the Service Secretaries

This option is clearly desirable. Circumvention of the Service Secretaries by the Service Chiefs undermines the Secretaries' authority and weakens many aspects of civilian management, especially effective civilian control of the military.

- Option 1J —remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice

In the context of clarifying and strengthening the role of the Service Secretaries, this option would be advantageous. As members of the JCS, Service Chiefs have the stature and independence to lessen control by the Service Secretaries.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNNECESSARY STAFF LAYERS AND DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

- Option 2A —fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy

The creation of a single top management headquarters staff in the Departments of the Army and Air Force should substantially reduce unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort. The dual levels of staff review would be eliminated and paperwork reduced. In addition, substantial manpower savings would be possible. In terms of senior positions, the illustrative proposals suggest that six civilian positions and one military position could be eliminated in the Department of the Army; and four civilian positions and one military position, in the Department of the Air Force.

Beyond the benefits of staff integration, the streamlining of the top management headquarters proposed as part of the illustrative proposals of Option 2A should permit more effective management by the Service Secretaries and Chiefs. The integrated Army staff would have only 14 major offices while the integrated Air Force staff would also have only 14 major offices. Presently, the top management headquarters of the Army and Air Force have 35 and 31 major offices respectively.

By far, the greatest advantage of this option is that it provides the Army and Air Force Secretaries the opportunity to exercise effective control over the military component of the headquarters staff. The Secretary and Chief will have equal access to all offices and officials—whether civilian or military. The entire headquarters staff, however, would work under the direction of the Secretary. Civilian control would be particularly enhanced in the financial management and research, development, and acquisition functions through their consolidation under a civilian assistant secretary.

One of the disadvantages of this option is that the authority and responsibilities of the Army and Air Force Secretaries and Chiefs could become confused with an integrated staff. When the Secretary and Chief have their own separate staffs (as they do now), it is easier to delineate the authority and responsibilities of these two officials. In an integrated staff, it must be made absolutely clear that the Service Secretary is the single superior official and the line of authority flows solely from him to every subordinate civilian and military position. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff will no longer preside over the military headquarters staffs as now authorized in title 10, United States Code.

JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, offers four separate, although not distinct, definitions of the term "chief of staff":

- the senior or principal member or head of a staff;
- the principal assistant in a staff capacity to a person in a command capacity;
- the head or controlling member of a staff, for purposes of the coordination of its work;
- a position, which in itself is without inherent power of command by reason of assignment, except that which is invested in such a position by delegation to exercise command in another's name. (page 64)

At present, the Army and Air Force Chiefs have assignments and perform duties that encompass the first, second, and fourth definitions. In the narrow context of the military headquarters staff, they serve as the head of staff (definition 1). In the broader context of the Army and Air Force Departments, they serve as the principal assistant in a staff capacity to the Service Secretary (definition 2) and exercise command delegated by the Secretary (definition 4).

In an integrated staff, the Army and Air Force Chief would no longer qualify as the head of the staff (definition 1); the Service Secretary would unquestionably occupy that role. The Service Chief would assume the responsibilities envisioned in definition 3: controlling member of a staff for purposes of the coordination of its work. In essence, the Army and Air Force Chiefs will become the Chief of Staff of the Service Secretary's staff. (In performing these responsibilities, whether the Army and Air Force Chiefs and Vice Chiefs will need the assistance of the Director of the Army Staff and the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff respectively. It is possible that these two positions could be eliminated.) The Army and Air Force Chiefs would continue to fulfill the roles envisioned by definitions 2 and 4.

The partial integration of the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy would have the same advantages and disadvantages as the full integration of the Army and Air Force staffs, but to a lesser extent.

- Option 2B —selectively integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs

The basic advantage of this option is that it eliminates the dual levels of staff review in four functional areas: manpower, reserve affairs, logistics, and installations. Modest reductions in manpower and paperwork should result.

The disadvantage of this option is that it would continue to permit unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in all other functional areas.

- Option 2C —reduce the size of the Service military headquarters staffs

Given the absence of attention in this study to field command and activities of the four Services, it is not possible to evaluate a proposal to reduce the military headquarters staffs through greater dependence on subordinate organizations. While useful possibilities in this regard may exist, they cannot be identified within the scope of this study.

If proposals to fully or partially integrate the Service Secretariats and military headquarters staffs are not adopted, the only reductions in the military headquarters staffs that are possible within the scope of this study are the elimination or reduction of Service staffs that unnecessarily duplicate or interfere in the work of joint organizations, particularly the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INEXPERIENCED POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND POOR CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE SECRETARIATS

- Option 3A —correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the Military Departments

This option is clearly desirable. There is little that can be done about this in legislation. The President, Secretary of Defense, and other Administration officials must begin to understand the importance of these positions, use these officials more appropriately, and emphasize the need to have highly qualified and experienced appointees.

The Senate could help change perceptions by insisting on nominees with stronger defense management credentials. However, without a change in the behavior patterns of the President and Secretary of Defense, such congressional action is likely to have little impact.

- ○ Option 3B —give the Service Secretaries authority to appoint their under and assistant secretaries

The arguments for and against this option are the same as for Option 1F which would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to appoint Service Secretaries.

In brief, vesting such appointment power in the Service Secretaries would enable them to (1) emphasize the defense management credentials of appointments; (2) select principal assistants who met their management needs; and (3) form a management team of principal assistants who are compatible with and loyal to them.

On the negative side, the loss of this appointment power would diminish the authority of and control by the President. In addition, the requirement for senatorial confirmation would no longer apply to these positions if the appointment power were vested in the Service Secretaries. While the loss of the confirmation requirement for Service under and assistant secretaries would be less critical than for Service Secretaries (as would result from Option 1F), it would have to be carefully weighed by the Congress.

4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMITED UTILITY OF THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF SERVICE ROLES AND MISSIONS AND THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

- ○ Option 4A —require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions

Since enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. military establishment has had considerable difficulty in resolving Service roles and missions disputes. The Key West Agreement laid some basic ground rules, but failed to address the more detailed guidelines for jurisdictional boundaries that are needed. Moreover, mechanisms for change or for addressing new jurisdictional issues arising from new strategies, tactics, or technology have not been available.

This option may or may not force serious study of these long neglected issues. If the officials responsible for preparing and reviewing this report devoted sufficient time and critical attention to the issues, the assignment of Service roles and missions might receive an objective review. If, however, these officials saw this as another congressional reporting requirement to be met with as little energy as possible, nothing would be gained. There is also the possibility that Administration officials would like to avoid the controversy associated with a rigorous review of roles and missions assignments.

- Option 4B —require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions

The absence of mechanisms, other than the budgetary process, for making changes in Service roles and missions is a serious deficiency in DoD management. The sole use of the budget for this purpose is too costly because of the unnecessary duplication that it permits and too inefficient because it is difficult to eliminate duplication that is entrenched in the budget.

This option would provide for a continuous, high-level, joint military review of roles and missions assignments which might permit earlier identification of unnecessary duplication and of more effective alignments of capabilities. In making recommendations for changes, the JCS Chairman would have to be careful that he does not propose the premature curtailment of useful competition.

The JCS Chairman is the most logical DoD official to submit this report. The multi-Service perspective of his position and his substantial military experience would enable him to better analyze these complex issues. Obviously, the JCS Chairman would be able to perform this responsibility more effectively if his independent authority were enhanced as proposed in several options in Chapter 4.

The Secretary of Defense may or may not seek to forcefully implement the recommendations that he receives from the JCS Chairman. Secretaries of Defense have traditionally been reluctant to enter the controversial arena of Service roles and missions. Armed with the JCS Chairman's report, he may be willing to engage the Services on these issues if his fear of congressional opposition were lessened. The Congress can play a useful role by encouraging the Secretary of Defense to act on roles and missions issues.

- Option 4C —authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles and missions

The Executive Branch and the Congress share responsibility for assigning Service roles and missions. For whatever reason, this power-sharing arrangement has inhibited the necessary review and alterations to Service roles and missions. Based upon the actual language, the statutory description of Service functions leaves the Executive Branch with considerable freedom in assigning detailed roles and missions. Yet, the Executive Branch has not taken advantage of this freedom; there has been great reluctance to pursue roles and missions issues. For the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been prepared to live with the duplications and inefficiencies permitted by the Key West Agreement and subsequent clarifications.

The Executive Branch apparently believes that the Congress will become heavily involved in roles and missions disputes whether or not they impinge on functions prescribed in statute. Moreover, the Congress has historically been sympathetic to Service positions on roles and missions issues. For these apparent reasons, reconsideration of controversial roles and missions issues has been avoided by the Executive Branch.

This option seeks to remedy this unfavorable situation by ending the power-sharing arrangement between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Secretary of Defense would be given broad authority to alter Service roles and missions. The Congress would forego its right to review these changes.

Abdication by the Congress of its role in specifying Service functions is a drastic step that does not appear justified by the circumstances. What appears to be needed is an expression of congressional willingness to objectively consider changes to roles and missions assignments which the Secretary of Defense believes are necessary. Implementation of the preceding Options 4A and 4B would in themselves be strong indications of a more favorable congressional attitude.

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Military Departments. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. The basic four-Service structure of the Department of Defense remains a viable concept.	
2. The positions of Service Secretary can make important contributions to the management of the U.S. defense effort and, therefore, should be retained.	
3. There is substantial confusion about the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of Service Secretaries.	3A. Specify in statute the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense.
	3B. Remove inconsistencies in statutory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries.
	3C. Repeal the Service Secretaries' authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress.
	3D. Strengthen the role of Service Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities.

Conclusions	Recommendations
	3E. Strengthen the role of the Military Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secretaries responsibilities for cross-Service cooperation and coordination.
	3F. Prevent the Service Chiefs from circumventing the Service Secretaries.
	3G. Remove the Service Chiefs from the institution that provides unified military advice.
4. There are unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort within the top management headquarters of the Military Departments.	4A. Fully integrate the Secretariats and military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrate the Secretariat and military headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy.
5. The Military Departments suffer from inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior civilian positions in the Service Secretariats.	5A. Correct the unfavorable perception of political appointments within the Military Departments.
	5B. Require that Military Department political appointees have strong defense management credentials.
	5C. Seek a longer commitment of service from Military Department political appointees.
	5D. Alter Federal tax laws with respect to forced sale of assets by appointed Military Department officials to permit the gain from such sale to be reinvested in similar assets without applying tax on the gain at the time of the forced sale.

Conclusions	Recommendations
6. The current assignment of Service roles and missions is of limited utility in eliminating unnecessary duplication and in maximizing force effectiveness; in addition, there are no effective mechanisms for changing roles and missions assignments.	6A. Require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions. 6B. Require the JCS Chairman to submit an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions.

CHAPTER 7

PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM

A. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental purpose of this study of the organization of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to evaluate (1) the civil-civil, civil-military, and military-military relationships among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, and Military Departments; and (2) the ability of these organizational arrangements to provide for sound planning, resource management, administration, and force employment. The reviews of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in this chapter and the acquisition process in Chapter 8 —both of which are internal decision-making processes designed to support the current organization —are intended to be secondary to these larger issues.

Despite this fact, changes to decision-making procedures within DoD can have significant effects on the performance of the organization as a whole. There are three fundamental sources in DoD for improved organizational performance: (1) people; (2) organizational structure; and (3) managerial techniques. PPBS and the acquisition process represent the most important and visible applications of managerial techniques in DoD. Changes in managerial technology can serve as a substitute for changes in the other two areas. In particular, Allen Schick has written about the use of PPBS during Secretary McNamara's tenure as a substitute for reorganization:

> PPB and departmental reorganization can be regarded as partial substitutes for one another. When PPB was flourishing in the Defense Department it was utilized to accomplish many of the objectives that had been sought in earlier reorganization attempts. Even though each of the military services retained its separate organizational identity, it was possible for the Secretary of Defense to make cross-cutting decisions by means of the mission-oriented program budget. ("A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB", *Public Administration Review*, March 1973, pages 151-152)

Beyond these considerations, perceived satisfaction or dissatisfaction with PPBS (with its current strengths and weaknesses) could, itself, be an important measure of the effectiveness of existing organizational relationships. Organizational deficiencies may become evident in the PPB system. In addition, it may be possible for PPBS to serve as one of the supplemental integrating devices discussed in Chapter 3. PPBS is, therefore, an appropriate topic for review while addressing the broad issue of DoD organization.

PPBS is DoD's formal process for arriving at resource allocation decisions. Its purpose is the translation of military strategy and planning into specific defense programs and the development of defense programs into a budget request. DoD Directive 7045.14 states:

> The ultimate objective of the PPBS shall be to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. (page 1)

In addition to the direct administration, operation, and employment of U.S. forces, the resource allocation process, as formalized in PPBS, is one of the central concerns of DoD. PPBS is also a source of numerous documents representing the official positions of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies on a broad range of defense issues.

Five objectives were established for the review of the PPB system:

- ○ assess the extent to which the PPB system is equal to its purpose (i.e., effectively balancing ends with means);
- ○ evaluate the responsiveness of the PPB system to the management needs of DoD leadership;
- ○ identify problems in the PPB system and their causes;
- ○ assess the extent to which problems in the PPB system are a product of organizational deficiencies; and
- ○ identify and evaluate alternative solutions to PPBS problems that could either be a source or a product of changed organizational relationships.

B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PPB SYSTEM

1. Pre-1961 Budget Process

The report, *Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System*, by the Joint DoD/General Accounting Office (GAO) Working Group on PPBS explains the budget process prior to the introduction of PPBS as follows:

> The individual military departments had prepared their budgets following their individual interests with relatively little guidance. The involvement of the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] was largely limited to dividing DoD's budget ceiling among the military departments and reducing the departments' budgets, if they exceeded their share of the pie. This was usually accomplished through across-the-board cuts. There was both little attempt and little ability within the Office of the SECDEF to review the programmatic aspects of the military department's budget submissions. This early approach to budgeting had the following weaknesses:
>
> —Budget decisions were largely independent of plans,
>
> —There was duplication of effort among the services in various areas,
>
> —Service budgets were prepared largely independent of one another with little balancing across services,
>
> —Services felt they were entitled to their fixed share of the budget regardless of the effectiveness of their programs or overall defense needs,
>
> —The budget process focused almost exclusively on the next budget year, though current decisions had considerable consequences for future years, and

> —There was little analytical basis on which the Secretary could either make choices among competing service proposals or assess the need for duplication in service programs. (pages 17–18)

Dr. K. Wayne Smith summarizes the pre-1961 budget process as follows:

> ...requirements planning was being done without explicit regard to cost, and budget planning was being done without regard to need. (*Proceedings of the Conference on the Defense PPBS: Past, Present and Future*, March 1983, page 50).

2. Initiation of the PPB System

The first elements of the current PPB system were introduced to the Department of Defense in 1961 by Secretary of Defense McNamara and were a product of earlier research by The Rand Corporation. The specific intent of the new PPB system was to introduce cost-benefit analysis and other quantitative techniques for the purpose of developing output-oriented programming. At the same time, programming was to be organized around functional mission areas and correlated with a budget process which was extended to project a 5-year defense plan. The broader effect of PPBS was to centralize planning, provide detailed program guidance to the Services, and make the budget a more effective instrument of policy. These broader effects were underscored through the centralized management style of Secretary McNamara.

3. Developments during the 1970's

Developments during the 1970's, both inside and outside the Department of Defense, have had an impact on how the PPB system has operated. Under Secretary Laird, the detailed program guidance from OSD to the Services was replaced with broader Fiscal Guidance. This had the effect of placing the responsibility for program development back in the Military Departments, a feature which has endured to the current system. Also during Secretary Laird's tenure, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) was developed to provide more specific oversight of major procurement programs.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 also affected the PPB system. By establishing the current congressional budget process, this legislation provided benchmarks against which PPBS participants could measure broad congressional support both for defense in general and for specific programs.

During the Carter Administration, Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) was instituted with limited success. The goal of ZBB was to more clearly identify marginal programs through an array of decision packages at three different resource levels. ZZB was discontinued early in the Reagan Administration.

A final development of the late 1970's was the establishment on April 7, 1979 of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) by Secretary Brown. Creation of the DRB was recommended in the *Defense Resource Management Study* prepared by Dr. Donald B. Rice and submitted to Secretary Brown during February 1979. While originally intended to oversee a combined programming and budgeting phase of PPBS, the DRB has functioned with broader and less clear management and decision-making responsibilities, again subject to the style and preference of the Secretary of Defense. However, the DRB remains the senior organization for planning and resource allocation review within the PPB system. When initially established, the DRB had five formal members, one ex officio member (JCS Chairman), and six associate members. As of July 29, 1985, the DRB has 20 formal members and 5 *de facto* members:

Defense Resources Board

Deputy Secretary of Defense —Chairman
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
General Counsel
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Office
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Associate Director of OMB, National Security and International Affairs
By Invitation:
Chief of Staff of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
National Security Council Staff Representative

C. KEY TRENDS IN THE PPB SYSTEM

It is widely recognized that DoD's budget process would face serious confusion without the organizing influence of the PPB system. Thus, since its introduction, there have been no attempts to radically alter the resource allocation process. However, many initiatives have been undertaken to improve the process, make it consistent with individual management styles, and correlate other internal management review processes with the PPB cycle.

Currently, three key trends are discernible in the continuing evolution of the PPB system: (1) increased participation of senior military officers in the Defense Resources Board; (2) greater interest in measurements of operational readiness and support costs; and (3) more emphasis on budget execution and oversight. The current trends in the PPB system highlight its flexibility and openness and its ability to be responsive to changing management environments. This underscores the character of PPBS as a process designed to support current organizational relationships and the reasons for its secondary role in this review of DoD organization.

1. Increased Participation of Senior Military Officers in the DRB

Greater participation of the senior military in DRB reviews has been one of the most notable changes to the PPB system undertaken by Secretary Weinberger. It has taken essentially two forms, a change in practice and a change in procedure. In practice, the Service Chiefs have become *de facto* members of the DRB and are now more capable of influencing DRB outcomes than with the previous membership rules under which Service positions were represented only by the Service Secretaries. The change in actual procedure is the receipt by the Defense Resources Board of formal comments from the unified and specified commanders. Particularly with regard to this latter change, the trend is toward providing greater input into PPBS from those responsible for "fighting the war."

2. Greater Interest in Measurements of Operational Readiness and Support Costs

Central to the evolution of the PPB system is the continuing refinement of analytical models which improve for the decisionmaker the visibility of those complex interrelationships that cause either net gains or net losses to force capability. The bulk of those analytical tools have traditionally been oriented towards weapons system acquisition and force structure. However, a broader resource analysis capability tied to the measurement of less well-defined policy objectives, such as "readiness", has been lacking. The ability to achieve more precise analysis in this area is still impaired by the difficulty of defining the ingredients of "readiness" and accurately relating resource inputs to the achievement of this policy objective. Even so, the need has been recognized, and the trend toward development of broader resource analysis techniques has been established.

3. More Emphasis on Oversight of Budget Execution

A third trend in the PPB system is toward more emphasis on oversight of budget execution. PPBS is very much a "forward-looking" process wherein results of the actual management of defense programs has been of secondary, even tertiary, importance. Recent moves towards greater integration of administration, review and oversight, and data processing functions have raised the possibility that more timely "feedback" mechanisms will strengthen PPBS as both a resource allocation and resource management process.

D. CURRENT PPBS PROCEDURES

Policy, procedures, and responsibilities for PPBS are presented in DoD Directive 7045.14. Implementing guidance is contained in DoD Instruction 7045.7. The PPB system represents a cycle of approximately 15 months duration. Chart 7-1 presents a diagram of the current PPBS with its three distinct phases. The *Defense Resource Management Study* describes the activities of these three phases as follows:

> . . . planning includes the definition and examination of alternative defense strategies, the analysis of exogenous conditions and trends, threat and technology assessment, and any other tasks associated with looking forward either to anticipate change or to understand the longer-term implications of current choices; programming includes the definition and analysis of alternative forces and weapons/support systems together with their resource implications, the analytical evaluation of options for variation therein, and other staff efforts necessary to construct and understand the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP); budgeting includes formulation, justification to the Congress, execution, and control. (page 1)

CHART 7-1

DOD PPBS


PLANNING
PROGRAMMING
BUDGETING
NOV
JAN
MAY
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT-DEC
JAN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD)
JCS
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES
CINCS
DRAFT DEFENSE GUIDANCE
DEFENSE GUIDANCE
ISSUE BOOKS
PROGRAM DECISION MEMOS
BUDGET DECISIONS
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
JLRSA
JSPD
JPAM
PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMOS
BUDGET ESTIMATES
CINCS PRESENTATIONS TO DRB
CINCS PRESENTATIONS TO DRB

JSPD	JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT
JPAM	JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM
JLRSA	JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

1. Planning Phase

The planning phase of the PPB system begins in October with a Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and a follow-on Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) submitted to OSD by the JCS. The JLRSA reflects the foreign policy inputs of other government agencies and identifies broad threats to national interests, while the JSPD is oriented towards defining the scope of military threats and the requirements for U.S. forces. The JSPD is, however, not resource-constrained.

In response to this input, OSD issues Draft Defense Guidance to the Services outlining (either generally or specifically) those military objectives and missions to be accomplished. Before being issued in its final form, the Defense Guidance is reviewed by the unified and specified commanders, whose comments are received by the Defense Resources Board (DRB). The Defense Guidance contains only one page of fiscal guidance identifying a single "topline" number for each Service.

2. Programming Phase

After the Defense Guidance is issued in January, the programming phase begins at the Service level as Program Objective Memoranda (POM's) are developed and submitted to OSD and OJCS in May. In reality, however, POM development begins much earlier as the Services receive projections of future requirements from their major commands and other institutional "claimants". The Services establish their own internal priorities and roadmaps for manning, equipping, training, and maintaining their respective organizations and infrastructures.

The POM's are openly reviewed by OSD and OJCS through the DRB for programmatic content, fulfillment of Defense Guidance, and duplication of effort. Prior to this DRB review, OJCS submits a formal critique of the Service POM's in the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). Through its seat on the DRB, OMB also has the opportunity to review the POM's. Also, the unified and specified commanders again appear before the DRB to provide comments on program issues. The programming phase ends when the Secretary of Defense issues Program Decision Memoranda (PDM's) which represent the formal, albeit temporary, conclusion of internal debate on most major program issues.

3. Budgeting Phase

The budgeting phase begins in September as the Services' budget estimates are reviewed for their accuracy and the consistency of their economic assumptions. The budgeting phase is further characterized by a more detailed definition and incorporation of the overall fiscal constraints being imposed through OMB and fact-of-life adjustments, such as those which might flow from congressional action on the current year's budget or from changes in program execution during the previous year.

December brings final, government-wide, action on the Federal budget and the resolution of any unresolved major program issues. The President's budget request is submitted within 15 days after the Congress reconvenes, usually in January.

4. Description of Key PPBS Documents

Enclosure 2 of DoD Instruction 7045.7 describes the key PPBS documents as follows.

a. Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA)

The JLRSA is submitted by the JCS to provide transition from long-range to mid-range strategic planning. The JLRSA is intended to stimulate more sharply focused strategic studies. Additionally, the JLRSA influences the development of the JSPD.

b. Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)

The JSPD is submitted by the JCS to provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. It contains a concise, comprehensive military appraisal of the threats to U.S. worldwide interests and objectives, a statement of recommended military objectives derived from national objectives, and the recommended military strategy to attain national objectives. It includes a summary of the JCS planning force levels required to execute the approved national military strategy with a reasonable assurance of success, and views on the attainability of these forces in consideration of fiscal responsibility, manpower resources, material availability, technology, industrial capacity, and interoperability in joint and cross-Service programs. The JSPD also appraises the capabilities and risks associated with programmed force levels, based on the planning forces considered necessary to execute the strategy as a benchmark, and recommends changes to the force planning and programming guidance. The JSPD provides a vehicle for an exchange of views on defense policy among the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Defense Guidance (DG)

After consideration of the military advice of the JCS, as expressed in the JLRSA and JSPD, the Secretary of Defense issues a draft of the DG to solicit the comments of all DoD components, including the operational commands, on the major issues, problems, and resource constraints in developing and programming forces to execute the policy, strategy, and management direction. The draft DG is also provided for comment to the Department of State, the staff of the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget. The final version of the DG, which is the principal output of the planning phase, serves as an authoritative statement directing defense policy, strategy, force and resource planning, and fiscal guidance for development of the POM's. The DG consists of the following elements: near and long-term threat assessment and opportunities; policy and strategy guidance; force planning guidance; resource planning guidance; fiscal guidance; and unresolved issues requiring further study.

d. Program Objective Memoranda (POM's)

Annually, each Military Department and Defense Agency prepares and submits to the Secretary of Defense a POM that is consistent with the strategy and guidance, both programmatic and fiscal, stated in the DG. Major issues that are required to be resolved during the year of submission must be identified. Supporting information for POM's should be in accordance with the annual POM Preparation Instructions or requirements established by DoD directive or instruction.

e. Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM)

The JPAM is submitted by the JCS for consideration in reviewing the POM's, developing Issue Books (discussed in the next paragraph), and drafting Program Decision Memoranda (PDS's; discussed later). It provides a risk assessment based on the composite of the POM force recommendations and includes the views of the JCS on the balance and capabilities of the overall POM force and support levels to execute the approved national military strategy. When appropriate, the JCS recommends actions to achieve improvements in overall defense capabilities within alternative funding levels directed by the Secretary of Defense.

f. Issue Books (IB's)

Based on a review of the POM's in relation to the Defense Guidance and JPAM, Issue Books are prepared by the OSD staff, the DoD components, and OMB. One-page outlines of proposed major issues may be submitted by any Defense Resources Board or Program Review Group (PRG) (a working group subordinate to the DRB) member. The issues are to have broad policy, force, program, or resource implications. Particular emphasis is given to cross—Service issues that have not been adequately, or consistently, addressed in the POM's. Major issues that were decided during the previous year's program and budget review are addressed only if some major new factors have appeared since that decision.

The proposed issues are first reviewed by the PRG, which recommends whether or not they are appropriate for DRB consideration. The selected issues are developed by an issue team under the direction of a lead office designated by the PRG, and assigned to one of the IB's. Issue Books are sent to the DRB for their review. The full Defense Resources Board meets to discuss the issues. The major issues that are raised during the program review are measured against the Defense Guidance, against available budgetary resources, and against management initiatives. The program produced as a result of the review should demonstrate the maximum degree of policy implementation consistent with national resource limitations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense makes all appropriate decisions after consultation with the Secretary.

g. Program Decision Memoranda (PDM's)

DRB program review decisions are recorded in a set of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM's), signed by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and distributed to DoD components and OMB. The PDM's then form the basis for the budget submissions.

h. Budget Estimates

Annually, each DoD component submits its budget estimates to the Secretary of Defense. The budget estimates include the prior, current, and budget fiscal years (budget year plus one for programs requiring congressional authorization) in accordance with established procedures. Data for the outyears (the 4 years beyond the budget year) are derived from, or are consistent with, the Five-Year Defense Plan update coincident with the submission of budget estimates. Budget estimates are prepared and submitted based on the program as approved in the PDM's, and on economic assumptions related to pay and pricing policies. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in close coordination with the Director, OMB, develops and promulgates the applicable economic assumptions. These assumptions are contained in separately prescribed detailed budget guidance each year, if they are not available in time to be included in the PDM's. Subsequent modifications may be necessary to remain consistent with administration policy.

E. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

The problem areas in the PPB system lay primarily at each end of the process, i.e. planning and execution. However, there are also latent concerns about the overall length, complexity, and instability of the PPBS cycle. This section identifies seven problem areas in the PPB system and presents analyses of the contributing causes. First, strategic planning is ineffective. Second, there is an insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints. Third, there is an absence of realistic fiscal guidance. Fourth, the output side of the defense program is not emphasized in the PPBS. Fifth, the JCS system is unable to make meaningful programmatic inputs. Sixth, within the PPB system, there is insufficient attention to execution oversight and control. Last, the PPBS cycle is too long, complex, and unstable.

It should be noted that none of these seven problem areas are new. Various study efforts —within the Department of Defense, by other government agencies, and by the defense academic community —have previously cited these problems in PPBS. In particular, the current administration undertook an assessment of PPBS shortly after entering office. This assessment, conducted by Vincent Puritano, then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and completed on March 13, 1981, identified 21 deficiencies in the PPB system. As summarized in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on November 10, 1983 (Part 9, pages 388–394), the deficiencies included:

- the failure to create a credible planning system;
- planning was irrelevant or useless during the programming and budgeting phases;
- the existence of an objectives-force (policy-capabilities) mismatch;
- an imbalance between modernization and readiness funding;
- "tail-end perturbations" in PPBS as major budget reductions were required late in the cycle by OMB and presidential decisions on fiscal levels;
- tendency of the JCS not to play an active part in the programming phase;
- neglect of execution;
- only limited feedback to policymakers/programmers to improve subsequent cycles; and
- program instability.

As a result of the assessment in 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci issued a memorandum on March 27, 1981 that made numerous changes in the PPB system and presented the management philosophy of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The major provisions of this memorandum were:

- modifying the existing PPBS to reflect a shift to greater emphasis on long-range strategic planning;
- greater decentralization of authority to the Services;
- closer attention to cost savings and efficiencies;
- elimination of most of the paperwork required by the Zero Based Budget (ZBB) system;
- a restructuring of DoD's top management board, the Defense Resources Board (DRB);
- an increase in the responsibilities and roles of the Service Secretaries;
- a change of roles and relationships between the various OSD staff agencies and the Services;
- a new process for management review by the Secretary of Defense of progress toward objectives in major programs;
- a general streamlining of the entire PPBS. (Part 9, page 388)

The changes directed by Secretary Carlucci's memorandum were designed to correct the many deficiencies identified in PPBS. Many of the changes have been effective in correcting or lessening the problems identified in 1981. However, certain problems, especially those identified in the preceding paragraph, continue to exist.

1. INEFFECTIVE STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Department of Defense conducts planning of two distinct types: (1) resource allocation planning and (2) contingency (or capabilities) planning. Resource allocation planning is conducted primarily by OSD and OJCS with appropriate inputs and review by the Military Departments and operational commanders. These plans are developed to serve as resource allocation tools rather than strategies for military action. Contingency planning is conducted by OJCS and the operational commanders and provides plans for the actual employment of forces to accomplish specific military missions.

In this chapter, only planning in the resource allocation process will be discussed. As the term "long-range planning" is often used to cover both the planning and programming phases of PPBS, it is too broad to describe only the planning phase. To address only the planning phase of PPBS and to distinguish it from other planning conducted in DoD, it will be termed "strategic planning." In this context, strategic planning encompasses selection of objectives, identification of constraints (including fiscal), formulation of a strategy to secure these objectives, and decisions on supporting policies and broad resource allocations.

The problem of ineffective strategic planning in DoD has existed for an extended period of time. The 1979 *Defense Resource Management Study*, citing the lack of planning as a major PPBS problem, states: "There is broad agreement that the first 'P' in PPBS is silent." (page 6) The Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, adds to this criticism: ..."the planning that takes place in the Department of Defense is not linked adequately to subsequent programming and budgeting decisions." (page 38) In his draft paper, "Strategymaking in DoD", Ambassador Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), expands on these themes:

> As a former practitioner, my own evaluation of our non-nuclear strategymaking is harsh. There is all too little systematic strategymaking in DoD, except in the strategic nuclear arena. Instead the reality is best characterized as a piecemeal, irregular, highly informal process, largely driven by cumulative program decisions influenced more by budget constraints and consequent inter-service competition than by notions of U.S. strategic priorities. Little long term policy or strategic planning takes place, except for adapting to new technology. There is little consideration of strategic alternatives. (page 23)
>
> ...All this is not to say that policy and strategic thinking does not recurrently influence programs and resource allocations, only that it does so in a spasmodic and usually unstructured way. (page 26)

In discussing the sources of ineffective strategic planning, this subsection will focus on seven generic causes. An eighth possible cause is listed, but a determination as to its existence was not possible. Beyond these generic causes, two specific shortcomings of the strategic planning process were identified; one of these was considered a cause of ineffective strategic planning while the other was viewed as a product. In any case, given their seriousness, they are treated as separate problem areas in the two subsequent subsections.

a. Dominance of Programming and Budgeting

First, within the current PPBS, programming and budgeting tend to dictate strategic planning rather than the reverse. There are several factors that have contributed to this occurrence. First of all, the programming and budgeting cycles are too long and essentially squeeze out a structured strategic planning effort. Second, resource managers —both from OSD and the Services —dominate the process through which objectives, strategy, and policies are translated into resource allocations.

b. Lack of Management Discipline in OSD

A second major cause of ineffective strategic planning is the inability of OSD to discipline itself to give strategic planning proper attention. OSD places too much attention on resource questions and on immediate problems. Much of this is in response to outside demands, especially from the Congress, which divert attention from strategic planning. The lack of discipline is a key issue because ineffective strategic planning is more of a management problem than an organizational problem; high-level defense officials have apparently failed to recognize the importance of planning and have not given it sufficient priority on the work agenda of OSD. In some instances, this has resulted as key OSD positions have been filled by individuals who are not well versed in national security planning.

c. Inability of the JCS System to Provide Useful Strategic Planning Advice and to Formulate Military Strategy

The PPB system provides an important role for the JCS system in strategic planning. The two initial planning documents are prepared by the JCS system: the Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). Despite this prominent role, the JCS system has failed to play a useful role in strategic planning. The *Defense Resource Management Study* comments on this deficiency:

> The implication to the uninitiated has been that these documents formed an important foundation for the process. In fact, *the joint documentation was generally considered irrelevant to the process*. The weaknesses of joint staffing cited in the Steadman Report *[Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure* by Richard C. Steadman, July 1978] play a role in explaining the reason for this low regard of the product, as do timing of the presentation, the utter impossibility of the assumed tasks (comprehensive annual assessments of national military strategy and force structure), and, most seriously, an inability to grapple with alternatives linked to resources. (emphasis added) (page 21)

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Retired) supports the criticism of ineffective strategic planning by the JCS system. In *On Watch*, he comments on the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), as the JSPD was previously titled:

> ...I found this particular document to be almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions always were in the process of being falsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal. (page 334)

d. Lack of Consensus

A fourth cause is that it is difficult to achieve a consensus on a coherent military strategy and related policies. This results from the following factors:

- strategic planning in DoD is an enormously difficult and complex task given the numerous and wide range of threats and fiscally constrained resources;
- absence of organizations with mission orientations participating in the strategic planning process;
- in protection of their narrow interests, many organizations prefer ambiguity in terms of U.S. objectives and mission priorities; and
- each Service has its own global military strategy which permits it to justify its programs and is primarily driven by resource competition.

The failure to develop a coherent military strategy with mission priorities has led to a perception of an objectives-force mismatch, often, but incorrectly, referred to as a "strategy-force mismatch". (Strategy attempts to effectively employ given forces to achieve stated objectives. If there is any mismatch, it must be that the objectives are too great to be achieved by available forces.)

e. Inadequate Strategic Planning Machinery

A fifth cause is that current strategic planning machinery is inadequate. As Ambassador Komer has noted, strategic planning is currently a piecemeal, irregular, and highly informal process. In particular, the Defense Resources Board, a large and unwieldy committee (20 formal members and 5 *de facto* members) oriented toward resources, appears to be the only operative forum for strategic planning. (Despite its name, the Armed Forces Policy Council is not involved in policymaking or strategic planning.) Given the complexity of strategic planning issues, the large number of officials that should be involved, and the substantial demands on their time (which tends to shortchange strategic planning), it appears that a more structured and formal strategic planning process would be beneficial.

f. Weak Strategic Planning Tradition

A sixth major cause is the weak tradition of strategic planning in DoD. U.S. strategic thought is really a product of World War II and the post-war world. For most of American history, the U.S. military did not need to formulate grand strategy. Since World War II, much work has been done on nuclear strategy and policy, but conventional strategy and policy have suffered from inadequate attention.

The weak tradition of strategic planning is also evidenced by the failure of the U.S. military education system to focus systematically on it, for example through strategic war games or the study of military history. As Liddell Hart put it, "in all our military training...we invert the true order of thought —considering techniques first, tactics second, and strategy last" (*Thoughts on War*, page 129). It should be noted, however, that the Services have recently placed increased emphasis on war games, often involving unified and other operational commanders.

g. Inadequate Policy and Planning Guidance

A seventh major cause of ineffective strategic planning is inadequate policy and planning guidance. Effective guidance for strategic planning requires a clear statement of policy and objectives which can be used for strategy formulation and program and budget development. The guidance issued by OSD has been inadequate for these purposes.

The Steadman Report noted the deficiencies in policy and planning guidance:

> ...Most military officers believe that more clear and definitive national security policy guidance is needed for strategic planning. If adequate policy guidance is not given to military planners, they must prepare their own, as a necessary starting point. Some argue that previous national security policy guidance was too general to be useful, and it certainly is true that vague or all-encompassing statements of defense policy objectives are of little help in detailed force planning. On the other hand, programs constructed without clear policy directives can only be prepared on the basis of policy goals determined by the programmer himself, but often not made explicit for senior decisionmakers to accept or reject. (pages 42 and 43)

General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired) presented similar criticism in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> Current guidance is so demanding that developing truly coherent programs to carry it out is impossible even under the most optimistic budget assumptions....the defense guidance does little to set meaningful priorities or mandate a search for new directions to maintain our security. This is not a problem unique to this Administration. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, pages 19 and 20)

h. Insufficient Guidance from the National Security Council

Some observers have expressed the view that another cause of ineffective DoD strategic planning is insufficient guidance from the National Security Council on grand strategy, U.S. strategic interests, and U.S. worldwide commitments and their priorities. It was not possible, within the scope of this effort, to determine the validity of this view.

2. INSUFFICEINT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND FISCAL CONSTRAINTS

While the review of the PPBS identified weaknesses across the entire range of strategic planning tasks, one major shortcoming was frequently noted: an insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints. It is central to the PPB system that programs and budgets should flow from requirements identified in the strategic planning process which, itself, results from broader national security and foreign policy planning. At present, however, DoD strategic planning resources are underutilized because they are not effectively applied to solving the major policy, strategy, and program issues that result from fiscal constraints. The reconciliation of policy guidance and strategy formulation with fiscal constraints must remain a central objective of the PPB system.

The symptoms of an insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints include: (1) limited utility of strategic planning documents in the programming and budgeting phases; (2) unattainable defense guidance; and (3) the growing distances between the recommended planning force, the POM force, and those inherent capabilities remaining after congressional action on the budget. Given the inability to effectively apply fiscal constraints to joint military planning, much of the strategic planning effort has been perceived as not being useful to PPBS participants. The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, comments on this situation and the deficiencies that result:

> ...joint military planning is not constrained by realistic projections of future defense budgets. Consequently, the primary JCS planning documents are fiscally unrealistic and therefore largely ignored in the programming and budgeting process. Instead, national military force planning results from loosely coordinated, parallel dialogues between OSD and each of the individual service departments. This often results in disparate plans that do not optimize the potential contribution of each military service to national strategic objectives. (page 38)

There are three basic causes of the problem of an insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints: (1) fiscally unconstrained planning; (2) a flawed strategic planning process; and (3) the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system.

a. Fiscally Unconstrained Planning

The divergence between strategic planning and fiscal constraints originates with the second procedure in the PPBS cycle: the preparation of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). As previously noted, the JSPD is not resource-constrained. Fiscally unconstrained planning fulfills a useful, if narrow, role in providing benchmarks from which to compare the required force structure with actual capabilities. However, using a fiscally unconstrained document as the principal, joint military input to the formulation of the Defense Guidance, which is resource constrained, provides an unsound foundation for subsequent strategic planning.

While strategic planners obviously would seek to distinguish those JSPD objectives, strategies, and policies that would be altered in a fiscally constrained environment, this is not an easy task. In essence, many of the conceptual products of fiscally unconstrained thinking are carried forward, unaltered, through subsequent PPBS steps —the Defense Guidance, Service Program Objective Memoranda, the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum, and final programming and budgeting decisions. These concepts may also have undue influence on contingency planning which is conducted outside of the PPBS process. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which furnishes guidance on military tasks to be accomplished in the short-range period for use in the preparation of contingency plans by the operational commands, may be substantially based on the fiscally unconstrained thinking contained in JSPD.

b. Flawed Strategic Planning Process

The strategic planning process in DoD should contain the following sequential steps:

Step 1 - analysis of external conditions and trends, including threat and technology assessments

Step 2 - setting of policy and planning objectives and identifying constraints, especially fiscal

Step 3 - definition and examination of alternative defense strategies to meet these objectives within these constraints

Step 4 - setting of program objectives and broad resource allocations

In the current DoD strategic planning process, Step 3 (strategy formulation) is underdeveloped. The Joint Strategic Planning Document does not fulfill the tasks associated with this step. The JSPD is part of Step 1 in that it merely helps to assess the inherent military risks associated with the resource-constrained posture adopted in Step 2. Essentially, in the current PPB system, Steps 2 and 3 have been combined in the Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance does take the strategy recommended in the JSPD and create from it a resource-constrained strategy. The utility of such an approach is highly questionable.

Sir Basil Liddell Hart spoke of military strategy in the following terms:

> ...strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the ends and the means. (*Strategy*, page 335)

It is absolutely clear that the Department of Defense does not have a military strategy that clearly tailors goals to resources. This is a serious deficiency because, as Jeffrey Record has stated in *Revising U.S. Military Strategy*:

> A strategy whose goals far exceed resources available for their implementation is a recipe for potential disaster. (page 1)

c. Institutional Deficiencies of the JCS System

The formulation of a strategy that is constrained by fiscal realities would place certain strategic goals of the Services at risk. Observers believe that the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system in which Service priorities predominate would place great strains on the organization if it attempted to formulate a fiscally constrained strategy.

3. ABSENCE OF REALISTIC FISCAL GUIDANCE

The development of fiscal guidance is one of the key tasks of the strategic planning process. The establishment of fiscal constraints is an important step before strategy can be formulated. The absence of realistic fiscal constraints, especially for the outyears of the planning effort, can undermine the value of the formulated strategy. The absence of realistic fiscal constraints (or guidance) has an effect, however, that reaches far beyond the planning phase into the programming and budgeting phases. Fiscal guidance which significantly exceeds the President's budget, which itself significantly exceeds the amounts eventually approved by Congress, clearly undermines and impairs the PPB system. The absence of stable and realistic budget constraints is a management, not a structural or procedural, problem. Even so, it is important to understand the impact of management problems on the resource allocation process.

The effect of over-optimistic fiscal guidance within the programming and budgeting framework is obvious. When the fiscal guidance is substantially higher than the budget guidance ultimately approved by the President, the hard decisions are thus deferred beyond the programming phase and, according to the *Defense Resource Management Study*: "set up pressures to unbalance the program as a way of coping with budget 'cuts' in the final stages of budget review, effectively wasting much of the year's programming effort." (page 7)

The relatively orderly process of POM preparation and review is, in practice, subsequently undercut by severe budget reductions, both internal and external to DoD. In fact, even within the internal DoD budget formulation and review process, significant programmatic decisions must be made to accommodate substantial budget reductions which are mandated late in the PPBS cycle. In recent years, between the time that the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum is submitted and Congress completes action on the budget (approximately 1 year), upwards of $30 billion has been reduced from the budget without making any joint military or civilian reassessment of program priorities. Such substantial reductions with their outyear implications are certain to produce a gap between planning and capabilities and undermine the benefits of the structured PPB system.

If the fiscal guidance is well above the levels attainable in the presidential budget review and/or the levels approved by the Congress, the PPB system will have allowed too many programs to enter or to be expanded during the programming phase, not just in the budget year, but also through the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP). Year-end budget adjustments, combined with congressional reductions, turn into major policy and programming problems — problems frequently unresolved and pushed further into the outyears of the FYDP. For example, 70 percent of the defense budget reductions made by the Congress for fiscal years 1982 through 1985 involved stretching out programs into future years. Rather than refining resource allocation decisions around the margins during the budget year, the PPB system becomes overburdened with major instabilities that consequently undermine the planning and programming phases of the next cycle. As an example, Table 7-1 shows the wide differences, totaling $165 billion, between the 5-year funding levels projected in the March 1981 FYDP and those actually approved by the Congress.

TABLE 7-1

ESTIMATES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

(Current dollars in billions)

		FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	TOTALS
March 1981 FYDP							
Budget Authority (BA)		226	260	295	333	374	
Outlays (O)		189	226	256	304	343	
Approved by Congress	BA	217	245	265	293[a]	303[b]	
	O	185	210	227	254[a]	273[b]	
Difference	BA	-9	-15	-30	-40	-71	-165
	O	-4	-16	-29	-50	-70	-169

---

[a] Estimate

[b] First Concurrent Budget Resolution as recommended by the Senate during May 1985.

There are four basic causes of unrealistic fiscal guidance: (1) differences in political judgments; (2) economic uncertainties; (3) the bureaucratic tendency for built-in growth; and (4) competition over fundamental constitutional responsibilities for the Federal budget. These four factors frequently combine to produce unattainable budgets which represent the first years of unattainable FYDP's.

a. Differences in Political Judgments

Fiscal guidance is promulgated by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments 12 months before the President submits his budget to the Congress and about 21 months before the Congress completes its review of the DoD budget request. Those Executive Branch officials who help formulate the fiscal guidance must project the politics of the budgetary process into a difficult-to-predict future. Wide swings in public opinion over relatively short periods of time indicate the difficulty of making such political judgments.

b. Economic Uncertainties

There are two aspects of economic uncertainty that have an impact on the defense budget. The first relates to the health of the national economy, its ability to support the Federal budget, and demands on the Federal budget or fiscal policy that flow from the economic situation. The second aspect is the extent to which events in the national economy raise or lower the costs to DoD to execute equipment or personnel programs. The uneven track record of economic forecasting is clear evidence of the inherent uncertainties in this area.

c. Bureaucratic Tendency for Built-in Growth

The Pentagon has historically had considerable difficulty in making the tough decisions to adjust programs to the fiscal resource levels provided for national defense. As a result, many fiscal problems are pushed into the outyears for solutions, known as "getting well in the future". The enormous procurement bowwaves in DoD are well-known examples. Programs are structured on the generally unrealistic assumption that substantial funds will be available in the outyears. This produces enormous internal pressures for projecting high rates of growth in the defense budget.

d. Competition over Fundamental Constitutional Responsibilities

In recent years, there have been substantial discrepancies in the budgetary priorities of the Executive and Legislative Branches. Despite significant defense budget reductions by the Congress, the Executive Branch has continued to press for its priorities by proposing defense budgets with significant real growth. In this regard, there is the possibility that some "gaming" is present in the formulation of budget policy. Especially with regard to defense budgets, which are routinely cut by the Congress, the desire of any administration to achieve meaningful real growth may actually require that initial requests be considerably higher.

As a flexible support mechanism for management, PPBS is capable of responding to the problem of unrealistic fiscal guidance. Even so, no evidence was found that the PPB system is as actively involved in the well executed reduction of budgets as it is in constructing them. The effectiveness of PPBS depends upon the internal consistency and political feasibility of the policy, programming, and fiscal inputs which begin the PPBS cycle. To the extent these inputs are unbalanced, the PPBS product will lose much of its value, and confidence in DoD's resource allocation process will be undermined.

4. Failure of the PPBS To Emphasize the Output Side of the Defense Program

When PPBS was instituted, it was described as providing "a mission-oriented program budget" and "output-oriented programming". While PPBS has enhanced the prospects for such results, it has fallen far short of its potential in this regard. PPBS focuses on inputs and not on outputs. One of the effects of the failure to emphasize outputs is the imbalance between modernization and readiness.

General David C. Jones, USAF, commented as follows on this problem while he was serving as JCS Chairman:

> There is not enough emphasis in the government on the "output" side of the Defense program (e.g., readiness). In particular, there is too little emphasis on Joint activities, which are primarily output-oriented. The Department of Defense traditionally organizes around inputs, not outputs; its priorities are driven by such issues as procurement decisions, manpower levels and policies, budget deadlines, Congressional hearings, and other program-oriented activities. Thus, the DoD has tended not to deal effectively with "output" issues such as readiness, integrated force capabilities, and crisis management preparations. The latter are all primary JCS issues —difficult under the best of circumstances, and certainly not resolved effectively when not given equal time in the defense management process. (*Chairman's Special Study Group Report*, page 22)

There are five basic causes of the failure of PPBS to emphasize the output side of the defense program: (1) the Defense Resources Board is dominated by officials who have a strong input orientation; (2) the absence of OSD organizations that have a multi-functional, mission (or output) orientation; (3) the limited influence of the unified commanders on the resource allocation process; (4) the limited independent authority of the JCS Chairman; and (5) the inability of the JCS system to make meaningful programmatic inputs.

The last four causes are discussed in detail in other chapters of this study; the last cause is also discussed in the following subsection as a distinct problem area because of its broader impact on the resource allocation process. As to the first cause, the only DRB officials who might be viewed as having at least some orientation toward output considerations are the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JCS Chairman, Under Secretary (Policy), Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs), and Assistant Secretary (International Security Policy). However, the last three officials have played only a limited role in resource allocation decisions. As a result, the functional OSD assistant secretaries and the Service representatives —who are clearly input-oriented —dominate DRB proceedings. As to the Services, the Chairman's Special Study Group confirms their input focus:

> ...the Service Chiefs and their Service staffs devote most of their time to Service programs and budgets —the *input* side of defense management. (page 6)

5. INABILITY OF THE JCS SYSTEM TO MAKE MEANINGFUL PROGRAMMATIC INPUTS

The resource allocation process does not yield the optimum military capability with the fiscal resources available because there is an insufficient joint military input. The current PPB system, through the Joint Program Assessment Memoranda, theoretically provides for this input. Instead of providing strong joint military comment about broad defense priorities, the JPAM is used only to restate the requirements for narrow, cross-Service programs already outlined in the Defense Guidance. The JPAM remains constrained by the institutional limitations of the current JCS system which are discussed at length in Chapter 4 of this study.

6. INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION IN THE PPBS TO EXECUTION OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL

As noted in Section C of this chapter which addresses key trends in the PPB system, there has been increased emphasis on oversight of budget execution. As Assistant Secretary Puritano's statement submitted to the Senate Committee on Armed Services cites:

> There is what I would like to describe as a fourth phase to PPBS, perhaps best referred to as "management execution." We have spent a good deal of time and effort seeing that once a decision has been made through the above described process, that it is in fact carried out in as effective and cost-efficient a manner as possible. We have set up management responsibilities to see that just that happens. (Part 9, page 371)

Despite this desirable emphasis, the PPB system continues to be too "forward-looking."

As the programming and budgeting phases of PPBS represent DoD's management control system, they must include adequate provisions to monitor the execution of program and budget decisions (and, to a lesser extent, planning decisions). The *Defense Resource Management Study* recognizes this need in its description of the budgeting phase of PPBS: "budgeting includes formulation, justification to the Congress, execution, and control" (page 1)

Anthony and Herzlinger in their book, *Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations*, identify two benefits of a good management control system for an organization:

> 1. It can make better plans: plans that are related to organizational objectives and which, in many cases, are based on an analysis of the relative benefits and cost of proposed alternative courses of action.
>
> 2. It can have better control; that is, more assurance that operating managers will act efficiently and effectively to accomplish the organization's objectives. (page 337)

As currently structured, the PPB system in DoD is heavily oriented toward the first benefit of making better plans. The potential of PPBS to provide for better control has not been realized.

Chapter 3 discusses OSD's concerns about the Services' failure to comply with OSD guidance for program development and management. Chapter 6 discusses the ability of the Military Departments to block implementation of decisions by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or senior DoD decision-making bodies. These problems clearly indicate that DoD does not have a structured process to exercise sufficient oversight of policy, program, or budget execution. The *Defense Resource Management Study* cited the absence of feedback as one of the PPB system's major problems:

> The PPB System has never had an explicit measurement system for tracking the progress made in implementing approved programs....Better feedback is needed, not only to monitor execution, but also to make adjustments to past decisions that, in turn, will motivate better execution. (page 9)

Some observers believe that the current inattention to execution oversight and control is so severe in DoD that the PPB system should be modified to add an explicit control phase, thus becoming the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Controlling System (PPBCS).

The Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies report, *Toward a More Effective Defense,* discusses the lack of attention to execution and oversight in PPBS:

> In theory, PPBS should be a circular process with financial and performance data from one year's cycle serving as the planning base for the early phases of the next year's process. In practice, however, PPBS essentially starts fresh each year. Little systematic attention is given to the evaluation of past program decisions. Major weapon programs that have high congressional visibility are sometimes an exception to this generalization, because their cost and performance data tend to be monitored more closely. But PPBS has never included an explicit and comprehensive system for measuring and reporting progress in implementing approved programs. (page 42)

Increased emphasis on execution oversight and control would have four benefits:

- ○ provide for more immediate feedback into the decision-making process;
- ○ result in improved financial control over spending;
- ○ provide a more sound basis for budget revisions, reprogrammings, and contingency allowances; and
- ○ help illuminate some of the undesirable behavioral patterns in subordinate organizations.

There are two major causes of the problem of insufficient attention in PPBS to execution oversight and control: (1) focus of principal PPBS participants on the future and (2) inadequate accounting and management information systems.

a. Focus of PPBS Participants on the Future

Of the 20 formal members of the Defense Resources Board (DRB), only three —the Service Secretaries —have direct responsibilities for program and budget execution. The other DRB members are focused on the future—on the budgets to be presented to the President and to the Congress next year and subsequent years. They make decisions as if they were missiles that can be "fired and forgotten". Given the dominating focus on the future, there is little time to worry about execution. Put into perspective, however, despite all of the forward planning and decision-making, execution is what actually happens.

b. Inadequate Accounting and Management Information Systems

~~The~~ CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, argues that both accounting systems and management information systems in DoD are inadequate to support effective execution oversight and control which CSIS terms "evaluation":

> ...the department's accounting base is inadequate to support effective evaluation. Department of Defense financial reports provide a mass of data, but the financial information in these reports is often inconsistent, incomplete, and untimely. The source of many of these shortcomings is the department's reliance on accounting systems that operate almost exclusively on an obligational basis. Under this system, an economic event is measured when the resources are "obligated," that is when contracts are awarded or orders placed —an emphasis that is understandable in terms of the department's fiduciary responsibilities. Obligation-based data, however, inhibit the evaluation of program effectiveness and management performance by focusing attention on the time of the commitment, with little monitoring of the actual delivery or the effective use of the resources acquired.
>
> ...The absence of sophisticated management information systems also impedes effective program evaluation. There are some areas, such as personnel recruiting and retention, in which the department has developed effective management information systems, but there are numerous others in which such systems are either incomplete or do not exist. The lack of integrated performance data is particularly severe with respect to combat readiness, as the 1978 Steadman Report pointed out. (page 42)

7. Length, Complexity, and Instability of the PPBS Cycle

The PPB system of the Department of Defense represents the most sophisticated resource allocation process within the Federal Government. Within a 15-month cycle, it is designed to translate broad national security objectives into a 5-year defense plan and a current year budget. It is so complex that it literally catches itself coming and going. Different phases of PPBS are often simultaneously addressing three different budgets: executing the current year's budget; programming, budgeting, or justifying next year's budget; and planning for the year beyond that.

Standing alone, there would be few concerns about the length or complexity of PPBS. However, PPBS is only one of several vital responsibilities of DoD's military and civilian leadership. The day-to-day administration of defense programs, communications with the Congress, international relations, and crisis management are all of equal importance with PPBS in the larger scheme of defense management. PPBS, however, is an internal process which, though influenced by outside factors, can be controlled. Consequently, many defense officials turn to PPBS and the broader budget process in search of opportunities to save time and to improve their ability to respond to those events and responsibilities beyond their immediate control. As a result of the dominance of programming and budgeting, the strategic planning process is more frequently shortchanged when the PPB system receives less time and attention from senior DoD officials.

Instability is one of the major problems in the PPB system. With the exception of unrealistic fiscal guidance, the causes of instability are clearly associated with external influences rather than internal deficiencies. The Congress is the primary external source of this instability.

The problem of the length, complexity, and instability of the PPB system represents a general frustration among those who work within the PPB system. There is broad consensus that the cycle is too long and that too many factors, both inside and outside the Pentagon, undermine its effectiveness. Recent evolutionary changes in PPBS, however beneficial, do not go far enough to address the concerns of those who participate in the PPB process. In short, the PPBS bureaucracy is ready for, and will likely be receptive to, broader changes in the Federal budget process (from whatever source) aimed at greater certainty and stability and less congressional interference.

Five of the six PPBS problem areas discussed in preceding subsections have an impact on the length, complexity, and instability of the PPBS cycle. Of these, the absence of realistic fiscal guidance clearly has the greatest negative impact. Beyond these broader problems, there are five other causes of a too long, complex, and unstable PPB system: (1) total annual review of plans, programs, and budgets; (2) sequential nature of the separate planning, programming, and budgeting phases; (3) length and instability of the congressional budget process; (4) conflicting congressional guidance on defense policies and programs; and (5) congressional micro-management of defense programs.

The last three causes involve the Congress. These issues and others associated with the Congress and its political processes are so serious that they are addressed separately in Chapter 9 of this study. This subsection will focus, therefore, only on the first two causes.

a. Total Annual Review of Plans, Programs, and Budgets

The PPB system completely rewrites all strategic planning documents and conducts reviews of all programs and budgets each year. The workload associated with these tasks is enormous. It does not appear that each planning and resource decision must be reconsidered every year.

b. Sequential Nature of the Separate Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Phases

Presently, the PPB system provides for three distinct phases that await the results of the preceding phase before being initiated. This sequential nature of the three phases demands a long period of time to be conducted.

F. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

In this section, possible solutions to PPBS problem areas are described. It should be noted that the options presented in this section to solve a problem area may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, only one of the options to solve a problem area could be implemented. In other cases, several options might be complementary.

1. Problem Area #1—Ineffective Strategic Planning

The thrust of solutions to the problem of ineffective strategic planning is to strengthen and formalize the strategic planning process. Proposals in this regard can be grouped into four categories: (1) lessen the focus on programming and budgeting; (2) strengthen strategic planning skills; (3) create a separate strategic planning office either in OSD or OJCS; and (4) make other changes to strengthen the prospects for improved strategic planning. A total of ten options has been developed within these categories. Three of these options involve formal organizational change which may require legislative action. However, the bulk of the options in this area merely require management attention and initiatives.

a. lessen the focus on programming and budgeting

- Option 1A—diminish OSD's focus on resource programs by lessening the role of OSD resource managers

This might be done by (1) changing the hierarchical structure of OSD; (2) changing the OSD membership on the Defense Resources Board (DRB); (3) substantially reducing the size of the OSD staff; (4) creating mission-oriented offices which would have a more balanced approach to strategic planning and resource decisions; or (5) creating a forum other than the DRB to make strategic planning decisions.

In this last regard, the *Department Headquarters Study* suggested the reestablishment of the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) to offer the Secretary of Defense regular and frequent advice in the formulation of defense policy. While the AFPC is currently active, it is not frequently, if at all, used in the formulation of policy. If the Defense Resources Board were found to be an inappropriate forum for strategic planning decisions, the AFPC could be used to conduct this work. This idea appears to have merit because the AFPC membership includes the principal officials of DoD from whose interaction major strategic planning documents should emerge. Such a use of the AFPC would be consistent with section 171(b) of title 10, United States Code, which provides:

> (b) The Armed Forces Policy Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

Alternatively, an executive committee of the DRB could be formed whose members would be only the most senior DoD managers with broad and important strategic planning inputs.

- Option 1B—lessen congressional interest in program details and increase congressional interest in major planning and policy issues

Implementation of this option would require action by both the Executive and Legislative Branches. DoD must substantially increase its efforts to engage the Congress in an active dialogue on major defense planning and policy issues. Within the Congress, the leadership must attempt to reorient the focus of congressional review from program details to more fundamental and important issues.

b. strengthen strategic planning skills

- Option 1C—appoint senior OSD officials with strong strategic planning interests and skills

In line with the view that ineffective strategic planning is more of a management problem than an organizational problem, skilled managers are critical to solving this deficiency. Only such managers can discipline OSD and other DoD elements to conduct adequate strategic planning and make the strategic planning organizational machinery—whatever it may be—work.

- Option 1D—reorient war colleges and military academies to strengthen the study of strategy and military history

This proposal responds to the need to strengthen the strategic planning tradition in the U.S. military establishment. Some critics of the current curricula of the war colleges and the academies have argued that there is increasing emphasis being placed upon science and engineering skills, to the detriment of other skills that are more purely military in nature. This viewpoint holds that certain insights and qualities needed by officers cannot be obtained in a typical college curriculum and that much greater emphasis should be placed on the study of military history, strategy, and the like.

Obviously, the more military history and strategy that the U.S. officer corps collectively knows, the better off the Nation will be. On the other hand, the war colleges and academies, like all educational institutions, must seek a balance and cannot teach everything. Ultimately, the judgment as to what should be taught in the military colleges and academies is probably one that should be left to the military professionals, since these schools are where the fundamental values, outlook, and skills of the profession are embodied and transmitted.

While this option may be desirable, further study of it is beyond the scope of this effort. For this reason, more detailed discussion and evaluation of this proposal are not presented.

c. create a separate strategic planning office either in OSD or OJCS

- Option 1E—create an OSD strategic planning office

Several studies have proposed the creation of a separate OSD planning staff. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended that:

> A Long-Range Planning Group should be created for the purpose of providing staff support to the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for long-range planning which integrates net assessments, technological projections, fiscal planning, etc. This group should consist of individuals from appropriate units in the Department of Defense, consultants and contract personnel appointed from time to time by the Secretary of Defense, and should report directly to him. (page 7)

Similarly, the *Departmental Headquarters Study* recommended:

> Establish a Planning Office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, formally linked in liaison to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (page 56)

The *National Military Command Structure Study* also recommended that this responsibility be assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy but made no recommendation on organizational arrangements. (page 47)

The exact responsibilities envisioned by these three studies for these planning offices are unclear. There is likely to be substantial resistance to strategic planning performed for the most part by staff planners. Lorange and Vancil argue this case in their *Harvard Business Review* article, "How to Design a Strategic Planning System":

> ...Strategic planning is a line management function; a sure route to disaster is to have plans produced by staff planners and then issued to line managers. Strategic planning is essentially a people-interactive process, and the planner is only one in the cast of characters involved. If the process is to function effectively, he must clearly understand his proper role:
>
> ...the planner's role initially is that of a catalyst, encouraging line managers to adopt a strategic orientation:
>
> ...System maintenance and coordination is the planner's primary function as the planning effort matures.

Options 1B and 1C presented in Chapter 3 include the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) and the elimination of the position of Under Secretary (Policy). Under Option 1A, which proposes an Under Secretary for Policy and Program Integration, and under an option that maintains the status quo with the current Under Secretary for Policy, it might be useful to establish a separate strategic planning office reporting to the under secretary. At what level this office should be organized is uncertain. In all of these options, it is intended that the strategic planning office would serve the catalyst, coordination, and systems maintenance functions. Much of the initial strategic planning work would be accomplished in the policy elements in the offices of mission-oriented assistant or under secretaries (or under the status quo, the policy-oriented assistant secretaries).

The principal purpose of the strategic planning office would be to establish and to maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process. It may be necessary, however, to have the strategic planning office prepare the first drafts of major planning papers that would then be further developed through interaction primarily among the mission-oriented or policy-oriented assistant or under secretaries, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, and the JCS Chairman.

The strategic planning office should, however, have primary responsibility for scanning the international security environment which is necessary if DoD is to adapt effectively and timely to changes. Having the Net Assessment Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency report to the Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning), as in Options 1B and 1C of Chapter 3, should facilitate the scanning role.

- Option 1F—create a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning

This option proposes that the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning should be established under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This could be done by altering the current position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or by adding a new position.

- Option 1G—reestablish the Joint Strategic Survey Committee or create a Joint Military Advisory Council

It has been suggested that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee which existed in the early years of the JCS should be recreated. This committee, manned by the best young flag and general rank officers, was charged with advising the JCS on broad strategy matters.

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Retired), has recommended the creation of a National Military Advisory Council consisting of a distinguished 4-star officer from each of the four Services. In General Meyer's view, this Council would formulate military strategy and translate policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense into programming direction for the Services.

While General Meyer proposed broad responsibilities for this Council, it will be considered here in a much narrower context dealing only with the need for strengthened strategic planning in OJCS. Specifically, this option proposes the creation of a Joint Military Advisory Council which would focus on the formulation of military strategy. The proposal to create a Joint Military Advisory Council with broader responsibilities is addressed in Chapter 4.

d. make other changes to strengthen the prospects for improved strategic planning

- Option 1H—insulate strategic planners from excessive outside demands on their time

One of the major causes contributing to ineffective strategic planning is continuous outside distractions that divert attention away from planning efforts. It is not possible to completely isolate planners from outside pressures. However, senior officials must set aside and protect the time of their planning subordinates. The creation of a separate strategic planning office (Option 1E) to coordinate and maintain the system should produce additional attention to this management issue.

- Option 1I—strengthen the mission orientation of organizations that contribute to the strategic planning process

The creation of assistant or under secretaries for major mission areas as proposed in Chapter 3 is one possible solution.

- Option 1J—expand the use of net assessments, particularly by OJCS

Net assessments of the current and/or projected relative military capabilities of the United States and her allies and those of potential adversaries and their allies provide extremely useful information on anticipated changes in the strategic environment. This is a useful input before establishing objectives and formulating strategic plans. While OSD has a net assessment office whose work is of high quality, efforts should be made to more closely connect the outputs of this office with subsequent strategic planning. At present the work of this office is not circulated widely enough for its full potential to be realized in the strategic planning process.

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has limited capability for conducting net assessments. It may be desirable to create an office in OJCS with formal responsibilities for such assessments. Alternatively, it may be more desirable to have the OSD net assessment office serve OJCS as well as OSD.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—INSUFFICIENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND FISCAL CONSTRAINTS

Options to strengthen strategic planning presented in the preceding subsection may indirectly enhance the prospects for a stronger relationship between planning and fiscal constraints. There are, however, two specific options to correct this problem area.

- Option 2A—require that the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) reflect the most likely fiscal constraints

If strategic planning is to be more closely connected with fiscal constraints, the most promising action appears to be requiring that the principal strategy document prepared by OJCS be resource constrained. Only through such an approach can the effort of ensuring that ends and means are proportional begin. If it were determined that the benchmarks provided by the fiscally unconstrained Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) continue to be useful, such information could continue to be prepared as part of Step 1 of the strategic planning process either as a separate document or as part of the Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal. However, the JSPD would be constrained by fiscal realities.

Under this option, the JCS would set military priorities in a fiscally constrained environment. This would have the effect of making the JSPD not only the focus of joint military strategic planning, but also the basis for programming. The objective of such an approach would be to strengthen the integrated force structure analysis which should stand between the strategic planning contained in the Defense Guidance and the programming contained in the Service Program Objective Memoranda. It should be noted, however, that the JCS cannot be expected to effectively produce a resource-constrained JSPD unless the institutional weaknesses of that JCS system are overcome.

- Option 2B—alter the strategic planning process to have the JSPD submitted after and based upon the Defense Guidance

The Defense Guidance is the principal element of Step 2 of the strategic planning process in which policy and planning objectives are set and constraints are identified. Accordingly, the Defense Guidance should be promulgated prior to the formulation of strategy which seeks to fulfull these objectives within the prescribed constraints.

This option proposes that the JSPD be submitted after the Defense Guidance is issued. In addition, the JSPD would be based upon the Defense Guidance.

3. PROBLEM AREA #3—ABSENCE OF REALISTIC FISCAL GUIDANCE

Three options to lessen the problem of unrealistic fiscal guidance have been developed: (1) a more formal process for reconciliation of Executive Branch and congressional budgets; (2) earlier Cabinet-level discussions of the Federal budget and Presidential intervention; and (3) administrative changes to PPBS.

- ○ Option 3A—require the President to submit a budget that highlights programmatic differences between Executive Branch and congressional budget projections

With the growth of congressional involvement in the budget process, the lines of constitutional responsibility for the Federal budget have been further blurred. Congressional budget resolutions provide the opportunity for the Executive Branch, as it prepares budget estimates for future years, to review congressional direction and intent. However, this opportunity goes unused when incompatible differences in national priorities continue to separate these two branches of the Federal Government. No mechanism currently exists to reconcile such differences. One suggested method would require the President to submit a budget which outlines the programmatic differences between the budget at levels projected by the Congress and the President's own budget proposal.

- ○ Option 3B—provide for earlier Presidential review of the defense budget

The suggestion of earlier Cabinet-level budget discussion and Presidential intervention is tied directly to lessening the problem of absorbing large reductions, with significant programmatic impact, during the last stages of the budgeting phase —in fact, only a few short weeks before the President's budget is presented to the Congress. An earlier Presidential review is one way to increase the likelihood that necessary budget reductions could be absorbed in a more logical and deliberate fashion.

- ○ Option 3C—require a mid-course correction after the First Concurrent Congressional Budget Resolution or other indications of congressional intent

Other options to establish more realistic or agreed upon budget estimates are more straightforward and administrative in nature, and the application of a basic "mid-course correction" after the Congress disposes of the budget resolution or the authorization bill is probably the most simple.

4. PROBLEM AREA #4—FAILURE TO EMPHASIZE OUTPUTS

The failure of the PPBS to emphasize the output side of the defense program is not a flaw in the process itself. In this instance, PPBS merely reflects basic organizational deficiencies in the Department of Defense. As these deficiencies and possible solutions have been identified elsewhere in this study, separate options are not presented here. It should be noted, however, that if these organizational deficiencies can be corrected or lessened, the PPBS will have the potential to place greater emphasis on mission-oriented outputs.

5. PROBLEM AREA #5—INABILITY OF THE JCS SYSTEM TO MAKE MEANINGFUL PROGRAMMATIC INPUTS

The inability of the OJCS to make meaningful programmatic inputs flows directly from the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system. Options to correct this problem are presented in detail in Chapter 4 and are not repeated here.

6. PROBLEM AREA #6—INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION IN THE PPBS TO EXECUTION OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL

Two options have been developed to lessen the problem of insufficient attention in the PPBS to execution oversight and control.

- Option 6A—expand the PPB system to include a controlling phase

At present, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) is the only forum in which OSD monitors execution. However, the DSARC focuses only on major acquisition programs through major development phases. There is no formal system for review and oversight of the execution of planning, non-major programming, and budgeting decisions.

To offset this deficiency, the PPB system should be expanded to include an explicit controlling phase, thus becoming the PPBCS. Obviously, there would be no reason in this review and oversight cycle to duplicate the work of the DSARC. Instead, the Defense Resources Board could identify critical policy, non-major program, and budget decisions that require continuing management attention to ensure appropriate and effective implementation.

- Option 6B—develop the accounting and management information systems necessary to support effective execution oversight and control

The CSIS report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, recommends that (1) the current obligation-based accounting system should be supplemented with reporting on an accrual basis; and (2) management information systems should be improved to enable decision-makers to evaluate progress toward identified goals. (page 43)

These CSIS report proposals are explained in the following terms:

> *Accrual Accounting*. The Department of Defense should also update and improve its accounting system to provide complete, accurate, and timely cost information to decision makers. The accounting system should record the use of resources on an ac-

crual, as well as an obligational, basis. Accounting on an accrual basis (recording resources as they are expended) is a key factor in improving the evaluation system, in that it would provide the basis for judging the impact of spending on a program in terms of its output.

Management Information Systems. Finally, the Department of Defense should adopt more comprehensive management information systems in order to assess performance in crucial areas such as equipment maintenance and combat readiness. (page 43)

7. PROBLEM AREA #7—LENGTH, COMPLEXITY, AND INSTABILITY OF THE PPBS CYCLE

Options to reduce the length or complexity of the PPBS cycle revolve around reducing the breadth and frequency of planning and guidance reviews and combining the programming and budgeting phases of the cycle. Options to reform the congressional budget process as a solution to PPBS instability are addressed in Chapter 9 of this study dealing with congressional review and oversight.

- ○ Option 7A —redo major strategic planning documents (e.g., Defense Guidance) less frequently to provide more time for thinking and to require less time for the process

While it is important that strategic planning be current enough to reflect the dynamic international environment, it is not difficult to argue that the fundamental security threats to the United States and her overseas interests are well understood and, while evolving, are generally stable over time. Accordingly, planning and policy objectives, once established by a new Administration, need not be reconsidered each year. DoD is already moving in this direction. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on November 10, 1983, Dr. David S. Chu, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, stated:

> ...we recently decided not to rewrite the Defense Guidance "from scratch" every year. U.S. national security objectives do not change radically from year to year, and a major annual rewrite tended only to reopen issues that had already been settled, while neglecting those questions that truly merited attention. (Part 9, page 398)

Moreover, on April 23, 1985, the Department of Defense announced a biennial planning cycle. The press release stated:

> ...the shift from an annual to a biennial planning cycle is expected to result in a more efficient and coherent process, saving considerable manpower and resources, as well as meshing with the proposed two-year defense budget currently being considered by some members of Congress. (DoD Press Release, "Biennial Defense Planning Cycle Announced by Deputy Secretary Taft", April 23, 1985)

This option proposes that certain strategic planning documents be prepared less frequently than the 2-year cycle recently adopted by DoD. The *Defense Resource Management Study* supports this approach:

> The "busy-ness" of the current process is heightened by an inexplicable feature of the system that insists on total review each year, from guidance through implementing programs. Most policy and planning guidance from OSD can truly be only incremental (not cut from whole cloth each year)....Hence, amendments to a standing document, conveniently linked to significant external benchmarks, seem at least as adequate as the current single guidance document (Consolidated Guidance). (page 10)

○ Option 7B —merge the programming and budgeting phases or reduce the time devoted to them

The *Department Headquarters Study* recommended significantly reducing the budget review process by "limiting budget review to pricing refinements and the program implications that result from pricing changes and 'fact-of-life' changes." (page 60) The objective of this recommendation by the *Departmental Headquarters Study* was to avoid the disadvantages of following the programming cycle with an extended budget review that re-examines many of the program decisions. The principal disadvantages were identified as (1) the unbalancing of the overall program through budget changes; and (2) the consumption of scarce staff resources in the re-examining of program issues. It is this latter disadvantage that is of concern here.

Another possibility which is often proposed is the merging of the programming and budgeting cycles. This possibility has been suggested in the context of both shortening the PPBS cycle and eliminating duplication of OSD review.

One of the two major, PPBS-related recommendations of the *Defense Resource Management Study* was to "combine the traditionally sequential program and budget reviews into a single annual review." (page viii) This study also recommended the establishment of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to manage the combined program-budget review. In the current PPBS cycle, the program review begins in June and ends in late August while the budget review is conducted from September through December. The combined program-budget review, as proposed by the *Defense Resource Management Study*, would extend from late August to December.

The *Defense Resource Management Study* describes the combined program-budget review as follows:

> These proposals contemplate programmers and budgeteers acting in a coordinated fashion on the unified program/budget submitted in August....While important mechanical adjustments will have to be worked out in detail, *especially those linkages that permit rapid translation between programs and appropriations*, the general description is clear: a comprehensive review that retains mission and programmatic oversight while continuing in parallel the honest-broker aspects inherent in the review for pricing, scheduling, consistency, legality, executability, and other aspects of financial saleability, through to final decision by the President. (pages 16–17)

The Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies report, *Toward a More Effective Defense*, also recommended a combined program-budget review:

> The programming and budgeting phases of PPBS should be merged into a single process that retains a program and mission orientation, but simultaneously establishes relevant budget inputs. (page 40)

G. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for improving the PPB system that were set forth in Section F. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

1. Options for Dealing With the Problem of Ineffective Strategic Planning

- Option 1A—diminish OSD's focus on resource programs by lessening the role of OSD resource managers

Among the options presented in Chapter 3 for correcting OSD problem areas, there are two sets of options that would indirectly result in a diminished OSD focus on resources. The three options (Options 1A, 1B, and 1C) that propose creation of mission-oriented offices and the two options (Options 2A and 2B) that would streamline OSD would produce a less resource-oriented focus. Given that OSD has failed to fulfill its responsibilities in many important areas—like strategic planning—and that it engages in some degree of micro-management of Service resource programs, there appear to be no disadvantages to this option.

Using the Armed Forces Policy Council or an executive committee of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to make strategic planning decisions seems to have merit. Using the full DRB to formulate plans and policy results in too much emphasis on programming and budgeting considerations. The DRB was not intended to be a strategic planning forum. The *Defense Resource Management Study*, which recommended establishment of the DRB, proposed only that it review program and budget issues.

The Armed Forces Policy Council includes the principal officials of DoD from whose interaction major strategic planning decisions should emerge. This council is the most appropriate DoD forum for making strategic planning decisions. If three mission-oriented under secretaries and an Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) were established, they should be included on the Armed Forces Policy Council (as is currently required by section 171(a) of title 10, United States Code). Even if these four under secretaries were added, the Armed Forces Policy Council would continue to have a strong Service orientation and limited joint military representation. Seven council members—the Service Secretaries and Chiefs—would provide the Service perspective, but only the JCS Chairman would provide the joint military view.

It might be preferable to establish an executive committee of the DRB to make strategic planning decisions. The composition of this executive committee could be the following 12 officials:

Deputy Secretary of Defense —Chairman
Under Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Deterrence)
Under Secretary of Defense (NATO Defense)
Under Secretary of Defense (Regional Defense and Force Projection)
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman and Members, Joint Military Advisory Council
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning)

This committee would have a substantial mission orientation, balanced between civilian and military perspectives. In addition, it would provide a balance between single Service and joint military views. On the whole, an executive committee of the DRB—organized roughly along the above lines—appears to be a more appropriate forum for strategic planning decisions than the Armed Forces Policy Council.

- Option 1B—lessen congressional interest in program details and increase congressional interest in major planning and policy issues

Evaluation of this option is presented in the chapter of this study dealing with congressional review and oversight.

- Option 1C—appoint senior OSD officials with strong strategic planning interests and skills

There are really no disadvantages to this option, for it clearly would be desirable to appoint OSD officials with the highest possible level of strategic planning abilities. There is, however, little that can be done about this by direct legislation. Other points of evaluation are the same as for Option 3A of Chapter 3 which would require that OSD political appointees have strong defense management credentials.

- Option 1D—reorient war colleges and military academies to strengthen the study of strategy and military history

Further consideration of this option is beyond the scope of this study.

- Option 1E—create an OSD strategic planning office

If this option were implemented in conjunction with either Option 1B (mission-oriented under secretaries) or Option 1C (mission-function matrix) presented in Chapter 3, the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would be abolished, and the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) would be created and would report directly to the Secretary of Defense. If the current Under Secretary (Policy) were retained or the position of Under Secretary (Policy and Program Integration) were created, this separate strategic planning office would report to either official.

Much like the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State, any such office in OSD, to be entitled Office of the Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning), would likely be effective only to the degree that the Secretary of Defense had great confidence in the official who headed it and paid close attention to the output and the management agenda of the office. The general belief in the Department of State has been that the Policy Planning Staff has had little real influence under most Secretaries of State; the exact reasons for this lack of influence are not clear. An OSD strategic planning office would clearly have the potential to improve planning and to help shape more coherent policies, but its potential might rarely or never be realized.

It appears that the role of this office must be clearly established and understood if it is to enhance the quality of OSD strategic planning. The planning office should not do strategic planning by itself. If it attempted to do so, its contributions would be minimal. Instead, it should assume responsibility for designing and maintaining an effective strategic planning process. It should serve as a catalyst to activate appropriate organizations in OSD, the Services, and OJCS to have them systematically and comprehensively address and interact on fundamental planning and policy issues. The focus of this office should be on the process and not on plans or policy.

Divorced from the day-to-day responsibilities that currently dominate the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, a separate planning staff should be able to strengthen the strategic planning process. Furthermore, because this office would have major responsibilities for ensuring interaction between line management organizations, it would be useful to create it as a separate staff organization without quasi-line management responsibilities as is the case with the current Office of the Under Secretary for Policy.

One could question the need for an assistant secretary position, as in Options 1B and 1C of Chapter 3, to fulfill these planning process responsibilities. This question can be put aside by the recognition of the importance and current weaknesses of strategic planning in an organization as complex as DoD.

- Option 1F—create a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning

The addition of a Deputy Under Secretary for Strategic Planning might strengthen the hand of the Under Secretary for Policy, enabling him to more effectively carry out his mandate. On the other hand, a Deputy Under Secretary ultimately could have no more effect on the policy planning process than is commensurate with the Under Secretary's own level of effectiveness, authority, and access to the Secretary of Defense. In instances where the Under Secretary is a strong individual with considerable influence with the Secretary of Defense, the addition of a Deputy Under Secretary might indeed have a positive effect on strategic planning; in instances where the Under Secretary for Policy himself does not wield a great deal of influence, the Deputy Under Secretary would be but another body and desk added to the process.

- Option 1G—reestablish the Joint Strategic Survey Committee or create a Joint Military Advisory Council

While this committee or council could improve strategic planning in OJCS, it would not appear to solve planning weaknesses in OSD. Without an improved OSD planning process, the full benefits of strengthened OJCS inputs may not be realized.

This does raise the issue of which and how many DoD organizations should have strategic planning as one of its principal responsibilities. Apparently, the view that only the OJCS should have this responsibility has been widely held. Hammond in *Organizing for Defense* argues that when a proposal has been put forth to improve OSD's capabilities to formulate general policies, "it has been rejected because it challenged the prerogatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the determiners of the military ends for which the military establishment exists." (page 315)

The failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct effective strategic planning is widely recognized. As a result of this deficiency, strategic planning in DoD is dominated (although poorly performed) by civilian agencies. As Samuel P. Huntington has noted:

> In many countries strategic planning is effectively dominated, if not totally monopolized, by the military acting through a central military staff. What is often lacking is an effective civilian counterweight to the strategic advice the military provides the government. In the United States, the situation is almost the reverse. Over the course of several decades, civilian agencies and groups have moved to shape strategy. ("Defense Organization and Military Strategy", page 26)

The loss of influence and a meaningful role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in strategic planning is the result of the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system.

Efforts to strengthen strategic planning should not focus exclusively on OSD or OJCS. Both have an important role to play in their areas of expertise. Moreover, these two organizations should serve as a counterbalance to the strategic advice of the other. In essence, there is a need for civilian-military collaboration in strategic planning. As General Meyer has said, effective military planning requires "much greater interplay between the joint military and civilian leadership." ("The JCS—How Much Reform is Needed?", *Armed Forces Journal International* 119 (April 1982), page 86)

For these reasons, evaluation of options to strengthen the strategic planning capabilities of the JCS system will be presented in the chapter dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- Option 1H—insulate strategic planners from excessive outside demands on their time

Although this is clearly a desirable option, it is not at all clear how it could be achieved except by having senior officials set aside and protect the time of their strategic planning subordinates. The creation of a separate strategic planning staff (Option 1E) may help.

- Option 1I—strengthen the mission orientation of organizations that contribute to the strategic planning process

The most important part of strategic planning is the formulation of an integrated plan of action to achieve the central strategic goals of DoD. In the absence of organizations focused specifically on these strategic goals, effective planning would be more difficult. It is the effective process of interaction of important points of view—functional, mission-oriented, Service —that creates high quality strategic planning. One could argue that the current Offices of International Security Policy and International Security Affairs do focus on these strategic goals. On the other hand, it can be asserted that the focus of these offices is too narrow because it does not have the breadth of a multi-functional, mission orientation. What is missing from the current process is the mission point of view which also includes a multi-functional perspective.

- Option 1J—expand the use of net assessments, particularly by OJCS

Better net assessments would clearly be of use to strategic planning decision-makers; the real problem is in assuring that the best and most objective analyses reach them and that they are able to apply the conclusions in actual decisions. That may be less a matter of organization, than of people. Strengthening the net assessment capabilities of OJCS would have to be designed to improve the overall work of the Joint Staff and ought not to be conceived as an alternative source of net assessment to that now performed by the Office of Net Assessment in OSD. There is no reason for this particular function to be needlessly duplicated in various offices.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF AN INSUFFICIENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND FISCAL CONSTRAINTS

- Option 2A—require that the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) reflect the most likely fiscal constraints

Weaknesses in strategic planning were identified as being reflected in the PPB system, not caused by it. Therefore, while it is possible that the quality of PPBS products could be improved as the result of organizational changes within OJCS or OSD, such changes should not be recommended exclusively for the benefit of PPBS. The PPBS is a process designed to support DoD's organization, not the reverse.

PPBS and other management support processes, however, should be expected to respond to the needs of the organization. Weaknesses in strategic planning may indeed require structural changes in the DoD organization, but the primary relationship of this problem to PPBS lies in the absence of any meaningful connection between fiscally unconstrained planning and resource-constrained programming and budgeting. JCS planning documents will not be taken seriously in the PPBS process until they are resource-constrained.

Administrative changes designed to achieve a more useful relationship between planning and the later phases of PPBS appear appropriate. To this end, requiring the JSPD or its major portions to be fiscally constrained appears to be desirable.

A resource-constrained JSPD would also provide a better strategy document to be used in evaluating the Service POM submissions. OSD and OJCS would be able to analyze the extent to which Service programming is consistent with the strategy. In particular, this would greatly enhance the role that the Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency in OJCS could play in the program review process.

The most negative aspect of this option is that it will force the JCS to establish priorities among the competing strategic interests of the Services. Formulating a resource-constrained strategy will involve difficult choices. It is not clear that the current JCS system with its institutional deficiencies is capable of meeting this challenge.

Another disadvantage of this option appears to be the possibility of a loss of objective and comprehensive assessments of U.S. defense needs, the full identification of which might not be possible if such assessments were totally constrained by fiscal realities. This possible disadvantage could be eliminated by continuing to prepare such assessments early in the planning process but to clearly separate them from the Joint Strategic Planning Document.

- ○ Option 2B—alter the strategic planning process to have the JSPD submitted after and based upon the Defense Guidance

This option appears to be highly desirable. At present, DoD does not have a true strategy document in the resource allocation process. JSPD is not a strategy document, because it fails to make ends and anticipated means proportional.

Having the JSPD submitted after the Defense Guidance would place the strategy document in its logical position in the resource allocation process. By preceding the Defense Guidance, as the JSPD currently does, it formulates strategy before either the desired ends or anticipated means are specified.

Even if the JSPD followed the Defense Guidance and were required to be based upon it, problems with strategy formulation may continue. Most likely in this regard would be the setting of objectives (ends) in the Defense Guidance which are not proportional to projected force capabilities (means). This would be a perpetuation of the "objectives-force mismatch" discussed in Section E. However, requiring the JSPD to be resource-constrained may highlight this mismatch and lead to the setting of realistic objectives in subsequent versions of the Defense Guidance.

3. Options for Dealing With the Problem of an Absence of Realistic Fiscal Guidance

As noted earlier, the absence of realistic fiscal guidance antedates the more recent disagreements between the Congress and the Executive Branch over the size of the defense budget. While fiscal guidance has long been a part of internal DoD documents which provide the foundation of annual PPBS cycles, DoD has frequently failed to establish topline projections that have been sustained through the budgetary process.

- Option 3A—require the President to submit a budget that highlights programmatic differences between Executive Branch and congressional budget projections

Because this issue is more a problem of management than structure or procedure, it follows that the potential solution should be administrative in nature. However, because of the emerging disagreements between Executive Branch and congressional budget priorities, it is not unreasonable to assume that a larger issue is at stake. Creating a formal process for budget reconciliation between Congress and the Executive Branch is an administrative response to a political and policy question. It deserves further study in a broader Separation of Powers context, but is probably not an appropriate solution in the narrow context of problems associated with PPBS.

- Option 3B—provide for earlier Presidential review of the defense budget

Earlier Presidential involvement in the PPBS cycle (perhaps in October rather than in December) could be expected to bring more realistic expectations (as the President himself defines "realistic") to bear sometime before the last days of the budgeting phase. If the President chooses to scale down DoD budget estimates, there should be more time than currently available for careful deliberation; if he endorses DoD's budget estimates, then the process can proceed more normally with fewer "excursions" and greater confidence in the process. Even so, differences between the Congress and the Executive Branch about what constitutes a "realistic" budget estimate may remain.

- Option 3C—require a mid-course correction after the First Concurrent Congressional Budget Resolution or other indications of congressional interest

Current efforts to interpret congressional intent through budget resolutions and authorization and appropriation bills and to apply such projections to outyear budget estimates have been frustrated by congressional inconsistency. Even so, PPBS is the proper forum for topline budget adjustments, and programming problems will increase if the PPBS process is too insulated from broad budget trends. The application of a mid-course correction in the Executive Branch remains an important tool available to DoD leadership that could be used more aggressively to refine outyear budget projections.

4. Options for Dealing With the Problem of the Failure To Emphasize Outputs

Options to solve this problem area are presented and evaluated in other chapters of this study.

5. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE INABILITY OF THE JCS SYSTEM TO MAKE MEANINGFUL PROGRAMMATIC INPUTS

Options to solve this problem area are evaluated in Chapter 4 dealing with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION IN PPBS TO EXECUTION OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL

- ○ Option 6A—expand the PPB system to include a controlling phase

To the extent that the PPB system has not been fully developed as a management control system, changes to expand the system should be made. In an organization as large and complex as the Department of Defense, mechanisms to improve management control are important and should be emphasized.

There is, at least, some recognition that the budgeting phase should include execution oversight and control. This appreciation, however, is not sufficiently widespread. Moreover, the level of necessary attention to the control function is absent. It appears that it is necessary to establish a distinct phase of PPBS to ensure sufficient execution oversight and control.

On the negative side, the PPBS cycle is already too long and complex. In addition, certain aspects of the current system, especially strategic planning, receive inadequate attention. Adding another phase to the system could exacerbate these problems. In addition, a controlling phase would require additional reporting and auditing efforts. However, it does not appear logical to conduct a structured, 15-month resource allocation process and then place limited attention on what actually happens.

- ○ Option 6B—develop the accounting and management systems necessary to support effective execution oversight and control

The current accounting and management information systems of the Department of Defense consume substantial resources, especially manpower, to maintain. There will be great resistance in DoD to increasing the burdens of accounting and information systems to support management control.

There appears, however, to be no alternative to this option. Accounting and information systems must be capable of providing decision-makers information that is critical to the allocation and control of resources.

7. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE LENGTH, COMPLEXITY, AND INSTABILITY OF THE PPBS CYCLE

Two options to correct this problem area have been developed.

- ○ Option 7A—redo major strategic planning documents (e.g., Defense Guidance) less frequently to provide more time for thinking and to require less time for the process

There is no doubt that a great deal of time and energy is spent in the Pentagon—and probably thousands of manhours expended—on paperwork which is little read and which must be rewritten frequently. It clearly appears that some aspects of strategic planning are repeated with few changes from year to year. The objective of increasing staff and management assets available for other PPBS tasks through a reduction in repetitive, strategic planning requirements has merit.

It would be desirable to initiate a major and comprehensive strategic planning effort as soon as possible after the start of a new presidential term. This effort should receive the highest possible priority within DoD for its results will give overall direction to the Department's policies for several years.

In subsequent years, an extensive strategic planning effort may not be necessary, but one that focused on new problem areas (or resolution of old ones) might be more appropriate. This more narrow review would demand less time from senior policymakers and would free strategic planners from a time-consuming process to do more in-depth analyses of difficult planning issues and problems.

Careful and detailed study seems called for to determine which documents could be rewritten and updated less frequently than currently required, and which, indeed, need frequent updating. This study will not attempt to go into this matter in detail. It does appear to be a promising area for additional streamlining of the planning process.

On the other hand, certain documents which may seem to be of relatively minor importance in any immediate PPBS cycle—such as the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)—may, nevertheless, be of considerable importance in helping decision-makers to establish long-term priorities and conduct meaningful planning. Also, the preparation of such documents is an exercise which may be of significant value to those who engage in it, even if the immediate effect on planning and policy is slight. What is important is that a process emerges through which high quality first drafts of planning papers are prepared and through which the Services and mission-oriented integrators later interact to produce coherent strategy, policies, and resource allocations using these papers as vehicles.

On the whole, the 2-year planning cycle recently adopted by DoD will substantially stabilize the planning process and increase staff and management assets available for other PPBS tasks. It may be preferable to gain actual experience with this 2-year cycle before proposing additional streamlining of the planning process.

- ○ Option 7B—merge the programming and budgeting phases or reduce the time devoted to them

Many Service officials have expressed frustration over the "double jeopardy" of two separate reviews (program and budget) at the OSD level. This narrow institutional perspective is buttressed by the actual practice of reductions so large during the budgeting phase that they are tantamount to major program decisions. If more realistic budget constraints were applied earlier in the cycle, there would be less justification for program reviews being made during the budgeting phase of PPBS.

OSD officials expressed the view that, because there is such a distinct difference between the two phases, their combination would produce no net savings of time in the cycle. Jack Quetsch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), presented this view in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

> There is a reason why these phases are separate. We can't simply look at them as separate and assume they are duplicative. In the programming phase, we are testing the candidate programs submitted by the military departments against the guidance that has been developed and against the objectives of the Department.
>
> In the budget phase, we are testing against a wholly different set of criteria. The programs that survive that first test we then test in terms of do-ability, time phasing, pricing, and all the things that matter in putting together a good defensible and doable budget.
>
> Even if we were to combine these two phases, we could not shorten either one of them. All you would do is get a budget submission earlier in order to give us time to do both a program and a budget review. You could not put together a good business-type budget until after you put together the program, so there would be two phases anyhow in which you would have later and less useful input from the military departments. (Part 9, page 400)

Similarly, Dr. Chu, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, testified:

> I am not sure that trying to consolidate those phases will, in the end, save much time. In fact, it might contribute to worse decisionmaking because you need to articulate your broad objectives before you can set down the details of a program. (Part 9, pages 400–401)

Even so, the arguments are divisible. Combining the programming and budgeting phases could be justified on its own merit without necessarily reducing the time or administrative burden involved. However, no judgment on this option was considered necessary in the context of this study.

H. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section E (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section G (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions). Excluded from this list are recommendations that are more appropriately presented in other chapters.

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. The PPB system is capable of responding to changes in policy and management style and generally supporting the management needs of DoD leadership.	

Conclusions	Recommendations
2. The PPB system has no deficiencies so severe that it should be considered the primary reason for changing the fundamental organizational relationships in DoD.	
3. DoD resource allocation is currently hampered by ineffective strategic planning; accordingly, the strategic planning process in DoD should be strengthened.	
4. Both OSD and OJCS have important roles to play in DoD strategic planning; accordingly, efforts should be made to strengthen the strategic planning capabilities of both organizations.	4A. Diminish OSD's predominant focus on resource decisions.
	4B. Form an executive committee of the Defense Resources Board to serve as the primary decisionmaking forum for strategic planning.
	4C. Appoint senior OSD officials with strong strategic planning skills and interests.
	4D. Create the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning) who would be responsible for establishing and maintaining a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process.
	4E. Insulate strategic planners from excessive outside demands on their time.
	4F. Strengthen the mission orientation of organizations that contribute to strategic planning by creating mission-oriented offices.
	4G. Expand the use of net assessments, particularly by OJCS.
5. There is an insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints.	5A. Require that the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) reflect the most likely fiscal constraints.

Conclusions	Recommendations
	5B. Alter the strategic planning process to have the JSPD submitted after and based upon the Defense Guidance.
6. The absence of realistic fiscal guidance results in a loss of much of the value of the PPBS product and undermines confidence in DoD's resource allocation process.	6A. Provide for earlier Presidential review of the defense budget.
	6B. Require a mid-course correction by DoD after clear indications of congressional intent on the topline of the defense budget.
7. The PPB system fails to emphasize the output side of the defense program.	
8. The JCS system is unable to make meaningful programmatic inputs.	
9. The PPB system gives insufficient attention to execution oversight and control.	9A. Expand the PPB system to include a controlling phase.
	9B. Develop the accounting and management information systems necessary to support effective execution oversight and control.
10. The PPBS cycle is too long, complex, and unstable.	10A. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he consider the following options: Redo major strategic planning documents less frequently; and Merge the programming and budgeting phases.

CHAPTER 8

THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the process used by the Department of Defense to develop and procure major weapon systems and other defense equipment. Part of the discussion is concerned with the formulation of military requirements; and part, with the acquisition function itself.

Over the last two years, there has been a great deal of press and public attention devoted to the defense acquisition process. Most criticisms of the process have dealt with subjects and issues that are not organizational in nature, but instead reflect shortcomings in management procedures. The purpose of this chapter is not to consider all defense procurement problems. Rather, the chapter is intended to examine organizational issues. Therefore, this chapter will address only a limited set of acquisition problems that are caused, at least in part, by organizational deficiencies and for which organizational adjustments might be solutions. Moreover, the problems identified in this chapter focus on those organizational relationships that exist among the principal DoD offices: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Military Departments. Excluded are organizational issues that are internal to the Military Departments, such as the structure of the Service buying commands. Though such internal Service issues may be important, they are beyond the scope of this study.

Despite the relatively narrow focus of this chapter, the substantial public interest in non-organizational procurement issues is recognized. For this reason, Appendix A to this chapter discusses the procurement process more generally and identifies defense procurement issues that are not organizationally based. However, since this study is not focused on such general management problems, there are no conclusions or recommendations with respect to issues discussed in the appendix.

B. EVOLUTION OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

1. Prior to World War II

The characteristics of the current defense acquisition process have developed since 1945. Prior to World War II, the Department of War and the Department of the Navy independently developed and used procurement procedures for equipping and supplying their respective Services. During World War I and World War II, attempts were made to establish a central agency to develop government-wide procurement policies and procedures, but in practice specific authority remained decentralized in the Military Departments.

By the end of World War II, a consensus had developed in the Legislative and the Executive Branches that a new organization was needed to coordinate defense production, distribution, and supply, as well as research and development, in the Military Departments. This consensus was a direct result of the World War II experience of trying to manage a full-scale conversion of the national economy from civilian to military production and of the recognition that the importance of science and technology in modern warfare was steadily increasing.

2. National Security Act of 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 established similar mechanisms to coordinate both military procurement and research and development. The Act established a Munitions Board and a Research and Development Board, each consisting of a civilian chairman and representatives of the Military Departments. In practice, inadequacies in the organization of these boards prevented them from performing their statutory functions in an effective manner. Three of the four members of each board were essentially required to judge the requests and programs of their Service. Moreover, the complicated administrative mechanism inherent in the board-type structure prevented the establishment of a clear line of civilian authority from the Secretary of Defense. In recognition of these inadequacies, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board were abolished in June 1953 and their functions were transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The role of the Secretary of Defense in the procurement of major weapon systems, however, remained limited throughout the 1950's. The lack of an integrated DoD resource allocation process allowed each Military Department, using its own resources, to develop and procure weapon systems for the type of conflict that it envisioned. The higher military budgets resulting from the increased international role of the United States following the Korean War presented this system with a twofold challenge. This decentralized decision-making apparatus had to attempt to both efficiently manage the first peacetime defense industry in U.S. history and effectively coordinate military research and development efforts. David D. Acker characterizes the defense acquisition environment of the 1950's as follows:

> Money was authorized to develop almost any new defense system that appeared capable of giving the United States a performance advantage over any potential adversary. Such considerations as "should-cost," "design-to-cost," and "life-cycle cost" were not uppermost in the minds of defense planners until the late 1950's. Both development and production were carried out under cost-reimbursement contracts. In this environment, production costs did not pose a major constraint on engineering design. When a design was discovered to be impractical in production —or to be inoperative in field use —it was modified in accordance with government-funded engineering changes . . .

> The lack of a well-organized and integrated DoD financial management system, along with the practice of "piecemeal" procurement, led to unstable employment in defense industry and the emergence of a transient work force. Many of the contractors being challenged to develop and produce defense systems on the outer fringes of technology found it difficult to create and maintain smoothly functioning program management teams. ("The Maturing of the DOD Acquisition Process," *Defense Systems Management Review*, Summer 1980, page 14)

3. The 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 recognized the need for greater OSD involvement in the acquisition of major defense systems. In addition to providing the Secretary of Defense with greater authority in the administration of defense funding, the Act also gave the Secretary the authority to assign the development and operational use of new weapons to any Military Department or Service. This legislation provided the groundwork for the expanding role of OSD in the management of defense acquisition programs.

4. Program Management Concept

The experience of developing technologically advanced weapon systems also led to the development of an integrated program management concept in the late 1950's. This concept, first formalized by the Air Force Systems Command, uses a centralized authority for the business and technical management of selected tasks. In the case of a major defense program:

> This process consists of a complex cycle that commences with identification of a need and the conception of a system to satisfy the need. The cycle ends —following deployment (and possible modification) of the system —with the retirement of the system from the inventory, or the expenditure of the system in service, as in the case of an air-to-air missile. A program...may be considered as an aggregate of controlled, time-phased events designed to accomplish a definite objective. Often, a program involves a pyramid of contractually interrelated government, contractor, subcontractor, and supplier organizations for long periods of time. In this complex environment, the performance of any one organization can affect the others. ("The Maturing of the DOD Acquisition Process," page 9)

Each Service adopted some variation of this process for the management of major programs. The program management office provided the mechanism for integrating various functional areas and overseeing defense contractors' internal operations that was required by the large number of sole-source contract awards. The program management framework has proven sound in practice, although such centralized management can result in the type of layered bureaucracy that stifles innovation and flexibility.

5. Secretary McNamara's Tenure

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, whose tenure spanned much of the decade of the 1960's, used the authority provided in the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 to centralize the resource allocation process in OSD. This action had a direct impact on defense acquisition management. Secretary McNamara introduced the concept of systems analysis as an integral part of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). An OSD office was given responsibility for conducting cost-effectiveness analysis of the different means to accomplish specific defense objectives. The results of these analyses were used in the selection of weapon systems for development and production. While the effectiveness of the resulting decisions was difficult to assess due to the absence of a quantifiable "right answer," systems analysis did provide an organized method to allocate limited resources.

Concern for greater efficiency in defense procurement led to the consolidation of most defense contract administration functions under the Defense Contract Administration Services in 1963. OSD also began issuing major policy directives emphasizing cost reduction in defense acquisition. The number of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts was reduced in favor of incentive and fixed-price contracts. Life-cycle cost —the total cost of acquisition and ownership —was made a principal consideration in the selection of systems and contractors.

The desire to introduce an aspect of accountability into PPBS and to respond to industry concerns about the proliferation of resource management systems and reporting requirements led Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Dr. Robert Anthony, to issue a series of DoD Directives beginning in 1966. These directives set up more rational resource reporting and management systems, including the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR's), for major defense programs. The systems were designed to reduce the reporting burden on contractors while providing more pertinent information to the program manager and information required by the Office of Management and Budget, the Treasury Department, and the Congress.

6. Secretary Laird's Tenure

At the end of the 1960's, the major concerns with the defense acquisition process were the inadequate ability to estimate and control costs and the lack of flexibility in the acquisition process. The Congress had also begun to reduce the defense budget to fund domestic programs. In response, the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and his Deputy, David Packard, took a number of actions to improve the defense acquisition process.

Secretary Packard established the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) within OSD to advise him of the status and readiness of each major defense system to proceed from one program phase to the next in its life cycle. Membership on the DSARC has included most of the senior managers within the Department of Defense, the composition of the individual boards depending on the specific program. The DSARC was intended to provide a mechanism for careful deliberation and evaluation before a decision to proceed to the next phase of the acquisition process. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) was formed in 1972 to provide independent cost estimates on programs before the DSARC and to set uniform DoD cost estimating standards.

In May 1970, Secretary Packard returned to the Services the responsibility for identifying needs and defining, developing, and producing the systems to satisfy those needs. OSD was to maintain responsibility for acquisition policy, to ensure fulfillment of mission needs, and to monitor the progress of major programs through the DSARC process. This shift was intended to improve the defense acquisition process by decentralizing authority and responsibility to the Services and the individual program managers.

Throughout the decade of the 1970's, further steps were taken to improve efficiency in defense acquisition. As a result of the recommendations made by the Commission on Government Procurement in 1972, DoD initiated a policy of focusing greater attention to alternative concepts at the "front end" of a program in order to reduce costs in later phases of the program. Then, in 1973, the senior military commanders responsible for acquisition issued a memorandum of agreement on joint program management among the Services as a means of reducing costs through standardization.

7. Secretary Weinberger's Tenure

In April 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and his Deputy, Frank Carlucci, issued 32 initiatives to improve the defense acquisition process. The major focus of these initiatives was cost reduction through greater program stability, more accurate cost estimating, and economic production rates. Also included in the 32 initiatives was the decision to try to strengthen the DSARC process by reducing the number of programs to be reviewed as well as the number of the phases in each program requiring review by the Secretary of Defense.

C. CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES FOR ACQUISITION

The acquisition process for the Department of Defense is extremely complex. Numerous elements of the Military Departments and OSD are involved in the process. This section briefly describes the major organizations and procedures involved in the DoD acquisition process.

1. The Buying Commands of the Military Departments

The major responsibility for acquisition, maintenance, and support of weapon systems lies with the so-called "buying" commands of the Military Departments. These are the Army Materiel Command, Air Force Systems Command, Air Force Logistics Command, and the five systems commands of the Navy. The Navy systems commands were, until 1985, collected under the Naval Material Command. That command was disestablished, and the systems commands (Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and Naval Supply Systems Command) now exist as independent organizations. The Marine Corps does not have a buying command comparable to that of the other Services. It is involved in operations of the Navy systems commands, however, and generally relies on buying commands of other Services to conduct its procurement.

The buying commands generally execute their acquisition responsibility for major weapon systems through program management offices. These offices consist of a program manager and other personnel assigned to the program manager. The program management office is responsible for the overall supervision of the program. The office has a contracting officer assigned to it, or a contracting officer from another organization within the buying command may be designated to support the program office.

The buying commands typically include a number of activities in addition to those committed to program management. For example, the Air Force Logistics Command operates five air logistics centers, which perform maintenance on Air Force systems. The Naval Sea Systems Command operates a number of naval shipyards, and the Naval Air Systems Command operates naval air rework facilities. Each buying command operates a series of laboratories as well as numerous test ranges and other facilities.

2. Acquisition Oversight in the Secretariats of the Military Departments

The Secretariat of each Military Department includes an office to provide oversight of that Department's acquisition activities. The Department of the Army has an Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition; the Department of the Navy has an Assistant Secretary for Shipbuilding and Logistics; and the Department of the Air Force has an Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Each of these officials, together with their staffs, represent the interests of their Service Secretary on acquisition issues.

3. Acquisition Oversight in the Service Military Headquarters Staffs

The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force each have reasonably large staffs to oversee the acquisition activities of the Service. For example, there is a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition; a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force with the same title; Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, and Air Warfare, and a Director of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; and a Deputy Chief of Staff for the Marine Corps for Research, Development, and Studies.

These military officers are involved in both the process that generates requirements and in monitoring acquisition activities for the Service Chiefs. In the Navy, the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations are primarily formulators of requirements. In the Army and Air Force, the formulation of military requirements is conducted primarily by commands in the field but ultimately is reviewed and coordinated for the Service Chief by the appropriate Deputy Chiefs of Staff. All of these offices are responsible for monitoring the activities of the buying commands on behalf of the Service Chiefs.

4. Defense Agencies

Certain Defense Agencies are also involved in the acquisition process. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is responsible for the centralized purchasing of a number of items which the Services use. In many cases, DLA purchases items that are not related to the maintenance of weapon systems. Since weapon system acquisition is the primary focus of this discussion, the role of DLA in the purchase of more general types of items is not given substantial attention. Subsequent portions of this chapter do, however, discuss the contract administration services performed by a part of DLA, the Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS).

A Defense Agency which has an important role in the acquisition process is the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). DCAA is the centralized auditor for DoD. The agency is responsible for the auditing of all defense contracts. The Director of DCAA reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), but audit policy for the Department is now provided by the DoD Inspector General.

5. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

As OSD is presently organized, two key OSD officials have essential responsibilities for defense procurement: the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics). The second position was created as a result of a reorganization in 1985 by Secretary Weinberger. The reorganization resulted in a readjustment of some of the responsibilities of the USDR&E, who previously had been the DoD Acquisition Executive and who had been responsible for acquisition policy as well as all research and development.

Under the new organization, USDR&E continues to serve as the chief scientific technical advisor to the Secretary on military requirements. He is also responsible for the conduct of the DSARC process at Milestones I and II (demonstration and validation and full-scale development), and his staff is structured to provide the Secretary with an ability to comment on particular military requirements and materiel programs of the Services.

The Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) is responsible for the conduct of the DSARC process at Milestone III (full-scale production). He also has responsibility for logistics and installations. The new position was created for several reasons. First, it brings the acquisition elements of logistics (such as spare parts procurement) together with the acquisition of major weapon systems. Second, it permits a senior DoD official to focus on all acquisition program and policy questions, while not having a substantial part of his attention diverted to the development of military requirements and to scientific and technical issues related to such requirements.

Reporting to the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Logistics) are three Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Procurement, Production Support, and Spares. These three individuals reflect the acquisition responsibilities of the new Assistant Secretary. (There are also Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Logistics and Installations.) Thus, the Assistant Secretary is charged with establishing procurement policy on a department-wide basis, and policies established in his office are to be observed by the buying commands of the Services.

Neither of these OSD officials, however, has line management responsibility for acquisition, maintenance, and support of weapon systems. The Military Departments have this responsibility. Thus, for example, the Commander of the Air Force Systems Command would report to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force who, in turn, would report to the Secretary of the Air Force.

6. The Acquisition Process

The acquisition process begins with the conduct of a threat analysis which evolves into the establishment of an operational requirement. For example, if the Marine Corps determines that it requires a landing craft which would have access to a larger percentage of the world's beaches than existing landing craft and which would have a higher speed than existing craft, a military requirement for such a landing craft would be established. If the Navy determines that it needs an anti-submarine warfare helicopter with certain capabilities, then that operational requirement would be established. Both requirements would reflect the capabilities of potential adversaries.

Once the military requirement is established, the acquisition process proceeds through the stages of concept exploration, demonstration and validation, full-scale development, and into production until initial operational capability of the system is reached. The approval to advance to each stage of this process is provided through the DSARC process.

The DSARC process was established in 1969 pursuant to DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2. The Secretary of Defense must approve the initial Justification of Major System New Start (JMSNS) to begin the process. The next major milestone, Milestone I, occurs prior to the demonstration and validation stage. Milestone II involves the decision to enter full-scale development, and may involve approval for limited production. The full production decision occurs at Milestone III. The length of time between new start approval and Milestone III is today approximately 8 to 12 years.

The principal DSARC members and advisors include the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering); the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of the Military Department concerned; appropriate Deputy Under Secretaries; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the Director, Defense Test and Evaluation; and the Chairman, Cost Analysis Improvement Group.

The DSARC is typically concerned with issues such as the transition from development to production, affordability, cost growth, test results, inventory objective, joint Service program coordination, efficient production rates, and acquisition strategy.

D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

This section discusses four problem areas that have been identified within the acquisition process and presents analyses of their contributing causes. First, there is an insufficient assured connection between national military strategy and the formulation of military requirements. The second problem area is failure to achieve feasible and desirable levels of military equipment commonality. Weak management of, and general resistance to, joint programs is the third problem area. The last problem area is the lack of effective departmental coordination of acquisition.

In each of these problem areas, the causes are domination of the requirements formulation process and acquisition system by the Military Departments and insufficient coordination, review, and integration by other elements of DoD, primarily OSD and OJCS. This theme will recur in the discussion of each of the four problems, but its central importance indicates clearly that solutions to the problems require the enhancement of the coordination and integration role of elements of DoD other than the Military Departments.

1. INSUFFICIENT ASSURED CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORMULATION OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

The process of determining what types of weapon systems and other defense equipment the United States buys is highly complex. As noted earlier, the process usually begins with a threat assessment of the military capabilities of potential adversaries. It is of critical importance to understand the capability of individual systems of potential adversaries, as well as the aggregate military capability of various types of adversary forces.

This threat is then considered in the context of U.S. national security commitments, and policy and planning objectives for U.S. military force capabilities are set. This should be followed by formulation of a national military strategy. Such a strategy would consider possible scenarios that might arise in different parts of the world and would plan for the use of military force, as appropriate, to deal with such scenarios. Part of this strategy would be the structure of forces to counter the threat. A key component of the force structure is the type of equipment available to United States forces.

Thus, a critical element in defense planning is the establishment of requirements for new military equipment. Such requirements should evolve from an assessment of the threat, existing United States military capabilities, and the national military strategy (which should reflect national commitments).

Consider, for example, the case of a new attack submarine, which is, in fact, currently being planned by the Navy. In the development of the requirement for the submarine, the Navy would consider the missions of such a platform and the relative capability of potential adversaries, in this instance the Soviet Union. Since one mission of an attack submarine is anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the Navy would regard the relative noise level of Soviet submarines as an important factor in determining how quiet American submarines would have to be in order to effectively perform the ASW role. In terms of offensive capabilities, the military requirement would have to reflect the anticipated use of submarines in the national military strategy. To what extent would submarines be based forward to attack enemy naval vessels in time of war? To what extent would submarines be responsible for keeping sea lines of communication open? What role, if any, would attack submarines have in the support of strategic missions? The answers to these questions should flow from the national military strategy; the type of platform that is built should reflect that strategy and the intended employment of attack submarines in various scenarios.

The concern, then, which is the first problem in the acquisition process portion of this study, is that there is not an assured connection between the national military strategy and the formulation of military requirements. The reason that the term "assured connection" is used is because it would be an overstatement to say that there is no connection. In many cases weapon systems that are developed fit well with the national strategy. Such a fit may exist more through chance than as a result of a careful planning process that assures such a fit.

This is not to say that the Services are procuring equipment which serves no military purpose. The issue is whether the platforms and weapons that are identified as new requirements are the most appropriate platforms and weapons to execute an integrated, unified military approach, not the approach of a single Service. For example, if the Air Force designs a new fighter, that fighter should ideally reflect the view of how four Services on a unified basis will fight in certain scenarios. There may be a difference, however, between the Air Force's view of its role in these scenarios and the views of the OJCS and unified commands of the Air Force role. If the Air Force defines requirements to reflect its own view of its role, then, though the aircraft procured will obviously have military value, it may not be the optimal aircraft to perform all of the unified missions required of it.

This problem may arise even more dramatically in the case of the failure of a Service to develop a capability to perform a particular mission at all, if its own plans and strategy do not reflect national military strategy. Consider, for example, a scenario in which hostilities might arise approximately 1,000 miles inland, and the successful rapid insertion of heavy land forces in sufficient numbers to be effective is considered unlikely. The American response to such a scenario would probably rely, at least initially, exclusively on air power. Does the process for developing military requirements assure that one of the Services will have developed aircraft capable of performing this mission? There is a concern that the process does not do that, particularly if the Service involved conceives its mission priorities differently than they are envisioned in the national military strategy.

The task of developing military requirements is essentially a Military Department function. The process by which this is done is different in each of the three departments. In the Navy, for example, requirements are established by the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare, Surface Warfare, and Air Warfare. These vice admirals and their staffs are part of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and generally decide on new requirements for ships, aircraft, and weapons. There is, of course, input from the fleet and from the naval laboratories.

In the Air Force, the process of formulating requirements is somewhat more decentralized. The requirements formulators are predominantly the headquarters of the operating commands —the Strategic Air Command, the Military Airlift Command, and the Tactical Air Command. Proposals for requirements are then considered by the Air Staff (the staff of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force).

The Army system is somewhat similar to that of the Air Force, in that the three major combat arms (infantry, armor, and artillery) and their supporting elements formulate requirements, which are then considered by the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Recommendations regarding new requirements are then transmitted for review to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Ft. Monroe, Virginia, and finally to the Army Staff.

Through these processes, the Services exercise primary responsibility for the development of requirements for new military equipment. The OJCS has a limited role, as do the unified and specified commands. The staff of the USDR&E is also chartered to be involved in the process of requirements formulation, but that office has far fewer resources than do the individual Services.

Because of Service dominance of the process by which military requirements are formulated, there is, as discussed earlier, a reasonable concern about whether these requirements fully reflect and support national military strategy. As noted, a particular Service may envision its role in various operational scenarios differently than the role contemplated for the Service in the overall national military strategy. Similarly, where a Service role is predominantly in support of another Service, there may be insufficient coordination between the two Services to assure that equipment developed for the supporting role is the optimal type of equipment. For example, in theory, if the Air Force were developing a multi-purpose air platform to perform combined missions, such as a general air-to-ground mission as well as a close air support mission, the Air Force might prefer a platform that would emphasize the general air-to-ground role (which would be an independent Air Force mission) as opposed to the close air support role. The Army, on the other hand, might prefer a platform with greater close air support capabilities. In either case, it is unclear that any neutral mediator —either OSD or the OJCS —could effectively direct a balance between mission capabilities in the platform based upon an understanding of national military strategy and priorities.

2. Failure To Achieve Feasible and Desirable Levels of Military Equipment Commonality

Though each Service obviously buys a number of weapon systems that are uniquely required for the missions of that Service, there are also systems and subsystems for which the general need is common among two or more of the Services. The opportunities for commonality vary depending upon the particular situation. In some cases, such as an air-launched missile, the same munition might theoretically be appropriate for all of the Services. In other cases, such as that of aircraft, it might be possible for one Service to make some modifications to the aircraft of another Service, rather than developing an entirely new aircraft. In addition, there are inevitably types of subsystems —such as radars, computers, and electronic countermeasure units —that might be commonly used in weapon platforms of more than one Service.

The Marine Corps, for example, relies almost completely on equipment procured for other Services to meet its needs. Much Marine Corps ground equipment is Army equipment, and the Marine Corps has for some time used carrier-capable aircraft procured by the Navy. The example of the Marine Corps is relatively clear evidence that there are substantial opportunities for common utilization of military equipment or the incorporation of common elements into various weapon systems.

For many of the same reasons that explain the insufficient assured connection between national military strategy and the formulation of military requirements, the amount of commonality in military equipment appears to be far less than might be desirable. Since the Services are responsible for the development of military requirements, the tendency is for each Service to develop a system uniquely tailored to the needs and mission which that Service seeks to perform. There is nothing necessarily sinister about this tendency; it is a natural desire of professional military officers to have equipment which best suits the specific needs and mission of their Service. There is always the concern that an emphasis on common utilization may force a compromise in capability in order to accommodate the needs of two or more Services. There is also the belief that lack of commonality confounds the enemy and complicates its task of responding to United States forces.

Nevertheless, given the very high cost of major weapon systems today and budgetary pressures faced by the country, every opportunity to achieve procurement economies by the common utilization of systems or subsystems ought to be explored. The structure of the Department of Defense as it now exists does not appear to be ideally suited to promote such exploration.

3. WEAK MANAGEMENT OF, AND GENERAL RESISTANCE TO JOINT PROGRAMS

A joint program is one in which two or more Services are participating in the development and acquisition of a weapon system. In such a program, the Services may ultimately buy the same item or variants of an item to reflect Service-specific needs, missions, and requirements. It appears that historically there have been significant management problems with such programs. The difficulties with managing joint programs generally flow from the difficulty in getting agreement on joint requirements. As noted in the discussion of problem area #2, the Services are reluctant to compromise on specifications or equipment capabilities. There are legitimate differences in the doctrine, tactics, and technical needs of various Services. Moreover, one Service may be willing to commit a greater amount of resources to satisfying a particular military requirement, because it is relatively more important to that Service than another Service.

If a joint requirement can be established, however, there are also problems in achieving effective joint program administration and management. Presently, when a joint program is to be undertaken, OSD appoints a lead Service which then appoints the program manager. Though the program manager has primary responsibility for staffing the program office, the participating Services in the joint program also assign representatives to the program office.

Often, these representatives will not be co-located. In some cases, such as the Joint Cruise Missile Project, co-location of all of the joint program participants was directed.

The joint program office, however, seems to have many of the conflict of interest problems that the Joint Staff does (which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4). These are briefly summarized in work conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) on this subject:

> Representatives appointed to the joint program have divided loyalty —to their continuing Service affiliation, and to the ad hoc joint program. They are in the program first and foremost to protect their Service's interest. Promotions and reassignments are done by the parent Service. Several sources told us that officer careers have been blighted due to loyalty conflict when the parent Services were cool toward the joint program. ("Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy," December 23, 1983, page 25)

Exceedingly difficult demands are placed upon a joint program manager. He is responsible for obtaining funds from participating Services, negotiating requirements disputes, keeping all the necessary components of the project under contract, dealing with different chains of command, and trying to maintain the program on schedule. There are numerous review ladders in a single Service project; there are even more in a joint program.

Some of the problems associated with joint programs should be relieved by the establishment of the Joint Requirements and Management Board. This is an instrument of the JCS which has been charged with examining potential joint military requirements; identifying, evaluating, and selecting candidates for joint development and acquisition programs; chartering study groups to identify concept definitions, joint requirements, and joint management issues; providing oversight of cross-Service requirements and management issues; and resolving Service issues that arise after a joint program has been initiated. The board consists of the Vice Chiefs of Staff of each Service and the Director of the Joint Staff. Also, the Services have demonstrated an awareness of and concern about this problem. For example, the Joint Logistics Commanders issued a thoughtful study in July 1984 on joint programs, in which the management weaknesses discussed here were recognized.

4. Lack of Effective Departmental Coordination of Acquisition

A simple review of the organization of procurement in the Defense Department should make it clear why there exists a lack of complete coordination in the acquisition process. As has already been noted, the Services control the process. Though there are officials in OSD who are charged with setting procurement policy or otherwise monitoring aspects of the acquisition process, those officials have no direct line management responsibility over the Service buying commands.

Thus, though OSD procurement policy officials control department-wide regulations, further regulatory direction comes from the Services, the buying commands within the Services, and even the buying divisions within the buying commands. The Services not only negotiate contracts for major weapon systems and for the support of such systems, but usually administer the contracts as well.

As a result of this Service domination of acquisition, there may be inconsistent policy or contracting practices. There is also a difficulty in establishing effective departmental standards and practices regarding the acquisition work force and the transfer of personnel between the procurement commands of the various Services.

It should be emphasized that the observations made here regarding this problem are a summary of the inevitable weaknesses of any decentralized system. There obviously, as is discussed later, would be other weaknesses of a highly centralized system. Many knowledgeable people believe that to the extent inconsistent practices exist among the Service buying commands, they have no tangible adverse impact on the overall performance of the system. The basic challenge in considering DoD organization is to determine whether a centralized or decentralized system offers relatively greater opportunities for effective acquisition, maintenance, and support of weapon systems.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

Possible solutions to the problem areas in the acquisition process are described in this section. The options presented in this section may or may not be mutually exclusive. In some instances, the implementation of one option would preclude the implementation of other options; in other cases, several options could be implemented.

1. PROBLEM AREA #1—INSUFFICIENT ASSURED CONNECTION BETWEEN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORMULATION OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

- Option 1A —enhance the role of the OJCS in the evaluation of military requirements

Section 141 of title 10, United States Code, assigns the following duties, among others, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces; and
- review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistics plans.

Beyond these duties, the JCS system is responsible for overseeing the development of contingency plans. While much of the contingency planning is actually performed by the operational commands, the JCS system sets the framework and reviews operational plans.

These duties for strategic planning (which is part of the resource allocation process) and contingency planning make the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specially qualified to evaluate military requirements and to determine whether Service-identified requirements are consistent with strategic and operational plans. While military requirements focus on future warfighting needs, the connection that the OJCS provides with current deficiencies —as made evident by contingency plans —is important.

This option envisions that there would be a specific staff capability in the OJCS to assess the military requirements for each new major weapon system. This assessment would independently review the threat and the mission for which a military requirement has been established, and would either validate the particular requirement or propose adjustments to it.

For example, if the Navy proposed a new class of attack submarines of a certain size, speed, quietness, and weapons carrying capability, the OJCS under this option would prepare a military requirement assessment that would evaluate the relative appropriateness of the requirement as defined by the Navy, given an independent review by the OJCS of the threat, the Navy mission, the quantity of attack submarines required to perform that mission, the affordability of the new submarine design, and other pertinent factors.

- Option 1B —enhance the role of OSD in the evaluation of military requirements

A second alternative for assuring greater connection between the national military strategy and the establishment and validation of military requirements would be to substantially increase the size and capabilities of the staff of the USDR&E, and to call upon that staff for a more thorough review of military requirements. Presently, notwithstanding substantial criticism of the overall size of OSD, it is clear that the staff of the USDR&E is much smaller than that of the Services performing comparable functions. In fact, the program office alone for some individual weapon systems would exceed the size of the entire staff of USDR&E. Thus, if the Under Secretary seeks to question the validity of a military requirement established by the Services, the Services have far greater staff capability and expertise to justify the established requirement than does OSD to challenge it. If OSD is to be a more effective counterbalance to the Services in evaluating military requirements, then it needs to have more substantial and broader-based staff capability.

2. PROBLEM AREA # 2—FAILURE TO ACHIEVE FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE LEVELS OF EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY

- Option 2A —create structures to promote communication among users, requirement formulators, and procurers of similar types of weapon systems

As noted earlier, the development of military requirements involves users, those charged specifically with requirements formulation, and the buying commands. Therefore, one means of promoting greater commonality of weapon systems or components would be to require the establishment of inter-Service committees of users, requirements formulators, and acquisition professionals. For example, if commonality in fixed-wing, high performance aircraft were sought, there would be a committee consisting of members of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps wings; another committee consisting of representatives of the requirements formulators in the Tactical Air Command, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, and the Office of the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation; and another committee consisting of officers assigned to the Aeronautical Systems Division of the

Air Force Systems Command and the Naval Air Systems Command. Such committees are already being established in the acquisition community. For example, in June 1985, the Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group, the Joint Commanders Group for Communications-Electronics, and the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group were established.

It is recognized that the further establishment of structures like those described in this option would not necessarily overcome problems of Service loyalty, since this option does not contemplate anyone having directive authority. Rather, this option simply ensures exchange of information among users, requirements formulators, and procurers, so that commonality can be voluntarily achieved to the extent that any single Service sees value in utilizing the approach of another Service.

- Option 2B —enhance the role of OSD

The same approach suggested earlier for an enhanced staff capability in the office of the USDR&E for the purpose of ensuring the linkage of the national military strategy to the formulation of military requirements could be utilized to promote greater commonality in military equipment. This responsibility already lies with USDR&E; the issue is whether USDR&E has adequate resources to identify and promote all appropriate common utilization opportunities.

- Option 2C —consolidate the buying commands

There has been some discussion about a possible consolidation of all of the buying commands of the Services into a single department-wide acquisition agency. This option is described at greater length under problem area #4. While consolidation of the buying commands would not necessarily promote greater commonality among whole weapon systems, since the buying commands are not responsible for formulating requirements, such consolidation might promote greater commonality among components of weapon systems.

- Option 2D —develop a larger number of joint programs

Though there have been problems with the management of joint programs, the mechanism of joint program development may in certain cases be an effective option for achieving greater commonality. If a program is conducted jointly, then it offers the potential for obtaining commonality of equipment.

A joint program does not ensure complete common use of equipment, since in many cases the mission requirements of each Service will vary and equipment will have to be modified to reflect individual Service mission requirements. This was the case, for example, with the joint cruise missile project. But even with substantial differences in types of cruise missiles, the joint program offered an organizational structure for using common components to the maximum extent possible. The joint program structure also ensured that technical achievements in cruise missiles were readily available to each Service and could be incorporated into all variations of the missiles.

3. PROBLEM AREA # 3—WEAK MANAGEMENT OF, AND GENERAL RESISTANCE TO, JOINT PROGRAMS

- Option 3A —let DOD manage all joint programs and assign a program manager

Under this option, OSD —either through USDR&E or through the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics —would be the direct manager of all joint programs. The responsible official at OSD would appoint the program manager, either a military officer or a civilian, who would then be directly accountable to the appointing OSD official.

Presently, the program manager for a joint program is from the Service with the lead responsibility for the program. Under this option, OSD would assume the management responsibility for joint programs.

- Option 3B —reserve a block of OSD funds to finance the development phases of joint programs

GAO has surfaced as an option in its report on joint programs the possibility of setting aside a block of OSD funds for joint major system development. According to the GAO study, the underlying rationale for this proposal is that the Services might be more willing to maintain a commitment to a joint program if development were "cost free."

- Option 3C —ensure that OSD protects the funding levels for joint programs

In those instances where joint programs are justified and joint funding is appropriate, OSD should ensure through the budget process that participating Services fully fund their portions of the effort. OSD already has the authority to do this through the established budget preparation procedures. It would simply have to exercise that authority.

4. PROBLEM AREA # 4—LACK OF EFFECTIVE DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION OF ACQUISITION

- Option 4A —consolidate the buying commands

This option has already been mentioned as a possible alternative for dealing with the problem of lack of commonality of military equipment. Under this option, the independent Service buying commands would cease to exist, and there would be a centralized defense procurement agency within the Defense Department, presumably headed by a senior civilian presidential appointee in OSD. This type of centralized procurement has been used by France among other countries.

The creation of a consolidated acquisition agency separate and apart from the Department of Defense has also been suggested. That particular option is not analyzed in this study, since it seems that any agency should appropriately be part of the Department and accountable to the Secretary of Defense.

- Option 4B —have the commanders of the buying commands report directly to a senior official in OSD

Under this option, the buying commands would continue to exist in their present form. However, the military commanders of the buying commands would no longer report to the Service Chiefs of Staff or to the Service Secretaries. Instead, they would report directly to a senior official in OSD. In other words, OSD would become the line manager for the buying commands under this option. This type of procurement organization is currently used in the United Kingdom.

- Option 4C —strengthen OSD coordination using existing structures

Under this option, there would be no change in the basic departmental structure. Instead, the Secretary would simply be urged to put sufficient support behind USDR&E and the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics to assure that the policy initiatives of those individuals and their staffs would be observed by the buying commands. Under the present highly decentralized acquisition system, there is some question about whether centralized direction from OSD has sufficient top-management support to be effective.

- Option 4D —consolidate contract administration

Rather than a consolidation of the entire buying commands, another option to address this problem would be the consolidation of the contract administration services only. The Defense Contract Administration Service of the Defense Logistics Agency already represents a consolidated contract administration service for certain contractors. However, the contract administration function for most major weapon systems and major contractors still lies with the Services. Since this results in one Service administering contracts for other Services, and since each Service has its own approach to and policies for contract administration, the suggestion has been made that at least contract administration should be a consolidated activity.

F. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the acquisition process that were set forth in Section E. No effort will be made here to compare these options with each other or to identify the most promising options for legislative action. Rather, this section seeks to set forth in the most objective way possible the pros and cons of each alternative solution. The options will be identified by the same number and letter combination used in the preceding section.

1. Options for Dealing With the Problem of Insufficient Assured Connection Between National Military Strategy and Formulation of Military Requirements

- Option 1A —enhance the role of the OJCS in the evaluation of military requirements

Greater involvement of the OJCS in the assessment of military requirements has substantial potential value. First, the OJCS, together with the unified commands, develops various operational plans.

Second, the OJCS has a major role in formulating national military strategy. Therefore, the OJCS should fully understand the underlying strategy, doctrine, tactics, and approach to various types of operations, and should be in an excellent position to judge whether certain newly specified military requirements are consistent with current and future needs.

Third, the OJCS should be the repository of extensive professional military judgment, in that most of the personnel assigned to the OJCS are military officers. Since the question of appropriateness and validity of a military requirement in large part requires such military judgment and experience, it follows that the OJCS should be an effective and competent reviewer of requirements developed by the Services. The OJCS is likely, however, to be unable to forcefully evaluate military requirements unless the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system —as identified in Chapter 4 —are corrected.

- Option 1B —enhance the role of OSD in the evaluation of military requirements

The major advantage of increasing the size and breadth of the staff of USDR&E is that such a civilian staff should be well positioned to be an independent evaluator of requirements proposed by the Services. In addition, to the extent that civilian control of various DoD decisions is desirable, this would result in substantial civilian control over one of the key types of decisions the Department of Defense makes —what new weapon systems to develop and produce.

There are potential problems, however, with greater utilization of the OSD staff as the primary evaluator of Service military requirements. The OSD staff has historically had no access to the operational plans developed by the OJCS, has a limited role in the formulation of national military strategy, and has limited professional military expertise. To the extent that the responsibility of any independent evaluator of Service-developed military requirements is to ensure the fit of such requirements with operational and strategic plans, access to or understanding of such plans and related military judgment are essential ingredients to perform the job. In addition, some thoughtful observers already believe that OSD is unwisely micro-managing the Services in many areas, including acquisition programs. This option could increase such micro-management tendencies in OSD.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF FAILURE TO ACHIEVE FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE LEVELS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY

- Option 2A —create structures to promote communication among users, requirements formulators, and procurers of similar types of weapon systems

At a minimum, it would seem that there should be mechanisms to promote communication among users, requirements formulators, and procurers of similar types of weapon systems. Formal structures to ensure communication among individuals in different Services involved with similar types of equipment would appear to be essential in order to make certain that Services were aware of what other Services were doing. Thus, the recent effort of the Joint Logistics Commanders to create the joint commanders groups is most welcome. It must be recognized, however, that while the existence of structures of this type would promote communication, they would not ensure commonality.

- Option 2B —enhance the role of OSD

One of the presumed roles of the USDR&E should be to search for opportunities for commonality in military equipment and to take whatever actions might be required to prevent unnecessary duplication of such equipment. USDR&E should be able to require common approaches to weapon system requirements, when it is determined that such a common approach is feasible and desirable. In addition, USDR&E should be a repository of department-wide knowledge about technical capabilities, and should, therefore, be able to identify opportunities for common utilization of weapon systems or components of weapon systems.

- Option 2C —consolidate the buying commands

If there are strong arguments for consolidation of the buying commands, an issue that is discussed at somewhat greater length later, those arguments do not have to do with the formulation of military requirements. Since the buying commands do not formulate requirements, but become involved only in the execution, consolidation of the buying commands would not necessarily promote common utilization of weapon systems. Such consolidation might, however, promote utilization of a greater number of common components.

Each of the buying commands of the Services is presently an exceedingly large organization, and there is a real and serious question about whether a consolidated command would be manageable. In addition, a consolidated command would almost certainly take away the supervisory responsibilities of the Service Secretary and Chief. It remains to be seen whether such extreme centralization would have more advantages than disadvantages.

- Option 2D —develop a larger number of joint programs

The issue of joint programs is discussed at greater length in the discussion of problem area #3. It should be adequate to state at this point that a joint program is the most direct means of obtaining common utilization, if it is determined at the outset that two or more Services can use the same type of equipment, either in identical form or with only slight modification.

3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF WEAK MANAGEMENT OF, AND GENERAL RESISTANCE TO, JOINT PROGRAMS

- Option 3A —let OSD manage all joint programs and assign a program manager

The main advantage to giving OSD a controlling role in joint programs is that, though a number of military officers serve in OSD, it institutionally has no Service bias or affiliation. As already indicated, one of the problems in the management of joint programs is that it is difficult to maintain equal Service commitments to various programs. Controlling these programs through a program manager reporting directly to an OSD official might relieve that problem. In addition, OSD should have the technical expertise to manage programs, and it should have the detachment from any

Service interest to resolve disputes about technical requirements that are raised.

This would be a significant role change for OSD. Some of the other impacts of this change are summarized by GAO:

> It would alter the character and structure of USDRE, requiring enlargement of control and the scope and depth of the staff. It might have to infringe on the military service —doctrine, capability selection, and service expenditure choices. It would be at odds with DoD administration's favoring decentralizing the decision-making to the Military Departments. ("Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive Strategy," page 32)

The primary shortcoming of this option is that OSD presently exercises no line management over the various programs. Therefore, it would almost certainly not be well equipped to suddenly exercise such line management. The buying commands, on the other hand, already have very large program management organizations and the staff support that these require.

- Option 3B—reserve a block of OSD funds to finance the development phases of joint programs

The primary advantage of reserving department-wide funds, rather than Service funds, to finance the development phases of joint programs is that the Services might be willing to cooperate in joint program development if their own resources were not being used. However, there is some question as to whether this would truly be the perception, since set-aside funds are still defense money and would probably be viewed as such in the eyes of the Services.

- Option 3C—ensure that OSD protects the funding levels for joint programs

As has already been noted, OSD could achieve control of joint funding with existing authority, if it chose to exercise it. This option should theoretically pose no difficulties to anyone, since OSD should, with respect to all departmental programs (whether joint or single Service), be exercising sufficient control over the budget to ensure that resources commensurate with the importance of the program are committed. OSD could certainly use this same authority and discretion to maintain sufficient support of all Services for joint programs which it regards as programs of critical importance.

4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF EFFECTIVE DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION OF ACQUISITION

- Option 4A—consolidate the buying commands

The theoretical benefits of a consolidated acquisition agency are relatively apparent. There would presumably be common policies, common contract administration, greater coordination of departmental research efforts, greater flexibility in staffing, and other similar related benefits which should arise from having one procurement agency.

On the other hand, each of the existing buying commands of the Services is already an exceedingly large organization, and a consolidated agency might be unmanageable.

The Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 directs the U.S. General Accounting Office to conduct a study of the feasibility of creating a consolidated acquisition agency and asks GAO to identify advantages and disadvantages of such a plan. It would seem essential to have a very detailed feasibility analysis and exceedingly careful study before any action as far-reaching as this option was undertaken.

In addition, it might generally be desirable to look toward more incremental means of achieving greater coordination and integration of the buying command activities. Incrementalism offers the benefit of being able to make careful adjustments at different stages of the process. There is always the concern with any change as massive as consolidation of the buying commands that substantial unforeseen problems might result.

- Option 4B—have the commanders of the buying commands report directly to a senior official in DoD

Option 4B is similar to the present system in the United Kingdom. Though the Ministry of Defense in Britain has procurement agencies in each Service, the senior official in the Service responsible for procurement reports to the Minister for Defense Procurement.

Under this option, there would be no change in the buying commands of the Services, but there would be a line reporting relationship directly into OSD rather than through the Service military and civilian chains of command. The advantage of this option is that it would give the senior OSD acquisition official control over the individuals actually performing procurement. Presently, for example, the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics is limited in his ability to affect results. He may issue guidance, directions, or policy, but the implementing officials work for the Services. If those individuals worked for the responsible OSD official, then there should be far greater OSD control over day-to-day procurement activities.

A primary drawback of this option is that it is inconsistent with the general management policy of decentralization of the present Administration. Both the Service Chief of Staff as well as the Service Secretary would probably regard it as totally unacceptable to have all the acquisition functions of the Service removed from their jurisdiction. They might well feel that some of the most important areas of management were no longer under their control.

In addition, the process of weapons development and acquisition is one that must be carefully related to operational realities. Creating a reporting relationship directly into OSD would reduce the interaction between users, requirements formulators and the acquisition community.

- Option 4C—strengthen OSD coordination using existing structures

This option is another of the type where OSD technically has the authority to provide coordination, but may not be exercising that authority. The question, then, is whether or not OSD coordination efforts have sufficient top-management support to require Service conformance with established policies. It would seem that this should be unobjectionable, since presumably if OSD issues a policy, it would be implemented by the Services.

○ Option 4D—consolidate contract administration

The primary advantages of consolidating contract administration services are that plants would not shift from one Service to another for contract oversight purposes if the balance of business at a plant shifted from one Service to another; no Service would have its contracts overseen by officials of another Service; and there would be uniform contract administration policies, practices, and procedures.

The view has been expressed that the Services, through their plant representative offices, do an effective job of contract administration. It is not clear, however, whether the Services do the job of contract administration more professionally than the Defense Contract Administration Service. Service control of contract administration would seem to be preferred to consolidated administration only in those instances where tangible benefits from Service control can be shown.

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the acquisition process. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. There is insufficient assured connection between national military strategy and the formulation of military requirements.	1A. Enhance the role of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of military requirements by requiring the OJCS to prepare an assessment of newly specified military requirements.

Conclusions	Recommendations
2. There is a lack of commonality of military equipment, both with respect to entire weapon systems and components of weapon systems; this results in unnecessary duplication of expense to the Department.	2A. Create formal structures to promote communication among users, requirements formulators, and procurers of similar types of weapons systems to enhance full exploration of opportunities for common utilization.
	2B. Provide the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) with adequate staff resources to act as an advocate for common utilization of military equipment where feasible and desirable.
3. There has been weak management of, and general resistance to, joint programs.	3A. Urge OSD to more forcefully use existing budgeting authority to ensure that Service financial commitments to joint programs are commensurate with the priority of such programs.
4. There is a lack of effective departmental coordination of the acquisition process.	4A. Urge OSD to more forcefully use existing authority to require, where appropriate, common acquisition policies and practices by the Services.

APPENDIX A

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ISSUES

As noted earlier, there has been extensive public and congressional interest over the last two years in the defense acquisition process. The purpose of this study is not to consider all of the issues related to that process. Nevertheless, because of the substantial interest in defense procurement generally, a brief identification of organizational issues related to defense acquisition would be useful. While this appendix will identify problems, questions, and issues, it is not intended to reach conclusions or to present solutions.

1. Cost of Weapon Systems

One of the most fundamental concerns about defense procurement is whether weapon systems are being purchased at minimum cost. There are any number of reasons that a system may cost more than it should. First, the military requirement may be excessive. In other words, the Service responsible for establishing the requirement may have specified more capability than that which is necessary to meet the expected threat and defined mission need. Second, the equipment actually procured may exceed the requirement to a greater extent than is desirable. Third, the design selected for a weapon system to meet the requirement may be relatively more costly to build than other possible designs. This may be true either because the design is unduly complex or because the design does not accommodate economic manufacture. Fourth, the production process used by the contractor may not be optimal from a cost standpoint. Fifth, the contractor may simply fail to achieve performance goals in production. Many of the acquisition problems discussed later in this appendix also have an impact on weapon systems cost.

There has been renewed attention to this issue as a result of the recent release of a study by the Contract Management Division of the Air Force Systems Command. The study reported conclusions from a comparison of the actual performance of several defense contractors with the standard work hours of certain manufacturing operations. Though there is some dispute about the methodology of this study, it concludes that the actual hours spent in the production of those weapon systems examined was substantially in excess of the standard hours.

Because the United States has a numerical disadvantage in most weapon systems when compared with the Soviet Union, and because substantial Federal budget deficits may severely constrain defense budget growth in the foreseeable future, acquiring weapons at minimum cost is critically important. Lowering the unit cost of comparable weapon systems is directly translatable into greater quantities and thus additional military capability. The challenge, therefore, is to define military requirements which are appropriate but not excessive; to meet, but not unnecessarily exceed, the requirement; to select a design which is less costly than competitive alternatives; to optimize the cost of production lines; and to ensure that production workers are encouraged by incentives to meet or exceed production standards.

Of course, there are a number of other factors which affect contractor cost. Does the contractor have sufficient incentive to make capital investments which will lower overall production costs? Is the quantity procured annually generally an economical quantity for production purposes? Does the contract reward the contractor for cost-savings and thus create tangible incentives for efficient operation?

Finally, there has been extensive interest in the last year in overhead costs incurred by contractors and charged against contracts. Specifically, there has been a concern that government regulations on the types of general and administrative costs which the government will pay are too vague and that the system for the submission, audit, and final settlement of such costs is inefficient. Legislation to address these concerns was part of the Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985. (At the time this study went to press, the conference report on the fiscal year 1986 defense authorization bill, which included the Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985, had been passed by the Senate and was awaiting action in the House.)

2. Cost Estimating and "Should Cost" Studies

The Department of Defense performs two substantially different types of cost estimating. The first type is the estimate of the likely cost of the weapon system done during its development. This type of cost estimating is essentially for budgetary purposes to facilitate decision-making on the long-term affordability of a particular program. The congressional emphasis on independent cost estimates over the last several years, as well as the work of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), has largely been focused on this type of cost estimating. Such cost estimating efforts try to determine, for example, at the stage of concept exploration and then at subsequent stages into and through full-scale development what the cost of developing, procuring, and supporting a particular system is likely to be.

A different type of cost estimating relates to efforts of the Department to know what a contractor's production cost should be for a particular system that is already in production. These "should cost" studies generally require a very large, multi-skilled team, with substantial technical expertise, to actually go into a contractor facility to independently ascertain whether the manufacturing operation is relatively efficient or can be improved.

The Congress has also had an interest in the second type of independent cost estimating. A provision in the Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 would require the Secretary of Defense to develop an annual plan identifying those major weapon systems for which "should cost" studies are to be performed in any given year.

The need for independent, accurate cost estimates of both types described here is apparent. The challenge is to develop mechanisms that will provide the Department with an enhanced capability to develop accurate estimates both of the long-term budgetary type and of the "should cost" type.

3. COMPETITION

There have been few subjects that have received as much congressional and public attention as that of competition for weapon systems and spare parts. In 1984, the Competition in Contracting Act was enacted into law (Public Law 98-369). This measure made substantial changes to federal procurement law in order to limit those circumstances under which non-competitive procurements were permitted. In addition, the Congress passed the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-525) and the Small Business and Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-577), both of which included numerous provisions that were intended to permit the government to compete a larger percentage of procurements by DoD and other agencies.

If structured properly, competition offers the opportunity to reduce cost. Concern is sometimes expressed that competition for major weapon systems in DoD may place relatively too great an emphasis on the technical quality of proposals and other non-price factors, while placing insufficient emphasis on the price that is offered. A properly structured competition should ensure that the government obtains the lowest price for comparable items.

The interest of the Congress in promoting competition has also been evidenced by legislative provisions to establish competition advocates within the Services. The Services have established competition advocates in every buying command. Though there is some concern about the large number of individuals who have been committed to this effort, there is nevertheless preliminary evidence that competition advocates are having a salutary impact in promoting competition in instances where it was not previously being achieved.

There is also substantial concern over the appropriate amount of competition at different stages in the procurement process. For example, at concept exploration it would be desirable to have extensive competition and to permit competitors to submit widely varying proposals for meeting identified mission needs. The number of competitors will usually have to be reduced as the process proceeds through demonstration, validation, and full-scale development. In many cases, only one full-scale development source has been funded, and there is often only one production source funded for major weapon systems.

There has also been a long-standing interest in the question of whether or not competitive prototypes should be produced in development for the purpose of selecting a production source. For example, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 included among its recommendations the greater use of competitive prototypes and less reliance on paper studies. Though there are obvious advantages to competing actual prototypes, it is apparent that this is very costly.

Recently substantial emphasis has been placed on trying to obtain dual source procurement of major weapon systems, where it appears economical to do so. Under dual source procurement, two contractors are maintained throughout the period of time in which the system is acquired, with an annual competition between the two contractors. Some of the benefits of dual source procurement can be obtained even where similar (but not identical) items are purchased, as is the case with the current Air Force aircraft engine competition.

Provisions of the Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 establish a presumption of having two sources in both development and production unless certain criteria for exception are satisfied. It is apparent that significant congressional attention to the need for greater competition continues, and a strong view predominates in the Congress that competition has numerous benefits in addition to the cost-saving opportunities that it provides.

4. SOURCE SELECTION PROCEDURES

The present source selection process involves the establishment by the buying command of evaluation criteria for proposals. Typically, the evaluation criteria will include such elements as the quality of the technical proposal, the management of the proposer, integrated logistical support that can be provided, and cost. The risk of a proposal is also carefully evaluated. These selection factors may be weighted in whatever manner is agreed upon in a buying command.

There are a number of questions that are periodically asked about the source selection process. For example, there is an interest in whether greater emphasis should be placed on the prior performance of contractors in source selection. There is also a concern about whether designs chosen in source selection give appropriate consideration to manufacturing factors, reliability, maintenance, production cost, and life-cycle cost.

There is always a concern in the source selection process about "buy-ins." A buy-in occurs when a contractor bids less than it anticipates its costs are likely to be under the contract, with the expectation that it will make the program profitable either through changes in the initial contract or through subsequent contracts.

Dealing with appropriate trade-offs between technical excellence and cost; ascertaining how to treat prior performance; and preventing buy-ins are all challenges of the source selection process. Source selection procedures should also encourage alternate design proposals during the development of the concept of a new major weapon system.

5. CONTRACTOR PROFIT

There is always interest in the appropriate level of profit which defense contractors earn. Since the defense procurement process is based upon virtually all major weapon systems being developed and produced by private industry, it is necessary to permit contractors to earn a sufficient profit to attract equity capital. At the same time, there is a justifiable concern that profits earned by defense contractors not be excessive.

The Department of Defense has recently released a Defense Finance and Investment Review (DFAIR) study. This study considers appropriate levels of contractor profit to reward risk and attract investment capital.

6. PROGRESS PAYMENTS

The Department of Defense utilizes progress payments to finance contracts. Where progress payments are permitted under a contract, a contractor periodically receives a certain percentage of the expenses actually incurred in the performance of the contract.The appropriate percentage for progress payments and the basis for such payments have recently been disputed. The Secretary of Defense reduced the progress payment percentage from 90% to 80% in 1984. In addition, the Congress has included in the Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 a provision which requires that progress payments be commensurate with work that meets the quality standards established in the contract that has been accomplished. The DFAIR study, which was mentioned earlier, also considers the subject of progress payments.

7. PROGRAM STABILITY

The lack of stability in the acquisition of many systems has often been cited as a major reason for increased cost and other program difficulties. Stability basically refers to the expectation that a predictable and relatively economical amount of a system will be procured annually. An unstable program is one in which the procurement amounts fluctuate substantially from year to year.

One of the mechanisms most effectively used in the past to achieve program stability has been that of multiyear procurement. Under a multiyear procurement, a contractor receives a contract for several years. By having a firm government commitment to purchase a system for several years, the contractor should have a greater financial basis upon which to make capital investments to increase the efficiency of production, to enhance productivity, and to lower costs. The incentive to do these things may only exist if the contractor realizes greater profits as a result of these efficiencies. Greater contractor profit may also be tied to a lower price to the government, so both parties may benefit.

A number of members of Congress have expressed substantial interest in the establishment of a two-year defense budget. Though there are many reasons for a two-year budget (they are discussed in Chapter 9), one justification would be the stability in procurement which such a budget could create.

8. TRANSITION FROM DEVELOPMENT TO PRODUCTION

The subject of managing of the transition from development to production has also received a great deal of attention in the last several years. The Defense Science Board issued a major report on the subject in 1983. It has been found on a number of occasions that many problems in a given program arise because of inadequate planning of the transition from development to production. There may have been inadequate attention during full-scale development to manufacturing issues. There may not have been adequate investment during development or at the start of production to achieve economy in the production process. Or there may have been excessive concurrency between development and production.

Such concurrency often introduces substantial risk into programs. It is clear that attention to this transition stage of the acquisition process is of fundamental importance and that further improvements can be made in the manner in which the transition is planned and managed.

9. CONFIGURATION CONTROL

It has long been recognized that one of the major sources of cost growth in a weapon system is changes made during production. Changes tend to be very expensive. In addition, there is the further problem that the amount to be paid a contractor for changes that are agreed upon are negotiated in a sole source environment, since the contractor already has the work in progress and there is often no way to compete the amount to be paid for a particular change.

Increased attention has been given over the last several years to trying to achieve and maintain configuration control. In a program like the B-1 bomber, where a ceiling was placed on the cost of the program, especially tight control was recognized as essential. Similar efforts to assure that only minimum changes are made once a system is in production are key to controlling the cost.

10. GOLDPLATING AND OVER SPECIFICATION

A great deal of attention has recently been paid to problems described as goldplating and over-specification. As the terms are used here, they refer to two different problems. Goldplating basically means giving a system more capability or additional capabilities than are required to meet the threat.

Over-specification, on the other hand, essentially means either writing specifications in so much detail that they exceed that which is necessary to meet the military requirement; or providing specifications which exceed the military requirement. For example, a great deal of attention was given in 1985 to a hot beverage warmer for the C-5 aircraft. There was some concern that the hot beverage warmer may have been overspecified. Without determining whether or not the allegation is correct, the assertion means that the specifications for the hot beverage warmer may have been unnecessarily complex, thus requiring the manufacturer to produce a more expensive warmer, while perhaps a functional specification would have permitted the substantial use of a commercial design. Alternatively, the assertion could be understood to mean that a functional specification issued to a designer exceeded reasonable requirements for the item.

These are inevitable problems in weapon systems design. Management techniques that provide constant attention to these problems are essential.

11. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE

Administration of DoD contracts is generally accomplished on major weapon systems through the presence at manufacturing facilities of a DoD plant representative, either from a particular Service or from the Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS), a part of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

The purpose of all these offices is to represent the interests of the Federal Government with respect to defense contracts. The offices typically include individuals who are responsible for quality control, administering changes, supervising progress payments, and all other day-to-day aspects of contract administration.

Partially as a result of the quality assurance problems that arose in 1984 with some defense contractors, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of on-site plant representative offices. Nevertheless, the basic structure and organization of these offices seem to be a relatively efficient and effective means of representing the government's interest in administering contracts.

12. DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AND REVIEW

The Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed Services held a hearing in 1985 on the coordination of defense contract audit and review activities. Though the witnesses appearing on behalf of DoD asserted that there was not duplication of various audit and review activities, evidence presented to the Committee indicated that the coordination of these activities was not nearly as perfect as their testimony suggested. For example, there was evidence that at least four different DoD entities (the Defense Contract Administration Service, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the buying command of a Service, and the Inspector General of DoD) were conducting executive compensation reviews.

Though it is true that DCAA by charter has the exclusive responsibility for the audit of contractor costs and other financial data, numerous other DoD entities have some review responsibilities which are in the nature of audits. The report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the fiscal year 1986 DoD authorization bill urges the Secretary to ensure the proper coordination of DoD audit activities, and suggests that a lead agency be appointed for each type of contractor audit or review.

13. WEAPONS TESTING

The subject of weapons testing has received a great deal of attention over the last two years. In the fiscal year 1984 DoD Authorization Act (Public Law 98-94), a separate Office of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) was established in OSD, with a Director of this office to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The purpose of this office was to set department-wide policy on operational testing.

Though the policy for operational testing is now set on a centralized basis as the result of congressional action, the responsibility for actually conducting such operational testing still lies with the Services. Virtually all of the test ranges, test equipment, and other test assets are owned by the Services. For example, a Navy entity called the Operational Testing Force (OPTEVFOR) has been responsible for some time for designing and conducting effective operational tests for all new Navy equipment and for providing an independent analysis of such equipment. The Army and Air Force have similar organizations.

There is also substantial attention to developmental testing. The policy on developmental testing is established by a Director of Defense Test and Evaluation, who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). Thus, the establishment of policy, implementation, and oversight of operational and developmental testing have been separated in OSD.

The creation of the new Director of OT&E resulted from a concern that operational testing was not being conducted in a sufficiently rigorous fashion by the Services at appropriate times in the acquisition cycle. The stated goal of the sponsors of the provision to create this office was to ensure appropriate Service attention to operational testing and to require that independent test reports be prepared by the Director of OT&E and submitted to the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

Though the office was only recently activated, the candor of its recent report on the effectiveness of the Sergeant York Divisional Air Defense Gun (DIVAD) has created substantial confidence that the office is operating as anticipated. There is a continuing need to ensure that weapons testing procedures are thorough and adequate.

14. ACQUISITION WORK FORCE

There has been continuing attention to the quality of the acquisition work force, including both military officers and civilians. First, there has been a concern about the qualifications of military officers assigned as program managers for major weapon systems or to other positions in the acquisition, maintenance, and support functions. Though impressive career planning for acquisition professionals exists in some situations, in the Services, a number of individuals with little or no procurement experience have still been given responsibility for major programs.

The Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy held hearings in 1984 and 1985 on the acquisition work force and, as a result of those hearings, included provisions in the Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 which would establish minimum standards for training and prior experience for individuals appointed either as program managers of major weapon systems or as general or flag officers in the buying commands of the Services. In addition, there has been continued interest by the Committee in the establishment and maintenance of a distinct career path for individuals pursuing acquisition as the primary part of their careers.

Substantial interest has also been expressed in the caliber of the civilian work force. There is evidence of serious problems in the grades available in the civil service, the ability to attract competent new personnel, and training and development incentives that can be offered to civilians.

15. PERMISSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF DOD OFFICIALS WHEN THEY LEAVE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Another subject that has received substantial attention over the last several years has been the so-called "revolving door." This issue generally refers to the question of the type of employment that individuals who have served in DoD in acquisition roles should be allowed to accept when they leave the Federal Government.

Some recent legislative proposals have required that an individual involved in any procurement function related to a particular contractor should be ineligible to accept employment with that contractor for a period of time, varying from two to five years, depending upon the proposal. The Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 includes a provision which would prohibit a presidential appointee who served as a primary representative of the government in negotiations with a contractor from accepting employment with that contractor for two years. Other provisions in the legislation make it clear that an individual may not negotiate employment with a defense contractor at the same time that the individual is negotiating on behalf of the government with that contractor, and also strengthen the reporting requirements applicable to individuals who leave DoD and accept defense contractor positions.

16. ACQUISITION OF SPARE PARTS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

Few subjects related to defense acquisition have received more attention over the last two years than the acquisition of spare parts and support equipment. Support equipment is the specialized equipment that must be purchased to support a system. For example, a special tool required for the installation of a particular spare part on a system would be support equipment. Since support equipment is often designed for only only one system, and then may be purchased in relatively small quantities (because it is used as a tool in the maintenance of the system, not as a spare part itself), such equipment often appears to be very expensive. The development cost of a particular item of support equipment may be high, and that cost may be distributed over a very small number of units.

There has been substantial attention on the part of both the Congress and DoD to the question of prices of spare parts and support equipment. In the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984, a number of provisions were intended to increase competition in spare parts procurement, and to ensure that the government obtains necessary technical data to permit competition in the reprocurement of spare parts. In addition, in the last two years numerous reports have been prepared by each Service and by OSD on the spare parts problem.

The Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 requested a report by the Secretary of Defense on the progress that has been made in solving the spare parts problem. That legislation identified the following as major causes of the problem:

(1) Some parts have been built to overly detailed specifications.

(2) Some parts have been designed and fabricated in such a manner that excessive engineering and manufacturing steps have been involved, resulting in a price in excess of the intrinsic value of the part.

(3) Some parts have been purchased in very small, and thus highly uneconomic, quantities.

(4) Some parts have had inappropriate amounts of corporate overhead assigned to them, resulting in a price in excess of the intrinsic value of the part.

(5) Some parts have not been purchased directly from the manufacturer, and thus the government has unnecessarily paid an additional profit to the seller.

(6) Some parts have not been purchased through a competitive process.

(7) Some parts have been sold with unreasonably high profits included in the price.

The 1985 legislation requires the Secretary to report to the Congress on whether each of these problems has been solved and, in the event that any problem is not solved, to propose changes to regulations or statutes that would enable more progress to be made.

There is some evidence that the effort to assure reasonable prices for spare parts has not been without some cost. For example, preliminary reports indicate substantial increases in the time necessary to acquire spare parts, notwithstanding significant additional personnel being committed to this function.

17. TECHNICAL DATA AND PROPRIETARY RIGHTS

One element of the spare parts problem that has received particular attention is that of technical data and a contractor's proprietary rights in that data. One difficulty that DoD found in its efforts to compete the acquisition of spare parts related to technical data. The Department found in some cases that it had not purchased the data from the original contractor that would permit it to compete the re-procurement of a particular spare part. In other cases, the government found that, though it had apparently purchased the data, the data could not be located, was incomplete, was not fully legible, or had not been properly updated, so that it was effectively not useful for re-procurement of spare parts. In other cases, the government found that though it had obtained the data, a contractor had asserted proprietary rights in the data. In other words, the contractor asserted that the government had no right to release the data to other private parties. Such proprietary rights were usually asserted in situations where the data had been developed at private expense (generally as part of a commercial product) and then used for the military items sold to the government.

The Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984 directed the Secretary of Defense to issue new regulations on technical data and proprietary rights in technical data. The required regulation has recently been issued. DoD should establish a rational policy which will provide direction for obtaining a sufficient amount of data to permit competitive re-procurement of spare parts in appropriate cases, while not obtaining other large amounts of data that will have little usefulness. At the same time, the predominant view in the Congress has been to respect the proprietary rights of contractors which have developed certain items at private expense, though the Congress has specifically permitted DoD to establish limitations on the amount of time during which proprietary rights may be asserted, if DoD wishes to do that. In taking this approach, the Congress rejected proposals that would have established a mandatory statutory limitation on the period of time for which proprietary rights can be asserted on items sold to DoD.

18. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE VARIOUS BUYING COMMANDS

In 1985, the Navy disestablished the Naval Material Command, which had been a single organization responsible for all Navy acquisition and logistics. There had, at the time of its disestablishment, been five subsidiary commands of the Naval Material Command, with a four-star admiral designated as the Chief of Naval Material. After the reorganization, there are five systems commands, each headed by a flag officer, the most senior of whom is a vice admiral. In addition, the staff which had previously been the headquarters staff of the Naval Material Command has been shifted to the Office of Naval Acquisition Support. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics is acting as the Navy member of the Joint Logistics Commanders.

These adjustments by the Navy raise some question as to the most desirable organizational structure of the buying commands of the Services. The Air Force Systems Command continues to have a headquarters organization headed by a general, with subsidiary buying commands (Aeronautical Systems Division; Electronic Systems Division; Space Division; Armaments Division; and Ballistic Missile Office). The Army has a headquarters at the Army Materiel Command, also headed by a general, with various buying divisions (Tank-Automotive Command; Aviation Systems Command; Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command; Missile Command; Communications-Electronics Command) reporting to the headquarters.

The Navy action raises the issue of whether a procurement organization with or without a centralized headquarters element is relatively more efficient. A general concern about the total size and complexity of all of these organizations is raised by Dr. Edward Luttwak in his book, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*. Dr. Luttwak is highly critical of what he views to be the unduly bureaucratic organization of the Air Force Systems Command, as well as its very large size.

There are several presumed effects of the Navy adjustment. Obviously, the change provides more direct access for the commanders of the various systems commands to the Chief of Naval Operations and his staff, to the Secretary, to the Assistant Secretary for Shipbuilding and Logistics, and to other appropriate members of the civilian secretariat. It would appear that the major issue involved in determining whether or not a Naval Material Command headquarters is valuable is whether the headquarters was an effective coordinator, integrator, and manager of systems command decisions

Even if the Navy assessment that, on balance, the Naval Material Command should be disestablished is correct, it does not necessarily mean that the Navy experience is immediately translatable to the other Services. Virtually all of the Navy buying activities are located in the Washington, D.C. area. This is substantially different than the Army and Air Force, where the various buying divisions are distributed around the country. Thus, even if the Navy decision is sound for the Navy, it may be more necessary for the Army and Air Force to have a Washington-based headquarters staff to assure proper integration and coordination of the various buying activities of each of those Services.

It is reasonably clear that a fresh look at the organization, size, and structure of the buying commands of all the Services would be useful. These are immense organizations of great complexity and there are probably opportunities to improve their organizational effectiveness.

19. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ROLES

Though the majority of individuals at all of the buying commands of the Services are civilians, the top management positions, including positions in program management, are held by military officers. Proposals have been made to turn the process of acquiring weapon systems over to civilians. Some believe, however, that it is essential to have military officers with meaningful operational backgrounds and experience in the most important acquisition positions. Others believe that there is no need for a military officer to devote his career to being an acquisition specialist, and that if acquisition is to be one's exclusive career, then it should be a civilian career. The pros and cons of both positions can be argued, though it is clear that whatever the role of civilians in acquisition, substantial involvement of the military is necessary in order to obtain meaningful input on operational realities.

Further attention to the appropriate distribution of responsibility between military officers and civilians would be useful. Should there be more civilian program managers than there presently are? What should be the distribution between military officers and civilians in the various program offices? Can civilians of outstanding ability be attracted into acquisition work at DoD despite numerous civil service impediments? These questions, of course, relate closely to the question of the professionalism of the acquisition work force which was discussed earlier.

20. PROGRAM MANAGER AND CONTRACTING OFFICER AUTHORITY

The primary responsibility for planning and contracting for various procurement programs should lie with the program manager and the contracting officer. The program manager has responsibility for general supervision of the program. The contracting officer has the authority to contractually obligate the Federal Government. It is the procurement contracting officer's responsibility to negotiate contract details and to prepare solicitations and contracts.

Some concern has been expressed recently over whether program managers and contracting officers have sufficient independence in the execution of their responsibilities. Some believe that excessive involvement and review by higher level officers outside the buying commands have compromised the authority and responsibility of both the program manager and the contracting officer, and that this dilution of responsibility weakens the acquisition process. The General Accounting Office is presently conducting a study of this and related issues.

21. CONTRACTOR INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES

In 1983, the House Appropriations Committee gave a great deal of attention to the system by which contractors are permitted to charge a certain pre-established amount of independent research and development expenses to corporate overhead for reimbursement by the government.

Under the present system, contractors which have previously done business with the Department of Defense are permitted to negotiate advance agreements with the Department on independent research and development (IR&D). An IR&D plan is prepared and reviewed by the Department, and this plan becomes the basis for the advance agreement. Under the agreement, the contractor is permitted to spend a certain amount of money on IR&D (that is, research and development on areas of interest to the company and not funded by particular governmental solicitations). If these amounts of IR&D are spent by the company, such amounts may then be considered corporate overhead and charged against other contracts with the Federal Government.

The rationale behind this program is that any high technology company, in order to maintain leadership and business growth opportunities, must do a certain amount of independent research. In the commercial world, this independent research is paid for in the cost of the products. For example, when one purchases an automobile, the purchase price of the automobile includes a certain amount of money which pays for the research activities of the automobile manufacturer. Since the government may be the predominant customer of a number of defense contractors, the justification for permitting the inclusion of some IR&D in corporate overhead is that the government should act as other commercial customers would and should pay these costs as legitimate costs of doing business. The government believes that it receives substantial benefit from the incorporation in specific equipment of advances made through IR&D expenditures.

There have from time to time been proposals made to try to either reduce the amount of IR&D that is chargeable to contractor overhead, or to more closely control IR&D. Greater controls would be inconsistent with the spirit of corporate independent research and development. In any case, it appears that congressional concerns from 1983 have been, at this time, adequately addressed by the Department.

22. RESEARCH AND DOD LABORATORIES

The process by which DoD conducts research in support of its programs is immensely complex. Much of the research is conducted by the Services through the buying commands. Some is done in the numerous laboratories operated by each of the Services. Other parts of the research are done through Federal contract research centers. There is also extensive research contracted with universities and corporations.

In addition, important research projects are coordinated by offices in OSD. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) reports to USDR&E. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization is responsible for extensive research in the area of strategic defense.

It is apparent that the coordination of all these various research activities is of central importance. Coordination is critical for at least two reasons. First, it is important that all potential users of research products be aware of research that is being done and of the results of such research so that it can be appropriately incorporated into hardware. Second, there is obviously a need to prevent unnecessary duplication of research efforts from the standpoint of minimizing research costs.

Further attention should be given to means for coordinating the research activities managed by the Services and OSD to ensure the maximum utilization of research products and the prevention of duplicated research efforts, where such duplication is not likely to be of value.

23. Length of Time in the Acquisition Cycle

A subject that is almost always cited when a critique of the defense procurement process is made is that of the time involved from the development of the concept for a new weapon system to the initial operational capability of the system. This period of time now often exceeds ten years.

Defenders of the acquisition process will quickly point out that this lengthy time is often planned into the system. For example, in the view of the Air Force, initial operational capability for the advanced tactical fighter is not required before 1995. Nevertheless, concept exploration started in the early 1980's. One can question whether such an extended development cycle is relatively sound or unsound.

Even when the acquisition system is under pressure to develop something quickly, it seems to have a hard time doing so. For example, after the Scowcroft Commission report was issued, it became apparent that the development of the small mobile intercontinental ballistic missile would probably become a high national priority. Notwithstanding its importance, the development process will still take six or seven years.

What are the costs associated with this length of time? An extended acquisition cycle results in increased costs as a result of inflation experienced during the extended time in development. A lengthy acquisition cycle also invites changes (and possibly goldplating) in the weapon system, all of which inevitably lead to increased costs. Finally, an inability to promptly field weapons leads to an inevitable concern that the technology incorporated in a weapon system may become outmoded before the system is operational.

For all these reasons, it is apparent that there must be an effort to try to streamline the acquisition process and shorten the time between the conception of a new major system requirement and its operational capability.

24. Social Goals in Defense Contracting

It has long been recognized that a number of social goals are explicitly promoted in defense contracting. For example, there are set-asides for small businesses, emphasis on minority business contracting, and certain "Buy America" provisions to ensure contracting with domestic firms. At points in time, there have been programs to test contracting in labor-surplus areas. Some question the relative effectiveness of these programs and whether the cost of the programs outweigh the social benefits they are supposed to yield.

25. RELIABILITY AND MAINTENANCE

One of the most important initiatives in defense contracting recently has been to place greater emphasis on the reliability and maintainability of weapon systems. It has been fully recognized that one of the most important characteristics of a weapon system is its reliability.

Tangible evidence of this concern is that Congress has passed two laws over the last several years on warranties on weapon systems. The most recent law requires that the Department of Defense obtain warranties of: (1) an absence of defects in materials and workmanship; (2) performance; and (3) conformity with design specifications, for virtually all weapon systems. These laws are intended to ensure greater emphasis on reliability and to ensure that the contractor assumes financial responsibility for such reliability.

CHAPTER 9

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT

A. INTRODUCTION

The Congress has a central role in the overall planning and management of the Nation's security and must share responsibility for any fundamental problems. The primary argument presented in Chapter 3 (The Office of the Secretary of Defense) is that the lack of mission integration in the Defense Department is a serious shortcoming which requires corrective action through substantial reorganization accompanied by new approaches and attitudes. Unfortunately, Congressional actions have traditionally served to frustrate mission integration efforts in DoD. Beyond this deficiency, the current practice of Congressional review and oversight has resulted in substantial instability in defense policies and programs.

Efforts to reorganize the Department of Defense will prove imperfect again unless accompanied by changes on Capitol Hill. This chapter's review of the role of the Congress in the formulation of defense policies and programs will be limited to two objectives:

- identify and analyze problems associated with congressional involvement in the formulation of defense policies and programs; and
- assess the potential impact of changes in congressional behavior on the effectiveness of the Department of Defense.

B. EVOLUTION OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT

1. Constitutional Powers of the Congress Relating to National Defense

Article 1 of the Constitution enumerates the powers granted to the Congress. Those relating to national defense include the power to declare war, to raise and support the armed forces, to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, to provide for calling for the militia, to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and to appropriate money.

In enumerating the powers of the President under Article 2, the Constitution also provides additional powers to the Legislature as a check upon Executive authority. These include the power to advise and consent on treaties and appointments (by the Senate only) and the ability to vest powers of appointment of lesser officials in persons other than the President.

In addition to these primary grants of authority, Article 5 gives the Congress power to dispose of and make rules concerning property belonging to the United States. Beyond all these expressed

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powers, the Congress retains the implied power to conduct investigations.

2. The Organization of the Congress in Providing for the National Defense

Because the Nation was born in conflict, providing for the common defense was explicitly identified as a primary and fundamental responsibility of the Federal Government and its Legislature. There was never any question that the Congress would provide itself with the tools to accomplish this task.

Article 1 provides that "each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings...." While this has produced different rules, traditions, and behavior in the two Houses of the Congress, their committee structures have been more notable for their similarities than for their differences. Over time, both Houses have had standing committees on Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, and/or the Militia.

The creation and evolution of these committees in both the House and the Senate were influenced by internal conflicts and struggles for jurisdiction within the committee system itself. In earlier years, these internal struggles, while present, were less obvious. There were fewer standing committees; the subcommittee structure was informal and *ad hoc*; and members of one committee were encouraged (and actually appointed) to serve *ex officio* on other committees or subcommittees with similar interests. In today's Congress, these mutually reinforcing traditions are no longer present. There are more standing committees and subcommittees. Joint tenure of Senators on an authorizing committee and its counterpart subcommittee on the Appropriations Committee is rare and discouraged. The growing complexity of public policy issues strains the traditional jurisdictional distinctions of the standing committees.

Under these circumstances, internal conflicts within the committee systems include jurisdictional disputes between authorizing and appropriating committees, between committees involved in defense and those concerned with foreign policy, and between the traditional authorizing and appropriating processes and the relatively new budget process. In fact, introduction of a new budget process in 1974 proved to be one of the most important historical developments in the evolution of congressional procedures and the assertion of congressional powers. These issues are discussed in greater detail in Section C (Key Trends) of this chapter.

3. The Role of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Senate Committee on Armed Services is a product of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which, among its actions, combined the Committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs. Starting with virtually no organizational structure and only narrow authorizing jurisdiction, the Senate Armed Services Committee has developed a formal subcommittee structure and comprehensive responsibilities for defense authorization.

a. Jurisdiction

In its formative years, the Committee's attention was necessarily focused on those issues that dominated the postwar environment, including the organization of the new Department of Defense, development of a military capability for the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the resolution of numerous personnel issues which followed from the Second World War.

This period was immediately followed by the Korean Conflict, for which the Committee shared oversight responsibilities with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. During the early 1950's, the Committee invested considerable time and effort in the development and oversight of security assistance and related programs.

Through 1954, legislation authorizing foreign economic and military aid was at least sequentially (and several times jointly) referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and then the Senate Committee on Armed Services. By 1961, however, the Foreign Assistance Act was referred exclusively to the Foreign Relations Committee. The decline of the Armed Services Committee's involvement in these matters paralleled a period in which the Foreign Relations Committee not only maintained oversight of the Federal agencies responsible for foreign assistance, but continued to be the source of expanding or amending legislation as well.

A fundamentally new direction in the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services was begun in 1959 through Public Law 86-14, which required annual authorizations of appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. This marked the beginning of a steady expansion in the Committee's jurisdiction and authority. Through the requirement for annual authorizations, the Committee found a device for becoming directly and immediately involved in defense policy, including resource allocation decisions. This development of annual authorizations is discussed in Section C on Key Trends.

Today the authority and responsibilities of the Committee on Armed Services are found under Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. The Rule states that all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the following subjects shall be referred to the Committee:

1. Aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations.
2. Common defense.
3. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, generally.
4. Maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, including administration, sanitation, and government of the Canal Zone.
5. Military research and development.
6. National security aspects of nuclear energy.
7. Navy petroleum reserves, except those in Alaska.
8. Pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the Armed Forces, including overseas education of civilian and military dependents.
9. Selective service system.
10. Strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense.

The Committee on Armed Services is also charged to "study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defense policy of the United States, and report thereon from time to time." In addition to this general authority, the Committee has specific responsibility for the review of presidential appointments to the Department of Defense.

In the discharge of its responsibilities, the Committee exercises four basic powers: the power to authorize appropriations, to call or subpoena witnesses and hold hearings, to conduct investigations, and to recommend statutory nominations to the Senate.

b. Organization

During the expansion in jurisdiction from 1960 to 1974, the Armed Services Committee continued to organize *ad hoc* subcommittees oriented toward specific issues and legislation. (The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee remained the only formally constituted one.) This dynamic period witnessed Committee consideration of the so-called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the war in Vietnam, and the emerging issues of arms control. Membership increased from 13 Senators in 1947 to 18 in 1967, but by 1973 had dropped back to 15. In the 99th Congress, committee membership grew to an all-time high with 19 members.

In 1975, the Committee reorganized itself, eliminating many of the temporary *ad hoc* subcommittees and creating a more formal structure to cope with the larger volume of legislation now being considered on a regular basis. The Committee established the following subcommittees: Intelligence, Preparedness Investigating, National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves, Military Construction, Arms Control, Tactical Air Power, Research and Development, General Legislation, and Manpower and Personnel.

Between 1975 and 1981, the Committee refined its organization further, reducing the number of permanent subcommittees from nine to six. The most significant change in recent years occurred in 1981 when the Committee reoriented several subcommittees from oversight of appropriation accounts to oversight of certain mission areas. Six subcommittees were created. The Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Sea Power and Force Projection, and Tactical Warfare Subcommittees were given oversight of mission areas, though in practice that oversight was limited to procurement and research and development appropriations. The Manpower and Personnel and Military Construction Subcommittees continued to exercise oversight along the line of appropriation accounts, while the Preparedness Subcommittee had oversight of the operation and maintenance (O&M) appropriation, elements of procurement accounts dealing with munitions, and the overall "readiness" of the military forces.

With the start of the 99th Congress in 1985, the Senate directed that the Committee may have no more than six subcommittees. Because the Committee had already planned to create a new Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy, it complied with the Senate's directive by disestablishing the Tactical Warfare Subcommittee. The full committee assumed the responsibilities of the Tactical Warfare Subcommittee, with no redistribution of jurisdiction to the other subcommittees.

C. KEY TRENDS

Four key trends characterize the evolution of congressional review and oversight of national security policy in recent years.

1. Erosion of National Consensus on Defense and Foreign Policy

United States security policy following World War II was informed by a broad consensus over the nature of U.S. interests and the threat posed to those interests by the Soviet Union. That consensus led to an unprecedented shift in defense policy. Unlike the period after World War I, the United States chose to enter into binding military alliances, to maintain a large peacetime military establishment, and to support extensive overseas deployments in order to protect its national interests.

That consensus, forged by 1947, prevailed through the 1950's and well into the 1960's. By the second half of the 1960's, however, there were significant signs of erosion. Numerous factors contributed to this erosion. The rift between the Soviet Union and China removed the specter of a communist monolith and presented new opportunities for containing the Soviet Union politically rather than just militarily. The war in Vietnam introduced fresh tensions among NATO allies and divided the United States. Some experts argue that by the middle of the 1970's the United States had tired of its role as a world leader and that the erosion of consensus merely represented a reemergence of American isolationism and a traditional ambivalence toward the military in American society. Yet others argue that American leaders failed to establish clear strategic goals in the increasingly complex and interdependent international political and economic climate of the 1970's.

Irrespective of the causes, during the second half of the 1970's, following the Vietnam war, much of the national security consensus collapsed. To the extent that basic concepts of national interests and threats to those interests were no longer uniformly accepted and shared among the American leadership, a psychological and physical retrenchment of the U.S. defense establishment followed. The erosion of the post-World War II consensus undermined the acceptance and support of long-term requirements for defense.

The decline of U.S. military capabilities during the 1970's was dramatic. By 1980 the American public judged that this trend had proceeded too far and supported the rebuilding of U.S. military capabilities. Yet while the pattern of physical retrenchment was reversed in the early 1980's, the post-World War II security consensus has not necessarily returned. Fundamental national security questions remain unanswered.

- What is the appropriate balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities in providing for national security?
- Can NATO meet the requirements of defending Western Europe?
- Do the non-U.S. NATO allies bear a fair share of the NATO security burden?
- What emphasis should be placed upon conflict with the Soviet Union versus lesser contingencies?
- Should and can the United States assume the burden of defending Western interests in the Persian Gulf region?

- Does the United States have the requirement for and capability of supporting a three-ocean Navy?
- Is the assessment of our national interests in balance with the level of resources likely to be devoted to protecting those interests?

These questions are widely debated today. There is no national consensus on the answers to these questions. Without agreement to the answers to these questions, the broad objectives of the defense program remain obscured, and the annual defense debate remains contentious.

2. Emergence of Annual Defense Authorizations

During the past 25 years, the Congress has gradually but consistently expanded the requirement that portions of the defense budget be authorized for appropriation. The requirement for antecedent authorization was not new in 1959. Indeed, separate authorizing and appropriating activities are as old as the Congress.

The original legislators clearly saw the need for separating the authorizing (then called "legislating") function from the appropriating function. In 1789 Congress first established the new Department of War, specifying its offices and responsibilities. Subsequently it passed an appropriation for the Department. This separation of substantive legislation from appropriations existed informally through the early years of the Republic. However, in 1837 the House of Representatives, responding to the growing disregard for the informal rules separating authorizations from appropriations, explicitly adopted a rule carried on to this day (currently as Rule XXI, Clause 2) prohibiting consideration of appropriations bills unless preceded by legislation authorizing the expenditure. The Senate followed suit in 1850, adopting the antecedent of current Rule XVI. Both the House and Senate reinforced this procedural separation by referring the two types of legislation to different committees. (Allen Schick, "The Many Faces of Congressional Budgeting," prepared for The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, January 1984, pages 3-7)

Congress alternately shifted power back and forth between authorizing and appropriating committees in response to national crises through the second half of the 1800's and into the 1900's. When external circumstances threatened the United States (e.g., World War I), the authorizing committees rose in power over the appropriations committees. When internal problems predominated (concern over the deficits following World War I, for example), Congress elevated the power of the appropriations committees to restrain spending. ("The Many Faces of Congressional Budgeting", pages 4-5)

In 1957 and 1958, following the launch of "Sputnik," the country perceived another crisis, this time in its competition with the Soviet Union. The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, under the direction of then Senator Lyndon Johnson, conducted an extensive inquiry into the state of U.S. nuclear defenses and the so-called "missile gap." It was in this context that the Senate began the march toward annual authorizations for virtually the entire defense budget.

Prior to 1959, the Armed Services Committees authorized an activity or program on a permanent basis, and let the Appropriations Committees fund it annually. This changed in 1959 with the adoption of the requirement for annual authorizations for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. Since that time much of the remainder of the defense budget has been brought under the requirement for annual authorizations, as noted in the following chronology:

> In 1962 (Public Law 87-436), to require the authorization of appropriations for research, development, test or evaluation associated with aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels;
>
> In 1963 (Public Law 88-174), to require the authorization of appropriations for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles;
>
> In 1967 (Public Law 90-168), to require the annual authorization of the personnel strengths of each of the Selected Reserves;
>
> In 1969 (Public Law 91-121), to require the authorization of appropriations for the procurement of other weapons;
>
> In 1970 (Public Law 91-441), to require the authorization of appropriations for the procurement of torpedoes and related support equipment and to require annual authorization of the active duty personnel strengths of each component of the Armed Forces;
>
> In 1973 (Public Law 92-436), to require the annual authorization of the average military training student loads of each component of the Armed Forces;
>
> In 1973 (Public Law 93-155), to require the annual authorization of civilian end-strengths;
>
> In 1975 (Public Law 94-106), to require the annual authorization of military construction of ammunition facilities;
>
> In 1977 (Public Law 95-91), to provide the Committee with jurisdiction over the national defense programs of the Department of Energy;
>
> In 1980 (Public Law 96-342), to require the annual authorization of funds for operation and maintenance of the Department of Defense and all its components;
>
> In 1982 (Public Law 97-86), to require the annual authorization of appropriations of funds for the procurement of ammunition and so-called "other" procurement; and
>
> In 1983 (Public Law 98-94), to require the annual authorization of appropriations for working-capital funds.

Commentators disagree over the fundamental causes that produced the first annual authorization requirement in 1959. Some argue that annual authorizations reflect the continuing struggle between authorizing and appropriating committees for power. John Gist argues that Section 412(b) requiring annual authorizations in procurement "was clearly an attempt to gain leverage for the armed services committees over policy decisions, and thus enhance their power and status vis-a-vis the defense appropriations subcommittees in making military policy." ("The Impact of Annual Authorizations on Military Appropriations in the U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, August 1981, page 440) Robert Art is more explicit: "Annual authorizations began because the Armed

Services Committees reasoned that they had lost control over the defense budget to the Appropriations Committees." ("Congress and the Defense Budget: Improving the Process," unpublished paper, June 1983, page 31) Schick explains the development of annual authorizations in terms of Congress's desire to force changes in policy on a reluctant Administration. Yet others see the annual authorization requirement as part of a seamless fabric of bureaucratic politics: "The intent of annual authorizations requirements was to reduce the area of discretionary power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to strengthen legislative control of programs. Congress, like the services, appeared to feel threatened by the growing power of OSD over all aspects of defense policy." (William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, *The Organizational Politics of Defense*, page 120)

Irrespective of the original causes, other factors fuel the utility of annual authorizations today. Annual authorizations have substantially expanded the power of the Armed Services Committee to exercise control over defense policy. Prior to 1959 the Committee largely confined its activities to manpower issues, military construction, and oversight of narrowly defined issues. (For example, "Purchase of Tanks by the Department of the Army During Fiscal Year 1956" or "Proposed Closing of Certain Government Owned Ordnance Plants" were typical of committee hearings and prints of that period.) Since then the Armed Services Committees have broadened the scope and deepened the level of oversight detail in virtually all aspects of defense policy, all through the mechanism of annual authorizations. Annual authorization bills offer expanded opportunities to influence and constrain DoD policy and resource allocation decisions. Constituents who have failed to "win" their case within DoD actively lobby Congress to make their case one last time.

In summary, annual authorizations have become a powerful trend because they reflect fundamental political forces: the struggle for power between committees in Congress, the struggle for power by the Congress over the Executive, the struggle for power by individual members of Congress on behalf of constituents.

3. Adoption of New Congressional Budgeting Procedure

In 1974 Congress established a new congressional budgeting procedure by passing the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344). This new budget process was designed to augment the existing two-stage process of authorizations and appropriations, rather than supplant either of the stages.

This new process incorporated the following general schedule of key events. The President submits the budget in January. The various committees of the Congress hold broad overview hearings and recommend to the respective budget committees by March 15 the spending those committees believe is justified in functional areas under their jurisdiction. By April 15 the budget committees must report a First Concurrent Resolution on the budget to their respective Houses. The resolution establishes revenue and spending targets for the budget in the aggregate, and specifies spending targets in each of 15 functional categories. The act specifies that Congress shall adopt a first budget resolution by May 15.

During this period the authorizing committees are supposed to review the program details of the annual budget request and report bills and resolutions authorizing new budget authority. The spending projections contained in those bills are supposed to aim at the targets adopted in the First Concurrent Resolution, though the authorizations themselves are not constrained by the budget act. During the summer the Congress is supposed to act on those bills. By September 15, Congress shall adopt a Second Concurrent Resolution which sets binding spending targets in each of the categories. Those binding targets then constrain the appropriations bills, all of which are supposed to be adopted by October 1.

In theory, the budget process is straightforward. Its operation in practice, however, has been less orderly. For all practical purposes, the First Concurrent Resolution has become the key binding resolution. Congress has concluded that key spending compromises must be set early in the process and cannot practically be reopened a second time near the end of the session. And while the budget act does not constrain authorization bills to meet spending targets contained in the budget resolutions, the practical political pressures of a recently adopted budget resolution on the authorization bills have become overwhelming.

The new budget process has been a wrenching experience. Congress as an institution is designed to deal with complex public policy problems by breaking them into their constituent elements and reviewing them in standing committees with jurisdiction over those constituent elements. By contrast, the budget process is Congress's only act of comprehensive public policy *integration*. Unlike all other activities, the budget process requires the participation of all committees, and brings their areas of jurisdiction into a common legislative process and vehicle. As such, it has established an entirely new pattern of pressure and power in Congress. Committees now have to reconcile "affordability" concerns with the substantive merits of the issues under their exclusive jurisdiction.

These pressures are exacerbated in a period of substantial Federal deficits. Those deficits impose enormous pressures to limit spending increases in all areas, including defense. Indeed, during the past three years, substantial reductions in defense spending have been imposed through the pressures of the Federal budget process.

Aside from the change in congressional behavior which affects all committees, the budget process also creates a difficult situation for the Armed Services Committees. Determining budget priorities has become a major legislative struggle every spring. An agreement on spending priorities and the accompanying budget resolution embodying those priorities are not established until May at the earliest. Therefore, the authorizing committees must review the details of the annual budget submission without clear guidelines on the level of spending the Congress is likely ultimately to permit. In each of the last three years, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported a defense authorization bill that proved higher than the Senate was prepared to support, requiring a complex and disruptive process of adjusting the bill. This creates serious problems in establishing spending priorities in so complex an area as defense procurement, for example.

The frustrations with the budget process have galvanized members of the Congress to seek means to lessen its burdens. Senators and Representatives alike widely believe the process has become too time consuming and duplicative of the authorizing and appropriating functions.

4. Breakdown of Traditions in the Congress

A fourth key trend concerns the evolution of traditions within the Congress itself, characterized generally as a breakdown in the traditions that informally guide the work of the Congress. This breakdown results in a dilution and distribution of power in ways that impede efficient review and authorization of the defense budget. This breakdown in traditions has occurred in several ways.

First, the jurisdictions of the various committees, and especially the authorizing and appropriating committees, have become blurred. Increasingly, authorizing committees are constraining appropriations, while the appropriating committees are including substantive legislative provisions in appropriation bills. The authorizing and appropriating procedures are becoming competitive rather than complementary.

This jurisdictional blurring between committees also includes expanded efforts by other authorizing committees to review defense issues. Senator John Tower, former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, addressed the problem of overlapping committee jurisdiction in his testimony before the Temporary Select Committee on Committees on August 2, 1984:

> If we look at the area of national security, most committees in the Senate have an involvement with some aspect of the subject. The involvement of the Armed Services, Appropriations and Budget Committees is obvious. The Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction over arms control, foreign aid, security assistance, war powers, and many aspects involving the use of military force outside the United States. The Small Business Committee injects itself in the breadth of the procurement process on the basis that it is concerned about small business opportunities to participate in defense contracting. The Veterans Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over a series of benefits available to those who have previously served in the armed forces, though this benefit package may have an impact on military recruitment and retention. The Governmental Affairs Committee asserts a claim, which I strongly dispute, that it has primary jurisdiction over procurement policy, including procurement policy in the Department of Defense. The Banking Committee has jurisdiction over the Cost Accounting Standards Board which sets the fundamental ground rules for the manner in which defense contracts are paid. That committee also has jurisdiction over the Defense Production Act, which is a critical legislative tool for ensuring an adequate defense industrial base. The Banking Committee also has jurisdiction over the Export Administration Act, which is the primary legislative tool for stopping transfer of militarily sensitive technologies. The Commerce Committee has jurisdiction

over NASA, which plays an integral role in providing access to space for the Department of Defense. The Commerce Committee also has jurisdiction over the Merchant Marine, which has an important national defense function, as we learned in the Falklands War. The Intelligence Committee has primary jurisdiction over the gathering of intelligence though that is inextricably linked to military posture. This is simply an illustrative list of the extent to which aspects of national security are divided among a huge number of standing committees. I might add that in the House the situation is even worse, in that the House Energy committee has shared jurisdiction with respect to the Department of Energy nuclear weapons program.

Second, the proliferation of committees and subcommittees in the Congress is diluting the time and attention any individual Senator can devote to key issues. The Temporary Select Committee on Committees highlighted this problem in its concluding report:

> A recurring theme in the Select Committee hearings was the proliferation of committees, subcommittees and assignments and the resulting conflicting demands on senators' time and attention. . . . When senators acquire additional committee and subcommittee commitments, it becomes increasingly difficult for them to attend all of the meetings scheduled for each of their panels. This situation frustrates not only each individual senator, but the chairmen of committees when they try to muster a quorum to conduct business. (pages 6–7)

The number of committees and subcommittees has fluctuated significantly. In the 1950's, senators typically had nine committee or subcommittee obligations. The early 1970's witnessed the largest growth in the number of committee and subcommittee assignments for members of the Senate, with the average senator serving on 15 panels. This has been reduced in recent years. The average senator in the 98th Congress served on 11 committees or subcommittees. This is still a substantial commitment of time which not only limits the time Senators can devote to any single area, but has compounded the problems of scheduling in the Senate as well.

Third, new cross-cutting organizations in Congress have entered the defense debate. Recent cross-cutting organizations include the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, the Military Reform Caucus, the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, in addition to longstanding partisan organizations. Most of these organizations reserve their input to the defense budget or oversight process until the authorization and appropriation bills reach the floor of the House or Senate. There these organizations sponsor a legislative agenda through amendments which has contributed to the increase in time required to adopt the annual defense authorization and appropriation bills.

Fourth, during the past twenty years, there has been a trend toward weakened congressional leadership and the committee system in general. The Congress is a unique institution in that it does not practically have the ability to control admission of its own membership. Consequently, it has had to develop alternative methods for controlling its members. Traditionally those methods involved positive and negative incentives controlled by the party and committee leaders. The structure of control revolved around committees and party organizations because they controlled resources.

While committees and leadership organizations still wield great power because of their procedural prerogatives, their dominant control over resources has been diluted. In 1947 each member of the House of Representatives had a staff of three. Today they may have as many as 18. In 1965 the average Senator had a staff of six. In 1985 the average senator has 40 employees. Members of Congress are less dependent on the party and committee leadership because they have at their personal disposal greater resources to deal with issues directly. The large number of organizations attempting to influence the Congress on defense and other issues provides additional *de facto* resources for members. Larger personal staffs and the availability of help from organizations outside of Congress mean that members are less dependent on committees and leadership organizations for information and direction, and hence are more willing to depart from the positions taken by those leadership organizations on individual issues.

D. PROBLEM AREAS AND CAUSES

This section discusses five primary problem areas in the current congressional execution of its responsibilities for review and oversight of defense policies and programs. These problem areas reflect the consequences of the key trends noted above.

1. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS THAT AFFECT DEFENSE OVERSIGHT

Members of Congress are increasingly preoccupied with what one senator called "the deteriorations of this institution." Fundamental factors changing the way the Congress operates *in general* are beginning to affect the way Congress oversees the Department of Defense *in particular*. These fundamental problems create difficulties, not just for the Department of Defense, but for the entire Executive branch. Two fundamental problems were identified for purposes of this study.

a. Hegemony of the Budget Process

The budget process has come to dominate the life of the Congress. During the last four years, the budget process has overwhelmed the remainder of the legislative agenda. Senator Nunn gave primary emphasis to this problem in his testimony before the Temporary Select Committee on Committees in August 1984:

> No one can deny that the 1974 Budget Act, which many of us worked on, provided, for the first time, the ability to spotlight the federal budget and to attempt to provide broad guidelines on overall consolidated spending. But the time and workload of the Senate—and of its Committees—are being dominated and devoured by this task alone.

The hegemony of the budget process over the rest of the legislative agenda occurs in several ways. First, there just is not sufficient time for Congress to adopt a budget, authorization bills, and appropriations bills before the start of a fiscal year. Congress is trying to fit too many activities into too little time. Any delay in one step creates a domino effect later in the year. The budget resolution is taking longer to adopt (reflecting the lack of consensus in the country on national priorities). This delays consideration of the authorization bills, which in turn delays consideration of appropriations bills and forces Congress to resort to continuing resolutions for spending measures. Since 1960 Congress has never started a fiscal year with all appropriation bills passed. However, the problem has deteriorated markedly in the last several years. Congress fails to meet its deadlines because it has too much to do, and the newcomer in the system—the budget process—is increasingly taking too much of the precious legislative time of Congress.

Second, the authorizing committees are caught in a pinch between the budget process and the appropriations process. Authorizing committees cannot effectively proceed to the floor with major authorizations until a budget has been adopted. This is taking longer each year, stretching well into June. On the other end, the last month of the fiscal year must be devoted to consideration of the appropriations bills. Consequently, all authorization bills are increasingly pinched into six to eight weeks in the summer. The budget process was not designed to pinch off the authorizing committees, but that has been the outcome.

Third, because the budget process is the first stage in the three-stage process, policy decisions are increasingly being brought forward into that stage. An extended defense debate occurred this year as in the past during the budget debate in the Senate. The most far reaching decision made by the Senate as a whole on the fiscal year 1986 defense budget—its decision to freeze defense spending in real terms for Fiscal Year 1986—occurred during the budget debate, not during debate on the authorization bill or the appropriations bill.

This predominance of the budget process is likely to continue so long as the country continues to have massive budget deficits. The challenge is to find less disruptive budget procedures.

b. Duplicative Committee Reviews and Blurred Jurisdictions

The new budget process added a third cycle to the authorizing and appropriating cycles. The three stages are supposed to be complementary. But increasingly they have become redundant and competitive. The Georgetown University CSIS Defense Organization Project highlighted this problem in its final report *Toward a More Effective Defense*:

> Redundancy in the congressional review process seriously aggravates the oversight problem. Each chamber reviews the defense budget at least three times annually. In each chamber, a separate committee controls each of the three annual reviews. At the same time the differentiation among functions, which once clearly distinguished the committees, has become blurred. The armed services committees in both chambers have expanded their authorization functions to encompass nearly the entire defense budget. At the same time, the appropriating committees increasingly apportion funds without regard to authorizations. Moreover, the question of how budgeting committees can rationally establish overall budgetary levels without delving into the detailed questions traditionally considered by authoriz-

ing, and even appropriating, committees has never been answered satisfactorily. (page 32)

These redundant steps mean that Congress rarely takes conclusive action on any issue. Compromises on key issues merely carry over to the next step and are then reopened. The story of the MX missile might represent an extreme case, but it is not entirely unusual either. Duplicative steps also unnecessarily burden the Defense Department in preparing and giving testimony, responding to formal inquiries, and notifying Congress of key changes or developments.

The jurisdictional blurring, especially between the authorizing and appropriating committees, has become a particularly keen problem. Appropriations committees no longer refrain from actions traditionally considered substantive legislation. Last year the appropriations committees appropriated nearly $3 billion in programs that were not authorized by prior legislation. This action constituted a fundamental assault on the basic premise separating authorizing and appropriating committees in Congress. Since the appropriation bill was enacted into law after the authorization bill, the Department of Defense argued that it constituted legal authority to spend the funds, even though no authorization existed for these programs. Objections by the Armed Services Committee held up DoD obligation of the funds for six months and created a policy flashpoint between the two committees in the Senate. The Armed Services Committee relented only when it became clear that DoD intended to proceed despite the Committee's objections. That the matter was resolved in the spring of 1985 does not mean that the fundamental cause of this problem—the blurring of functional boundaries among committees—is diminished.

2. CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES REINFORCE DIVISIONS IN DOD

The very structure of Congress and its review procedures produce an inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pattern of oversight and guidance. This inconsistent pattern reinforces divisions within the Defense Department, inhibiting the development of coherent and integrated defense program. The absence of coherent mission integration in DoD is a fundamental flaw in the current defense organization, and Congress has been a major contributor to that shortcoming.

There are five aspects to this problem. First, the cognizant committees charged with DoD oversight have developed different structures, styles, and traditions, resulting in an inconsistent and sometimes contradictory pattern of oversight. These inherent differences foster confusion, and tempt factions within DoD to export conflicts to Congress. Second, the Congress tends to review the defense program in terms of artificial accounting inputs rather than in terms of defense mission outputs. Adjustments tend to be made for financing reasons within accounts rather than for reasons of priorities among defense missions. Third, the Congress tends not to compare programs across Service lines and very rarely makes policy tradeoffs that cross military Service lines. Fourth, the Congress tends to dwell on policy or program conflicts and tensions within

DoD, reinforcing those conflicts. Fifth, the Congress has historically favored independent subordinate offices as opposed to centralized control in DoD, in order to maximize its leverage in directing the allocation of resources or determining the outcome of policy disputes.

a. Cognizant Committees Have Different Styles and Traditions

Each of the four cognizant congressional committees has developed different styles and traditions in reviewing the Defense Department budget. This is demonstrated by comparing the subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, as shown in the following table:

COMPARISON OF SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

Senate Subcommittees	House Subcommittees
Defense Acquisition Policy	Investigations
Manpower and Personnel	Military Personnel and Compensation
Military Construction	Military Installations and Facilities
Preparedness	Readiness
Sea Power and Force Projection	Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces	Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems
(Tactical Warfare)	Research and Development

While the two committees have parallel subcommittees for some areas—Preparedness vs. Readiness, for example, or Manpower and Personnel vs. Military Personnel and Compensation—there are important differences. The House Armed Services Committee is aligned primarily in terms of appropriation accounts. The Research and Development Subcommittee reviews all R&D accounts and only R&D accounts for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies. The Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee reviews only procurement programs, except for Navy programs included in the Seapower Subcommittee's jurisdiction.

By way of contrast, in 1981 the Senate Armed Services Committee established three subcommittees to review defense programs on a mission basis—Sea Power and Force Projection, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, and Tactical Warfare. (The rules of the Senate now limit committees to six subcommittees. When the Armed Services Committee formally established the Defense Acquisition Policy Subcommittee, it dissolved the Tactical Warfare Subcommittee, though the functions of the subcommittee were assumed by the full committee.) These three subcommittees review both procurement and R&D programs in their mission areas. However, these subcommittees do not have jurisdiction over the traditional operating accounts; therefore, their ability to assess major policy trade-offs (e.g., between modernization and readiness) is limited.

These differences are not inconsequential. Different structures produce different perspectives on problems and different priorities when constructing solutions. The Senate Armed Services Committee, because of its mission orientation, is better able to address defense outputs and relative trade-offs among contending priorities. The House Armed Services Committee, because it is organized along appropriation account lines, can more readily highlight duplicative efforts and redundant programs.

Maintaining different committee organizations, however, creates distinct problems and generates confusion in DoD. The conference committee for the fiscal year 1986 defense authorization bill had over 1,200 items in disagreement between the House and Senate bills. Many of the differences were trivial, though a large number were quite significant. The two committees engage in major disputes because of the different perspectives they bring to the same defense issue.

Various elements within DoD attempt to exploit those differences by developing relationships with this committee or that committee, hoping that their distinct interests will be preserved in any compromise. Similarly, the committees align themselves with contending factions within the Defense Department.

In short, Congress, by its nature and traditions, fosters the very factors within DoD that have frustrated mission integration in the past.

b. Congress Dwells on Artificial Accounting Inputs Rather than Defense Outputs

When the Congress reviews the annual budget request, it tends to examine the details of the request as accounting inputs to functional activities rather than as defense mission outputs. This is best illustrated with an actual example.

In 1978 the United States joined with our NATO allies in signing the Long Term Defense Plan. As a component of that plan, the United States agreed to develop the capability to deploy 10 combat divisions to Europe within 10 days of mobilization. Virtually all areas of the DoD budget were involved. The following is a general delineation of the activities required to carry out that national policy directive, and the subcommittee responsible for each of those activities:

Component Program	SASC Subcommittee
Storage Sites for Prepositioned Equipment	Military Construction
Stockage Levels of Spare Parts/Munitions	Tactical Warfare/Preparedness
Airlift Modernization Program	Sea Power and Force Projection
Forward Deployment of Logistics Units	Military Construction/Preparedness/Manpower

Component Program	SASC Subcommittee
Transportation of Equipment and Spares to Europe	Preparedness
Combat Equipment Modernization Programs	Tactical Warfare

Virtually every subcommittee has responsibilities for aspects of the national policy decision to pledge 10 divisions within 10 days of mobilization for the defense of Europe. The emphasis in oversight, especially after the initial announcement of the policy, shifted from the policy goal itself to the relative allocation of resources required to implement the policy. However, those inputs were compared with other like activities unrelated to the policy. Storage facilities for combat equipment in Europe were evaluated in conjunction with other military construction projects that ranged from new housing in California to office buildings in Maryland. Funds requested for spare parts for the 10 day requirement were lost in the mass of funding for spare parts in general. Budget reductions were imposed on spare parts or other procurement with no knowledge of the impact it would have on our ability to meet the 10 day requirement. In a short time, the emphasis on policy implementation of a major defense commitment was lost among thousands of minor decisions on accounting inputs.

This pattern of reviewing programs within artificial categories of resource inputs means that Congress rarely obtains a comprehensive picture of current defense capabilities, or of the progress being made toward a major defense commitment or national policy objective. The policy decisions are dissipated because they are reviewed in Congress along artificial appropriation lines providing resource inputs to DoD, instead of in the context of defense outputs.

The Senate Armed Services Committee attempted to overcome this problem by establishing mission oriented subcommittees. However, none of the mission subcommittees deal at all with the traditional operating accounts—Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel. The Preparedness Subcommittee has responsibility for reviewing the O&M account as well as the ammunition procurement account. Yet some of the most important factors accounting for peacetime readiness—replenishment spare parts and sophisticated munitions such as air-to-air missiles—are not within the jurisdiction of the Preparedness Subcommittee; instead, they are reviewed by the mission subcommittees.

The committees and subcommittees determine funding priorities and program trade-offs within appropriation accounts, not across them. When budget reductions are required, "bogies" are allocated to subcommittees. If the subcommittees are organized along appropriation account lines, trade-offs are not made, for example, between "readiness" and "modernization", but instead are made against competing projects or programs within the same appropriation. Even where subcommittees are organized somewhat along mission lines, trade-offs between appropriation accounts are limited.

c. Congress Reviews Service Programs in Isolation

While Congress reviews defense programs largely within artificial appropriation categories, it also tends to review the Services' programs in relative isolation. Funding trade-offs very rarely cross Service appropriations. The resource shares of the Services change very little as a result of congressional oversight. Traditionally, Congress is loath to alter the priorities contained implicitly in the annual budget submission.

The subcommittees and the staff tend to develop closer ties with some Services and branches than others. The Military Departments develop particularly close working ties with certain members of Congress, often because of the types of installations in the Members' state or congressional district, or the types of major defense contractors in the state or district. Also, many members of the House and Senate committees have former military service and naturally understand, and retain keen interest in, the activities of their Services. Because of these close ties, subcommittees and their members become advocates for their client Services. Faced with the need to impose budget reductions, the committees attempt to minimize tensions by insuring reductions are balanced among the Services, irrespective of the priority of their missions.

d. Congress Dwells on Conflicts within DoD

The massive number of Defense Department activities and programs makes it largely impossible for the Congress to review all programs in a comprehensive manner. As such, congressional review tends to dwell on the policy and programmatic conflicts within DoD—conflicts among the Military Departments, between the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), among offices within OSD, and so forth.

Conflicts within DoD are exported to Congress and the battle is waged in a different arena. The case of helicopter airlift for special operations forces is illustrative. The Army and Air Force jointly decided to transfer the Air Force fleet of 7 helicopters to the Army. This proved threatening to a small number of Air Force helicopter pilots, and to the member of Congress whose district contained the military installation where the 7 aircraft were based. The Congress acted to prevent the transfer of the mission and to direct a change in policy by the Army and Air Force. Quite apart from the merits of the case, this example demonstrates the extent to which conflicts within DoD are exported to Congress. Conversely, congressional participants frequently cite differences within DoD as justification for revising budget requests or program proposals. It is commonplace for Congress to suspend funding in a program for a year based on disagreements among the Services over the justification for a program.

e. Congressional Preference for Independent Subordinate Organizations Within DoD

Traditionally the Congress has favored decentralization in the Defense Department over highly structured central control. Decentralization permits the Congress to establish direct relationships with and control over those organizations within the military establishment that are responsible for directing the allocation of resources, thereby maximizing Congress' leverage over the distribution of those resources.

This pattern is longstanding and was firmly entrenched by 1900. The Dodge Commission, established by President Theodore Roosevelt following the Spanish American War, was highly critical of the war effort, particularly the lack of logistics support and the absence of competent command in the field. The Dodge Commission concluded that one of the prime factors contributing to the problems that plagued the war effort was the autonomy of the independent bureaus in the War Department, which was encouraged by the Congress.

> In both [the War Department and the Navy Department] the agencies immediately concerned with the expenditure of military budgets on arms, armaments, and supplies were the technical bureaus. In both [the Navy and War Departments], they were thoroughly entrenched in power. They had the statutory authority to spend their moneys directly granted from the Congress and it was an observed pattern for them to maintain close and direct relations with key figures in Congress and to receive outright political help when attacked from within the executive branch. (Paul Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, page 8)

The military officers in the bureaus were generally awarded advances in rank and pay when assigned to the bureaus and served with no time limit in those positions. Secretary of War Elihu Root ended this open-ended tenure of bureau officers, but did not end the special relationships that prevailed between the bureaus and the Congress. While the Congress assented to many of Root's reforms, it specifically exempted one bureau from oversight by the new Chief of Staff of the Army, and provided that all bureaus could deal directly with Congress if so specified in future legislation. (For a more extensive discussion, see *Organizing for Defense*, page 26)

World War II forced a consolidation of control by the central staffs over the bureaus in both the Navy and the War Departments. And while this consolidation led over time to the creation of the Department of Defense, it did not end Congress's preference for continuing relations with subordinate organizations. Instead of Congress siding with the bureaus against their parent Military Departments, increasingly Congress joined forces with the military Services against the new Office of the Secretary of Defense. Lucas and Dawson noted this pattern in the early days of the new Department of Defense:

> Congress has an interest in a considerable measure of service autonomy. . . . It is significant that, starting with the 86th Congress in 1959, successive Congresses either enacted or considered the enactment of new requirements for annual authorization legislation in all major areas of weapons procurement and military research and development. The intent of these changes was clear: to reduce the area of discretionary power of OSD and to strengthen legislative control of programs. Congress, like the services, appeared to feel threatened by the

> growing power of OSD over all aspects of defense policy. Congress joined with the armed services in resisting a historic redistribution of power in the Pentagon. (*The Organizational Politics of Defense*, page 120)

Congress continues to align itself with the military Services against OSD. In 1981, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of then Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, established a Special Task Force to study management alternatives for improved surface transportation, both land and ocean, in DoD. The Special Task Force recommended integration of the Army's Military Traffic Management Command and the Navy's Military Sealift Command into a new unified command to be called the Military Transportation Command reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though endorsed by the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Carlucci, the Secretary of the Navy in March 1982 opposed the plan because it would "diffuse management accountability for sealift and fleet support programs" and would disrupt the ship acquisition process.

Responding to Secretary Lehman's concern, the Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision in the fiscal year 1983 defense authorization bill prohibiting DoD from proceeding with any consolidation of military transportation. The provision was accepted by the House of Representatives and became law. The provision remains in effect to the present, despite DoD's subsequent requests to repeal it. Despite substantial evidence that consolidation would yield more effective command arrangements for military surface transportation, the Congress sided with the Navy in preventing consolidation.

To summarize this second major problem in congressional oversight, Congress as an institution, because of its structure and its decentralized procedures, amplifies the inherent flaws within DoD which inhibit development of a coherent integrated defense program. The primary weakness in defense organization is the lack of mission integration, fostered by congressional procedures, traditions, and attitudes.

3. Predominance of an Annual Review Cycle

Oversight of the Department of Defense has evolved into an annual review of DoD's budget submission. Virtually the entire defense budget is now subject to annual authorization review in addition to annual appropriations. The development of the congressional budget procedure reinforced, and arguably accelerated, the trend toward annual review. The budget act requires the Congress to adopt annual spending goals for the various functions of the federal government. Increasingly the Congress looks at all government activity in fiscal year increments.

Also, as legislative gridlock developed during the latter half of the 1970's and through the early 1980's, annual defense bills have become a primary means for advancing legislative proposals that probably would not otherwise get over all the legislative hurdles. Additionally, since the President is not likely to veto the annual defense authorization or appropriation bill, it becomes a convenient vehicle to force through legislative proposals that might not otherwise be favorably received by the President. An annual authorization and appropriation becomes an important lever of power, not only for factions within Congress but by Congress over the Executive Branch as well.

This is reflected in the time devoted to floor consideration of the annual authorization and appropriation bills and the number of amendments considered during the debate. There has been a distinct shift during the past 10 years in both the House and the Senate. From 1975 through 1979, debate on the defense authorization bills averaged slightly more than three days each in the House and Senate. From 1980 through 1984, however, the annual defense debate averaged over seven days each in the House and Senate.

As might be expected, the increase in time devoted to the authorization bills led to an increase in the number of amendments considered. During the same 10-year period, there were roughly four times as many amendments considered during the second half of the period as during the first half. These data are summarized in the following table:

Summary of Floor Debate on Annual Authorization Bills

Year	House		Senate	
	Days of Debate	Number of Amendments	Days of Debate	Number of Amendments
1975	3	15	6	29
1976	2	12	4	16
1977	3	0	2	6
1978	3	0	2	18
1979	5	33	3	11
1980	4	17	3	18
1981	8	49	3	16
1982	8	78	7	61
1983	12	64	13	72
1984	6	52	10	107
1985	9	140	9	107

Because the annual authorization and appropriation bills are guaranteed action in the Congress and almost certainly will be signed by the President, they become vehicles for a host of amendments, many of which are only remotely germane to the primary legislation.

This annual review process has produced four specific problems. First, the Congress focuses increasingly on the details, not on the big picture. Second, an annual review process tends to sacrifice long-term goals in the face of short-term pressures. Third, overemphasis on annual budgets tends to stress each year's new budget plan for the future, ignoring the execution of last year's program. Fourth, annual budgets become impediments to conclusive decisions.

a. Preoccupation with Detail, Ignoring Fundamental Policies and Priorities

The annual review process, together with an increasing desire to control details, has led the Congress to a preoccupation with detail. Senator Nunn noted this trend in testimony before the Temporary Select Committee on Committees in 1984:

> . . . the extent to which we have wrapped ourselves around the budget axle is exacerbated by the growing tendency to examine budget proposals in even finer, almost microscopic, detail. The Armed Services Committee now authorizes almost every element of the Defense budget each year, down to almost the last screw and bolt.

The emergence of "micro-management" is discussed in greater detail below. The point here is to note that by its preoccupation with detail, the Congress has tended to trivialize its true charter, which is to spell out major strategies and purposes. The Constitution intends for the Congress to establish national strategic priorities and to allocate resources toward those priorities. The Congress is to act as a national board of directors, not as national level program managers.

b. Sacrifice Long-Term Goals Because of Short-Term Pressures

A second unfortunate outcome of an annual review process is the tendency to sacrifice long-term goals in the face of short-term pressures. The evidence of this trend is manifold in the defense budget. Repeatedly, the military Services, OSD, or the Congress will sacrifice long-term savings in order to achieve short-term budget reductions. For example, faced with the need to find budget reductions in one year, production rates are stretched out, saving modest sums one year only to create even greater long run costs for the program and delay modernization.

This pattern typifies the entire budget. Stable long-term plans are sacrificed to meet the pressures to make budget reductions in any one year.

c. Ignore Program Execution to Focus on Future

Third, the annual review process reinforces the inherent DoD tendency to ignore program execution and to focus on future programs. (See the discussion in chapter 7 on the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.) The annual budget submission is finalized only two to three months into the new fiscal year. Obviously the pending budget cannot respond to the lessons learned in the execution of the current budget. During consideration of the pending annual request, there is rarely sufficient data to evaluate the operations of the current budget. The annual review then tends to develop into a comparison of last year's plans with this year's plans, instead of a comparison of plans with current problems.

More recently, it has encouraged Congress to react to problems without knowing whether or not the solutions enacted in the previous year were working. In 1984, the Congress enacted significant changes in defense procurement. Nonetheless, procurement "horror stories" created intense pressure to institute yet new sets of procurement reforms. An entirely new set of initiatives was proposed in 1985 without knowing whether the laws passed last year (and just now being implemented) are having an effect.

d. Impediments to Conclusive Decisions

Because the defense review process has evolved into an annual budget debate, congressional decisions are always tentative and never final. Actions taken by one committee are always subject to appeal in subsequent legislative steps or in the next fiscal year submission. Losing a legislative battle in one committee, a Military Department or contractor will seek to reverse that action in subsequent stages of the legislative process by building countervailing positions in the other committees.

This is understandable in a bicameral legislature, if unfortunate. It results in several specific problems. Congress rarely terminates marginal programs, since the energy required to do so over the opposition of the Services, the Defense Department, or the contractor is immense, and the outcome will likely be reversed in compromise as the aggrieved parties build firebreaks in the other chamber or in subsequent legislative steps. For example, over a dozen major programs were proposed for termination by either the House or the Senate in the fiscal year 1986 defense authorization bill. Yet every program recommended for termination was restored in the House-Senate conference, albeit with some restrictions.

This creates an incentive for proponents to patch together a compromise in order to get past each legislative hurdle, instead of confronting fundamental choices over the future of troubled systems. It also creates an incentive for system opponents to focus on any problem with a program to justify slowing it down or terminating it. Consequently, the same issues are reviewed year after year. The MX missile is an extreme example, but not a unique one.

Compromise is the central reality of a legislative democracy. But the process of annual review of the defense budget has elevated compromise at the expense of finality and progress.

4. CONGRESSIONAL MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Of all the criticisms of congressional behavior in the formulation of defense policies and programs, overmanagement or micro-management of the Department of Defense is most often mentioned. Increasingly the Congress is becoming involved in the details of the defense budget, not just the broad policies and directions that guide it. There has been a steady and dramatic increase in the extent of congressional involvement in the annual defense budget submission. In 1970 the defense authorization act totaled 9 pages, with a 33 page conference report accompanying the bill. The authorization bill enacted into law in 1975 reached 15 pages of bill language and 75 pages of conference report. The final fiscal year 1985 bill was 169 pages and the conference report 354 pages.

The Secretary of Defense highlighted this increasing problem of congressional micro-management this spring in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. The following table (presented by the Secretary of Defense) shows that since 1970 the number of reports and studies requested by the Congress has increased by a factor of 12. Statutory restrictions have increased by 233 percent.

Growth of Congressional Micro-Management Since 1970

	1970	1976	1982	1985	Percent increase 1970–1985
Requested studies and reports	36	114	221	458	1,172
Other mandated actions for DOD	18	208	210	202	1,022
General provisions in law	64	96	158	213	233
Number of programs adjusted:					
In authorization	180	222	339	1,315	631
In appropriation	650	1,032	1,119	1,848	184

Historically the appropriations committees have generally made substantial dollar adjustments, which is seen in the number of programs that were adjusted in each of the years, though most changes consisted of financial, not programmatic, adjustments to the budget submission. Since 1970 the Appropriations Committees have roughly tripled the number of changes in individual line items and program elements. An even more dramatic change has occurred in micro-management by the Armed Services Committees. During the past 15 years, the Armed Services Committees have increasingly become involved in this pattern of line item revision, adjusting individual programs seven times more often than in 1950. Clearly, micro-management has grown dramatically and has reached crisis proportions.

The fiscal year 1985 budget request had 1,890 separate line entries in the various procurement accounts and 897 program elements in the various research and development (R&D) accounts. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees changed 440 or 23 percent of the procurement line entries and 317 or 35 percent of all R&D programs.

More than an irritation to civilian and military managers, congressional micro-management reinforces problems within DoD. First, the tremendous demands that the Congress places on the Pentagon to justify in detail every aspect of the defense budget forces the Office of the Secretary of Defense to place too much attention on resource questions. This diverts attention from strategic planning, an area of weakness in DoD. Second, in response to congressional micro-management, OSD places an equivalent emphasis on details that could be better left to the Military Departments.

Micro-management has had an equally perverse impact on the Military Departments, as noted by Theodore Crackel:

> The line-item by line-item budgeting embraced by Congress in recent decades has created perverse incentives in the defense acquisition system. By budgeting for a specific weapon, rather than providing funds to accomplish the task or mission for which the weapon is intended, the Services are encouraged to shield marginal programs from scrutiny. The funded weapon amounts to their only solution; to lose it is to lose the money for the mission. As a result, the Services tend to fix and patch whatever problems emerge on that weapon rather than scrap it, try to sell an alternative approach, and obtain approval for new funds. There is little incentive for effective testing; the results can only hurt. Any problems identified by testing threaten both the project and the mission. Congress recently created an independent Office of Test and Evaluation. This, however, treats the symptoms, not the cause, and provides little incentive for better testing. ("Pentagon Management Problems: Congress Shares the Blame", *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, January 22, 1985, page 2)

The reasons for micro-management have been discussed earlier. They are worth repeating here: (a) the evolution toward standing subcommittees with specific substantive jurisdiction; (b) the development of an annual budget review process; (c) the quest to control policy through control of details; and (d) the pressure imposed on members of Congress by interest groups (and by staff), and the desire by members of Congress to be responsive to those constituent concerns. While these four factors evolved through the last 30 years, the trend has accelerated with the collapse of the foreign policy consensus which disciplined micro-management in the past.

5. INSUFFICIENT SENATE REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS IN DOD

Chapters 3 and 6, which address the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments, identify several concerns related to the quality of senior civilian leadership in DoD. Dissatisfaction with the qualifications of nominees must be identified (at least in part) as a problem of congressional oversight. Presidential appointments cannot be made without the advice and consent of the Senate. Even though the candidates have been disappointing, Congress has shown little stomach for fighting the President for candidates of higher caliber. There are two fundamental causes that contribute to a relatively loose congressional attitude toward presidential nominees.

a. Different Perceptions of Job Requirements and Qualifications

There are different perceptions of the job requirements and necessary qualifications which accompany specific appointments. This is, in part, the fault of the Congress for not having established the specific responsibilities associated with each appointed position. Even so, there is an understandable tendency in the Senate to assume that the President is, in effect, asking for the qualifications that he thinks are needed in a given position.

b. Tendency to Defer to the President

The second cause of an insufficient review of presidential nominations is the basic philosophy within the Senate that (barring some specific cause) the President is entitled to have the pleasure of his appointment, regardless of a Senator's personal opinion on the competence of the nominee. In the 96th and 97th Congresses, the Senate approved 99.1 percent and 99.2 percent of presidential nominations, respectively. In these two Congresses, not a single presidential nominee was rejected by the Senate, and less than 0.05 percent were withdrawn.

E. DESCRIPTION OF SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

1. PROBLEM AREA #1—FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS THAT AFFECT DEFENSE OVERSIGHT

The first major problem area encompasses two fundamental problems in Congress itself—the growing hegemony of the budget process in the overall legislative agenda and the blurring of jurisdictions among committees, turning the three stage legislative process into a series of redundant steps. Solutions to these problems go far beyond the issue of improving the quality of defense oversight to the heart of the continuing effectiveness of Congress in general.

Fundamentally, Congress has too much to do and insufficient time to do it. There are two basic solutions to the problem: either skip some stages in the process or do all the steps, but less frequently. The following specific solutions expand on these two basic strategies.

○ Option 1A—adopt a biennial budget process

A key option widely advocated is to shift the current budget process from an annual to a biennial cycle. Currently, the Congress reviews the President's annual budget and makes changes only in the pending budget year. Under a biennial budget, the Administration would submit a proposed budget for a two-year period, and the Congress would debate, amend, and eventually approve a two-year budget, authorization, and appropriation.

Many different biennial proposals have been offered by a wide range of proponents. All proposals fit into one of the following three categories:

> Spend the first session of a new Congress adopting a two-year budget and the second session conducting oversight reviews;
>
> Spend the first session of a new Congress conducting oversight hearings and adopt a budget during the second session based on those hearings; or
>
> Stretch out the current annual process to cover a two-year period.

Ideally, the entire Federal budget process would be shifted to a two-year cycle. However, it would be possible to shift just the Department of Defense to a biennial budget. Indeed, Congress has already acted on this option to establish a two-year budget for DoD. The fiscal year 1986 defense authorization bill contained a provision (section 1405) directing the President to submit a two-year budget for the Department of Defense and related agencies in January 1987 for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. The Secretary of Defense is directed to submit by April 1, 1986, a study outlining the statutory and procedural changes required to implement the two-year budget.

The provision does not presuppose which of the three categories might be adopted for a new biennial cycle for DoD. Because DoD may be the only Executive Branch department on a two-year cycle, it is likely that the first category would be most appropriate. Also open to question is whether the two-year cycle must include all steps—budgeting, authorizing, and appropriating—or might consist of just the first two.

- Option 1B—consolidate congressional committees

A second solution to the overall problems with Congressional oversight would be to consolidate the number of steps in the process. Since each step is controlled by separate committees, this in effect requires the consolidation of committees.

The form of that consolidation is again subject to dispute, with proponents offering many different combinations. Again, three basic types of recommendations for consolidation have been suggested:

> Consolidate the authorizing and appropriating committees into a single functional committee;
>
> Combine the Budget and the Appropriations Committees into a single committee that has responsibility primarily for the budgeting stage; or
>
> Expand the membership of the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees and give them responsibility for authorizations as well as appropriations.

Obviously those senators and representatives on authorizing committees would favor options 1 and 2 while the members on the Appropriations Committees would disagree and prefer option 3. Members of the Budget Committees would likely oppose option 2. Clearly there is no consensus on which approach to take. The Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System chose to ignore recommendations offered by several senators in testimony calling for committee consolidation.

- Option 1C—restructure the Budget Committee membership

One suggestion for solving the problem of the dominance of the budget process is to restructure the Budget Committee so that its membership reflects the leadership of the authorizing and appropriating committees. Members would serve on the Budget Committee because they were chairmen or ranking members on the other committees. This option would not lessen the number of steps in the process. Nor would it reduce the number of committees. It would, however, theoretically integrate the priority setting aspects of the budget process into the normal functioning of the authorizing and appropriating committees. As such, it would, in theory, represent an extension of the authorizing and appropriating processes and committees, and not a separate stage.

- Option 1D—clarify and enforce jurisdictions among committees

The jurisdictional boundaries separating the committees of the Congress have become blurred in recent years. The boundaries have become particularly imprecise between authorizing and appropriating committees. Jurisdictional differentiation between authorizing committees is relatively easy to accomplish through definitions. Differentiation between authorizing and appropriating committees is much more difficult, necessitating functional distinctions. Traditionally those functional distinctions have been honored and have been complementary in producing a final product. Increasingly, they have become competitive. Jurisdictional realignment will come initially through party organizations as they organize the House and Senate for a new Congress. Sustaining the differences will require the ongoing diligence of the committee and party leaders.

2. PROBLEM AREA #2—CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES REINFORCE DIVISIONS IN DOD

The second major problem area is the inconsistent and contradictory pattern of congressional oversight which reinforces divisions within DoD. Ultimately, consolidation of committees offers the best solution. Absent that, however, there are several alternatives that might be considered.

○ Option 2A—complete evolution to mission-oriented subcommittees

As previously discussed, in 1981, the Senate Committee on Armed Services altered its subcommittee structure to improve its focus on defense missions. Three of the six subcommittees were given a mission-orientation. However, only one of these subcommittees—the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces—has a sharp mission focus. The two other subcommittees—Tactical Warfare and Sea Power and Force Projection—have a tendency to focus on forces and individual programs, and not on missions. Further, their jurisdiction is incomplete since they review procurement and research and development programs only. The mission subcommittees do not have jurisdiction over most of the accounts that traditionally contribute to combat readiness.

In addition, the current subcommittee structure does not lend itself to continuing and detailed consideration of broad defense strategy and policy issues. Only the full committee can address such issues, and the time and attention that it can devote to these issues is limited. Similarly, the committee does not have organizational arrangements for conducting investigations.

These shortcomings in the subcommittee structure of the Senate Committee on Armed Services weaken the committee's ability to address fundamental defense issues. To correct shortcomings in the current structure, the subcommittees could be reorganized as follows:

	Current Subcommittees	Proposed Subcommittees
1.	Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces	Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces

Current Subcommittees	Proposed Subcommittees
(Tactical Warfare)	Tactical Warfare and NATO Defense
2. Sea Power and Force Projection	Sea Power and Force Projection and Regional Defense
3. Preparedness	Manpower, Installations and Logistics
4. Manpower and Personnel	
5. Military Construction	
6. Defense Acquisition Policy	Procurement Policy and Technology Base
	Strategy, Policy and Investigations

There would be no change in the jurisdiction of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee. The Tactical Warfare Subcommittee would have the additional responsibility of oversight of NATO defenses, while the Sea Power Subcommittee would assume responsibility for regional defense programs, including the Persian Gulf and Central America. The Manpower, Preparedness and Military Construction subcommittees would be consolidated into a single new subcommittee, though readiness issues directly related to deployed forces would fall subject to the mission subcommittees. The Defense Acquisition Policy Subcommittee would also have responsibility for oversight of defense technology issues. Finally, a Strategy, Policy and Investigations Subcommittee would be created for oversight of broad issues of defense policy.

The impact of this evolution in committee structure would be limited unless both the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services adopt parallel structures. The transition would be modest for the Senate Armed Services Committee though drastic for the House Armed Services Committee which continues to organize subcommittees along the lines of the appropriation categories. On the other hand, the House Armed Services Committee has a standing investigations subcommittee and a *de facto* strategy subcommittee. If different committee structures persist, however, dissonance in congressional oversight will continue.

○ Option 2B—structure hearings along mission lines

As noted above, the Congress tends to confine its oversight of defense programs within Service appropriation accounts. Hearings tend to focus on each Service's appropriation budget requests, even in the mission subcommittees of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This reinforces the tendency to review the defense program in terms of artificial accounting inputs instead of mission outputs. It also prevents the committees from determining relative priorities among contending missions.

In recent years, the Armed Services Committees have held hearings featuring the testimony of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's) of the unified commands. This testimony has been helpful in identifying near-term problems and shortages, but has been of marginal help in determining priorities in the annual budget submission because of the lack of depth of knowledge by the CINC's of the pending budget proposals. The CINC's have largely endorsed without elaboration the Service programs.

This option would expand those hearings, making operational commanders lead witnesses for a larger number of hearings, especially those hearings with a resource review emphasis primarily in the areas of readiness and combat sustainability. In order to accomplish this, the CINC's will need expanded access to and responsibilities in the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS), a proposal which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 on the Unified and Specified Commands.

- Option 2C—modify budget justification material to reflect missions

Budget justification material submitted by DoD to the Congress follows the appropriation account categories for each of the Services. There is no detailed presentation of justification material along mission account lines, despite the fact that DoD's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System ostensibly develops the annual budget submission within DoD along mission lines.

However, as noted in Chapter 7, the PPB system largely ignores program execution. Current DoD budgeting and management systems tend to operate autonomously. That is, DoD does not routinely link the process that acquires resources with the tools that manage those resources once they are in hand. If the Congress authorizes and appropriates less for systems than was requested, the Defense of Defense will subsequently adjust its fielding plans, though at the time the reductions are made, there is no way to determine the impact of the decision.

The annual budget submission and justification materials could be modified along mission account lines, though a comprehensive change would take some time. Such changes at first would be superficial, rearranging the various accounts under different headings. A more fundamental revision in DoD accounting and management procedures would be required ultimately to facilitate a more direct linkage between policy decisions by Congress with programming and execution actions within DoD.

3. Problem Area # 3—Predominance of Annual Review Cycle

As noted earlier, the burdens of an annual defense budget process have become too great, both for DoD and the Congress. An annual budget process requires the Defense Department to work on three separate budgets simultaneously—executing the current program, defending the request for the pending budget year, and planning the budget submission for the next year. For its part, Congress has become mired in the details of a massive budget, losing sight of its fundamental responsibilities to provide national level guidance and direction for policies and priorities. Three options have been developed to help overcome this problem.

- Option 3A—establish a biennial budget process

This option is discussed under Problem Area #1 but is listed here as well because of the substantial impact it would have in overcoming the predominance of the annual review cycle.

- Option 3B—establish milestone authorizations for major weapon development

For the procurement of major new weapon systems, the Defense Department follows explicit procedures outlined in DoD directives. Current DoD rules specify a series of major milestones in the life-cycle development of a new system. The acquisition milestones focus on key program development phases such as concept development, demonstration and evaluation, full-scale development, and production go-ahead. At the start of each of these phases, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meets to evaluate the promise of a system in meeting its documented requirements. Each DSARC phase represents a major milestone in the development cycle of a new system. (The DSARC process changes somewhat with the particular emphasis of each Administration.)

The Congress has no similar explicit review process. Instead each program is evaluated each year whether it is troubled or trouble free. The average weapon system requires 8 to 10 years of development before production begins. Systems will stay in production from 10 to 15 years. Annual authorizations in this broad context make little sense.

The current process of annual reviews reinforces the tendency to focus on accounting considerations rather than policy issues. It also tends to prolong the period of contentiousness over a program, with advocates and opponents alike struggling from year to year, debating the future of the system.

In its place the Congress could choose to establish an explicit procedure to authorize milestones in the life of a system, paralleling the process currently used by DoD. At each milestone, the Defense Department would provide a cost and performance baseline that would carry the program to its next milestone (for example, from demonstration to full-scale development). If the Congress authorizes that milestone the defense managers would be free to continue the program, unless costs or performance deviate (by some preset percentage) from the baseline provided at the time of authorization, until its next natural milestone. If a program deviated from its cost or performance baseline, Congress would review the program in a traditional oversight manner.

- Option 3C—require budget submissions to conform to the congressional budget resolution

The current congressional budget process requires Congress to set mandatory ceilings for the budget year and targets for the following two years. The President is free, however, to submit the next year any proposal he may choose. Presidents have traditionally submitted optimistic five-year defense spending plans.

Unrealistic long-term plans pose serious problems because they tend to distort near-term decisions. Overly optimistic projections of resources permit the start of more programs than can be afforded over the long run. They also permit DoD to carry forward marginal programs rather than terminate them, because everything appears "affordable" by the end of the five-year plan. Finally, it tends to reinforce the inefficiencies of annual budget reviews, since only the budget year represents a serious budget proposal.

The Congress could require the President to submit a five-year budget that conforms to the outyear spending targets contained in the previous congressional budget resolution. The President would be free to submit a request for funds in addition to the amount contained in the budget resolution, which would be considered simultaneously with the budget request.

4. Problem Area # 4—Congressional Micro-Management of Defense Department

Micro-management is a particularly difficult problem to address because it requires a steady plan to reverse the trends of the past 25 years. At the core is the need to restore the pattern of trust and consensus that prevailed through the 1950's and 1960's. Any recommendation for mechanical changes to reduce micro-management will be at best a secondary solution until the underlying consensus can be restored. There are, however, a few mechanical changes that could help reduce micro-management.

- Option 4A—"package" authorizations

Less than 100 major systems in procurement account for approximately half of all expenditures for procurement. There are over 1,800 individual line entries in the procurement accounts, however. The bulk of the annual revisions to the budget request are in these small programs. This creates several specific problems. First, changes can be made in individual programs which create imbalances in other programs. For example, the Congress may increase the number of tanks over the budget request, but reduce the number of trucks required to support tanks. Presumably the Services submit balanced acquisition programs. Changes in the large number of line entries can distort that balanced acquisition program.

More fundamentally, however, Congress has become trapped in trivia, authorizing shop vans, five ton trucks, munitions lift trailers, and so forth, instead of keeping a focus on major policy issues and national priorities.

One solution to this problem, suggested by General M.R. Thurmond, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, is to develop authorization packages, instead of individual line items. Under this approach, all of the major items required to support a fielded tank would be brought together into a package and authorized as a package. Instead of authorizing a tank and 29 different items required to support that tank, Congress could authorize a single package that had 30 separate elements. If Congress chose to add 120 tanks, it would also add 120 tank packages. Binding programs together into these packages would help avoid the distortions that come from micromanagement and would help Congress disengage from a preoccupation with trivial details.

- Option 4B—consolidate research and development accounts

During the last ten years, the number of individual line items in the research and development appropriations has multiplied. Today there are over 900 individual program elements and multiple projects within each program element.

The hundreds of line items and multiple projects encourage the very micro-management by the Congress that DoD decries. More importantly, this proliferation diverts attention from more fundamental problems: the need to establish criteria for evaluating the progress of R&D activities, and the need to assign priorities for research and development efforts across mission areas and among promising technologies.

The Congress could direct that DoD consolidate the number of separate program elements and convert the justification material from a description of funding inputs to a description of goals set for the project and the progress expected in meeting those goals. The current justification material is broadly descriptive and offers little indication of the role the R&D activity plays in meeting some specifically determined defense objective. Ultimately the Congress should be able to authorize an objective and the baseline program required to attain the objective patterned after the milestone authorizations noted above.

○ Option 4C—increase discipline by congressional leaders

A third option for dealing with micro-management is not at all mechanical. A consistent effort by defense leaders in the Congress to resist micro-management cannot be legislated but would have substantial impact in reversing the trend toward micro-management. It is often said that organizations do well those things the boss checks. If the boss places priority on minimizing micro-management, the staff will follow that lead.

Logically this should carry over to the floor debate on defense. In recent years, the number of floor amendments to authorization bills has escalated. This poses a dilemma for the floor managers. Fighting superfluous amendments would prolong the debate and add to its contentiousness. It is much easier to modify amendments to make them relatively benign and accept them on the floor, rather than fight them. This establishes a pattern, however, of yielding to almost any member's wishes for the sake of expediency in securing adoption of the bill. If the desire to curtail micro-management is sufficient, the leaders will have to bring discipline to the floor debate and oppose a much larger number of amendments.

5. PROBLEM AREA # 5—INSUFFICIENT SENATE REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS IN DOD

To the extent that the Congress believes that improvements are required in this area, it has the tools to fix the problem.

○ Option 5A—reduce the number of presidential appointive positions

This option would permit the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate to focus on fewer nominations which would be the most senior in the Department of Defense. However, this solution offers, by itself, little potential for correcting the problems of poorly qualified political appointees in DoD. Only if the Senate makes its standards for appointments more rigorous will the quality of DoD appointees improve.

- Option 5B—vest powers of appointment in persons other than President

This option focuses on a basic cause of the problem of inexperienced political appointments in DoD, which is the failure of the White House to give defense management credentials sufficient emphasis in the selection of nominees for appointive positions. By vesting powers of appointment in persons other than the President, it is likely that the defense management credentials of nominees would receive greater attention and that other factors would receive less emphasis.

- Option 5C—establish more rigorous standards for congressional approval of presidential appointees

Absent legislative changes, the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate as a whole could simply alter its practice of nearly routine confirmation of Presidential nominees. This is at once the easiest and the most difficult option to pursue. It would require no statutory changes or any significant changes in procedures. However, it would pose serious difficulties because of the generally held view among Senators that Presidents deserve to have a staff of their own choosing.

F. VALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This section evaluates the specific options for reforming the pattern of congressional oversight of the Department of Defense that were set forth in Section E. These options are not compared with each other or ranked in any way. Rather, this section seeks to delineate in an objective manner the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative solution. The options are identified by the same number and letter combination that was used in the preceding section.

1. Options for Dealing With Fundamental Problems in Congress That Affect Defense Oversight

The first problem area concerned broad scale problems in Congress that go beyond the issue of congressional oversight of DoD. As such, the prospect of implementing these options is substantially more problematical than for those options that are subject to the action of the Senate Armed Services Committee alone.

- Option 1A—adopt a biennial budget process

A biennial budget process offers tremendous promise of long-term benefits. A biennial budget would foster greater stability in the planning process and minimize the number of disruptive reviews for programs. It would ease the burden now created by an annual cycle on senior DoD managers who spend tremendous amounts of time preparing annual budget submissions, preparing and delivering testimony, and responding to official inquiries. More important for the Congress, a biennial cycle would allow greater efforts to be directed at the broad questions of national strategy and policy oversight. Currently, all oversight must be accomplished during the budget review, which has become mired in a mass of programmatic trivia.

On the negative side, while there is broad agreement on the desirability of a two-year budget process, there is little agreement on the specific type of two year cycle to be adopted. The different basic strategies noted in Section E reflect fundamental differences in the perspective of the sponsors, determined largely by the committees on which they presently serve.

Beyond these fundamental philosophical differences, there are persistent technical problems that affect all schemes for biennial budgeting. How would the system adjust to significant changes in the economy without reopening the substantive debate over spending priorities? This is potentially a very serious problem if only DoD shifts to a two-year cycle while the rest of the budget is on an annual cycle. Any major changes in the economy might place substantial pressure to reopen the second year in the defense two-year budget.

Second, in which year should deliberations take place and the budget begin? If the debate occurred in odd-numbered years, members of Congress would be forced to run for reelection on the basis of budget compromises set more than a year before the election. The sharp economic swings of the past three years highlight the perils of that approach. Were the deliberations to take place in even-numbered years, however, newly elected Presidents would have to wait nearly three years to implement new policy initiatives. Since either situation would likely be unacceptable, supplemental budgets would be necessary and could quickly evolve into an annual budget review, negating the purpose of the shift to a biennial budget.

○ Option 1B—consolidate congressional committees

Consolidating the number of committees that have jurisdictional oversight over the Department of Defense is perhaps the only sure formula for reducing redundancy. As Senator Nunn said before the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, "Three different Committees in each House should not be doing essentially the same thing. Some consolidation of the tasks currently being performed repetitively be these three Committees must be given serious assessment."

Fewer committees would result in fewer steps in the process, which would not only reduce redundancy but lower the total time required by the House and Senate to review the budget request. Fewer committees would also result in fewer staff members to review DoD programs and generate work for the Department. Some critics charge that the primary reason Congress has turned toward micro-management is because the professional staff working for the Congress has opened these areas. Once opened, the mass of detail leads Senators and Representatives to argue for more staff to cope with the job requirements, continuing on in a deteriorating spiral.

Finally, fewer committees would reduce the inconsistency inherent in current Congressional oversight. Each committee brings a different perspective to problems because of the different traditions and priorities of the Members. Fewer committees would result in fewer inconsistencies in congressional oversight.

The primary negative argument against this option is its political implausibility. Consolidating committees is a euphemism for stripping power from some committees (and their members) and giving power to other committees. Who becomes the "consolidator" and who the "consolidatee" is a subject of little agreement in either the Senate or the House. As the Georgetown CSIS Defense Organization Project stated in its final report, "Despite the attractiveness of such a committee consolidation, we judge that under current circumstances the political obstacles to its implementation are insurmountable." (pages 35–36) While several Senators suggested in testimony before the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System that consolidation should be considered, the Committee avoided the subject entirely in its report.

- Option 1C—restructure the Budget Committee membership

Under this option, the budget committee members would be drawn from the chairmen and ranking members of the other committees. As such, the budget committee, and the budget process, could become extensions of the authorizing committees, rather than a separate step in a three-stage process.

The primary advantage of this option is that it would provide a more structured method for formulating a political consensus on budget priorities than currently exists. Presently the Budget Committee (especially in the Senate) builds packages through informal consultation with the committee chairmen and ranking members. This option would make this informal arrangement explicit and open. It would also permit committee chairmen to gauge more accurately earlier in the session the likely range of possible spending targets, permitting a more orderly mark-up process within the committee and bills more acceptable to the full Senate. During each of the last three years, the Senate Armed Services Committee has had to modify its recommendations because the Senate was unwilling to accept the levels proposed in the defense authorization bill in light of compromises reached in the budget process. Making the chairman a part of the budget committee would ease this uncertainty.

The primary problem with this option is that it proposes a mechanical solution to what is essentially a non-mechanical problem. The budget process has come to dominate the legislative agenda primarily for three reasons. First, the President chose to use the budget process in 1981 to launch his legislative agenda. He was successful in that effort and has made the budget process a central focus of the Administration's agenda ever since. The budget is now a prominent focus for partisan politics. Second, the budget dominates the Congress because there is so little consensus in the country over spending priorities, and Congress accurately reflects that lack of consensus. Establishing a budget in any fiscal year involves wrenching conflict and compromise among important priorities. In the absence of clear agreement in the country on those priorities, Congress will have difficulty reaching swift agreement. Third, the massive deficits insure that the budget battle will be fought each year. In the face of these powerful forces, this option to restructure the Budget Committee membership represents a superficial change that fails to come to grips with the fundamental problems that have been identified in congressional oversight.

- ○ Option 1D—clarify and enforce jurisdictions between committees

Clarifying the jurisdictional confusion among committees will provide much clearer guidance from the Congress and should measurably contribute to better strategic guidance within DoD. The current process lends itself to confusion and inconsistent oversight as committees compete for jurisdiction, reverse the recommendations of other committees, and dilute a clear perspective of national intent and policy.

There are no disadvantages to this option. Achieving it, however, may prove difficult. The problem is not one of unclear definitions or boundaries but of inconsistent efforts to police transgressions. Congress as an institution operates on consensus and compromise. Guarding jurisdiction "turf" is difficult, because it requires continuing attention and confrontation which may tax the pattern of trust and accommodation that must prevail in a legislative body like the Senate.

2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM THAT CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES REINFORCE DIVISIONS IN DOD

- ○ Option 2A—complete evolution to mission-oriented subcommittees

Under this option, the Armed Services Committees would restructure their subcommittees to follow the primary missions of the Department of Defense, rather than to continue to review programs along appropriation account lines.

There are several advantages to this option. It would help shift the perspective away from artificial accounting inputs toward defense outputs. So long as the Congress reviews the DoD budget along appropriation account lines, it will fail to develop an integrated plan. Mission integration has been a primary shortcoming in DoD. If the Congress places a priority on mission integration, OSD and the Services will respond by giving it greater attention as well.

There are disadvantages to such an option, however. The Appropriations Committees prefer the present input-oriented categories because it is easier to control them, and changes in them, over time. The Appropriations Committees, especially in the House, presume a fiduciary responsibility to the public over appropriations, and as such operate with an "accounting" mentality. This frame of reference places a premium on stable definitions and accounts. It is much preferable with this perspective for the Congress to determine those definitions on the input side than it is to permit DoD to determine the categories on the output side.

It could also be argued that having different structures—a mission-oriented approach in one committee and an input appropriation-oriented approach in the other—improves the quality of oversight in the Congress. Retaining the two different approaches would combine the strengths of both. Uncertainty and confusion at the staff level is the price paid for different subcommittee orientations by different committees. But that uncertainty and confusion is manageable, as has been demonstrated during the last four years.

- Option 2B—structure hearings along mission lines

Under this option, hearings on the defense budget would be structured along mission lines rather than along appropriation account lines for each of the Services.

This option is logically related to Option 2A which would organize the subcommittees along mission lines. As such, it would continue the effort to shift the focus away from inputs toward outputs. This approach would be especially valuable in the area of readiness and sustainability. These areas are traditionally neglected because the advocates for those areas—primarily the operational commanders-in-chief—do not traditionally testify on the details of the budget submissions. The primary testimony is given by the senior Service managers who are primarily oriented toward modernization rather than toward readiness.

There is a limit, however, to the value of the testimony of operational commanders in the area of procurement of new weapon systems, for example. The operational CINC's should lead on issues of current operations and the capabilities and problems of standing forces. They cannot be expected to be responsible for future systems. Here the emphasis could be placed on expanded joint hearings along mission lines. Instead of a hearing on tactical aircraft modernization in the Air Force and ground forces modernization in the Army, hearings could emphasize joint mission activities, such as "Combined Arms Operations and Close Air Support". These hearings would be more useful in helping the committees determine problems and progress in meeting mission requirements and would aid in determining priorities among contending activities.

- Option 2C—modify budget justification material to reflect missions

This option too is related to the two previous options in this section in that it is required to complement the shift away from artificial accounting inputs to mission outputs.

There would be substantial advantages to an improved ability to relate resource decisions to mission outputs. For example, if the Congress wished to add $10 billion over three years to improve U.S. capabilities for reinforcing NATO, Congress can do so only indirectly by increasing funding in certain categories, while providing instructions to DoD to apply those increases according to certain criteria. There is no way to know where the most effective investments could be made. And there is no way to insure that the funds will actually go to the intended purpose. Congress could add funds to increase the stockage level of war stocks in Europe, for example, but the Army could just as easily subsequently redirect those additional items of equipment to U.S.-based units.

A revised system linking resource decisions to program implementation would help overcome this shortcoming. Underlying this change would be an improvement in the PPB system that would focus on program execution. These changes could be beneficial to all of DoD, but they would help move Congress away from micro-management of individual items toward broad issues of policy direction.

There are significant problems associated with presenting justification material along mission account lines. How, for example, would we treat procurement of fighters, which can be used either in continental air defense (which would be subject to the Strategic Subcommittee), in a conventional war in Europe (falling subject to the jurisdiction of the Tactical Warfare and NATO Defense Subcommittee), or in third-world contingencies (subject to the jurisdiction of the Sea Power, Force Projection and Regional Defense Subcommittee)?

Decision rules can certainly be constructed to deal with the problem, but they would be arbitrary at best. It should be noted, however, that DoD builds the budget annually along these mission lines, so the task is certainly not impossible.

3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE PREDOMINANCE OF ANNUAL REVIEW CYCLES

- Option 3A —establish a biennial budget process

A biennial budget process would obviously alleviate the problems caused by annual review cycles. However, this option is already described and evaluated as Option 1A in sections D and E.

- Option 3B —establish milestone authorizations for major weapon development

Under this option, Congress would authorize milestones in the life of a system rather than one year's activity in the life of that system. Once a program successfully accomplishes one stage—e.g., concept development—the Congress would then authorize the Service to proceed entirely with the next stage—full scale development in this case. If the Congress authorizes that milestone, the defense managers would be free to continue the program, unless costs or performance deviate (by some preset percentage) from the baseline provided at the time of authorization, until its next natural milestone. Once a program is authorized to begin procurement, milestone authorization naturally would extend to multi-year procurement.

This option holds tremendous potential. The Congress would be free from having to review every system every year, and could focus instead on the key programmatic and policy issues before the Congress that year. Program managers could count on stable programs so long as they remain on cost and meet their performance objectives. The Congress would get out of the business of micromanagement, except when major programs are in trouble, where oversight is appropriate and warranted.

Milestone authorizations would also help focus debate on major systems and bring that debate to a conclusion, rather than have it stretched out for years. Currently, troubled systems are debated year after year, often during both the authorization and the appropriation stages. This system would help overcome the need to reopen debate.

There are additional benefits that accrue from this alternative. Under the current system of annual authorizations, the Congress is pressured to make adjustments in programs because of the limited time perspective, which would not be the case with a longer time perspective. For example, minor problems in the early stages of testing are frequently blown entirely out of proportion. During the first years of production on the M1 tank, every little problem was cited as reason to terminate the program. In retrospect, the M1 tank program was a significant success story. Its progress was unnecessarily disrupted because of annual reviews. A system of milestone authorizations would help overcome this problem. If a program were authorized to proceed to its next milestone, unless its cost grows unacceptably or its performance falls consistently short of expectations, minor problems would be kept in perspective and Congress could reject the demands of the perennial critics to disturb a program based on a single test.

There are three problems with milestone authorizations. First, milestone authorizations would still be subject to the perverse effects of unrealistic long-term budgeting in DoD. If DoD insists on budgeting to unrealistically high targets in the future, milestone authorizations would not necessarily protect programs from pressure within DoD. Indeed, the primary source of program stretchouts during the past four years has been the Defense Department and not Capitol Hill. Milestone authorizations would certainly be better than annual programs, but they could still fall victim to unrealistic long-term budgeting.

Second, as larger portions of the procurement and R&D accounts would come under milestone authorizations, greater pressure would fall on programs not under those procedures if budget reductions had to be made. Long-term authorizations would limit the flexibility of the Military Departments to make annual adjustments. As is the case with multi-year contracts, budget reductions become concentrated in areas that are not covered by the milestone authorizations. The difficulty this could pose for those programs not covered under milestone authorizations could become so great that the Services would trade away program stability in order to preserve budgeting flexibility.

Third, some have argued that milestone authorizations would delay progress on programs, forcing program managers to wait until Congress has authorized the next stage. This is a specious argument, since under current practice a program manager cannot proceed to the next stage until provided the funds to do so. As such, this system would have the same effect as the current system of annual authorizations in this regard.

- Option 3C—require budget submissions to conform to the congressional budget resolution

This option would require the President to confirm his annual budget submission to the targets specified the previous year in the congressional budget resolution. The President would be free to submit a request for funds in addition to the amount contained in the budget resolution, which would be considered simultaneously with the budget request.

This would help to reduce the artificiality of long-term spending horizons and introduce near-term discipline in budget-making. It would also help discipline the Congress to live up to the budget commitments made in the previous year. Recently the Congress has demanded lower levels for defense spending than were agreed to in the previous year's budget resolution. This process would not preclude the Congress from reneging on its plans, but it would reduce the contentiousness that accompanies the annual budget submission and would provide a basis for the Administration to justify its submission and call on the Congress to acknowledge the requirement for long-term commitments in the area of national security.

The disadvantage of this approach is that the President should be free to submit whatever he believes is required to meet defense requirements. Under current practice, the "out-years" of the First Concurrent Resolution for national defense are set entirely on the basis of artificial assumptions and political requirements, and not on the basis of defense requirements.

It should be acknowledged that the out-years of the Five Year Defense Plan are usually set in the aggregate and not constructed from the bottom up looking at requirements. At the start of its first term, the Administration pledged to increase the defense budget by 7 percent real growth without knowing whether that was sufficient or executable. As such, this option would merely bring the Administration and the Congress together in setting out-year goals.

4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONGRESSIONAL MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

○ Option 4A—"package" authorizations

The purpose of this option is to reduce the number of items authorized by the Congress by packaging together those items required to support major systems. Instead of separately authorizing a tank and the 29 different items required to support that tank, Congress could authorize a single package that has 30 separate elements. If Congress chose to add 120 tanks, it would also add 120 tank packages.

Under this approach, the procurement programs would be kept in balance and incremental changes would be tied to realistic requirements. More specifically, the Congress would shift away from excessive detail and more toward the fundamental issues that should guide our procurement plans and priorities.

At this time, the Services lack the management tools to bring together disparate procurement programs into defendable "packages" for authorization. And there would be difficult transition problems since some programs would be ending while others were just beginning. Consequently, some items for the existing stock of deployed equipment would have to be procured outside of packages. The Services would also likely resist this "package" concept since it would show the full cost of a weapon system and give greater ammunition to critics of the system.

○ Option 4B—consolidate research and development accounts

The primary advantage of this option is to reduce the proliferation of research and development categories to minimize their exposure to micro-management. This is also primarily the objection to this option since the Congress has tended to focus its revisions more intensively in R&D than in other accounts. It is widely believed in the Congress that once a program has entered full scale development, it is virtually impossible to make any meaningful changes. Consolidating R&D accounts may help, but there would be nothing to stop the Congress from going into the accounts and making changes in individual projects, as is currently the case.

- Option 4C—discipline by congressional leaders

This is judged to be the only truly effective solution to the micro-management program. Micro-management occurs because House and Senate leaders permit it to occur. These leaders increasingly accept amendments on the floor of the House and the Senate to avoid holding up passage of the defense authorization bill. Accepting these amendments not only contributes to micro-management but fosters additional efforts in subsequent years as well. Staffs feed this pattern of micro-management because it suits the interests of their employers. If congressional leaders placed primary emphasis on avoiding micro-management, the staffs would follow suit. Organizations do well those things the boss checks.

There is no apparent disadvantage to this option. The primary problem with it is its difficulty in implementation. As noted above, the Congress as an organization operates on the basis of compromise and conciliation. Fighting micro-management requires confrontation. Since most instances of micro-management do involve a genuine problem (the question is not that a problem exists but whether the Congress, as opposed to the Military Departments or DoD, ought to be dwelling on the problem), congressional leaders are placed in the difficult position of arguing against an amendment to deal with a problem.

5. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS IN DOD

- Option 5A—reduce the number of presidential appointive positions

This option treats the symptoms and not the cause.

- Option 5B—vest powers of appointment in persons other than the President

The purpose of this option is to remove senior management positions from political pressures by giving the power to make those appointments to those individuals who will be judged for the success they have in accomplishing their missions. It is believed that those individuals who are going to spend the next four years in DoD and will be judged by their success in managing the Department will want to place a greater emphasis on defense management credentials than nominations made by the White House which naturally reflect a significant political dimension.

On the negative side, this option would lessen powers of the President that have been exercised for a considerable period of time. Also, a decision to vest powers of appointment in individuals other than the President would require the concurrence of the House of Representatives and the signature of the President or a subsequent vote to override his veto. This may be difficult to achieve.

- Option 5C—establish more rigorous standards for congressional approval of presidential appointees

This alternative is at once the best and the most difficult one to implement because it is essentially political in nature. Presidential appointments represent presidential commitments, and the President's party is almost always obligated to support the President. Alternatively, a decision to reject a candidate's appointment on a bipartisan basis could have a significant impact in encouraging the President to seek more competent candidates to avoid the embarrassment of a second rejection.

G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning congressional review and oversight. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section C (Key Trends) and Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based on the more promising options evaluated in Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. Efforts to reorganize the Department of Defense will prove imperfect unless accompanied by changes in congressional review and oversight of the defense program.	
2. The congressional budget process dominates the legislative agenda and has distorted defense oversight.	
3. Annual congressional review cycles of DoD's budget submission have become counterproductive and inhibit coherent oversight.	3A. Adopt a biennial budget process. 3B. Establish milestone authorizations for major acquisitions.

Conclusions	Recommendations
4. The Congress has trivialized its responsibilities through micro-management of DoD; the Congress no longer focuses on fundamental issues of strategy and national priority.	4A. Have congressional leaders place increased emphasis on avoiding micro-management of DoD. 4B. Consolidate individual line items into force "packages" andauthorize packages. (A biennial budget process, while not solving micro-management directly, would help shift the fundamental focus of the Congress by deemphasizing annual budgets and reemphasizing traditional oversight.)
5. The Congress reinforces the flaws inherent in current DoD organizations and procedures; the Congress dwells on material inputs, not mission outputs.	5A. Complete the evolution to mission-oriented subcommittees. 5B. Structure hearings along lines of defense missions, not appropriation accounts. 5C. Modify budget justification material to reflect defense missions.

CHAPTER 10

OVERVIEW ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapters 2 through 9 of this study address distinct concepts, organizations, and decision-making procedures within or affecting the Department of Defense. This chapter seeks to combine these separate efforts to provide an overview analysis of DoD and its problems. The extensive interdependence of the topics studied in the eight preceding chapters requires an integrated analysis; it is not possible to formulate effective solutions for any one topic in isolation. As Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch have noted:

> ...an organization is not a mechanical system in which one part can be changed without a concomitant effect on the other parts. Rather, an organizational system shares with biological systems the property of an intense interdependence of parts such that a change in one part has an impact on the others. (*Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action*, pages 9 and 10)

The subsequent section of this chapter aggregates the numerous problem areas identified in Chapters 3 through 9 to identify ten major problem themes that are undermining the performance of the Department of Defense. These problem themes provide useful insights into broad organizational and procedural deficiencies in DoD. The third section seeks to place the current problems of DoD in a historical context. The final section presents a set of conclusions and recommendations based on the overview analysis contained in this chapter. Appendix B of this chapter presents a brief summary of the views of 15 outside experts who evaluated this staff study. These views were presented during meetings of these experts with nine Members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services held at Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia, on October 5 and 6, 1985.

B. MAJOR PROBLEM THEMES IN DOD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

Chapters 3 through 9 identify 34 organizational or procedural problem areas within or affecting the Department of Defense. From these numerous problem areas, ten major problem themes emerge. The first six problem themes, while they have counterparts in other organizations, are specifically oriented to the uniqueness of the Department of Defense. The next three problem themes are general management problems that plague many organizations, both private and public. The last problem theme —involving the insufficient power and influence of the Secretary of Defense —draws upon the nine problem themes that precede it. The specific problem areas from Chapters 3 through 9 upon which each theme is based are presented in Appendix A of this chapter.

1. IMBALANCE OF EMPHASIS ON FUNCTIONS VERSUS MISSIONS

In discussing new concepts in organizational design, Peter F. Drucker has written:

> ...We realize now that structure is a means for attaining the objectives and goals of an institution. And if a structure is to be effective and sound, we must start with objectives and strategy.
>
> ...Strategy—that is, the answer to the questions: "What is our business? What should it be? What will it be?" —determines the purpose of structure. It thereby determines the key tasks or activities in a given business or service institution. Effective structure is the design that makes these key activities function and produce results. In turn the key activities are the load-bearing elements of a functioning structure. Organization design is, or should be, primarily concerned with the key activities; other purposes are secondary. ("New Templates for Today's Organizations", *Harvard Business Review On Management*, page 633)

The organization of the Washington Headquarters of the Department of Defense, especially the Office of the Secretary of Defense, violates this approach. Objectives and strategy, or missions, are not sufficiently reflected in any of the headquarters organizations. The organizational structures of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Military Departments are focused excessively on functional areas, such as manpower, research and development, and policy. Within the functional offices of these organizations, there may be officials who worry about missions, but they do so only from the narrow perspective of a single function.

The functional structure across the Washington Headquarters of DoD leads to a focus on business management and not on major missions and their objectives and strategy. There are benefits to this business management orientation. DoD can integrate on a functional basis across major organizational lines. For example, manpower planning can be done on a department-wide basis. Yet, business management efforts are, in Drucker's terms, "secondary" activities. While these secondary activities continue to be needed in DoD, they have come to assume the role of key activities by displacing a sharp focus on mission needs.

Lost in the functional diffusion of the current DoD organization is a focus on the central strategic objectives and missions of DoD. (As identified in this study, DoD has six major missions: nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, defense of East Asia, defense of Southwest Asia, maritime superiority, and power projection superiority.) This focus must be provided in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The deficiencies of OSD's functional structure are well documented in Chapter 3 and will not be repeated here. However, Peter F. Drucker's summation of the problems of a functional structure puts the issue into perspective:

> ...The functional principle [of organizational design], for instance, has great clarity and high economy, and it makes it easy to understand one's own task. But even in the small busi-

> ness it tends to direct vision away from results and toward efforts, to obscure the organization's goals, and to sub-optimize decisions. It has high stability but little adaptability. It perpetuates and develops technical and functional skills, that is, middle managers, but it resists new ideas and inhibits top-management development and vision. ("New Templates for Today's Organizations", page 631)

These deficiencies of the functional structure are reflected in the organizational problems of DoD, especially OSD. The functional structure serves to:

- ○ *direct vision away from results and towards efforts* —DoD is focused on inputs and not outputs;
- ○ *obscure the organization's goals* —strategic goals and missions are not the focus of organizational activity within the Washington Headquarters of DoD;
- ○ *sub-optimize decisions* —decisions in DoD are dominated by Service and functional perspectives and not by benefits to the goals of the entire organization;
- ○ *limit adaptability* —changes in the nature of warfare and the external environment, primarily the threat, are slow to be reflected in organizational activity;
- ○ *develop functional and technical skills* —DoD has built great expertise in these areas, yet there is a lack of a strategic context for the effective application of these skills; and
- ○ *resist new ideas and inhibit top-management development and vision* —DoD is unable to conduct effective strategic planning, to clearly articulate strategic goals and concepts, to establish resource priorities, and to adapt readily to changing requirements and concepts.

While the functional structure of DoD results in many shortcomings in organizational performance, its major deficiency is that it inhibits the integration of Service capabilities along mission lines, termed "mission integration" in this study. As mission integration is the principal organizational goal of DoD, the predominant functional structure is a major problem.

This problem theme does not suggest that certain portions of DoD organizations should not focus on functions. They will need to do so. The problem arises because they are now excessively focused on functions and are nearly ignoring missions. A more appropriate organizational balance between functional and mission orientations is needed.

2. Imbalance of Service Versus Joint Interests

The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of the National Security Act of 1947 stated:

> In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval avia-

> tion and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

In many respects, the intent of the Congress has not been fulfilled, particularly with respect to providing for "authoritative coordination and unified direction", for "effective strategic direction," and for "integration [of the armed forces] into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces."

The failure to implement this policy results from the inability to strike an appropriate balance between Service and joint interests in DoD decision-making. The Services have been able to maintain overwhelming independence and influence. In his book, *Reappraising Defense Organization*, Archie D. Barrett cites one of the significant organizational problems of DoD as

> The overwhelming influence of the four services. The deference accorded their positions on defense issues as a result of the present organization is completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities—in essence, organizing, training, and equipping forces for the combatant commanders. (pages xix and xx)

Barrett supports this conclusion as follows:

> ...In effect, the services have co-opted the joint structure through the dual roles of the service chiefs, overweening influence on the Joint Staff, participation in CINC [Commander in Chief of a unified or specified command] selection, and predominant control over the component commands.
>
> ...the military input into decisionmaking, whether through service secretaries, the JCS, Joint Staff, CINCs, or components, is predominantly service-oriented. On a broad range of contentious issues, military advice from a national perspective is unavailable to civilian decisionmakers who are forced to provide this perspective themselves, whether or not they are qualified to do so. (pages 79 and 80)

The Chairman's Special Study Group reached a similar conclusion:

> The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of Service independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the Services too much, and the larger needs of the nation's defenses too little. The military organizations given the responsibility for the planning and execution of Joint activities —notably the JCS, the Joint Staff and its subordinate agencies such as the Joint Deployment Agency, and the various Unified Command headquarters —simply do not have the authority, stature, trained personnel, or support needed to carry out their jobs effectively. (page 54)

Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger cites the same imbalance:

> The net effect of the structure that we created in the postwar period was that the balance was tipped toward a preservation of existing institutional [Service] interests and against the efficient design of forces or execution of war plans. (Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearings, Part 5, page 187)

Ambassador Robert W. Komer found the same imbalance in strategy formulation and resource allocation:

> ...The fact of the matter is that the historical independence and political strength of the services is inconsistent with the goal of coherent unified strategy with clear priorities and better translation of those priorities into resource allocations. Because the JCS system is service-dominated at the expense of any joint perspective, bureaucratic politics has greater influence on JCS and Service planning than systematic strategic thinking. ("Strategymaking in DoD," page 24)

Samuel P. Huntington terms the predominant influence of Service interests as "servicism" which he cites as "the central malady of the American military establishment." ("Defense Organization and Military Strategy", *The Public Interest*, Number 75, Spring 1984, page 24) Huntington discusses "servicism" in the following terms:

> ...the individual services *per se* were not supposed to fight wars, to make strategy, or to determine overall force structure. In fact, they continued to exercise a prevailing influence in each of these areas. Instead of developing a system for coherent central strategic planning, the Joint Chiefs continued to give priority to their role as spokesmen for their services, and Joint Staff officers bargain among themselves, each trying to get the most for his service. Instead of rational choices of programs and weapons most needed to serve national purposes, such choices are still largely determined by service needs and service interests, resulting in duplication of some programs, misallocation of resources to others, and, most important, neglect of still others. Instead of the unified command of combat forces, command is often fragmented and the unified commanders (CINCs) almost always find their authority over their forces second to that of the services that supplied those forces. (pages 23 and 24)

To which, he adds:

> ...servicism is the doctrine or system that exalts the individual military service and accords it primacy in the military establishment. The individual military services are and will remain indispensable elements in that establishment. Service interests, service needs, and service power, however, have dominated U.S. defense structure, warping and frustrating efforts to establish rational systems of strategic planning, force development, and combat command. The result is, inevitably, an undesirable weakening of the collective military contribution in these areas. (page 45)

The predominance of Service influence finds expression in organizational deficiencies in DoD. The Services are able to dominate joint organizations, both those in Washington and in the field. Correcting these organizational imbalances will substantially enhance effective strategic direction and mission integration. Yet, the problem is more deep-seated than can be corrected by mere organizational realignments. The core of this problem is the basic attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps. As long as the vast majority of military officers at all levels gives highest priority to the interests of their Service or branch while losing sight of broader and more important national security needs—and believes that their behavior is correct—the predominance of Service influence will remain a problem. Whatever changes are made at the top of the DoD organization, powerful resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their Services.

This fact is presented here not to argue against organizational realignments which are obviously needed. The utility of this observation is that it is a clear indication that organizational realignments, by themselves, will not be sufficient. They will need to be augmented by major changes in the education and training of military officers of all Services. The objective of these changes should be to produce military officers with a greater commitment to national (instead of Service) security requirements, a genuine multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of the other Services.

The imbalance between Service and joint interests also is a major cause of another imbalance: between modernization and readiness. For the most part, the Washington Headquarters of the Services are focused on future requirements and the modernization of their equipment. The constituency for readiness is the operational commands which are among the joint organizations whose interests are under-represented in senior decision-making councils. The operational commands are the organizations that worry about warfighting or crisis response capabilities today and tomorrow.

The needs of the operational commands are not well represented in the Pentagon. Their geographic separation from Washington makes it impossible for them to exert a continuing influence on decisions. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —which is expected to articulate their needs —is dominated by the modernization-oriented Services. Moreover, the unified commands must work through their Service component commands on resource issues. These component commands are generally attuned to the resource allocation priorities of the Washington Headquarters of their Services. In addition, the links between the operational commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are weak. Even if these links were stronger, the functional organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense does not provide natural allies for operational commanders on the full spectrum of their resource needs.

As a result, those organizations that are modernization-oriented are over-represented in Pentagon decision councils, and those that are readiness-oriented are under-represented. U.S. defense efforts have been continually plagued by the resulting modernization—readiness imbalance.

3. INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING

In *Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action*, Lawrence and Lorsch state:

> ...effective organizations confront internal conflicts, rather than smoothing them over... (page 14)

By this yardstick, DoD is not an effective organization. The Services have developed a strong inclination to smooth over internal conflict. This smoothing over is accomplished by inter-Service logrolling. In this context, logrolling means the practice of the Services to submerge divergent views on the important issues for mutual parochial gain. This practice has been referred to as backscratching, marriage agreements, negotiated treaties, and truces. The following quote from General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired), previously cited in Chapter 4, provides evidence of inter-Service logrolling. In commenting on the imbalance of Service and joint interests and the JCS desire for unanimity, General Jones stated:

> It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in "negotiated treaties" which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests. Such a "truce" has its good points, for it is counterproductive for the services to attack each other. But the lack of adequate questioning by military professionals results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in our defense capabilities. What is lacking is a counterbalancing system, involving officers not so beholden to their services, who can objectively examine strategy, roles, missions, weapons systems, war planning and other contentious issues to offset the influence of the individual services. (Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 22)

This point of view clashes sharply with the long-standing criticism of destructive and disruptive "inter-Service rivalry." For the most part, this intense rivalry was the mark of an earlier era — roughly the 20 years following World War II. However, since about the third or fourth year (1963 or 1964) of Secretary McNamara's tenure, "inter-Service logrolling" has been the order of the day.

The intensity of the postwar rivalry among the Services was so great that its continued existence has been assumed. It is true that inter-Service hostility, secretiveness, jealousy, duplication, lack of understanding, and inconsistencies continue to exist. These are found at lower levels of organizational activity where they continue to undermine coordination and cooperation. However, on the central issues of concern to them, the Services logroll in order to provide a united front to the Secretary of Defense and other senior civilian authorities.

Lucas and Dawson comment on this profound change in DoD organizational politics:

> ...During the McNamara era, however, the defense secretariat [OSD] came to find itself confronted by a Joint Chiefs of Staff which had informally and tacitly moved to a stance of non-competition among themselves. Not that interservice con-

> flict disappeared; but it was muted when the services dealt with the Secretary of Defense, especially on those issues which General [Maxwell D.] Taylor called the "blue chip" ones. (*The Organizational Politics of Defense*, page 108)

The impact of this change, in Lucas and Dawson's view, was to shift the focus of organizational conflict:

> ...Interservice conflict —adjudicated by OSD —was largely supplanted by civil-military conflict. The center of gravity of defense decision-making was so decisively changed that the dominant form of organizational conflict was between the defense managers and the military services, instead of interservice rivalry. (page 98)

This change in the pattern of organizational conflict resulted from the development of expertise in OSD to challenge Service positions. Prior to 1961, OSD relied on the natural competition among the Services as the source of information to pick and choose between alternatives. The development of independent expertise in OSD, coupled with forceful management by Secretary McNamara, "created a military consensus that rested on log-rolling and on submerged differences." (*The Organizational Politics of Defense*, page 108)

Since 1961, independent expertise has remained an enduring feature of OSD. In response, the Services have continued to logroll on major issues and have forced OSD to assume the entire burden of challenging the policies and programs of any Military Department. The natural consequence has been a heightening of civil-military disagreement, an isolation of OSD, a loss of information critical to effective decision-making, and, most importantly, a political weakening of the Secretary of Defense and his OSD staff. The overall result of inter-Service logrolling has been a highly undesirable lessening of civilian control of the military.

The current system in many regards represents the worst of many possibilities. On critical issues, the Services logroll and deny the opportunity for effective decision-making. On lesser issues, the Services remain determined rivals and preclude the degree of cooperation and coordination necessary to provide efficient and integrated fighting teams.

4. PREDOMINANCE OF PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

The overall performance of DoD suffers from the predominance in organizational activity of the programming and budgeting phases of the resource allocation process. The overly extensive focus on resource decisions leads to insufficient attention to other important responsibilities:

- strategic planning;
- operational matters, including the preparation and review of contingency plans; and
- execution of policy and resource decisions.

Combined with the deficiencies of the functional structure of DoD (which contribute to this problem), the predominance of programming and budgeting has inhibited the overall strategic direction of DoD. There is a lack of clarity of the strategic goals of DoD (which is addressed in detail in the following subsection).

The operational side of DoD is neglected in the rush to address resource issues. The Secretary of Defense pays insufficient attention to his chain of command responsibilities. Contingency plans, joint doctrine, joint training, and coalition issues are among the operational topics that receive insufficient attention. In *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, Edward N. Luttwak notes the poor performance of the operational chain in DoD:

> ...In peacetime, delusions of adequacy persist; but ever since Korea, each test of combat has revealed gross deformations in the making of strategy, in the absence of operational art, and in tactics made willfully clumsy. (page 64)

The underemphasis of operational matters is also reflected in the professional development of military officers. The development of leadership skills needed in wartime has been given relatively low priority in the resource-oriented Services. Instead, technical, managerial, and bureaucratic skills have been emphasized. The Army's *Professional Development of Officers Study* supports these assertions. The officer survey conducted as part of this study revealed the following critical perceptions of the current officer professional development system:

- 45 percent of general officers agree that senior Army leaders behave too much like corporate executives and not enough like warriors.
- 68 percent of all officers feel that only two-thirds or less of their peers would make good wartime leaders.
- 78 percent of all officers agree that the officer professional development system does not go far enough today in preparing officers for war and combat.
- All officers tend to agree that the weakest areas of officer preparation tend to be warfighting, leadership, and critical thinking skills.
- 49 percent of all officers agree that the bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today's Army.
- Company and field grade officers tend to agree that the promotion system does not reward those officers who have the seasoning and potential to be the best wartime leaders. (Professional Development of Officers Study Survey Results, pages 1, 2, and 9)

In *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, Edward N. Luttwak uses the term "the materialist bias" in discussing the predominance of programming and budgeting. He states:

> ...the pervasive materialist bias...distorts our entire approach to defense policy and military matters in general. With few exceptions (as when nuclear weapons are at issue), Pentagon officials, military chiefs, Congress, and the media all focus their attention on the measurable, material "inputs" that go into the upkeep and growth of the armed forces—i.e., the weapons and supplies, maintenance and construction, salaries and benefits. Spelled out in dollars and cents, these inputs are very important considering the federal budget and the entire relation-

> ship between the military establishment and the nation's economy. But the purpose of the armed forces is to make the nation secure and powerful, and for that it is the "outputs" of military strength that count....when it comes to military power, the relationship between material inputs and desired outputs is not proportional; it is in fact very loose, because the making of military strength is dominated by nonmaterial, quite intangible human factors, from the quality of national military strategy to the fighting morale of individual servicemen. (page 139)

5. LACK OF CLARITY OF STRATEGIC GOALS

In an organization as large as the Department of Defense, the clear articulation of overall strategic goals can play an important role in achieving a coordinated effort toward these goals by the various components and individuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhance unity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of this unifying mechanism through its failure to clarify its strategic goals.

In *The Organizational Politics of Defense*, William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson discuss the importance of organizational goals in enhancing organizational unity:

> At least two factors are particularly significant in limiting the degree to which an organization fragments into autonomous, confederated divisions: (1) the degree to which the members of the organization adhere to the basic organizational goals; and (2) the extent to which it is possible to put those organizational goals into practice. If the participants in the component units accept the organizational goals and the goals can be expressed in meaningful terms, then the sub-goals and specialized ideologies of the [military] departments will develop only until they appear to be detrimental to the basic goals of the organization itself. If these constraining factors are not present, the "centers of interest" [the Military Departments] may become so diverse that centrifugal forces are set in motion which rend the organization. (pages 11 and 12)

In this context, Lucas and Dawson note the importance of clarity of goals:

> ... If the organization's goals are clear and its members are committed to them, the ends-means connections of the various activities will be clear, and conflict and goal displacement will be relatively low. When the goals are ambiguous, however, there is great latitude for conflict and for sequential displacement of organizational goals by sub-ideologies, and sub-ideologies, in turn, by activity-decision rules [e.g., in Vietnam, these were number of aircraft sorties and the number and tonnage of bombs dropped]. And, concomitantly, it becomes more likely that the nature of that displacement will serve the varied self-interests of groups and individuals in the organizations. To the degree they have been unable to operationalize the common defense, members of the defense establishment then become engaged in the competitive pursuit of their own normative ac-

> tivities [those activities most central to the achievement of each Military Department's sub-ideology]. (page 16)

This is exactly what is happening in DoD. The vagueness of the strategic goals of DoD as a whole has led to their displacement by the sub-goals and sub-ideologies of the Services. The Services then compete to secure resources for programs that promote their subgoals. Yet, the ability of OSD and OJCS to decide between these competitive programs is hampered by the lack of clear goals and the accompanying lack of program yardsticks.

This goal displacement and program competition by the Services has taken the form of a "requirements approach." Lucas and Dawson discuss this approach as follows:

> The historical means by which programs have been defined to cope with national security needs has been by service statements of what they "require." This "requirements approach," as Bernard Brodie has called it, has been the operational manifestation of military sub-ideology. The services come to believe that their requirements are a reasonable minimum definition of what is adequate, and they press to have them fulfilled. Too frequently a service group will lose sight of the vague goal of security and fix instead upon the more concrete sub-goal of its requirements. They equate security with requirements, leading them to view the compromise of their requirements as the compromise of national security. (page 67)

The Services have continued the requirements approach, now stated in terms of 18 Army divisions, 600 Navy ships, and 40 Air Force wings. The relationship of these requirements to DoD strategic goals has been poorly developed, primarily because they were not derived from them. Their source is the sub-goals and sub-ideologies of each Service. Warner and Havens describe this phenomenon as a "means-ends inversion, the neglect of the claimed goals in favor of the means as ends in themselves." ("Goal Displacement and the Intangibility of Organizational Goals," page 541)

What makes this approach so difficult to counter in DoD is that Service leaders —both civilian and military —believe that their behavior is correct. Lucas and Dawson comment as follows:

> ...The departmental ideologies that result from specialized centers of interest, whether they are in industry or government bureaucracies, are powerful explanatory factors precisely because they lead men to believe in the correctness of their own behavior. Their actions might be ill-advised or short-sighted, but organizational conflict is often all the more intense because it is well-intentioned. (page 11)

In their book, *In Search of Excellence, Lessons from America's Best Run Companies*, Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr. list eight basic principles used by the best-run companies. One of these, which they term "simultaneous loose-tight properties", is applicable to the issue of unclear DoD goals. They describe this principle as follows:

> ...fostering a climate where there is dedication to the central values of the company combined with tolerance for all employees who accept those values. (unnumbered page)

In explanation of this principle, Peters and Waterman offer:

> ...The excellent companies are both centralized and decentralized. For the most part ... they have pushed autonomy down to the shop floor or product development team. On the other hand, they are fanatic centralists around the few core values they hold dear. (page 15)
>
> ...a remarkably tight—culturally driven/controlled—set of properties marks the excellent companies. Most have rigidly shared values. (page 320)
>
> ...when we look at McDonald's or virtually any of the excellent companies, we find that *autonomy is a product of discipline. The discipline (a few shared values) provides the framework.* (page 322)

In DoD, this principle cannot be applied due to a lack of shared values or goals. DoD is more difficult to manage because the strategic goals around which the department's officials could become "fanatic centralists" have not been clearly articulated. As a result, DoD cannot provide its components more autonomy because they seek to promote their own self-interested goals and values.

Nothing in this discussion is intended to imply that the clear articulation of strategic goals is an easy undertaking. The complexity of DoD's missions and the rapidity of change in the international security environment make the formulation of strategic goals extremely difficult. It is precisely for this reason that DoD must devote more attention to this vital task.

6. INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

Throughout history, military organizations —like all large organizations —have been noted for their resistance to change. A popular military maxim is:

> Any change, even for the better, is to be deprecated. (*Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, page 268)

Basil H. Liddell Hart cited the resistance to new ideas in the military profession:

> The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out. (*Thoughts on War*, v, 1944)

The U.S. military establishment shares the resistance to change innate in the military profession. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired) spoke of the resistance to change in the U.S. military establishment:

> By their very nature, large organizations have a built-in resistance to change. As the largest organization in the free world, our defense establishment —the Department of Defense —has most of the problems of a large corporation but lacks an easily calculated "bottom line" to force needed change. At the core are the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps: institu-

> tions that find it difficult to adapt to changing conditions because of understandable attachments to the past. The very foundation of each service rests on imbuing its members with pride in its missions, its doctrine and its customs and discipline —all of which are steeped in traditions. While these deep-seated service distinctions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, cultivating them engenders tendencies to look inward and to insulate the institutions against outside challenges.The history of our services includes striking examples of ideas and inventions whose time had come, but which were resisted because they did not fit into existing service concepts. The Navy kept building sailing ships long after the advent of steam power. Machine guns and tanks were developed in the United States, but our Army rejected them until long after they were accepted in Europe. The horse cavalry survived essentially unchanged right up until World War II despite evidence that its utility was greatly diminished decades earlier. Even Army Air Corps officers were required to wear spurs until the late 1930's. But the armed services are only part of the problem. The Defense Department has evolved into a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies —services, agencies, staffs, boards and committees —which embrace the past and adapt new technology to fit traditional missions and methods. There is no doubt that the cavalry leaders would have quickly adopted a horse which went farther and faster —a high-technology stallion. The result of this rigidity has been an ever-widening gap between the need to adapt to changing conditions and our ability to do so. (SASC Hearing, December 16, 1982, page 16)

In part, resistance to change in the U.S. military establishment can be attributed to inherent military conservatism. The Steadman Report comments on military conservatism:

> There is a natural tendency to be comfortable with what one understands and knows will operate and a natural skepticism to accept theoretical assertions of improvements. This tendency (pejoratively labeled by some "fighting the last war over again") needs to be challenged more often, but challenges are difficult within the existing system which provides many avenues for delay. (pages 55 and 56)

As the Steadman Report suggests, this tendency in the Department of Defense is magnified by systemic problems. Key among these systemic problems are (1) the bureaucratic agreements among the Services —the Key West Agreement on Service roles and missions, the Unified Command Plan, and JCS Publication 2 (*Unified Action Armed Forces*) being key examples —which are "off-limits" even when serious deficiencies are identified; (2) the predominant influence of the Services, particularly when compared to that of joint organizations; (3) inter-Service logrolling on critical issues; and (4) absolute Service control over promotions and assignments of all military officers, including those in joint duty billets. The result of these systemic problems is that DoD does not have effective mechanisms for change.

As this study documents, the Department of Defense suffers from numerous organizational and procedural deficiencies. Of major concern is the frequent inability of DoD to correct these deficiencies on its own. Despite substantial evidence of poor organizational performance, DoD expends its energies on defending the *status quo*. Citing inaction following the urgent appeals of senior military officers then on active duty —General David C. Jones, USAF and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN among others --for structural reform, Edward N. Luttwak concludes:

> ...such is the paralyzing effect of long-decayed military bureaucracies that even the widest consensus on the need for reform does not yield any substantial remedy. (*The Pentagon and the Art of War*, page 61)

Lawrence and Lorsch cite the "process of self-correcting and self-modifying" as making organizations "potentially such a flexible and powerful tool." (page 11) The absence of an effective process of self-correction and self-modification has resulted in an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures. In *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, Edward N. Luttwak notes the inability of DoD to reform itself:

> ...the path of self-reform, which a healthy institution would achieve informally by an entire pattern of disinterested [objective, non-parochial] decisions, is rigidly blocked. (page 43)

Related to the problem theme of insufficient mechanisms for change is the absence of useful feedback in many organizational activities of DoD. Effective management control is not possible without useful and timely feedback on actual operations and implementation of plans. In *Organization and Management*, Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig discuss the importance of feedback:

> Feedback is an essential ingredient in any control process. It provides the information for decisions that adjust the system. As plans are implemented, the system is tracked or monitored in order to ascertain whether or not performance is on target and whether objectives are being met. Feedback is usually obtained with reference to both the ends sought and the means designed to achieve them. (page 509)

Peter F. Drucker notes the importance of feedback to the decision-making process:

> A feedback has to be built into the decision to provide continuous testing, against actual events, of the expectations that underlie the decision. Few decisions work out the way they are intended to. Even the best decision usually runs into snags, unexpected obstacles, and all kinds of surprises. Even the most effective decision eventually becomes obsolete. Unless there is feedback from the results of a decision, it is unlikely to produce the desired results. (*Management*, page 480)

Feedback mechanisms in DoD are underdeveloped. This shortcoming denies DoD managers the information required to make necessary changes and adjustments to plans and programs. As a result, substantial deviations from desired performance remain uncorrected for extended periods.

While inadequate feedback reduces management control of the resource allocation process, it also precludes learning large lessons from poor organizational performance. Past mistakes—whether in the procurement of a weapon system or in the employment of forces during a crisis—often do not receive the critical review that would prevent them from recurring. The lessons go unlearned, and the mistakes are repeated. While there are other factors that contribute to this deficiency, inadequate feedback mechanisms play an important role.

While inadequate feedback results in part from the predominance of the forward-looking programming and budgeting processes, DoD has not established a tradition of comprehensive, critical evaluations of its performance in many areas. Internal investigations have traditionally failed to comprehensively and objectively assess the causes of deficient performance. Edward N. Luttwak notes the absence of critical evaluations in the context of the military failure in Vietnam:

> ...there was no agonizing reappraisal after Vietnam, no reform of any kind, let alone the drastic reform so obviously needed. (*The Pentagon and the Art of War*, page 42)

Obviously, these incomplete investigations have often sought to deflect public criticism from DoD and its programs and operations. They may have achieved this objective, but they have denied DoD the critical information which it needs to modify its plans and programs, management procedures, organizational structure, command relationships, and coordination and supervisory arrangements.

7. INADEQUATE QUALITY OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND JOINT DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL

Problems with the quality of personnel have been identified in political appointee positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretariats and in joint duty military positions, especially in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the staffs of the unified commanders. Political appointees are a problem because of their relative inexperience and high turnover rates as well as lengthy vacancies in appointed positions. These factors lead to extended periods of on-the-job training and poor continuity. The Senate shares some responsibility for the inadequate quality of political appointees because of its failure to establish more rigorous standards for presidential appointments.

Regarding joint duty military personnel, Hanson W. Baldwin made the following statement in 1949:

> One of the tragedies of unification is that there are not, at the top, men who really know enough about each of the services to evaluate all of those services. (*The New York Times*, October 16, 1949, page 34)

Unfortunately, this statement is nearly as true today as it was in 1949. DoD has given insufficient attention to the development of military officers capable of effectively performing joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in such assignments have been permitted to persist.

8. Failure To Clarify the Desired Division of Work

One of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency is to rationally divide the work among the various structural components. In *Organization and Management*, Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig discuss division of work (or division of labor) in the following terms:

> A basic concept of traditional management theory is to divide work into specialized tasks and to organize them into distinct departments. Departmentalization with a natural division of labor is emphasized. It is desirable to determine the necessary activities for the accomplishment of overall organizational objectives and then to divide these activities on a logical basis into departments that perform the specialized functions. The organization structure is the primary means for achieving the technical and economic advantages of specialization and division of labor. (pages 238 and 239)

Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, in *Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions*, discuss the principle of division of work in terms of organizational effectiveness and efficiency:

> ...The more an organization structure reflects a classification of the tasks or activities necessary to attain goals and assists in their coordination, and the more that roles are designed to fit the capabilities and motivations of people available to fill them, the more effective and efficient an organization structure will be. (page 411)
>
> ...The point of the principle [of division of work] is that the activities of an enterprise should be so divided and grouped as to contribute most effectively to objectives. (page 412)

Within DoD, the desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many instances; in others, the assigned division of work is ignored in practice. Congressional micro-management of defense programs and OSD micro-management of Service programs are key examples of this problem theme. Equally relevant is DoD's inability to objectively examine the Unified Command Plan and the Services' roles and missions. This inability precludes a more rational division of work among the operational commands in the first instance and among the Services in the second. In the context of civilian control of the military, there is also a lack of clarity on the division of work between civilian and military officials and organizations. As a last point, many organizations have encroached on the duties of OJCS; both OSD and the Services are performing roles assigned to OJCS.

9. Excessive Spans of Control and Absence of Effective Hierarchical Structures

At many levels of the Department of Defense, key managers have an excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. For example, the Secretary of Defense has 41 senior military and civilian officials (excluding the Deputy Secretary and his immediate staff) who report directly to him. Likewise, the Service Chiefs have unwieldy spans of control. The Army Chief of Staff has 42 officials reporting directly to him; the Chief of Naval Operations, 48 officials; the Air Force Chief of Staff, 35 officials; and the Marine Corps Commandant, 41 officials. As is noted in Chapter 3, an analysis of organizational needs in the Department of Defense suggests that smaller spans of control for senior civilian and military officials would enhance organizational performance. Effective management and coordination of excessive numbers of officials are not possible. As a result, organizational inefficiency is substantial.

In general, excessive spans of control in DoD result from the use of relatively flat organizational structures. Use of more orderly hierarchical structures may help to solve the problems of insufficient supervision and coordination.

At the same time, the existing hierarchy does not clearly define superior-subordinate relationships. This is most notable in the operational chain of command where considerable confusion exists over the actual authority of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. This problem is also found in the relationships between the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries. In discussing mistakes in organizing, Koontz and O'Donnell comment:

> The failure to clarify organization relationships, probably more than any other mistake, accounts for friction, politics, and inefficiencies. Since the authority and the responsibility for action are critical in organization, lack of clarity here means lack of knowledge of the part employees are to play on an enterprise team. (page 397)

10. INSUFFICIENT POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From the foregoing analyses of this chapter and of preceding chapters, it is evident that the actual power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not sufficient to enable him to effectively manage the Department of Defense. The problem arises not from his formal statutory authority which provides him a full measure of power. Instead, the problem emanates from powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own agendas has substantial weakened the office of Secretary of Defense. As a result, the Secretary lacks the tools, levers, and organizational channels that he needs to effectively manage the defense bureaucracy. Moreover, his efforts are seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military advice.

In his paper, "The Office of the Secretary of Defense With a Strengthened Joint Staff System," John G. Kester states:

> By statute, the Secretary enjoys "direction, authority and control" of all that goes on in the Defense Department. In reality, his authority is impinged upon from all sides —by the Congress, by other Executive Branch power centers, by the parochial subparts of the Department of Defense, sometimes even by some of his own appointees who busily pursue their own agendas. The Secretary, if he does his job, is likely often to be embattled constantly, and even if he does very little still is likely to feel he is less heading a department than sitting atop

> a centrifuge. His real authority is not as great as it seems, and his vast responsibilities are not in reality matched by commensurate powers. (pages 12 and 13)

Inherent in the system of checks and balances found in American government is the goal of preventing any one official from accumulating too much power. While this principle must be adhered to, it is legitimate to examine whether checks on the power of the Secretary of Defense have become so substantial as to make his management task extremely difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, it should be recognized that limiting the power of the Secretary of Defense —the President's deputy for military affairs —also limits the power of the President.

Circumscription of the powers of the Secretary of Defense are inherent in the form of American government. The Constitution provides that separate institutions share power. Other limitations are prescribed in statute. These limitations are not at issue. The Secretary of Defense must work within the national political process of which the Department of Defense is only a part. In this regard, the political skills of the Secretary will remain important. The problem arises because the Secretary's ability to exercise effective political power has been eroded by bureaucratic constraints and obstacles. Real authority in DoD has become so dispersed that the power of the Secretary is insufficient for him to effectively play his important political role.

Section 133(b) of title 10, United States Code, places vast responsibility on the Secretary of Defense:

> The Secretary is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to this title and section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401), he has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.

The Secretary's authority is not, however, commensurate with his statutory responsibility. The problem is not the Secretary's statutory authority. The Congress prescribed his authority in the strongest terms possible. The problem is the Secretary's insufficient political authority, primarily within the Department of Defense. As John C. Ries notes in *The Management of Defense*:

> ...Regardless of what the folklore of organization prescribes, leadership and control have a political rather than a statutory base. (page 200)

To which he adds:

> ...His [the Secretary of Defense's] control is as much (if not more) a function of his political powers as of his legal authority or hierarchical position. (page 203).

In *Organization and Management*, Kast and Rosenzweig comment on the importance of linking authority with responsibility:

> ...authority and responsibility should be directly linked; that is, if a subordinate is responsible for carrying out an activity, he should also be given the necessary authority....Authority is the means for integrating the activities of participants toward

> objectives and provides the basis for centralized direction and control. (page 239)

This study presents substantial evidence that there is an imbalance in the responsibility and authority of the Secretary of Defense. In many instances, bureaucratic constraints on the Secretary make him impotent in efforts to achieve needed changes and set new directions. The following give some appreciation for this problem:

- ○ *Congress* —The Congress continues to reinforce the divisions in DoD. In pursuit of local political interests, the Congress has given its support to the promotion of parochial Service interests. This perspective, combined with congressional micro-management, hinders the development of an integrated defense program. In addition, the substantial demands that the Congress makes on the time of the Secretary of Defense in reviewing near-term programs and problems precludes sufficient attention by the Secretary and other senior officials to the long-term strategic direction of the Department.
- ○ *OSD* —OSD is comprised of functional specialists who do not share the broader perspective of the Secretary of Defense. These officials are special pleaders for their functional areas and offer little assistance to the Secretary on the larger issues that confront him. Moreover, some OSD officials pursue separate agendas which is made possible by their independent political bases.
- ○ *JCS* —Rather than seeing themselves as principal assistants to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS have sought to secure a position of independence from him. They have logrolled on important issues and have normally provided the Secretary with only one course of action for consideration. In many respects, their ~~actions~~ have denied the Secretary information critical to effective decision-making. The JCS, moreover, have often served to insulate the Secretary from the operational commanders.
- ○ *Service Secretaries* —For the most part, the Service Secretaries have confined their role to being zealous advocates of Service interests. In this role, they have often undermined the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Much more could be stated in this regard, but the point has been made. The Secretary of Defense is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer him little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities.

Efforts to strengthen the political authority and management potential of the Secretary of Defense need not seek to preclude organizational conflict or provide for increased centralization. As Lucas and Dawson note:

> ...When policy choices are made, organizational conflict is inevitable. (*The Organizational Politics of Defense*, page 5)

In line with this reality, Ries concludes:

> ...On troublesome issues, where sharp differences occur among subordinates, no substitute exists for the consideration

> of opposing views, ably argued. The secretary [of defense] must be able to examine the proponents carefully, convince them he is familiar with the full consequences of the decision, is intolerant of superficiality, and is willing to use his political power, fully if necessary, in resolving the issue. (page 201)

Given their limited political power, Secretaries of Defense have more often than not sought to centralize key organizational activities in order to secure greater control. However, as long as the Secretary's authority remains limited and his allies within the system are few in number, overcentralization will have minimal benefits and numerous drawbacks. Only when bureaucratic constraints and obstacles are removed can the Secretary balance centralization and decentralization without losing control. On the whole, the recommendations of this study offer the potential for the Secretary of Defense to realize the advantages of decentralized management of many organizational activities. Key among these recommendations are:

- the shift of OSD's efforts away from functional micro-management of the Services and toward more effective mission integration and strategic planning;
- the formation of an institution —the Joint Military Advisory Council —capable of providing more useful and timely advice on critical issues, especially those that cross Service lines, which would lessen the time that the Secretary of Defense and OSD must devote to these issues;
- the clarification of the roles of the Service Secretaries which should enhance their effectiveness and contributions to DoD management;
- the strengthening of the stature, authority, and support of the unified commanders which should enhance warfighting capabilities and serve to emphasize operational matters;
- the creation of three mission-oriented under secretaries of defense to assist the Secretary of Defense in his mission integrator role; and
- the streamlining of the organizations of OSD and the Military Departments which will serve to broaden the responsibilities of subordinates and lessen demands on more senior officials.

C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

One obvious conclusion of this study is that the problems currently plaguing the Department of Defense have not just recently evolved. For the most part, they have been evident for much of this Century. This section seeks to show the long-term nature of current problems. It is important to understand the distant origin of these problems and the repeated failures to solve them.

The *Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* noted (in the third paragraph of the following quote) three changes in the organizational requirements of the U.S. military establishment that began to emerge at the start of the 20th Century:

> ...for nearly 150 years the President was the sole coordinator of the two [War and Navy] departments and the sole court for settling disputes.

During the 19th century this was a reasonable arrangement and not very burdensome. Army and Navy missions seldom overlapped, and, in the absence of instant communications, such problems as arose in the field had to be resolved in the field anyway. Moreover, the military Services, being relatively small organizations, except in time of war, caused no earth-shaking problems. The peace time Army never reached 30,000 men in the years before the Spanish-American War, and the peace time Navy stayed below 13,000, and the peace time Marine Corps below 4,000.

This situation gradually changed after the turn of the century. First, the emergence of the United States as a world power, accompanied by a deeper involvement in international problems, gave an increased importance to an effective joint military policy. At the same time, the technological revolution, particularly the development of the airplane as a military weapon, had a disturbing effect on the traditional missions of the Army and Navy. And finally, the constantly increasing responsibilities of the Chief Executive made the proposal to delegate the burden of coordinating the two military Services to a subordinate an ever more attractive one. (Appendix A, page 4)

Organizational arrangements to meet these new requirements have continuously proven to be flawed. The development of an effective joint military policy has not been possible because Service, rather than joint, interests continue to dominate. The Services have been unable to adjust traditional missions and develop cooperative approaches to keep pace with the evolution of warfare. Lastly, there has been continuing resistance to a forceful role for the President's deputy for military affairs —the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary's efforts to curtail the independence of the Services have too often been resisted, and he has frequently been viewed as an undesirable barrier between the Services and the Commander in Chief.

The Spanish-American War, particularly the Cuban campaign, demonstrated serious deficiencies in the performance of the U.S. military establishment in both operational and administrative areas. The utter failure of the Army and Navy to cooperate in Cuba was the forerunner of inter-Service bickering and uncoordination during World War II, the Vietnam War, the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the Iranian rescue mission, and the Grenada incursion to name a few. On the administrative side, during the Spanish-American War, there were no effective central organizations in the War and Navy Departments. The departmental bureaus, supported by their congressional interest groups, remained autonomous and independent of meaningful central direction.

During the 40-year period after the Spanish-American War, the topics of debate on the organization of the U.S. military establishment were remarkably similar to those of the last few years. Some of the topics included:

- *emphasis by military officers on technical skills rather than warfighting skills and strategic planning* —In *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Hammond relates Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's criticism of this misplaced emphasis:

> ...Mahan conceived the bureaus of the Navy to be oriented primarily to peaceful, civil, and routine functions, while naval operations were of a military character, and strategic planning, the essence of the military art. He thus repudiated the tendency of professional naval officers to stake out their profession by emphasizing highly technical skills. (page 53)

In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel P. Huntington uses the term "technicism" to describe the orientation of military officers to technical skills. He identifies the major organizational problem of the U.S. military establishment in the 20-year period leading up to World War I as "the struggle against technicism":

> ...The fundamental organizational problem for both the Army and Navy at the end of the nineteenth century was to provide an organ to perform the professional military function and to represent professional military interests. Inevitably solution of this problem required subordination of the technical-administrative units which played a major role in the structure of both services. (page 247)

○ *congressional undermining of central authority in the U.S. military establishment* —While the Spanish-American War clearly showed the problems of autonomous bureaus and weak and ineffective central organizations in the War and Navy Departments, the Congress, in pursuit of its own political interests, continued to oppose the creation of effective central authority in both departments. Hammond discusses this problem:

> ...Before World War I the major political effects of War and Navy Department organization were the pork barrel and other local advantages accruing from the location of military posts. In both services the agencies immediately concerned with the expenditure of military budgets on arms, armaments, and supplies were the technical bureaus. In both, they were thoroughly entrenched in power. They had the statutory authority to spend their moneys directly granted from Congress; and it was an observed pattern for them to maintain close and direct relations with key figures in Congress and to receive outright political help when attacked from within the executive branch. (page 8)

○ *centralization versus decentralization* —Efforts to provide for central direction and development within the War and Navy Departments were resisted by the bureaus and their congressional allies. For the most part, those who favored decentralization had the upper hand. Hammond notes this outcome and its consequences:

> The effect on both the Army and the Navy of this enforced administrative decentralization was not only to keep them fragmented as organizations, but to inhibit the development of a single general concept of their profession in terms of their national purpose. (page 9)

○ *absence of a national military strategy* —The efforts of the War and Navy Departments during this period were hampered by the absence of a national military strategy. While particularly critical of the absence of grand strategy for naval and national warfare, Admiral Mahan was able to provide the Navy with strategic doctrines. Hammond discusses the absence of a national military strategy in terms of its impact on the War Department:

> ...without defined strategic objectives, a national military policy of any coherency, or at least a general strategic doctrine such as the Navy had, strategic planning was virtually meaningless...(page 30)

Huntington also noted this problem during the same period:

> ...Frequently, the military men found themselves forced to work in a vacuum and to guess as to the nature of national policy. Such a situation tended to undermine either civilian control or national security, forcing the military men to make their own policy or give up any serious strategy planning. (*The Soldier and the State*, page 263)

- ○ *the division of civilian and military responsibilities* —As many of the preceding issues were debated, the question of appropriate civil and military roles also arose, particularly in the Navy Department. During the period from 1900 to 1930, Hammond notes the central role of this issue in the Navy:

  > ...At stake were fundamental questions concerning the administration of a military establishment: the role of civilian responsibility and of the professionals in the administration of the Navy Department. (page 53)

- ○ *General Staff* —While the Congress enacted the General Staff Act of 1903 providing a General Staff for the Army, congressional hostility to the concept of a General Staff remained substantial. While many Navy officers pressed for a General Staff for the Navy, the opposition was too great to create it. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels was one of the more outspoken opponents. According to Hammond, Secretary Daniels

  > ...regarded a General Staff not simply as unwise but as undemocratic and "un-American." (page 61)

This brief discussion of the organizational history of the U.S. military establishment serves two purposes: (1) it clearly shows the long-standing nature of current problems; and (2) it demonstrates the complexity of these issues which have remained unresolved despite the serious attention that they have received at regular intervals over the last 85 years. On the whole, the U.S. military establishment has not been able to adapt its organizational arrangements to keep abreast of the evolution of warfare which has required a greater integration of land, air, and sea capabilities. While President Eisenhower declared in 1958 that "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever," this fact has not been recognized in organizational and command arrangements or in inter-Service cooperation and coordination.

On the administrative side, the sharing of responsibilities between the Executive and Legislative Branches has caused many problems, often obscuring national defense needs. The legitimate role of central authority, whether civilian secretaries or General

Staffs, remains undecided. Powerful bureaucratic forces have continued successfully to press for decentralization (despite much evidence of the need for greater unified direction and control) in order to promote narrow interests and greater independence. The preoccupation with technical skills and material resources continues to plague the military establishment; strategy, operational planning, and command —the heart of the military profession —remain secondary concerns.

D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents conclusions and recommendations based upon the analyses in Sections B and C of this chapter. An effort has been made to avoid the repetition of conclusions and recommendations presented elsewhere in this study. The focus here is on broader judgments that could not be adequately developed in Chapters 2 through 9.

Conclusions	Recommendations
1. The functional structure of the Washington Headquarters organizations of DoD inhibits the integration of Service capabilities along mission lines which is the principal organization goal of DoD.	1A. Create mission-oriented organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
2. The power and influence of the Military Departments and Services are completely out of proportion to their statutorily assigned duties.	2A. Strengthen the authority, stature, and support of joint organizations, primarily the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or its succeeding organization) and the unified commands.
3. The basic attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps result in the unjustifiable emphasis on Service or branch interests; organizational realignments to correct the problem of undue Service influence will be insufficient without substantial alteration of officer corps attitudes and orientations.	3A. Change the system of military education, training, and assignments to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements, a genuine multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of the other Services.
4. The imbalance between Service and joint interests is a major cause of the imbalance between modernization and readiness.	4A. Strengthen the representation of the unified commanders in the resource allocation process.

Conclusions	Recommendations
5. The Services logroll on critical issues in order to provide a unified front when dealing with the Secretary of Defense; this logrolling has heightened civil-military disagreement, isolated OSD, denied information critical to effective decisionmaking, politically weakened the Secretary of Defense, and lessened civilian control of the military.	5A. Require that senior civilian authorities be informed of all legitimate alternatives.
6. The predominance of programming and budgeting in DoD organizational activity leads to insufficient attention to strategic planning, operational matters, and execution of policy and resource decisions.	6A. Diminish DoD's predominant focus on programming and budgeting.
7. The lack of clarity of strategic goals denies DoD an important unifying mechanism.	7A. Establish and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process.
8. The absence of sufficient mechanisms for change has denied DoD an effective process of self-correction and self-modification.	8A. Correct systemic problems that preclude the development of effective mechanisms for change and result in an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures.
9. DoD's feedback mechanisms are underdeveloped; moreover, DoD has not established a tradition of comprehensive, critical evaluations of its performance in many areas.	9A. Develop feedback mechanisms necessary for effective management control.

Conclusions	Recommendations
10. Despite his vast statutory authority, the power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not sufficient to enable him to effectively manage DoD; the Secretary is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities.	10A. Ensure that organizational and procedural changes enhance the management potential of the Secretary of Defense.
11. The conceptual, organizational, and procedural problems currently plaguing DoD—both on administrative and operational matters—are not new; they have been evident for most of the 20th Century.	

APPENDIX A

AGGREGATION OF PROBLEM AREAS INTO MAJOR PROBLEM THEMES

This appendix identifies the problem areas from Chapter 3 through 9 which were aggregated into the ten major problem themes. Some of the problem areas contributed to the identification of more than one theme.

1. IMBALANCE OF EMPHASIS ON FUNCTIONS VERSUS MISSIONS

This problem theme is based on three problem areas:

- limited mission integration of the overall defense effort (Chapter 3 —OSD);
- planning and programming are unilateral, not coalition, oriented (Chapter 3 —OSD); and
- failure of the PPBS to emphasize the output side of the defense program (Chapter 7 —PPBS).

2. IMBALANCE OF SERVICE VERSUS JOINT INTERESTS

This problem theme is based on nine problem areas:

- inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice (Chapter 4 —OJCS);
- weak authority of unified commanders over Service component commanders (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands);
- imbalance between the responsibilities and accountability of the unified commanders and their influence over resource decisions (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands);
- absence of unification below the level of the unified commander and his staff (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands);
- confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries (Chapter 6 —Military Departments);
- inability of the JCS system to make meaningful programmatic inputs (Chapter 7 —PPBS);
- lack of commonality of military equipment (Chapter 8 —Acquisition Process);
- weak management of, and general resistance to, joint programs (Chapter 8 —Acquisition Process); and
- congressional institutions and procedures reinforce divisions in DoD (Chapter 9 —Congressional Review and Oversight).

3. INTER-SERVICE LOGROLLING

This problem theme is based on two problem areas:

- inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice (Chapter 4 —OJCS); and

- inability of the JCS system to make meaningful programmatic inputs (Chapter 7 —PPBS).

4. PREDOMINANCE OF PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

This problem theme is based on seven problem areas:

- inadequate OSD review of non-nuclear contingency plans (Chapter 3 —OSD);
- insufficient OJCS review and oversight of contingency plans (Chapter 4 —OJCS);
- ineffective strategic planning (Chapter 7 —PPBS);
- insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints (Chapter 7 —PPBS);
- absence of realistic fiscal guidance (Chapter 7 —PPBS);
- insufficient assured connection between national military strategy and formulation of military requirements (Chapter 8 —Acquisition Process); and
- predominance of annual review cycles in the Congress (Chapter 9 —Congressional Review and Oversight).

5. LACK OF CLARITY OF STRATEGIC GOALS

This problem theme is based on two problem areas:

- ineffective strategic planning (Chapter 7 —PPBS); and
- insufficient assured connection between national military strategy and formulation of military requirements (Chapter 8 —Acquisition Process).

6. INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE

This problem theme is based on two problem areas:

- absence of an objective review of the Unified Command Plan (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands); and
- limited utility of the current assignment of Service roles and missions and absence of effective mechanisms for change (Chapter 6 —Military Departments).

In addition, one specific problem area was identified in the study relating to inadequate feedback:

- insufficient attention in the PPBS to execution oversight and control (Chapter 7 —PPBS).

There is, however, other evidence of this problem:

- the failure to honestly assess military operations during crises (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands); and
- the absence of links between contingency planning and the resource allocation process (Chapter 4 —OJCS).

7. INADEQUATE QUALITY OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES AND JOINT DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL

This problem theme is based on four problem areas:

- inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in senior levels of OSD (Chapter 3 —OSD);
- inadequate quality of the OJCS staff (Chapter 4 —OJCS);

- inexperienced political appointees and poor continuity in the Service Secretariats (Chapter 6 —Military Departments); and
- insufficient Senate review of presidential appointments (Chapter 9 —Congressional Review and Oversight).

8. FAILURE TO CLARIFY THE DESIRED DIVISION OF WORK

This problem theme is based on six problem areas:

- OSD micro-management of Service programs (Chapter 3 —OSD);
- absence of an objective review of the Unified Command Plan (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands);
- unnecessary micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command during crises (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands);
- limited utility of the current assignment of Service roles and missions and absence of effective mechanisms for change (Chapter 6 —Military Departments);
- fundamental problems with Congress that affect defense oversight (Chapter 9 —Congressional Review and Oversight); and
- congressional micro-management of defense programs (Chapter 9 —Congressional Review and Oversight).

9. EXCESSIVE SPANS OF CONTROL AND ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURES

This problem theme is based on four problem areas:

- many offices in OSD are neither adequately supervised nor coordinated (Chapter 3 —OSD);
- confused chain of command from the Commander in Chief to the operational commanders (Chapter 5 —Unified and Specified Commands);
- unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments (Chapter 6 —Military Departments); and
- lack of effective departmental coordination of acquisition (Chapter 8 —Acquisition Process).

10. INSUFFICIENT POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This problem theme is based on four problem areas:

- limited mission integration of the overall defense effort (Chapter 3 —OSD);
- inability of the JCS to provide useful and timely unified military advice (Chapter 4 —OJCS);
- confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries (Chapter 6 —Military Departments); and
- congressional institutions and procedures reinforce divisions in DoD (Chapter 9 —Congressional Review and Oversight).

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF THE VIEWS OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON THE STAFF STUDY

As had been their long-standing intention, Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn organized a group of distinguished military and civilian experts to review the staff analysis and to advise the Task Force on Defense Organization and the Armed Services Committee. This group of 15 experts met with nine Members of the Armed Services Committee on October 5–6, 1985 at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. This paper summarizes the major areas of consensus among the outside experts on the staff study. This summary was prepared by the staff based on the proceedings of the meetings. The individual participants did not review this summary.

There was complete agreement among the experts that U.S. military forces are more capable today than they were previously. There have been improvements in U.S. military capabilities. However, the experts believed that the future is likely to pose significant challenges and that Soviet capabilities have continued to improve as well. Further, the experts believed that progress against the capabilities of our adversaries should be the primary criteria of evaluation. There was a general belief that budget resources available to the Department of Defense have peaked and that the defense budget can be expected to remain static for the foreseeable future. Finally, international political developments and the changing nature of various threats present a more complex security challenge to the United States and its allies.

In view of this situation, the experts agreed there are major long-standing problems in the various organizations of the Department of Defense (DoD) and that changes should be made. It was noted that some improvements have occurred in recent years, but that additional changes are needed and would improve and strengthen U.S. military capability.

The group agreed that the fundamental analysis in the study was sound and accurately reflected the substantive problem areas in DoD. Several experts felt that some characterizations in the study were too sharp and should be modified or qualifying words added. This criticism was focused on the Executive Summary and Chapter 10 (Overview Analysis). The consensus was that the analysis in these two summary portions of the study was correct and that the points could be made while using less dogmatic wording. Appropriate changes in the Executive Summary and Chapter 10 (Overview Analysis) have been made in an effort to accommodate this criticism. As might be expected, not all participants agreed with all of the specific recommendations offered in the staff study. A few experts believed that there were no organizational changes needed and that any problems could be resolved simply by improvements in the quality of people in key positions, both military and civilian. The majority of experts agreed that better people would help, but that organizational changes would still be needed.

MISSION INTEGRATION

The concept of mission integration is a key issue in the study. The staff study argues that insufficient mission integration is a fundamental shortcoming in the current organizations and that improving mission integration should be a key criteria for evaluating changes. The study recommends several specific changes, especially in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to improve the focus of the work of the Department of Defense in carrying out its major missions.

Generally, the experts believed that the study properly emphasized the need for improved attention to missions in the Defense Department and that changes should occur to accomplish that goal. There was general agreement with the staff conclusions in this area. However, several experts were skeptical that the staff study's proposed creation of mission-oriented Under Secretaries in OSD was the best approach to solving this problem. They acknowledged the disproportionate emphasis on inputs and the lack of attention to outputs—or missions—of the Department. There was general agreement that the quality of those people appointed to positions in DoD should be improved and that they should serve longer. There was general agreement that OSD is engaged in a considerable degree of micro-management whereas the focus should be on broad policy. The experts generally agreed that future Secretaries of Defense should be free to structure their offices, but that the Committee should make recommendations in the areas needing improvements and outline options for making the improvements.

STRENGTHENING JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

The study notes that joint organizations currently are weak in DoD, with the Military Departments and Services continuing to exercise disproportionate power and influence over decisions within the Defense Department. The staff study recommends elimination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the creation of a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a Chairman and a four-star military officer from each Service on his last tour of duty. The study also recommends strengthening the authority of the unified commanders over their single-service component commands, giving them more of a voice in resource decisions, and strengthening their ability to promote greater unification within their commands.

The panel of experts generally agreed that the "joint perspective" is insufficient in the Defense Department today and that the joint perspective will be more important in the future. They generally agreed that there was an imbalance between Service interests and joint interests. The experts drew a distinction between the corporate written advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the informal advice provided to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Where the latter was believed to be quite timely and thoughtful, the corporate written advice of the Joint Chiefs, especially on matters of resource allocation and inter-Service disputes over roles and missions, was judged to be of much lower quality and value. The experts generally agreed that changes to current DoD organizations that strengthen the joint perspective and the quality of joint advice by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be a goal of reform.

The experts generally did not agree with the recommendation to disestablish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, they did agree with the substance of the staff analysis—that the JCS organization today is inadequate and should be changed. Generally, the experts felt that changes should be relatively modest and evolutionary and that the changes should generally strengthen the role and power of the Chairman. Of the specific suggestions offered during the meetings, the widest agreement centered on providing a deputy to the Chairman of the JCS, placing the Joint Staff directly and exclusively under the direction of the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman, and strengthening the Joint Staff by improving the joint duty assignment and promotion system.

The experts agreed that the unified commanders should be significantly strengthened, that they must have greater influence and authority in the Department of Defense, and that they should have stronger control over their subordinate organizations.

There was general agreement that there are too many layers of command bureaucracies which should be streamlined.

Finally, the experts generally agreed that changes in the JCS would have spin-off benefits for other areas of the Department of Defense that may obviate the need for more direct and specific changes in those organizations.

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The staff study argues that there is a continuing requirement for separate Military Departments. The study also argues that the Secretaries of the Military Departments can play an indispensable role in the management of the defense program, primarily in the areas of financial management and acquisition. The study also calls for removing the duplicative administrative layers that exist between the Service Chief and the Service Secretary and integrating as fully as possible those staffs into one to support both individuals.

The panel uniformly agreed on the continuing need for the Military Departments. The panel also indicated that some level of integration of the Service Chief's staff and the Service Secretary's staff could be beneficial although there was not agreement on the specific staff recommendations.

PREDOMINANCE OF PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

The experts agreed with the staff study that resource allocation issues exert a disproportionate influence in the day to day activity of the Defense Department. Participants generally believed that effective ways of dealing with the predominance of resource allocation issues must be a key component of reform.

NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The staff study does not specify which recommendations should be implemented through legislation and which should be left to the Department to implement through administrative channels. The panel of experts was not asked to make explicit comments or recommendations on this issue.

All experts felt that the legislative "underbrush" in Title 10 of the United States Code—the inconsistencies, anomalies and narrow prescriptions—should be removed.

ROLE OF THE CONGRESS

The experts concurred with the part of the staff study that noted the key role of the Congress in perpetuating flaws in defense oversight and the need for change in Congress in order to implement effectively reform in the Department of Defense.

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The outside experts were:

1. Former Senator Nicholas Brady (R-NJ)
2. Mr. William K. Brehm
3. Secretary Harold Brown
4. General Paul Gorman, USA (Retired)
5. Vice Admiral Thor Hanson, USN (Retired)
6. Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
7. General David C. Jones, USAF (Retired)
8. Mr. John G. Kester
9. Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN (Retired)
10. Mr. Robert Murray
11. Mr. Philip A. Odeen
12. Dr. Donald Rice
13. Secretary James R. Schlesinger
14. Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Retired)
15. Dr. Frank Vandiver

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